Reaffirming Strict EEO Timeliness and Narrow Equitable Tolling for Federal Employees: Commentary on Kucharczyk v. Steiner

I. Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Kucharczyk v. Steiner, No. 24-3082 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 2025), though formally non-precedential, is a detailed application of several recurring doctrines in federal employment discrimination law:

the strict 45–day deadline for federal employees to contact an EEO counselor under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act,
the narrow circumstances in which equitable tolling is available when a plaintiff alleges serious mental illness, and
the demanding standards for proving retaliation, particularly what counts as a “materially adverse action” and how to establish a causal link.

Plaintiff–Appellant Iwona Kucharczyk, a United States Postal Service (USPS) employee, sued the Postmaster General under:

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.), and
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.),

alleging (1) national origin discrimination, (2) failure to accommodate a disability, and (3) retaliation. The parties agreed to categorize the alleged adverse employment actions into 13 numbered “AAAs” (Adverse Actions Alleged).

On appeal, the plaintiff challenged only limited aspects of the district court’s summary judgment ruling:

Whether AAAs 1–6 were time-barred for failure to comply with the EEOC’s 45–day counseling requirement, and whether equitable tolling should apply to AAAs 1–3 given her mental health condition.
Whether the district court erred in dismissing her retaliation claims tied to AAAs 7–13—specifically, in finding AAAs 8, 11, 12, and 13 not “materially adverse,” and AAAs 7, 9, and 10 unsupported by evidence of causation.

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. The order does not create new law in a formal sense, but it usefully synthesizes and applies existing precedent on timeliness, equitable tolling, and retaliation in a federal employment context, particularly when mental illness is invoked to excuse untimely administrative action.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court (Chief Judge Livingston, and Judges Raggi and Park) reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, as is standard. The opinion addresses three main clusters of issues:

A. Timeliness and Exhaustion (AAAs 1–6)

Federal employees must consult an EEO counselor within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory act.
AAAs 1–3 occurred more than 45 days before the plaintiff’s first EEO contact on December 7, 2017. These were thus presumptively time-barred.
AAAs 4–6 were never raised to the EEO at all and were therefore unexhausted.
The plaintiff argued that AAAs 1–5 were “reasonably related” to a later, timely claim and should be allowed in despite untimeliness, but the Court held that these were discrete acts barred under National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
The Court further held that the plaintiff was not entitled to equitable tolling of the 45–day period for AAAs 1–3, despite her alleged mental illness, because the record showed she remained capable of managing written communications and filings during the relevant time.

The panel also affirmed (in a footnote) the dismissal of a related Rehabilitation Act claim concerning alleged failure to accommodate (AAAs 5–6), finding that USPS had actually attempted to engage in the interactive process and provide options, rather than refusing accommodation.

B. Retaliation Claims (AAAs 7–13)

The Court then turned to the retaliation claims:

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show:
1. protected activity,
2. employer awareness,
3. a materially adverse
4. a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.
AAAs 8, 11, and 12 were disciplinary or similar measures taken in accordance with USPS policy; without evidence of deviation or misuse, they did not rise to the level of “materially adverse actions.”
AAA 13 was described as “broad and vague harassment” and likewise did not qualify as a specific, materially adverse action under the law.
As to AAAs 7, 9, and 10, even assuming that they might be materially adverse, the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of causation—either via temporal proximity or other circumstantial or direct proof of retaliatory animus.

In short, the Court held that:

All claims based on AAAs 1–6 failed due to untimeliness, non-exhaustion, lack of entitlement to tolling, or lack of proof of failure to accommodate.
All retaliation claims based on AAAs 7–13 failed either on the “material adversity” prong (AAAs 8, 11, 12, 13; and AAA 6 to the extent framed as retaliation) or on the causation prong (AAAs 7, 9, 10, and 6).

Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for USPS in full.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The panel relies on a set of well-established precedents, which it applies in a fairly orthodox way. These are worth unpacking, as they frame the entire analysis.

1. Summary Judgment Standards

Rubens v. Mason, 527 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 2008)
Cited for the proposition that appellate review of summary judgment is de novo. The appellate court re-examines the legal questions without deference to the district court’s conclusions.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a)
Summary judgment must be granted if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007)
Cited for the definition of a “genuine issue”: whether the evidence, viewed in the non-movant’s favor, could allow a reasonable jury to find for that party.

2. Administrative Exhaustion and Timeliness for Federal Employees

Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2008)
Establishes that federal employees bringing Title VII claims must exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to EEOC regulations, including the 45–day counseling requirement.
Bruce v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 314 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2002)
Applies the same exhaustion framework to Rehabilitation Act claims, which generally borrow Title VII’s procedures for federal-sector discrimination claims.
Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345 (2d Cir. 2001)
Interprets the 45–day period as a limitations period for federal employees; claims based on conduct more than 45 days before EEO contact are typically time-barred.

3. “Reasonably Related” Claims and Discrete Acts

Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 1998), and Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2003)
These cases explain that claims not expressly raised in the EEOC charge can still be pursued in federal court if they are “reasonably related” to the EEOC charge—meaning they fall within the scope of the EEOC investigation that could reasonably be expected to follow the initial charge. Terry is particularly applicable to federal employees and the agency EEO process.
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002)
A crucial decision distinguishing:
- discrete acts (e.g., termination, demotion, denial of transfer) which must each be timely exhausted, and
- hostile work environment claims, which may involve a series of events, some of which pre-date the limitations period, so long as at least one act is timely and the acts form one unlawful practice.
The Court here follows Morgan to hold that AAAs 1–5 are discrete acts and not saved by being “related” to later timely claims.

4. Equitable Tolling and Mental Disability

Phillips v. Generations Family Health Center, 723 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013)
Establishes that equitable tolling decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2011)
Reiterates that equitable tolling is available only in “rare and exceptional circumstances.”
Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island Term Disability Plan, 288 F.3d 506 (2d Cir. 2002)
Places the burden of establishing tolling on the plaintiff.
Bolarinwa v. Williams, 593 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2010)
States the two-part test for equitable tolling:
1. The plaintiff must have pursued her rights diligently; and
2. Some extraordinary circumstance stood in her way and prevented timely filing.
In the mental health context, the disability must “severely impai[r]” the ability to comply with the deadline.
Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2000)
Emphasizes that whether mental disability justifies tolling is “highly case-specific.”

5. Retaliation: Prima Facie Case, Material Adversity, and Causation

Carr v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 76 F.4th 172 (2d Cir. 2023)
Provides a recent and authoritative summary of the elements of a prima facie retaliation case:
1. protected activity,
2. employer’s awareness,
3. materially adverse action(s),
4. causal connection between the protected activity and adverse action(s).
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)
Defines “materially adverse action” in the retaliation context as one that “might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” It also clarifies that the standard is objective.
Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2011)
Reaffirms that “material adversity” is measured objectively from the standpoint of a reasonable employee; “petty slights or minor annoyances” do not suffice.
Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Regional Transportation Authority, 743 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 2014)
Holds that reasonable enforcement of preexisting disciplinary policies, without more, does not ordinarily constitute a materially adverse action.
Duplan v. City of New York, 888 F.3d 612 (2d Cir. 2018)
Recognizes that reasonably related retaliation claims that arise during the pendency of an EEOC investigation or a timely filed federal action can be exempt from separate exhaustion, but plaintiffs must still prove the elements of retaliation, including causation.
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Gordon v. N.Y.C. Board of Education, 232 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000))
Describes two ways to prove causation:
1. Indirectly, through temporal proximity or other circumstantial evidence (e.g., differential treatment of similarly situated employees), or
2. Directly, through evidence of retaliatory animus, such as explicit statements or admissions.
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District, 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015)
Notes that under some circumstances, a gap of about two months between protected activity and the adverse action can support an inference of causation.
Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1990)
Holds that a roughly three–month gap, without other supporting evidence, is too attenuated to support a causal inference.

6. Waiver of Unargued Claims on Appeal

Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1998)
Applied to hold that the plaintiff waived her national origin discrimination claims by failing to adequately brief them on appeal.

B. Legal Reasoning: Step-by-Step

1. Timeliness, Exhaustion, and the 45–Day Rule (AAAs 1–6)

(a) The 45–Day EEO Counseling Requirement

Under EEOC regulations governing federal employees, a complainant must initiate EEO counseling within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory act. As the Court notes, this deadline functions like a statute of limitations (citing Fitzgerald and Mathirampuzha), and non-compliance generally bars the related claim.

In Kucharczyk:

AAAs 1–3 occurred more than 45 days before the plaintiff’s first contact with an EEO counselor on December 7, 2017.
Because the opinion explicitly identifies December 7, 2017, as the first EEO contact date, AAAs 1–3 are treated as untimely.
AAAs 4–6 were not raised to the EEO at all, and thus were not “exhausted” administratively.

The Court is applying the settled rule that each discrete act of alleged discrimination—such as denial of a transfer, disciplinary write-up, or other actionable event—triggers its own 45–day clock.

(b) “Reasonably Related” Claims and the Morgan Constraint

The plaintiff tried to salvage AAAs 1–5 by arguing that those acts were “reasonably related” to AAA 13, which the district court considered timely asserted. Under Brown and Terry, such “reasonably related” claims can sometimes be pursued even if not expressly articulated in the administrative charge.

However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan sharply limits this doctrine for discrete acts. The Second Circuit quotes Morgan to underscore the rule:

“[D]iscrete acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.” – 536 U.S. at 113.

Applying that principle, the panel holds:

Even if AAAs 1–5 were both:
1. raised administratively, and
2. “reasonably related” to a timely claim,
they would still not be actionable, because they are discrete acts occurring outside the 45–day period.

This is a clear reminder that “reasonable relatedness” does not rescue discrete acts that are themselves time-barred. Only continuing violations (like hostile work environment claims) can partially reach back beyond the limitations period if at least one component act is timely.

(c) No Entitlement to Equitable Tolling (AAAs 1–3)

The plaintiff argued that her serious mental illness during March–November 2017 warranted equitable tolling of the 45–day requirement for AAAs 1–3.

The Court reviews this issue under the abuse of discretion standard (Phillips) and applies the two-part Bolarinwa test, requiring:

Diligent pursuit of rights, and
An extraordinary circumstance that prevented timely filing, which in the context of mental illness means a severe impairment that made it practically impossible to comply with the deadline.

The plaintiff’s argument centered on the idea that her husband, rather than she herself, was responsible for submitting documents to her employer, her union, and the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs during the relevant period, suggesting she was too impaired to manage such filings herself.

The Court, however, closely examines the record:

Although her husband helped with the December 7, 2017 “Information for Pre-Complaint Counseling” form, he testified that:
- It was her decision to submit it, and
- They worked together to complete it.
There was no testimony that the husband alone handled all claims and correspondence from March to November 2017.
The plaintiff herself testified that she:
- typed and signed a note submitted to her employer on September 12, 2017, and
- signed other documents during the period in question.

From this, the Court concludes that:

“[N]otwithstanding her documented psychiatric condition, Kucharczyk remained capable of timely filing.”

Because equitable tolling requires a showing that the mental disability severely impaired her ability to meet the filing deadline despite reasonable diligence, the plaintiff’s evidence fell short. The Court therefore holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying tolling.

(d) Rehabilitation Act Accommodation Claims (AAAs 5–6)

Though the panel deals with this in a footnote, its reasoning is important for Rehabilitation Act practice. AAAs 5 and 6 related to the plaintiff’s request for a transfer as a reasonable accommodation. The record showed that:

After she requested a transfer, USPS informed her of multiple avenues:
- use of the eReassign portal,
- contacting her union, and
- submitting a formal reasonable accommodation request.
The District Reasonable Accommodation Committee (DRAC) contacted her to engage in the interactive process and provided instructions regarding reassignment procedures.

The Court emphasizes that:

“[T]he record demonstrates that USPS did not refuse to make a reasonable accommodation. … Thus, Kucharczyk has failed to adduce evidence supporting a finding that USPS refused to make a reasonable accommodation.”

In other words:

Engagement in the interactive process and provision of options for transfer/reassignment undermined any claim that USPS “refused” accommodation.
The plaintiff’s suggestion that these steps were retaliatory is unsupported by the record.

This underscores that under the Rehabilitation Act (like the ADA), what matters is whether the employer refused reasonable accommodation after being put on notice—not whether the plaintiff is fully satisfied with the pace or manner of the interactive process, absent evidence of obstruction or bad faith.

2. Retaliation Claims (AAAs 7–13)

(a) The Prima Facie Retaliation Standard

The Court quotes Carr to restate the elements a plaintiff must establish:

She engaged in protected activity.
The employer was aware of that activity.
She was subjected to a materially adverse
A causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action(s).

Here, the relevant protected activities were the plaintiff’s:

December 7, 2017 EEO Pre-Complaint Counseling request, and
March 2018 formal EEO complaint.

The later AAAs (7–13) occurred in May and June 2018. The Court analyzes both whether these acts are materially adverse and whether there is sufficient causation.

(b) What Is a “Materially Adverse” Action?

Applying Burlington Northern and Tepperwien, the Court reiterates:

A materially adverse action is one that might have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge.”
The standard is objective; the question is not how the particular plaintiff felt, but what a reasonable employee would think.
“Petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience” do not qualify.

The panel also invokes Rivera to emphasize that reasonable enforcement of preexisting disciplinary rules—without evidence they are being selectively or harshly imposed in retaliation—does not generally constitute a materially adverse action.

(c) Application to AAAs 8, 11, 12, and 13

The Court concludes that:

AAAs 8, 11, and 12 – These involved disciplinary or other employment actions that were taken:
- according to USPS policies, and
- without evidence of deviation from normal procedures or unusual severity.
The Court holds that, “without more,” no reasonable jury could find that these were materially adverse enough to dissuade a reasonable worker from complaining.
AAA 13 – The plaintiff characterized this as harassment, but the Court describes it as “broad and vague,” insufficiently specific or severe to meet the materially adverse standard. Vague allegations of feeling harassed, without particularized facts, often fail in this way.

Consequently, AAAs 8, 11, 12, and 13 cannot serve as the basis for a retaliation claim because they fail the third prong of the prima facie test.

(d) Application to AAAs 7, 9, and 10: Causation

As to AAAs 7, 9, and 10, the Court accepts that they might be adverse enough to matter, but focuses on the causation element.

Under Littlejohn and Gordon, causation can be shown:

Indirectly – Often by temporal proximity (closeness in time) plus other circumstantial indicators, such as:
- similarly situated employees who did not complain but were treated better,
- sudden escalation in discipline immediately after a complaint, etc.
Directly – Through explicit statements or other direct evidence of retaliatory animus.

The Court holds:

The plaintiff offered no direct evidence of retaliatory motive.
She also failed to offer sufficient circumstantial evidence to allow a reasonable jury to infer retaliation.

The timing question is subtle. The panel notes:

AAAs 7, 9, and 10 occurred in May and June 2018.
The plaintiff’s protected activities (pre-complaint counseling and formal EEO complaint) occurred in December 2017 and March 2018.

The Court recognizes that:

In some cases, a two-month gap has been held sufficient to support an inference of causation (citing Vega), but
In other cases, an interval of roughly two to three months, without more, is deemed too attenuated (Hollander).

Because:

the plaintiff produced no additional circumstantial evidence (e.g., no evidence of change in treatment immediately after the complaint, no comparators, no suspect comments), and
no direct proof of retaliatory animus,

the Court concludes that the plaintiff failed to make out even a prima facie showing of causal connection for AAAs 7, 9, and 10.

The panel applies the same reasoning to AAA 6, which the plaintiff tried to recast on appeal as retaliation for the December 7, 2017 pre-complaint counseling:

Even if AAA 6 were deemed “reasonably related” and thus excused from separate exhaustion under Duplan,
the plaintiff still needed to prove causation—and she did not.

Thus, all retaliation theories tied to AAAs 6–13 fail on either the “material adverse action” or “causation” elements.

C. Impact and Significance

Although this is a summary order with no formal precedential effect (as the opening caption emphasizes), it is nonetheless significant for practitioners for several reasons.

1. Reaffirmation of Strict Timeliness Requirements for Federal Employees

The decision reinforces a well-established but frequently contested principle:

The 45–day EEO counseling deadline for federal-sector Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims is applied strictly.
Discrete alleged wrongs—clock-in/clock-out disputes, disciplinary actions, denials of leave or transfer—must be brought to an EEO counselor within 45 days or they are usually lost.
Attempts to recast older discrete acts as part of a later “reasonably related” claim will generally be thwarted by Morgan.

For federal employees and their counsel, this is a cautionary reminder: delay is costly. Administrative deadlines are not aspirational; they are enforcement barriers.

2. High Bar for Equitable Tolling Based on Mental Illness

The order underscores that the Second Circuit’s approach to mental-health-based equitable tolling is strict:

Mental illness alone—even serious psychiatric conditions—does not automatically trigger tolling.
The key factual question is functional capacity:
- Did the plaintiff retain the ability to make decisions, sign documents, seek benefits, or engage in other administrative processes during the relevant period?
If evidence shows that the plaintiff managed to:
- correspond with the employer,
- submit workers’ compensation claims,
- involve a union, or
- prepare written communications,
courts are likely to find that she could have initiated EEO counseling as well, absent persuasive evidence to the contrary.

This case, applying Bolarinwa and Boos, confirms that equitable tolling remains reserved for truly extraordinary circumstances where the plaintiff’s condition essentially disabled her from acting at all with respect to her legal rights, despite diligence.

3. Discipline Versus Retaliation: The “Materially Adverse” Threshold

The Court’s discussion of AAAs 8, 11, and 12 illustrates the continuing impact of Burlington Northern:

Not every disciplinary action following protected activity is retaliatory.
When discipline is:
- consistent with preexisting policies, and
- applied in a reasonable, non-exceptional way,
it is unlikely to qualify as “materially adverse.”

This provides a measure of comfort to employers who enforce discipline post-complaint, provided:

the rules are consistently applied, and
the record shows no pretext or selective targeting.

For employees, it reinforces the need to show that post-complaint discipline is:

unusually harsh,
out of line with typical practices, or
linked to other signs of retaliatory intent.

4. Temporal Proximity Alone Rarely Suffices Without Context

By juxtaposing Vega and Hollander, the Court sends a clear message: temporal proximity is a context-dependent indicator:

A short gap (around two months) can support an inference of causation—but only where the surrounding facts suggest something suspicious or unusual.
Similar or slightly longer gaps may be viewed as too attenuated if the record is otherwise bare of circumstantial or direct evidence of retaliatory motive.

Here, because the plaintiff offered nothing beyond timing, and the timing itself was not immediately proximate, the Court found causation lacking even at the prima facie stage.

5. Rehabilitation Act: Interactive Process as a Shield

The treatment of the DRAC’s involvement confirms a recurring pattern in disability cases:

If an employer:
- responds to an accommodation request,
- offers multiple avenues to consider (e.g., internal transfer systems, union channels), and
- engages in an interactive dialogue,
it will be difficult for a plaintiff to prove “failure to accommodate” absent evidence that the employer ultimately refused any reasonable option.

The Court’s conclusion that the record showed no refusal to accommodate indicates that employers who document their interactive efforts can effectively defend against Rehabilitation Act claims.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies”

In the federal employment context, “exhaustion” means:

Before going to federal court, an employee must:
1. contact an EEO counselor, and
2. follow the agency’s internal EEO complaint process.
Only after these steps are completed (or appropriately initiated and then concluded) can the employee sue in federal court.

If an employee fails to include an alleged act in the EEO process (or fails to timely raise it), she usually cannot later base a lawsuit on that act—unless it is “reasonably related” to what was raised and falls within certain limited categories recognized by the courts.

2. “Equitable Tolling”

Equitable tolling is a kind of judicial “forgiveness” for missing a filing deadline. Courts may extend a deadline when:

the plaintiff has tried hard to pursue her rights, and
an extraordinary circumstance—such as severe illness, fraud, or a complete misrepresentation by an official—prevented her from filing on time.

In mental health cases, the question is:

Was the plaintiff’s condition so severe that she could not realistically comprehend or act on her legal rights, even with reasonable effort?

If the record shows that the plaintiff continued to handle paperwork, pursue benefits, or correspond with others about work issues, courts are reluctant to say she was too impaired to pursue EEO remedies at the same time.

3. “Discrete Acts” vs. “Continuing Violations”

A discrete act is a specific, identifiable event:

e.g., denial of a promotion, issuance of a formal reprimand, termination, or a specific refusal to accommodate.

A continuing violation (often in a hostile work environment claim) involves:

many smaller actions that collectively create an unlawful atmosphere, some of which may be individually innocuous.

Under Morgan:

Each discrete act must be filed on time; you cannot “reach back” to revive it just because it is related to later acts.
In a continuing violation, at least one act must fall inside the limitations period, but then the court may look at related older acts as part of the same pattern.

4. “Materially Adverse Action” in Retaliation Cases

Not every unpleasant workplace experience is legally significant. A “materially adverse action” is:

something serious enough that it would likely stop a reasonable person from making or supporting a discrimination complaint.

Examples that may qualify include:

termination or suspension,
significant reduction in duties or pay,
undesirable reassignment with substantially worse conditions,
pattern of unwarranted disciplinary actions far beyond normal practice.

Examples that often do not qualify:

trivial criticisms,
isolated rude comments,
ordinary enforcement of workplace rules,
minor schedule changes with no major effect.

5. “Causal Connection” and Temporal Proximity

To show that an adverse action was taken “because of” the protected activity, a plaintiff often uses:

Temporal proximity: the closer in time the action follows the complaint, the more plausible a retaliatory link—especially if the employer’s behavior changes noticeably after the complaint.
Circumstantial evidence: showing that similarly situated employees who didn’t complain were treated better, or that the employer’s stated reasons are pretextual.
Direct evidence: e.g., a supervisor saying, “You’re being written up because you went to EEO.”

Standing alone, a gap of several months, without additional supporting evidence, is usually not enough to establish causation.

V. Conclusion

Kucharczyk v. Steiner offers a tightly reasoned application of settled principles in federal employment discrimination law, particularly in the context of:

the federal-sector EEO exhaustion and timeliness regime,
equitable tolling grounded in mental illness, and
the demanding standards for proving retaliation—material adversity and causation.

Key takeaways include:

Strict Enforcement of the 45–Day Rule
Federal employees must act quickly; discrete discriminatory acts must be raised with an EEO counselor within 45 days, or they are commonly lost. “Reasonably related” doctrine does not revive untimely discrete acts after Morgan.
Equitable Tolling Is Exceptional, Even in Mental Health Cases
The burden is on the plaintiff to show that a mental condition severely impaired her ability to pursue her rights, despite diligence. Evidence that the plaintiff continued to handle other paperwork and communications strongly undermines tolling claims.
Rehabilitation Act: Participation in Interactive Process Counsels Against Liability
Where an employer provides guidance on available options and engages an accommodation committee, courts are disinclined to find “failure to accommodate” absent a clear refusal of any reasonable accommodation.
Not All Discipline Is Retaliation
Disciplinary actions that conform to established policies and are reasonable in their application typically do not qualify as “materially adverse” for retaliation purposes, absent additional evidence of retaliatory misuse or unusually harsh treatment.
Temporal Proximity Needs Context
While a short interval between protected activity and adverse action can be relevant, it is rarely dispositive by itself. Plaintiffs must supplement timing with concrete evidence of retaliatory animus or pretext.

Although this decision is a non-precedential summary order, it is highly instructive. It reaffirms the Second Circuit’s commitment to:

enforcing administrative deadlines,
limiting equitable tolling to truly extraordinary circumstances, and
maintaining a high bar for retaliation claims where the record shows little beyond routine policy enforcement and modest temporal proximity.

Practitioners on both sides of the “v.” can draw from Kucharczyk practical guidance on building (or defending against) claims involving mental-health-based tolling arguments, allegedly retaliatory discipline, and the evidentiary burden necessary to survive summary judgment in federal-sector Title VII and Rehabilitation Act litigation.