Reaffirming Strickland’s “Reasonable Probability” Standard in Competency-Related Counsel Claims

Introduction

William Payne v. Secretary, Department of Corrections is an Eleventh Circuit decision handed down on March 4, 2025, that clarifies the proper application of the Strickland v. Washington prejudice standard when a habeas petitioner alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and pursue a competency hearing. William Payne, a Florida inmate convicted of trespass, criminal mischief, and possession of burglary tools, filed a §2254 petition claiming his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance was violated because counsel did not question his competency to stand trial. The district court denied relief; on appeal, Payne argued the state court unreasonably applied a heightened Florida‐law standard rather than Strickland’s “reasonable probability” test. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that (1) the state court did misapply a more onerous prejudice standard derived from Florida precedent, but (2) even under de novo review of the correct Strickland standard, Payne could not show a reasonable probability he would have been found incompetent or that the outcome would have differed.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Payne’s Petition: Payne contended counsel should have pursued a competency evaluation and hearing before his June 2009 trial.

2. State‐Court Ruling: The Florida post‐conviction court and appellate division applied a “clear and convincing proof” standard drawn from Thompson v. State (88 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)), requiring proof of a “real, substantial, and legitimate doubt” about competency rather than showing a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

3. AEDPA Review: The Eleventh Circuit held that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the state court’s use of Thompson’s heightened test was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington’s prejudice prong.

4. De Novo Analysis: Even applying the correct Strickland standard—requiring a reasonable probability that Payne would have been found incompetent and the trial result would differ—the record did not support relief. Prior competency evaluations and Payne’s own courtroom comportment demonstrated he assisted counsel and did not meet the retrospective competence threshold.

5. Holding: Affirmation of the denial of habeas relief. State courts must apply Strickland’s “reasonable probability” test, but Payne failed to carry that burden.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – Established the two‐prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and resulting prejudice defined as a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome.
Thompson v. State, 88 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) – Florida precedent applying a “clear and convincing” standard for competency‐related IAC claims, requiring proof of a “real, substantial, and legitimate doubt” of competence.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) & Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 (2008) – AEDPA deference principles, holding that if Supreme Court precedent does not clearly address an issue, a state court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied “clearly established Federal law.”
Guardado v. Secretary, Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, 112 F.4th 958 (11th Cir. 2024) – Held that Florida courts unreasonably applied Strickland prejudice by using an “actual bias” test more demanding than the “reasonable probability” standard.
Calhoun v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison, 92 F.4th 1338 (11th Cir. 2024) – Reaffirmed that where a state court requires a more burdensome standard than Strickland, AEDPA deference is forfeited and the case must be reviewed de novo.
Wingo, 789 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015) – Confirmed that retrospective competency determinations are permissible when there is sufficient contemporaneous evidence to ensure the inquiry is more than mere speculation.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s analysis proceeded in two steps:

AEDPA Deference & Unreasonable Application: Under § 2254(d), a federal court must give state‐court rulings the benefit of the doubt unless they contravene or unreasonably apply clearly established Federal law. The Florida courts in Payne had followed Thompson’s “clear and convincing” competence‐doubt test rather than Strickland’s “reasonable probability” standard for prejudice. Relying on Guardado and Calhoun, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that this was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland’s prejudice prong and therefore required de novo review.
De Novo Strickland Analysis: Under Strickland’s prejudice prong, Payne needed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to seek a competency hearing, (a) one would have been granted, (b) he would have been found incompetent at trial, and (c) the outcome of the trial would have been undermined.
- The record included a 2007 evaluation by Dr. Henry Dee in an unrelated case finding Payne “factually competent” but “harboring a delusion” about counsel. At a 2008 competency hearing, a Florida trial court had ruled him competent.
- During the 2009 trial in the instant case, Payne actively assisted counsel—reviewing transcripts, drafting communications, testifying coherently at a suppression hearing, and participating in voir dire.
- Post‐trial evaluations in late 2009 by Drs. Henley and Hartig diagnosed incompetence at that later period—but neither opined that Payne was incompetent during the June 2009 jury trial, and both noted Payne’s exaggeration of symptoms when unmedicated.
Because no expert ever concluded Payne was incompetent at the time of the trial, and because his courtroom behavior undermined a retrospective incompetence claim, Payne could not meet Strickland’s “reasonable probability” standard even on de novo review.

Impact

1. Clarification of Competency‐Related IAC Framework: Payne cements that any state‐court requirement of “clear and convincing” evidence of incompetence for ineffective‐assistance claims conflicts with Strickland’s more forgiving “reasonable probability” test. Lower courts in the Eleventh Circuit must now apply Strickland directly in competency contexts and cannot graft on a separate Florida competence‐doubt standard.

2. De Novo Competency Review in Federal Habeas: Where a state court employs a heightened burden in reviewing counsel’s failure to request a competency hearing, federal habeas courts will conduct de novo Strickland prejudice analysis, subjecting the entire record—including retrospective expert opinions and in‐court behavior—to fresh evaluation.

3. Limits of Retrospective Competency Claims: Though Wingo allows backward‐looking competency assessments, Payne illustrates the evidentiary hurdle petitioners face: absent an expert’s contemporaneous opinion of incompetence tied to the date of trial, and absent conduct so aberrant as to raise a “real doubt,” prejudice cannot be shown.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC): A constitutional claim under the Sixth Amendment asserting that defense counsel’s performance was so poor it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. To succeed, a petitioner must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
Strickland’s Two-Prong Test: 1) Performance: Counsel’s conduct must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 2) Prejudice: There must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would differ.
Competency to Stand Trial: A defendant is competent if he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings. Incompetence violates due process.
AEDPA Deference (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)): Federal habeas courts must defer to state‐court decisions unless they are contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law—or based on unreasonable fact‐finding.
Retrospective Competency Analysis: Even after trial, courts may review contemporaneous evidence (expert reports, behavior notes, in‐court testimony) to determine if a defendant was incompetent at the time of trial—provided the evidence suffices to move beyond speculation.

Conclusion

William Payne v. Secretary, Department of Corrections serves two critical functions in habeas jurisprudence. First, it underscores that Strickland’s “reasonable probability” standard governs all ineffective‐assistance claims—competency‐related or otherwise—and supersedes any state‐law requirement of “clear and convincing” competence doubt. Second, it reminds petitioners and courts that, even under de novo review, establishing prejudice in a competency‐failure claim demands solid evidence—ideally contemporaneous expert opinion or unmistakable indicators of unfitness at trial. Payne thus both broadens federal review where states impose unduly harsh tests and reaffirms the stringent evidentiary burden petitioners must meet to upset a criminal conviction on competency grounds.