Reaffirming Stacked Vulnerable‑Victim Enhancements and the Foreign‑Scheme Increase: Seventh Circuit’s Anders Dismissal in United States v. Ramos‑Soto

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Date: November 5, 2025

Disposition: Counsel’s Anders motion granted; appeal dismissed (nonprecedential).

Introduction

In this nonprecedential disposition, the Seventh Circuit granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders v. California and dismissed the appeal of Matthew Ramos‑Soto, who received a below‑Guidelines sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349). The case arose from a cross‑border “grandparent/bail” fraud that targeted elderly residents in Wisconsin. The panel—Judges Scudder, Kirsch, and Jackson‑Akiwumi—agreed with counsel that no nonfrivolous issues existed for appeal.

Although not precedential, the order provides a compact but meaningful application of several recurring sentencing issues in fraud cases: (1) concurrent application of the vulnerable‑victim enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) and (b)(2); (2) the “foreign‑scheme” enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B); (3) denial of a minor‑role reduction under § 3B1.2; (4) the limits of sentence‑credit arguments under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) and the Bureau of Prisons’ authority; (5) the presumption of reasonableness for below‑Guidelines sentences; (6) waiver of challenges to supervised‑release conditions; and (7) the mandatory nature of restitution under the MVRA. It also illustrates the Seventh Circuit’s structured approach to Anders review, including reliance on counsel’s issue‑spotting and the appellant’s nonresponse under Circuit Rule 51(b).

Summary of the Opinion

Ramos‑Soto participated as a courier in a four‑day scheme in which conspirators operating from Canada telephoned elderly Wisconsin residents, posed as a relative or an attorney, and demanded cash to cover purported bail following a serious car accident. Couriers, including Ramos‑Soto, retrieved cash directly from victims’ homes, netting $247,085 from nearly two dozen victims. He pleaded guilty and received a below‑Guidelines sentence of 41 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and mandatory restitution.

On appeal, appointed counsel moved to withdraw under Anders, having identified no nonfrivolous issues. The court, limiting its review to the issues flagged in counsel’s brief (given the defendant’s nonresponse), concluded that potential challenges to the Guidelines calculations, the denial of a minor‑role reduction, the refusal to reduce the sentence to account for time in state custody, the substantive and procedural reasonableness of the below‑Guidelines sentence, the supervised‑release conditions, and restitution would be frivolous. The court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): Establishes the protocol for appointed counsel who believes an appeal is frivolous—counsel files a motion to withdraw with a brief referencing potential issues. Here, counsel complied, enabling the court to conduct a limited merits screen.
United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2014) and Seventh Circuit Rule 51(b): When the Anders brief appears thorough and the appellant does not respond, review is restricted to the issues counsel raises. Ramos‑Soto did not respond; the panel thus confined its review accordingly.
United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020 (7th Cir. 2024): Emphasizes counsel’s duty to consult the defendant about challenging the plea’s validity. Counsel confirmed Ramos‑Soto did not wish to challenge the plea, so that issue was properly omitted.
United States v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2016): Interprets the vulnerable‑victim enhancement and endorses “double counting” unless the Guidelines expressly forbid it. The court relied on Lewis to affirm (1) application of § 3A1.1(b)(1) where the defendant knew or should have known of victim vulnerability and (2) the permissibility of also applying § 3A1.1(b)(2) for a large number of vulnerable victims.
United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2005): Supports the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) enhancement when a substantial part of a fraudulent scheme is committed from outside the United States. Calls from Canada initiating and propelling the scheme sufficed.
United States v. McCombs, 128 F.4th 911 (7th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Turnipseed, 47 F.4th 608 (7th Cir. 2022): Frame the minor‑role reduction standard (“substantially less culpable than the average participant”) and the deferential review of role determinations. The district court’s factual findings that Ramos‑Soto was “critical … way beyond just being a courier … integral … [in making] this scheme work” defeated any minor‑role claim.
United States v. Whitlow, 740 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2014): Abuse‑of‑discretion review applies to sentencing decisions including whether to vary or adjust for time served elsewhere. The panel found no abuse in declining to reduce the sentence to offset time already credited to a state sentence.
United States v. Carr, 107 F.4th 636 (7th Cir. 2024) and 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b): The Bureau of Prisons (not the district court) calculates credit for prior custody, and § 3585(b) forbids “double credit” for time already credited to another sentence. Thus, a request to reduce the federal sentence to replicate such credit had no legal traction.
United States v. Oregon, 58 F.4th 298 (7th Cir. 2023): Below‑Guidelines sentences are presumptively substantively reasonable. The record offered no basis to rebut this presumption.
United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019): An express declination to object to supervised‑release conditions constitutes waiver—not mere forfeiture—extinguishing appellate review.
United States v. Harris, 102 F.4th 847 (7th Cir. 2024); United States v. Griffin, 76 F.4th 724 (7th Cir. 2023); 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) (MVRA): Restitution is mandatory for the offense category at issue; with notice and no objection below, challenging the amount is futile, and in any event the district court enjoys broad discretion consistent with MVRA mandates.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in the familiar Anders framework. Having concluded that counsel’s brief was thorough and that Ramos‑Soto elected not to respond under Circuit Rule 51(b), the panel evaluated the possible issues counsel identified and found all to be frivolous.

Guidelines calculations affirmed:
- Vulnerable‑victim knowledge (§ 3A1.1(b)(1)): Even if the defendant did not select victims, he came face‑to‑face with them when collecting cash; the PSR showed all victims were elderly. Under Lewis, it suffices that he knew or should have known of their vulnerability.
- Large number of vulnerable victims (§ 3A1.1(b)(2)): Applying (b)(2) in addition to (b)(1) is not impermissible double counting because the Guidelines do not prohibit applying both subsections. Lewis underscores that “double counting” is generally allowed absent explicit textual bar.
- Foreign‑scheme enhancement (§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(B)): A “substantial portion” of the scheme occurred outside the U.S. because conspirators placed initiating calls from Canada. Arnaout confirms that extraterritorial conduct that materially advances the fraud supports the enhancement.
Minor‑role reduction denied (§ 3B1.2): The district court found Ramos‑Soto’s role “critical … way beyond just being a courier,” making the scheme work. Under McCombs and Turnipseed, these factual determinations—showing he was not substantially less culpable—are reviewed deferentially and were adequately supported.
No adjustment for state custody credit: Because § 3585(b) prevents crediting time already counted toward a state sentence and the BOP, not the court, computes such credits (Carr), the district court did not abuse its discretion (Whitlow) by refusing to reduce the federal sentence to mimic unavailable BOP credit.
Sentence reasonableness: The 41‑month sentence fell below the 46–57 month Guideline range (total offense level 22; Criminal History Category II). Under Oregon, below‑Guidelines sentences are presumed substantively reasonable; the record reflected careful consideration of § 3553(a) factors and mitigation, defeating any procedural or substantive challenge.
Supervised‑release conditions: By expressly declining the court’s invitation to object, Ramos‑Soto waived any challenge (Flores).
Restitution: With prior notice and no objection, and given the MVRA’s mandate for restitution in this offense category (§ 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii)), a challenge would be frivolous (Harris; Griffin).

Impact and Practical Implications

While labeled nonprecedential and thus nonbinding, this disposition is instructive in several ways for fraud prosecutions—especially cross‑border “grandparent” or bail‑money schemes targeting the elderly.

Stacked vulnerable‑victim enhancements are sustainable: The opinion reaffirms that applying both § 3A1.1(b)(1) (knowledge of vulnerability) and § 3A1.1(b)(2) (large number of vulnerable victims) is permissible. Defense arguments of “double counting” will face steep headwinds absent an express Guideline prohibition.
Foreign‑scheme enhancement is broad: Initiating calls from abroad that set in motion the fraud in the United States satisfies § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B), even if the defendant operated domestically and served as a courier. The locus of critical planning or execution steps can be outside the U.S. without the defendant personally being overseas.
Couriers can be “integral” participants: Where the scheme’s success requires in‑person collections from vulnerable victims, couriers may not be “substantially less culpable.” Defense requests for § 3B1.2 reductions must confront the operational indispensability of the courier role.
Credit for prior custody remains a BOP function: District courts are not obliged to offset sentences to account for time already credited to a state sentence; § 3585(b) precludes double credit, and the BOP controls computations. Defense counsel should address concurrency and equitable considerations at sentencing, but cannot rely on post‑hoc judicial credits.
Presumption for below‑Guidelines sentences is robust: Overcoming the presumption of substantive reasonableness for a below‑range sentence is difficult without compelling countervailing facts.
Waiver traps at sentencing: An express declination to object to supervised‑release conditions—or to restitution figures after notice—will likely extinguish appellate review. Preservation requires timely, explicit objections.
Anders practice in the Seventh Circuit: Thorough issue‑spotting by counsel, consultation about plea challenges (Larry), and a defendant’s nonresponse under Rule 51(b) together streamline dismissal where no meritorious issues appear.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Anders brief: When appointed counsel believes an appeal lacks merit, Anders allows withdrawal if counsel files a brief identifying potential issues. The court independently confirms there are no nonfrivolous grounds before dismissing.
Nonprecedential disposition: A ruling designated nonprecedential is not binding in future cases, though it may be cited as permitted by Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 for persuasive value.
Vulnerable‑victim enhancements (§ 3A1.1):
- (b)(1): Adds 2 levels if the defendant knew or should have known that a victim was vulnerable (e.g., elderly).
- (b)(2): Adds an additional 2 levels if the offense involved a large number of vulnerable victims.
- Both may apply together unless the Guidelines expressly forbid it—which they do not.
Foreign‑scheme enhancement (§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(B)): Adds 2 levels if a substantial part of the scheme was committed outside the U.S. The enhancement focuses on where meaningful parts of the scheme occurred, not solely on the defendant’s location.
Minor‑role reduction (§ 3B1.2): Reduces the offense level if the defendant is substantially less culpable than the average participant. It turns on role‑specific facts and is reviewed deferentially on appeal.
Double counting: Using multiple enhancements based on overlapping facts. Permissible unless the Guidelines text expressly forbids the combination at issue.
Sentence credits and § 3585(b): The BOP calculates jail credits. A defendant cannot receive double credit for time already counted toward a different sentence. Courts may consider time served in fashioning a sentence, but they are not required to duplicate BOP credits barred by statute.
Presumption of reasonableness: A below‑Guidelines sentence is presumed substantively reasonable on appeal; the defendant must show it is unreasonably harsh in light of § 3553(a) factors.
Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right (e.g., expressly declining to object), which eliminates appellate review; forfeiture is a failure to timely assert a right, often leading to plain‑error review.
Mandatory restitution (MVRA): For specified offenses, restitution is compulsory. When the defendant has notice and does not object to the proposed amount, appellate challenges are generally foreclosed and, substantively, the court’s broad discretion is constrained by the MVRA’s mandate.

Conclusion

United States v. Ramos‑Soto is a concise exemplar of the Seventh Circuit’s Anders practice and its application of well‑settled sentencing principles in cross‑border elder‑fraud cases. The panel’s dismissal rests on solid doctrinal ground:

The vulnerable‑victim enhancements under § 3A1.1(b)(1) and (b)(2) can be applied together when the record shows knowledge of vulnerability and a large number of vulnerable victims.
Initiation and direction of a scheme from outside the United States warrant the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B) increase.
Couriers may be denied minor‑role reductions where their tasks are operationally indispensable.
Credit for prior custody is the BOP’s domain, and § 3585(b) bars double credit for time already counted toward a state sentence.
Below‑Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable, and waiver principles strictly apply to supervised‑release conditions and restitution objections.

Although nonprecedential, the order underscores practical litigation lessons in elder‑targeting frauds: the evidentiary significance of face‑to‑face interactions with victims, the breadth of the foreign‑scheme enhancement in transnational scams, the limits of “courier” mitigation, and the procedural rigor required to preserve sentencing objections. For practitioners, the case is a roadmap of what arguments will—and will not—gain traction in similar appeals.