Reaffirming Separate Sexual Assault Counts and Deference to Jury Credibility Findings: Commentary on State v. Eanes

I. Introduction

In State of West Virginia v. Ronald Eanes, No. 23-512 (Nov. 25, 2025), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, by memorandum decision, affirmed convictions for burglary, first-degree robbery, and two counts of first-degree sexual assault arising from a single encounter between the defendant and a 65-year-old victim, B.T.

The case is significant not because it announces a dramatic new rule, but because it:

• Reaffirms that under West Virginia’s sexual assault statutes, distinct acts of vaginal and oral intercourse within one episode may each be prosecuted as separate first-degree sexual assaults, consistent with State v. Carter.
• Emphasizes that credibility challenges based on a victim’s intoxication, delayed reporting, or evolving disclosures do not render testimony “inherently incredible” as a matter of law; such issues are for the jury.
• Clarifies, under the plain error standard, the limits of appellate relief for unobjected-to prosecutorial remarks in closing argument, including comments that:
  • the victim “came in here with the truth,” and
  • “you all get to decide what [proof beyond a reasonable doubt] is,”
  when the trial court has correctly instructed the jury.

  The decision therefore functions as a consolidating precedent: it reiterates existing doctrines on sufficiency of the evidence, double jeopardy, and prosecutorial argument, and applies them to a fact pattern that is common in sexual assault prosecutions—an older, intoxicated victim, delayed reporting, partial initial disclosures, and a “he-said/she-said” consent defense.

  II. Factual and Procedural Background

  A. The Alleged Assault and Robbery

  According to the State’s evidence at trial, on April 23, 2021, B.T., a 65-year-old woman in Huntington, West Virginia, answered a knock at her apartment door. She testified that:

  • The petitioner, whom she did not know, pushed his way into her apartment, knocking her down.
  • She saw a knife in his jacket, which frightened her and led her to comply with his commands.
  • He directed her into the bedroom, told her to remove her clothes, and then removed his own clothes.
  • He penetrated her vagina with his penis. When she cried out from pain, he told her to “shut up,” placed his hand over her mouth “real hard,” and caused her mouth to bleed.
  • He then forced her head down and made her perform oral sex on him, ejaculating in her mouth, and wiped himself with a washcloth he left behind.
  • Before leaving, he took $360 from her purse, her shoes, her phone, and a ring.

  B.T. admitted she was an alcoholic, had been drinking that day, and that she provided the petitioner with a cup of vodka. She did not immediately report the assault; instead, she remained in the apartment and continued drinking, feeling ashamed that she had been raped.

  Three days later, a concerned caseworker, unable to reach B.T. by phone, went to the apartment, discovered B.T. in distress, and summoned emergency services. A paramedic and a responding police officer testified that:

  • B.T. was intoxicated but very distraught.
  • She reported she had been raped three days earlier.
  • The officer documented a small cut on her lip.

  Detective Steven Fitz later interviewed B.T. at a hospital where, by his account, she was coherent. She then described:

  • Forced entry into her apartment.
  • Being struck in the mouth with an open hand.
  • Vaginal penetration, which she said then occurred twice (once on a couch and once on the bed).
  • The theft of money and personal items.

  At trial, B.T. corrected or elaborated on portions of that statement:

  • She said she was mistaken in telling police that she was assaulted on the couch; she testified the assault took place on the bed.
  • She admitted she did not disclose the forced oral sex to police or the prosecutor until a couple of weeks before trial because she was “disgusted with [her]self” and “so embarrassed about that part.”

  B. Investigation, Identification, and Forensic Evidence

  During the investigation:

  • B.T. said she did not know the perpetrator’s name, but provided a physical description used to assemble a photo lineup, from which she identified the petitioner.
  • The petitioner possessed a knife when he was arrested.
  • Forensic experts testified that a washcloth and towel found in B.T.’s apartment contained saliva, sperm cells, and DNA from both B.T. and the petitioner.

  In an interview with Sergeant Stephanie Coffey, the petitioner gave a materially different account. He stated that:

  • He was “hanging out” at the apartment complex with B.T.’s neighbor, Brett Layne, when he met B.T.
  • B.T. invited him into her apartment, made sexual overtures, drank vodka, and poured vodka for him.
  • B.T. voluntarily performed oral sex on him.
  • He initially denied vaginal intercourse but later admitted that he attempted vaginal intercourse but was unable to complete it.
  • He denied ejaculating.
  • B.T. gave him money, her phone, her shoes, and a ring.
  • He then returned to Layne’s apartment, showed him the phone and ring, and told Layne that B.T. had “messed with” him.

  At trial, however, Layne denied key aspects of this narrative:

  • He denied “hanging out” with the petitioner.
  • He denied seeing any interaction between the petitioner and B.T.
  • He denied that the petitioner showed him a phone or ring or said that B.T. had “messed with” him.

  C. Trial, Verdict, and Sentence

  The Cabell County grand jury indicted the petitioner on:

  • Two counts of first-degree sexual assault,
  • One count of first-degree robbery, and
  • One count of burglary.

  At the close of the State’s case, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal under a familiar “he-said, she-said” argument about consent, emphasizing B.T.’s alcoholism and its effect on her memory and perception. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the State had presented sufficient evidence to permit the jury to decide the case. The defense then rested without presenting evidence.

  The jury found the petitioner guilty on all counts. The circuit court imposed:

  • Ten years’ imprisonment for first-degree robbery;
  • Fifteen to thirty-five years’ imprisonment for each count of first-degree sexual assault;
  • One to fifteen years’ imprisonment for burglary;
  • All terms to be served consecutively;
  • Plus thirty years of supervised release.

  D. Issues Raised on Appeal

  On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals, the petitioner raised three assignments of error:

  1. Insufficiency of the evidence and erroneous denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts, with particular focus on the sexual assault charges and the credibility of B.T.
  2. Double jeopardy, arguing that the two first-degree sexual assault convictions violated the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense because there was allegedly only one act of “sexual intercourse.”
  3. Prosecutorial misconduct / mistrial, claiming the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte based on closing argument statements by the prosecutor, including an alleged alteration of the reasonable doubt standard and improper bolstering of B.T.’s credibility.

  Crucially, defense counsel did not object to the closing arguments at trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reviewed these claims only for plain error.

  III. Summary of the Court’s Memorandum Decision

  The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions in a memorandum decision, concluding there was:

  • No substantial question of law, and
  • No prejudicial error,

  thus making oral argument unnecessary and affirmance appropriate.

  Key holdings and conclusions include:

  1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
     • Applying the standard from State v. Guthrie and State v. Juntilla, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could find each element of first-degree sexual assault, robbery, and burglary proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
     • B.T.’s testimony was not “incredible as a matter of law” under State v. Smith; her intoxication, memory issues, delayed reporting, and partial initial disclosure were matters for the jury’s credibility determination, not grounds for acquittal as a matter of law.
     • Although the petitioner did not meaningfully brief sufficiency arguments regarding robbery and burglary as required by Rule 10(c)(7) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court nevertheless found ample evidence supporting those convictions.
  2. Double Jeopardy
     • Under State v. Carter, where a defendant commits separate acts falling under the statutory definition of “sexual intercourse” in different ways (e.g., vaginal and oral intercourse), each act may be charged and punished as a separate offense.
     • The evidence showed two distinct acts: vaginal intercourse and oral intercourse. Thus, convictions on two counts of first-degree sexual assault did not violate double jeopardy.
  3. Prosecutorial Closing Argument and Plain Error
     • Because there was no contemporaneous objection, the Court reviewed the alleged misconduct under the four-part plain error test from State v. Miller.
     • Considering the factors set out in State v. Sugg, the Court held that the prosecutor’s isolated remark that the jurors “get to decide” what proof beyond a reasonable doubt is, when measured against the judge’s thorough reasonable doubt instruction, did not mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant.
     • The various statements allegedly bolstering B.T.’s credibility—such as saying she “came in here with the truth” and characterizing her delayed report as typical of sexual assault victims—were based on the evidence and fell within the bounds of proper summation under State ex rel. Games-Neely v. Yoder.
     • State v. Bolen, involving improper reference to the victim’s religious beliefs, was distinguished because no religious evidence was involved, and here the State also presented substantial corroborating physical and testimonial evidence.
     • Therefore, there was no plain error, and no basis for reversal based on prosecutorial conduct in closing argument.

  IV. Detailed Analysis

  A. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury Credibility Determinations

  1. The Governing Standard: Guthrie and Juntilla

  The Court reviewed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, citing State v. Juntilla, 227 W. Va. 492, 711 S.E.2d 562 (2011). For sufficiency challenges, the Court reiterated the standard from syllabus point 1 of State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995):

  “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

  This is deliberately a highly deferential standard to jury verdicts:

  • The appellate court does not re-weigh evidence.
  • Conflicts in testimony and issues of credibility are resolved in favor of the prosecution, so long as there is some evidence from which a rational juror could find guilt.

  2. The “Inherently Incredible” Doctrine: Smith

  The petitioner’s sufficiency argument centered not on an absence of evidence, but on the alleged unreliability of B.T. as a witness due to alcoholism, intoxication, memory problems, and inconsistent or delayed disclosures.

  The Court confronted this by citing syllabus point 8 (in part) of State v. Smith, 178 W. Va. 104, 358 S.E.2d 188 (1987):

  “A trial court may not declare a witness’s testimony ‘incredible as a matter of law’ unless it is so unbelievable on its face that it defies physical laws.”

  The Court also reaffirmed the principle, drawn again from Guthrie, that:

  “Credibility determinations are for a jury.”

  In other words:

  • Appellate courts do not lightly disturb a jury’s choice to believe one witness over another.
  • Only when testimony is physically impossible or defies basic common sense in an extreme way will it be deemed inherently incredible as a matter of law.

  Here, while B.T.’s testimony involved some inconsistencies (e.g., location of the assault, delayed disclosure of oral assault) and was affected by alcoholism, it did not defy physical laws or reach the extreme threshold of inherent incredibility.

  3. Application to an Intoxicated, Delayed-Reporting Victim

  The decision is instructive for how courts treat the testimony of victims with:

  • Heavy alcohol use,
  • Intoxication at or near the time of the incident,
  • Delayed reporting, and
  • Evolving or incomplete initial disclosures.

  The Court noted that B.T.’s account was substantially corroborated:

  • Forensic DNA evidence tied the petitioner to sexual activity at the scene.
  • Physical injury (a bleeding or cut lip) was documented by law enforcement.
  • Her description of the perpetrator matched the petitioner, whom she identified in a photo lineup.
  • The petitioner’s own statement acknowledged sexual activity, acknowledged alcohol consumption, and admitted he received B.T.’s property, even though he claimed it was consensual or gifted.
  • Layne’s testimony undercut critical parts of the petitioner’s story (no “hanging out,” no show of property, no “messed with me” comment).

  Against this backdrop, the fact that B.T. had been drinking, misremembered a detail about the couch vs. bed, or initially withheld the oral assault allegation out of shame did not make her testimony legally insufficient. Rather, these were classic matters for cross-examination and jury deliberation.

  By rejecting the “inherently incredible” argument, the Court effectively reaffirmed:

  • Sexual assault prosecutions can rest on the testimony of an intoxicated or vulnerable victim,
  • Where that testimony is supported by corroborating physical or circumstantial evidence, challenges based solely on the victim’s drinking history and delayed reporting are unlikely to succeed on sufficiency grounds.

  4. Robbery and Burglary Sufficiency & Appellate Briefing Requirements

  The petitioner’s brief did not meaningfully develop arguments or cite legal authority challenging the sufficiency of evidence for the burglary and robbery convictions. The Court noted this omission under Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires:

  “The brief must contain an argument clearly exhibiting the points of fact and law presented.”

  Despite this, the Court reviewed the record and found no error, pointing out that:

  • Burglary under W. Va. Code § 61-3-11(a) requires entry (with or without breaking) into a dwelling house of another with the intent to commit a violation of criminal law. B.T.’s testimony that the petitioner forced his way into her apartment intending to rob and sexually assault her sufficiently established this offense.
  • Robbery, under State v. Harless, 168 W. Va. 707, 285 S.E.2d 461 (1981), involves an unlawful taking of property from the person or presence of another by force or putting in fear, with intent to steal. First-degree robbery under W. Va. Code § 61-2-12(a) requires violence or threat of deadly force (e.g., use or display of a deadly weapon). B.T.’s account of the visible knife, the physical assaults, and the taking of her money, phone, shoes, and ring supported the robbery conviction.

  Two points of broader significance:

  • Appellate counsel who fail to properly brief issues risk summary rejection of those claims.
  • Even so, where the record clearly supports the verdict, as here, the Court will affirm the convictions.

  B. Double Jeopardy and Multiple First-Degree Sexual Assault Convictions

  1. The Double Jeopardy Framework and the Unit of Prosecution

  The petitioner contended that convicting him of two counts of first-degree sexual assault violated double jeopardy, arguing that the indictment contained two counts that were “identical in every way,” and that there was only one act of “sexual intercourse” within the meaning of West Virginia Code § 61-8B-1(7).

  The Court reviewed this claim de novo, citing syllabus point 1 of State v. McGilton, 229 W. Va. 554, 729 S.E.2d 876 (2012). Double jeopardy concerns here fall into the category of multiple punishments for the same offense. The key inquiry becomes: what did the Legislature intend as the “unit of prosecution”?

  2. Carter and the Definition of “Sexual Intercourse”

  West Virginia’s first-degree sexual assault statute provides, in relevant part:

  First-degree sexual assault occurs when “[a] person engages in sexual intercourse . . . with another person, and, in so doing . . . employs a deadly weapon in the commission of the act.” W. Va. Code § 61-8B-3(a)(1)(B).

  The definitional statute, W. Va. Code § 61-8B-1(7), states:

  “‘Sexual intercourse’ means any act between persons involving penetration, however slight, of the female sex organ by the male sex organ or involving contact between the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another person.”

  In State v. Carter, 168 W. Va. 90, 282 S.E.2d 277 (1981), the Court held:

  “Where a defendant commits separate acts of our statutorily defined term ‘sexual intercourse’ in different ways, each act may be prosecuted and punished as a separate offense.” (Syl. pt. 2).

  Thus, the statutory definition of “sexual intercourse” encompasses:

  • Vaginal intercourse (penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ), and
  • Oral-genital contact.

  Per Carter, if these distinct forms are committed as separate acts, they may each serve as the basis for a separate sexual assault charge.

  3. Application in Eanes: Vaginal vs. Oral Intercourse as Separate Offenses

  The Court found that the State presented evidence of two distinct acts of sexual assault:

  • Vaginal intercourse, and
  • Oral intercourse (fellatio).

  These acts were factually and temporally distinguishable:

  • The vaginal penetration occurred first, accompanied by force (pushing B.T. down, display of the knife, physical restraint and striking of her mouth).
  • After that, the petitioner forced B.T.’s head down and compelled her to perform oral sex, culminating in ejaculation.

  Because these are two different ways of committing “sexual intercourse” under § 61-8B-1(7), and because Carter expressly authorizes separate prosecutions when “separate acts” are committed “in different ways,” the Court concluded there was no double jeopardy violation.

  The petitioner’s assertion that both indictment counts were “identical in every way” ignored the underlying factual distinction in the acts proven at trial. Under Carter, the Legislature permits—and, by implication, expects—courts to treat such distinct sexual acts as separate units of prosecution, even if they occur in one encounter.

  Practical implications:

  • Prosecutors in West Virginia may charge separate counts for vaginal and oral assaults (and, by logical extension, anal acts) within a single incident, where the evidence supports distinct acts.
  • Defendants face the possibility of consecutive sentences for each act, significantly increasing exposure in serious sexual assault cases.

  C. Prosecutorial Closing Argument, Reasonable Doubt, and Plain Error Review

  1. The Plain Error Standard: Miller

  Because the defense did not object to any of the prosecutor’s challenged remarks during closing argument, the Court applied the plain error standard under Rule 52(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure and syllabus point 7 of State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995), which requires:

  1. There must be an error;
  2. That is plain (clear or obvious);
  3. That affects substantial rights (typically, it must be prejudicial, affecting the outcome); and
  4. That seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

  This is a demanding standard, particularly for claimed errors arising from closing arguments where:

  • Improprieties are often cured or mitigated by jury instructions, and
  • Appellate courts are reluctant to second-guess strategic choices not to object at trial.

  Additionally, under syllabus point 6 of State v. Sugg, 193 W. Va. 388, 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995), the Court evaluates alleged improper prosecutorial comments by considering:

  1. The degree to which the remarks tend to mislead the jury or prejudice the accused;
  2. Whether the remarks were isolated or extensive;
  3. The strength of the State’s proof absent the remarks; and
  4. Whether the comments were deliberately made to divert attention to extraneous matters.

  The Court will not reverse based on prosecutorial remarks absent clear prejudice or manifest injustice, as reaffirmed in State v. Critzer, 167 W. Va. 655, 280 S.E.2d 288 (1981).

  2. Comment on Reasonable Doubt

  One challenged remark was the prosecutor’s statement in closing:

  “It’s proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I’m going to remind you of that. You all get to decide what that is.”

  The petitioner argued that this statement improperly “altered” the court’s reasonable doubt instruction by suggesting that jurors could define the standard for themselves.

  However, the trial court had already given a proper, thorough instruction on reasonable doubt, including:

  • “A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense—the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act.”
  • “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it.”
  • Emphasis that the burden is always on the prosecution and that the defendant may not be convicted on suspicion or conjecture.

  Measured against this context, the Court concluded that:

  • The prosecutor’s remark, if improper at all, was isolated.
  • When considered with the correct jury instruction, it was unlikely to mislead the jury or shift the burden of proof.
  • The strong evidentiary case (testimony, physical evidence, defendant’s own admissions) supported the verdict independent of the comment.
  • There was no indication the comment was a deliberate attempt to divert the jury to extraneous matters.

  Thus, even assuming arguendo that the comment was questionable, it did not satisfy the stringent requirements of plain error warranting reversal.

  3. Alleged Vouching and Bolstering of the Victim

  The petitioner also challenged several remarks as impermissible bolstering of B.T.’s credibility, including:

  • “[S]he [B.T.] came in here with the truth”;
  • “She didn’t want to tell people. Why? Just like every other sexual assault victim, she didn’t think people were going to believe her”;
  • “I’d submit to you that’s corroboration of [B.T.]. All of that is corroboration that [B.T.] is telling you: This is what happened and that’s the truth”;
  • “Alcohol alters him” (referring to the petitioner’s own admission).

  The key question was whether these statements:

  • Improperly vouched for B.T.’s credibility by suggesting the prosecutor had special knowledge or personal belief beyond the evidence; or
  • Were instead permissible commentary on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom.

  Invoking Games-Neely v. Yoder, 237 W. Va. 301, 787 S.E.2d 572 (2016), the Court reiterated that a proper closing argument in a criminal case consists of:

  “The summation of evidence, any reasonable inferences from the evidence, responses to the opposing party’s argument, and pleas for law enforcement generally.”

  The Court reasoned as follows:

  • The remark that B.T. “came in here with the truth” was largely responsive to the defense theory that B.T. was not telling the truth due to intoxication and memory problems. B.T. herself testified she was telling the truth. Framing the argument as “this is what the evidence shows, and thus she is telling the truth” falls within advocacy based on the evidence, not improper personal vouching.
  • The statement that “just like every other sexual assault victim, she didn’t think people were going to believe her” was grounded in B.T.’s testimony that she delayed reporting because she feared people would not believe her or would judge her. While phrased broadly, the prosecutor was drawing an inference about why B.T. reacted as she did, based on her own explanation.
  • “Alcohol alters him” was drawn directly from the petitioner’s admission that alcohol can “alter” him or get him “bent out of shape,” and that he had a “buzz” during the incident. This was a fair use of the defendant’s own words.
  • The “corroboration” language explicitly anchored the prosecutor’s claim of truthfulness in the corroborating evidence—DNA, physical injury, and testimony contradicting the petitioner’s story—rather than personal opinion detached from the record.

  Because these remarks:

  • Were isolated,
  • Were tied to the evidence and reasonable inferences,
  • Occurred in the context of strong proof of guilt, and
  • Did not clearly mislead or prejudice the jury,

  the Court held they did not constitute plain error or require a mistrial.

  4. Distinguishing State v. Bolen

  The petitioner analogized his case to State v. Bolen, 219 W. Va. 236, 632 S.E.2d 922 (2006), where the Court reversed a conviction after the State improperly relied on evidence of the victim’s religious beliefs to bolster credibility, in violation of Rule 610 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.

  The Court distinguished Bolen on two grounds:

  • No religious evidence was introduced in Eanes. Thus, the specific Rule 610 concern (using religious belief to support or attack credibility) was not implicated.
  • Unlike in Bolen, here the State presented both physical evidence (DNA and injury) and corroborating testimony, so the case did not rest solely on an improperly bolstered credibility determination.

  This distinction underscores how fact-specific prosecutorial-misconduct inquiries are, and how the presence of strong corroborating evidence generally makes reversal on closing argument grounds less likely.

  D. Statutory Elements and Evidentiary Mapping

  The decision also implicitly illustrates how the evidence aligned with the relevant statutory elements:

  • First-Degree Sexual Assault (W. Va. Code § 61-8B-3(a)(1)(B)):
    • “Sexual intercourse” (vaginal penetration; oral-genital contact) was established by B.T.’s testimony and corroborated by DNA evidence.
    • “Employs a deadly weapon in the commission of the act” was satisfied by the visible knife in the petitioner’s jacket during the assault, used to instill fear and compel compliance.
  • Burglary (W. Va. Code § 61-3-11(a)):
    • Entry into the dwelling (forced entry when B.T. answered the door).
    • With intent to commit a crime (sexual assault and robbery) as inferred from the petitioner’s conduct and subsequent theft.
  • First-Degree Robbery (W. Va. Code § 61-2-12(a); Harless):
    • Unlawful taking and carrying away of money and goods (cash, phone, shoes, ring).
    • From the person or presence of another (from B.T.’s purse and apartment while she was being assaulted).
    • By force or putting in fear (physical violence, hand over mouth, visible knife).
    • With intent to steal.
    • First-degree status established by committing violence or using the threat of deadly force through the presence of a deadly weapon.

  The Court’s brief but firm conclusion that “upon review we find no error” on these counts reflects confidence that the evidence, if believed, easily satisfied the statutes.

  V. Complex Concepts Simplified

  This section briefly unpacks some of the legal terms and doctrines used in the decision.

  1. “Inherently Incredible” Testimony

  When appellate courts say testimony is “incredible as a matter of law,” they mean:

  • It is not just unlikely or inconsistent, but
  • Physically impossible or absurd—for example, claiming to have been in two places at the same exact time, or describing events that defy basic physical laws.

  If testimony is merely questionable, inconsistent, or undermined by the witness’s character or lifestyle (e.g., heavy drinking), it remains for the jury to assess. Courts rarely find testimony “inherently incredible” because that would usurp the jury’s role.

  2. Reasonable Doubt

  “Beyond a reasonable doubt” is the highest standard of proof in law. It does not mean beyond all doubt; instead:

  • It is the level of certainty a reasonable person would require to make a serious decision in their own life (e.g., undergoing major surgery).
  • If, after considering all the evidence, jurors have a doubt based on reason and common sense—a doubt that would make them hesitate to act—they must acquit.

  3. Plain Error

  “Plain error” allows an appellate court to correct certain serious mistakes even if:

  • The defense did not object at trial.

  But the standard is very strict:

  • The error must be obvious.
  • It must have affected the outcome of the trial.
  • It must seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial process.

  Mild or debatable mistakes, especially in closing argument, usually do not qualify.

  4. Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishments

  The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against:

  • Being tried twice for the same offense after an acquittal or conviction, and
  • Receiving multiple punishments for the same offense.

  In cases like Eanes, the issue is whether multiple counts represent:

  • Truly separate crimes (different acts), or
  • The same crime being punished twice.

  Here, because West Virginia law recognizes that vaginal intercourse and oral intercourse are separate potential acts of “sexual intercourse,” each can be prosecuted separately if they are distinct acts—even within a single encounter.

  VI. Likely Impact of State v. Eanes

  1. Sexual Assault Prosecutions Involving Intoxicated Victims

  Eanes confirms that:

  • A victim’s alcoholism or intoxication at the time of the offense,
  • Delayed reporting, and
  • Partial or evolving disclosures

  do not, by themselves, render that victim’s testimony incapable of supporting a conviction. When such testimony is corroborated by:

  • Forensic evidence,
  • Physical injuries,
  • Defendant’s admissions, or
  • Other witnesses contradicting the defendant’s story,

  appellate courts will defer to the jury’s credibility determinations.

  Practically, defense strategies that rest solely on attacking an intoxicated victim’s general credibility—without undermining specific corroborating evidence—are unlikely to yield sufficiency-based reversals.

  2. Charging Multiple Sexual Assault Counts

  By relying squarely on Carter and the definitional statute, the Court underscores that:

  • Distinct acts of vaginal intercourse, oral intercourse, and anal intercourse may each be separately charged, even within one continuous episode, if evidence supports discrete acts.
  • Each count can carry its own punishment and may be run consecutively.

  This strengthens prosecutorial charging options in serious sexual assault cases and can significantly increase sentencing exposure. It also heightens the importance of carefully describing and distinguishing each act in indictments and jury instructions.

  3. Prosecutorial Advocacy and Appellate Risks

  Eanes sends a mixed but clear signal on closing argument:

  • Prosecutors may argue that the evidence shows a witness is telling the truth and may infer reasons for delayed reporting, so long as statements are grounded in the record.
  • They should, however, avoid language that could be construed as:
    • Suggesting personal knowledge beyond the evidence (“I know she is telling the truth”), or
    • Redefining reasonable doubt in a way that undermines the court’s instructions.
  • Defense counsel must object promptly to preserve such issues; absent objection, plain error review is unlikely to result in reversal unless the comments are egregious and outcome-determinative.

  4. Appellate Practice and Briefing

  The decision also reinforces Rule 10(c)(7)’s requirement for properly developed appellate arguments. Undeveloped or unsupported arguments:

  • Risk being deemed waived, and
  • Will not generally prompt the Court to undertake extensive analysis on its own.

  Competent appellate practice requires:

  • Citing appropriate statutes and precedents,
  • Explaining how facts fit (or fail to fit) legal standards, and
  • Articulating specific reasons why the trial court’s ruling was wrong.

  VII. Conclusion

  State v. Eanes is a memorandum decision, but its reasoning reinforces several important principles in West Virginia criminal law:

  • The sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard is generous to jury verdicts, especially where victim testimony is corroborated by physical and circumstantial evidence, even if the victim is intoxicated or delayed in reporting.
  • Under Carter and W. Va. Code § 61-8B-1(7), distinct acts of vaginal and oral intercourse during one encounter appropriately support multiple first-degree sexual assault convictions without offending double jeopardy.
  • Unobjected-to prosecutorial comments in closing argument will only rarely satisfy the demanding plain error test, particularly when:
    • The trial court’s legal instructions are accurate,
    • The remarks are brief and tied to the evidence, and
    • The evidentiary case is strong independently of the remarks.

  Taken together, these points make Eanes a useful reference for practitioners in sexual assault litigation, both at trial and on appeal, and a reaffirmation of the central role juries play in resolving credibility disputes in criminal cases.