Reaffirming Rule 35(a)’s Narrow Reach and the Definite Sentencing Scheme for Voluntary Manslaughter in West Virginia

Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in State of West Virginia v. Amanda York (No. 23-468), issued September 10, 2025. The case arises from Amanda York’s Rule 35(a) motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence following her 2013 convictions for three counts of voluntary manslaughter and one count of conspiracy to conceal a deceased human body. The circuit court denied the motion, finding the issues res judicata and the sentences within statutory limits. The Supreme Court affirmed.

At stake were several recurring post-conviction questions:

What claims are cognizable under Rule 35(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure?
Can a defendant repackage sufficiency-of-the-evidence or accomplice-liability challenges as “illegal sentence” claims under Rule 35(a)?
Does a jury’s finding that a defendant did not use a firearm, and an acquittal on conspiracy to commit murder, restrict the court’s authority to impose maximum, consecutive sentences for voluntary manslaughter?
Is the correct penalty structure for voluntary manslaughter in West Virginia determinate (definite) or indeterminate?

The Court’s answers, while not creating new law, provide a clear reaffirmation and practical clarification: Rule 35(a) is a narrow vehicle reserved for illegal sentence claims, not a forum to revisit trial evidence; and voluntary manslaughter carries a definite sentence of three to fifteen years under West Virginia Code § 61-2-4, which the circuit court may impose at the maximum and order to run consecutively, so long as no impermissible factor is involved.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Webster County Circuit Court’s June 6, 2023 denial of Amanda York’s Rule 35(a) motion. Applying the standards from State v. Head and State v. Goff, and the long-standing principle from State v. Goodnight that sentences within statutory limits and not based on impermissible factors are not subject to appellate review, the Court held:

York’s first three assignments of error—contending that she could not be punished as a principal given jury findings of “no firearm” and acquittal on conspiracy to commit murder, and contesting malice—amounted to challenges to the sufficiency and theory of conviction, which are not cognizable under Rule 35(a).
York’s “back door gun enhancement” argument failed; her 15-year terms for voluntary manslaughter were authorized by statute and did not constitute a firearm-based enhancement.
Her contention that the court was obligated to impose indeterminate sentences (three to fifteen years) under West Virginia Code § 61-11-16 was incorrect; voluntary manslaughter carries a definite sentence under § 61-2-4, and the 15-year definite terms were lawful.
Issues previously adjudicated on direct appeal (2015 memorandum decision) and in habeas proceedings (2019 denial) were barred by res judicata and could not be revived under Rule 35(a).
York did not demonstrate that her sentences were based on any impermissible factor, and the record deficiencies in her appendix undermined her burden on appeal.

Accordingly, the Court held there was no abuse of discretion and affirmed the denial of Rule 35(a) relief.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

State v. Head, 198 W. Va. 298, 480 S.E.2d 507 (1996) (Syl. Pt. 1) — Establishes the standard of review for Rule 35 motions: abuse of discretion for the disposition, clearly erroneous for underlying facts, and de novo for questions of law and statutory interpretation. This framework guided the Court’s appraisal of the circuit court’s denial.
State v. Goff, 206 W. Va. 516, 509 S.E.2d 557 (1998) — Emphasizes that as a general matter Rule 35 motions are not reviewable absent abuse of discretion. The Court signaled that York faced a high bar to upset the lower court’s discretionary ruling.
State v. Goodnight, 169 W. Va. 336, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982) (Syl. Pt. 4) — The key substantive limit: “Sentences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits and if not based on some impermissible factor, are not subject to appellate review.” This principle effectively foreclosed York’s challenges because her sentences were authorized by statute and no impermissible factor was shown.
Layne v. Siefert, No. 10-1278, 2012 WL 2874240 (W. Va. Jan. 13, 2012) (memorandum decision) — Clarifies the scope of Rule 35: it is for correction or reduction of sentence, not for challenging the underlying conviction. The Court relied on Layne to reject York’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence and accomplice-liability arguments as non-cognizable in a Rule 35(a) motion.
State v. York, No. 13-1312, 2015 WL 1881062 (W. Va. Apr. 24, 2015) (memorandum decision) — York’s direct appeal, in which her convictions were affirmed. The Court referenced its prior conclusion (and the habeas court’s later conclusion) that the evidence supported treating York as a principal actor; repetition of those issues in a Rule 35 motion was foreclosed.
State v. Larry A.H., 230 W. Va. 709, 742 S.E.2d 125 (2013) and State v. Myers, 229 W. Va. 238, 728 S.E.2d 122 (2012) — Reinforce the appellant’s burden to demonstrate error from the record and the rule that the Court will not reverse unless error affirmatively appears. The Court noted York’s sparse appendix failed to include the very Rule 35 motion at issue, impairing her burden.
State v. LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996) and State v. Lilly, 194 W. Va. 595, 461 S.E.2d 101 (1995) — Issues not developed with supporting authority are deemed abandoned; casual mention is insufficient. The Court declined to address York’s underdeveloped claim that a clerical error in the commitment order rendered her sentence illegal.

W. Va. R. Crim. P. 35(a) and (b) — Rule 35(a) allows correction of an illegal sentence at any time, and correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time allotted for reduction under Rule 35(b) (120 days from imposition or from mandate after affirmance). Because York did not allege “illegal manner” of imposition, the Court treated her motion as an “illegal sentence” claim (not time-barred).
W. Va. Code § 61-2-4 (voluntary manslaughter) — Sets a “definite term of imprisonment … not less than three nor more than fifteen years.” This specific statute controls the penalty structure for voluntary manslaughter and authorized the court to impose 15-year definite terms.
W. Va. Code § 61-11-6(a) — Provides that principals in the second degree and accessories before the fact are punishable as if principals in the first degree. York invoked this to argue a mismatch with the jury’s firearm and conspiracy findings; the Court rejected the argument as previously adjudicated and, in any event, not a sentencing illegality.
W. Va. Code § 61-11-16 — The general indeterminate sentencing statute. York claimed it required indeterminate 3–15-year sentences for voluntary manslaughter. The Court reiterated that the offense-specific statute (§ 61-2-4) mandates a definite term, which supersedes the general statute.
W. Va. R. App. P. 7(d) — Requires the appellant to provide an appendix containing material motions and filings. The Court flagged York’s failure to include her Rule 35 motion as an impediment to appellate review.
W. Va. R. App. P. 21 — Authorizes memorandum decisions where there is no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error; the Court proceeded without oral argument under this rule.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) Framing the Rule 35(a) claim and standard of review. Because York did not allege that her sentence was “imposed in an illegal manner” (which would trigger Rule 35(b)’s 120-day limit), the Court construed her motion as asserting an “illegal sentence,” which may be corrected at any time under Rule 35(a). The Court then applied the Head three-part standard of review and the Goff admonition that Rule 35 dispositions are rarely reversible.

2) Sufficiency and accomplice-liability theories are not cognizable under Rule 35(a). York’s first three assignments of error argued that the jury’s special findings—no firearm used and acquittal of conspiracy to commit murder—precluded treating her as a principal or finding malice. The Court characterized these as attempts to re-litigate the elements and evidentiary basis of her convictions. Under Layne v. Siefert and basic Rule 35 principles, such contentions are challenges to the conviction, not to the legality of the sentence, and are therefore out of bounds in a Rule 35(a) proceeding.

3) Res judicata bars re-litigation of issues previously decided on direct appeal and in habeas. To the extent York’s complaints were previously adjudicated (the 2015 direct appeal and the 2019 habeas denial), the Court agreed with the circuit court that they were barred by res judicata. Rule 35(a) cannot be used as a collateral vehicle to revive arguments already resolved.

4) The “back door gun enhancement” argument fails. York argued that the 15-year terms effectively operated as firearm enhancements notwithstanding the jury’s “no firearm” finding. The Court rejected this for two reasons:

Her sentences fall squarely within the statutory range for voluntary manslaughter (§ 61-2-4), which authorizes up to a 15-year definite term; the court did not add any extra years based on firearm use.
Goodnight governs: where a sentence is within statutory limits and not based on an impermissible factor, it is not subject to appellate review. There was no showing that the court relied on firearm use or any impermissible factor in choosing the high end of the range.

5) Voluntary manslaughter requires a definite, not indeterminate, sentence. York maintained the court was obliged to impose indeterminate 3–15-year terms under § 61-11-16 and to label its sentence a mere “judicial recommendation.” The Court responded that she invoked the wrong statute: § 61-2-4 specifically prescribes a “definite” term between three and fifteen years. Under the lex specialis principle, the offense-specific, definite-sentencing statute controls over the general indeterminate scheme. The circuit court properly imposed definite 15-year terms for each count.

6) No impermissible factor identified. The Court noted York neither alleged nor demonstrated that the sentencer relied on any impermissible factor (such as race, vindictiveness, or other constitutionally suspect considerations). Absent such a showing, Goodnight forecloses review of a within-range sentence.

7) Record inadequacy undermined the appeal. The Court underscored that York’s appendix did not include the Rule 35(a) motion itself, contravening Rule 7(d) and undercutting her ability to meet the appellant’s burden. The omission fortified the affirmance.

8) Ancillary “clerical error” claim was undeveloped. York posited that the commitment order mistakenly indicated a guilty plea rather than a jury verdict. The Court deemed the point inadequately briefed (LaRock; Lilly) and declined to address it. Notably, such clerical discrepancies are typically addressed, if at all, via a narrow mechanism for correcting clerical mistakes (distinct from Rule 35(a) relief).

Practical Impact and Future Litigation

Rule 35(a) remains narrow and sentence-focused. Defendants cannot use Rule 35(a) to re-argue trial evidence, accomplice theories, or mens rea issues. Such claims belong on direct appeal or in habeas, subject to preclusion and waiver doctrines.
Within-range sentences are insulated under Goodnight. Absent proof of an impermissible factor, appellate courts will not second-guess the length of a sentence that sits within statutory limits—even where the jury returned no-firearm findings or acquitted on related conspiracy counts.
Voluntary manslaughter’s penalty is definite by statute. Practitioners should not assume the general indeterminate scheme applies. Section 61-2-4 expressly authorizes a definite term, and courts may impose the full 15-year term on each count and run them consecutively, subject to ordinary sentencing discretion limits.
Res judicata and issue preclusion matter across post-conviction vehicles. Recycled arguments from direct appeal or habeas will not be entertained in Rule 35 proceedings.
Appellate record completeness is critical. Failure to include the operative motion and essential filings in the appendix can be outcome-determinative, as the appellant bears the burden to demonstrate reversible error.
Jury special findings do not cabin judicial discretion within the statutory range. A “no firearm” finding prevents a firearm enhancement or separate firearm offense, but it does not prevent the court from selecting the statutory maximum for the underlying offense on permissible grounds.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 35(a): Illegal sentence vs. sentence imposed in an illegal manner.
- An “illegal sentence” is one the law does not permit (e.g., above the statutory maximum). It may be corrected “at any time.”
- A sentence “imposed in an illegal manner” involves procedural irregularities during sentencing (e.g., denial of allocution) and must be raised within the time limits for a reduction under Rule 35(b) (generally 120 days).
Res judicata/issue preclusion in post-conviction practice. Once an issue has been finally decided on direct appeal or in habeas, it cannot be re-litigated in another post-conviction proceeding absent extraordinary circumstances.
Determinate (definite) vs. indeterminate sentencing. A determinate sentence is a fixed term (e.g., 15 years). An indeterminate sentence has a range (e.g., 3–15 years). Voluntary manslaughter in West Virginia is punished by a definite term of 3–15 years; the judge selects a fixed number of years within that range.
Goodnight rule. Appellate courts will not review the length of a sentence if it is within the statutory range and not based on an impermissible factor.
Principals and accessories (§ 61-11-6(a)). Principals in the second degree and accessories before the fact face the same punishment as the principal actor. This statute addresses liability and punishment equivalence, not the selection of a sentence within a statutory range.
Memorandum decisions (Rule 21). Used when no substantial question of law or prejudicial error exists. They can be cited but typically do not announce new law; rather, they apply established principles to the facts at hand.

Conclusion

State v. Amanda York is a textbook reaffirmation of two bedrock principles in West Virginia criminal practice. First, Rule 35(a) is a limited mechanism for correcting illegal sentences; it is not a conduit for revisiting evidentiary sufficiency, accomplice liability, or mens rea determinations. Second, voluntary manslaughter sentences are definite under § 61-2-4, and a 15-year term per count—run consecutively—falls comfortably within statutory authority absent impermissible considerations.

The decision underscores the durable force of Goodnight’s bar on reviewing within-range sentences, the preclusive effect of prior adjudications in successive post-conviction efforts, and the importance of a complete appellate record. For practitioners, York offers a practical roadmap: steer conviction-level challenges to the right forums and timelines; identify and substantiate any truly “illegal sentence” defect; and, when addressing voluntary manslaughter, anchor arguments in the offense-specific, definite sentencing statute rather than the general indeterminate scheme.