Reaffirming Rooker-Feldman Boundaries:
Viegas v. Owens and the Non-Reviewability of Colorado Rule 120 Foreclosure Orders in Federal Court

1. Introduction

In Viegas v. Owens, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit delivered an unpublished—but citable—order that crystallises several procedural doctrines. At its core, the panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of pro se plaintiffs Keri Lynn and James Viegas’ civil rights and consumer-finance claims stemming from a Colorado Rule 120 foreclosure proceeding on their Dillon, Colorado property. The appellate opinion is principally notable for three reasons:

1. It re-emphasises the sharp jurisdictional bar imposed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when state-court losers attempt to relitigate foreclosure orders in federal court.
2. It reinforces the duty—even on pro se appellants—to brief every issue they wish to preserve on appeal, otherwise the issues are deemed waived.
3. It highlights that a pre-answer dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) does not implicate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and that discovery is unavailable without a well-pleaded complaint.

Key Parties

• Plaintiffs-Appellants: Keri Lynn Viegas and James Viegas (homeowners, acting pro se).
• Defendants-Appellees: Judge Reed W. Owens (state judge), Chris Kilkenny (Summit County Clerk), Kathleen Neel (Public Trustee), Randall M. Chin (lender’s counsel), NewRez LLC and Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (loan servicers), and Gena Osborn (title company employee).

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Viegases’ amended complaint. Applying de novo review to the Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal, the panel concluded that Rooker-Feldman deprived the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims because those claims sought to “undo” or “reverse” the state foreclosure order. As to all other claims (Seventh Amendment, consumer-protection statutes, and assorted criminal-law theories), the circuit held they were either inadequately pleaded, waived on appeal, or barred as a matter of law and therefore properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). The court further rejected the Viegases’ ancillary objections regarding the denial of discovery and the absence of a jury trial.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)
  The Supreme Court’s definitive articulation of Rooker-Feldman—limiting its reach to cases brought by “state-court losers” seeking federal review of adverse state judgments—furnished the primary analytical framework.
• Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2012)
  Quoted for the proposition that a claim has merit only if the underlying state-court forfeiture order was unlawful, making federal review improper.
• Millard v. Camper, 971 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2020)
  Confirmed that if relief would require “re-examining the state-court judgments,” jurisdiction is lacking.
• Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2006)
  Emphasised that federal relief which would “reverse or undo” state-court relief triggers Rooker-Feldman.
• Mayotte v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 880 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2018)
  Cited for the futility of re-packaging attacks on state judgments as constitutional claims.
• Driskell v. Thompson, 971 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Colo. 2013)
  Used to dispose of the Seventh Amendment argument: Colorado Rule 120 procedures do not violate the right to a jury.
• Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) & Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992)
  Clarified finality and appealability of dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
• Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2007)
  Basis for declaring issues waived when not adequately briefed.
• Smith v. Kitchen, 156 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 1997)
  Confirmed that dismissal at the pleading stage does not implicate the Seventh Amendment.
• Workman v. United States Postal Serv., 127 F.4th 237 (10th Cir. 2025) (new authority)
  Newly invoked to illustrate that discovery is unavailable prior to a well-pleaded complaint.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Rooker-Feldman Jurisdictional Bar
   The Viegases’ constitutional claims could not be entertained without nullifying the state Rule 120 order. As such, the federal courts lacked power ab initio. The panel carefully applied the two-part Exxon Mobil test: (i) plaintiffs were state-court losers; (ii) injuries were caused by the state judgment itself.
2. Issue Preservation and Waiver
   The appellants’ opening brief failed to address several district-court grounds (Rule 9(b) particularity, TILA/RESPA deficiency, lack of private right under criminal statutes). Under Bronson, those issues were deemed waived.
3. Pleading Deficiencies
   Even apart from jurisdiction, the panel affirmed dismissal of statutory claims because the amended complaint did not identify specific statutory provisions or factual predicates, flunking Rule 8(a) and 9(b).
4. Seventh Amendment and Discovery
   The panel reiterated that the right to a jury attaches only once claims survive Rule 12 challenges. Likewise, discovery requires a plausible pleading—bolstered by citation to the recent Workman decision.

3.3 Potential Impact on Future Litigation

• Foreclosure Litigation
  For Colorado homeowners attempting to challenge Rule 120 foreclosures in federal court, Viegas underscores that constitutional or § 1983 theories will fail unless they attack conduct independent of the state judgment (e.g., fraud extrinsic to the proceeding). Practitioners must pursue direct state-court appeals or Rule 60(b) relief rather than federal forums.
• Pro Se Appellants
  The opinion is a cautionary tale: the liberal construction accorded to pro se litigants does not relax appellate briefing standards. Failure to discuss each dismissed claim leads to irrevocable waiver.
• Consumer-Finance Claims
  The court’s summary rejection of generic TILA/RESPA allegations signals that plaintiffs must tie statutory sections to concrete facts. Bare recitations risk dismissal and may invite sanctions under Rule 11.
• Procedural Doctrine Development
  Although unpublished, the decision can be cited under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. It will likely be wielded by mortgage servicers and trustees as persuasive authority when removing or moving to dismiss similar federal suits premised on Rule 120 orders.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

A rule forbidding federal district courts from acting like appellate courts over state judgments. If you lost in state court, you cannot “retry” the case federally just by re-labeling your complaint.

Colorado Rule 120 Proceeding

A streamlined, quasi-in-rem state procedure where a lender seeks a court order permitting a public trustee to conduct a foreclosure sale. It decides only whether a default exists and the deed of trust authorises sale; it is not a full civil trial.

Rule 12(b)(1) vs. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(1) dismisses when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction (e.g., Rooker-Feldman). Rule 12(b)(6) dismisses when the complaint fails to state a plausible claim, even if the court has power to hear it.

Rule 9(b) Particularity

Fraud-based claims (including many state debt-collection statutes) must specify “who, what, when, where, and how” of the misconduct—not mere conclusory labels.

Waiver on Appeal

If an appellant does not argue an issue in the opening brief, the court treats the point as abandoned—no matter how meritorious it might have been.

Seventh Amendment Jury Right

Guarantees a jury for certain civil suits, but only once the pleadings survive dismissal and the case reaches factual dispute. No complaint, no jury.

5. Conclusion

Viegas v. Owens reinforces the formidable wall that Rooker-Feldman erects around state-court foreclosure judgments, particularly Colorado’s expedited Rule 120 orders. The Tenth Circuit’s message is unequivocal: federal courts are not venues for collateral attacks on state foreclosure rulings, and repackaging grievances as constitutional or consumer-protection claims will not avail plaintiffs. Equally, the decision is a procedural primer—reminding litigants of stringent pleading, briefing, and discovery thresholds and affirming that the Seventh Amendment is not a shield against early dismissal. Practitioners should counsel clients to exhaust state remedies or pursue independent federal claims untethered to the validity of the state judgment. In the broader legal landscape, Viegas supplies persuasive precedent closing a recurring door through which foreclosure defendants often attempt (unsuccessfully) to re-enter the courthouse.