F. Remedial Actions and Mitigating Conduct

The opinion emphasizes extensive remedial conduct, much of it undertaken before the disciplinary matter was fully resolved. P’Pool highlighted:

1. Actions Before Conclusion of the Boyd County Criminal Case

1. Immediate self‑reporting of the incident to the KBA and KYLAP.
2. Service of five days in Boyd County Detention Center before imposition of a $5,000 cash bond.
3. Eight months of home incarceration with an ankle monitor at $12.50 per day.
4. Weekly or twice‑weekly drug and alcohol testing for eight months at $45 per test.
5. Regular participation in AA and Celebrate Recovery meetings.
6. Monthly in‑office counseling sessions with a licensed therapist.
7. Voluntary admission to and completion of a 30‑day residential substance treatment program.
8. Suspension of his driver’s license for eight months during case proceedings.

2. Post‑Disposition Obligations and Continuing Measures

1. Payment of fines, restitution, costs, and attorney fees exceeding $10,000.
2. Completion of Kentucky Alcohol Driver Education.
3. Continuation of monthly counseling with a licensed therapist.
4. Ongoing AA and Celebrate Recovery participation.
5. Use of Naltrexone (an anti‑craving medication) under medical supervision.
6. Over 100 hours of pro bono service for Kentucky flood victims.

These efforts were central to the Court’s mitigation analysis and its decision to probate the suspension.

G. Negotiated Resolution Under SCR 3.480(2)

After review by the Chair of the Inquiry Commission and the Immediate Past President of the KBA, the parties negotiated:

• P’Pool would admit Count One (SCR 3.130(8.4)(b)) and deny Count Two.
• OBC would agree to dismiss Count Two.
• Both parties would jointly request a 181‑day suspension, probated for two years with specified conditions.

Under SCR 3.480(2), the Court has discretion to accept or reject such a negotiated sanction. It is not a mere rubber stamp; the Court must determine whether the sanction is consistent with precedent and the ABA Standards. The Court concluded that it was, and entered its Opinion and Order accordingly.

IV. Legal Framework and Precedents

A. Key Rules and Standards

1. SCR 3.130(8.4)(b) – Criminal Conduct Reflecting on Fitness

SCR 3.130(8.4)(b) is Kentucky’s version of ABA Model Rule 8.4(b). In substance, it provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.

The rule does not require that the criminal act be “moral turpitude” or directly related to client representation; instead, the key inquiry is whether the conduct reflects adversely on fitness to practice. Repeated DUI, wanton endangerment, assault on officers, and related misconduct are classic examples of such conduct in disciplinary jurisprudence.

2. SCR 3.130(3.4)(c) – Disobeying Tribunal Rules

SCR 3.130(3.4)(c) concerns fairness to opposing party and counsel and generally prohibits:

knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.

In this case, Count Two alleged that the second DUI while on home incarceration violated this rule. Ultimately, this count was dismissed as part of the negotiated agreement and is not the basis of the Court’s finding of misconduct.

3. SCR 3.480(2) – Agreed Sanctions

SCR 3.480(2) authorizes disciplinary cases to be resolved by agreement. It provides that:

The Court may approve the sanction agreed to by the parties, or may remand the case for hearing or other proceedings specified in the order of remand.

Thus, while the parties may negotiate, the Supreme Court retains ultimate authority and independently assesses whether the agreed sanction is appropriate in light of precedent and the ABA Standards.

4. ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

The Court expressly relies on the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2d ed. 2019), particularly:

• § 5.12: Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.
• § 9.22(k): Lists “illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances” as an aggravating factor.
• § 9.32: Lists mitigating factors, including:
  • Absence of a prior disciplinary record (§ 9.32(a)).
  • Full and free disclosure or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings (§ 9.32(e)).
  • Imposition of other penalties or sanctions (§ 9.32(k)).
  • Remorse (§ 9.32(l)).

The Court’s analysis explicitly balances these aggravating and mitigating factors to justify a probated rather than active suspension.

B. Precedents Cited by the Court

The Court grounds its decision in three prior Kentucky bar discipline cases involving alcohol‑related misconduct, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court’s Alford decision. These precedents collectively frame the proportionality and structure of sanctions in this class of cases.

1. Kentucky Bar Association v. Dunn, 965 S.W.2d 158 (Ky. 1998)

In Dunn:

• The attorney drove the wrong way into traffic, forcing four vehicles off the road.
• He pled guilty to four counts of wanton endangerment and one count of first‑offense DUI.
• Less than a year later, he drove drunk again, injuring another driver and pleading guilty to a second‑offense DUI.

The Court imposed:

• A six‑month suspension, probated for two years.

Dunn established that multiple alcohol‑related criminal incidents, including endangerment and injuries, justify a probated suspension of several months. The parallel to P’Pool’s case is notable:

• Both involve multiple alcohol‑related incidents in a compressed time frame.
• Both include conduct that endangered or harmed others.
• Both received a six‑month‑range probated suspension as a calibrated response, emphasizing protection of the public and remediation rather than immediate exclusion from practice.

2. Kentucky Bar Association v. Rankin, 862 S.W.2d 894 (Ky. 1993)

In Rankin:

• The attorney was first convicted of wanton endangerment, assault, and DUI after injuring three people while driving drunk.
• He was twice more arrested for DUI within three years.

The Court held that Rankin’s conduct violated what is now SCR 3.130(8.4)(b), as it constituted criminal conduct reflecting adversely on his fitness to practice law. The Court imposed:

• A public reprimand.
• A six‑month suspension, probated for two years.

Significantly, the Court in Rankin mitigated the sanction because:

• Rankin acknowledged his guilt and his alcoholism.
• He took remedial action.
• There was no adverse impact on his ability to practice law and no specific harm to a client.

The present opinion draws a direct analogy, noting that:

• P’Pool likewise acknowledged his alcoholism and engaged in extensive remedial efforts (treatment, AA, counseling, KYLAP participation).
• There is no suggestion of client harm or impaired representation.

Rankin therefore supports maintaining a similar level of sanction—suspension with probation—where rehabilitation is demonstrable and ongoing.

3. Kentucky Bar Association v. Njuguna, 405 S.W.3d 435 (Ky. 2013)

In Njuguna:

• The attorney, under the influence of alcohol, became involved in a domestic dispute resulting in his girlfriend being on the hood of his car as he drove away.
• He was charged with second‑degree wanton endangerment, second‑degree fleeing and evading police, and disorderly conduct.
• Within less than two years, he accumulated two additional DUI charges.

The Court imposed:

• A 181‑day suspension.
• With 90 days probated for five years, subject to conditions aimed at addressing alcohol issues.

The Njuguna decision underscores two themes that the P’Pool Court echoes:

• Gravity of conduct: Alcohol‑related criminal misconduct, especially involving endangerment in a domestic or public context, warrants a significant suspension.
• Rehabilitative focus: Conditions are tailored to the attorney’s alcohol problems, aiming to prevent recurrence and protect the public through sustained treatment and monitoring.

By aligning the length of suspension (181 days) and using probated time plus treatment conditions, the Court signals that P’Pool’s case falls squarely within this disciplinary tradition.

4. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)

Alford is not a disciplinary case but a U.S. Supreme Court decision authorizing guilty pleas by defendants who maintain actual innocence, provided the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered and supported by a strong factual basis.

In this opinion:

• P’Pool entered his criminal pleas in Boyd County under Alford, thereby formally pleading guilty while ostensibly not admitting factual guilt.
• Importantly, the Court notes that despite the Alford posture, P’Pool affirmatively admitted in the disciplinary proceeding that his actions violated SCR 3.130(8.4)(b).

The implication is that an Alford plea does not shield a lawyer from discipline. What matters is:

• The underlying conduct (as established in the criminal case and/or disciplinary record).
• The lawyer’s acknowledgement, in the disciplinary forum, that such conduct constitutes professional misconduct.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Acceptance of the Negotiated Sanction Under SCR 3.480(2)

Although the parties agreed to a 181‑day probated suspension, the Court emphasizes that acceptance of this agreement is discretionary. The key inquiries are:

• Does the proposed sanction comport with Kentucky precedent for similar misconduct?
• Is the sanction consistent with the ABA Standards, particularly § 5.12 and § 9.0?

The Court answers both questions affirmatively, noting that:

• Prior Kentucky cases (Dunn, Rankin, Njuguna) imposing six‑month‑range suspensions, often probated, for multiple alcohol‑related offenses support a similar sanction here.
• The ABA Standards presuppose suspension for serious criminal conduct that adversely reflects on fitness; probating that suspension can be appropriate when mitigating factors predominate.

Thus, the Court does not merely defer to the parties but independently confirms that the sanction is reasonable and proportionate.

B. Application of SCR 3.130(8.4)(b) to Alcohol‑Related Criminal Conduct

The opinion reaffirms a consistent line of Kentucky authority: repeated or serious alcohol‑related criminal offenses by lawyers—particularly those involving:

• Driving under the influence,
• Endangerment or injury to others,
• Assault on police officers, and
• Threatening or destructive behavior,

constitute “criminal conduct that reflects adversely” on a lawyer’s fitness to practice. The Court does not dwell on the doctrinal foundation; instead, it relies on prior decisions that have already treated such conduct as falling squarely within SCR 3.130(8.4)(b).

Notably, the Court:

• Focuses not only on the initial Boyd County incident, but also on the second DUI while on home incarceration, evidencing a pattern rather than an isolated lapse.
• Recognizes that even though the final Boyd County convictions are all misdemeanors, they still carry sufficient gravity (e.g., assault, wanton endangerment) to impact fitness to practice.

C. The Role of the Alford Plea

Although the opinion does not dwell extensively on the implications of the Alford plea, it contains a subtle but important point:

• P’Pool entered Alford pleas in the Boyd County criminal case, which theoretically allow the defendant to maintain factual innocence.
• Nonetheless, in the disciplinary case, he expressly admits that his actions violated SCR 3.130(8.4)(b).

This underscores that:

• For disciplinary purposes, the Court is not constrained by the formal characterization of the criminal plea as an Alford plea.
• The critical factors are the existence of criminal convictions and the underlying conduct, together with the lawyer’s acknowledgment of rule violations.
• Alford pleas, like other guilty pleas, provide a sufficient basis for the Court to find violations of SCR 3.130(8.4)(b) when supported by the record.

D. Dismissal of the SCR 3.130(3.4)(c) Count

Count Two alleged that the second DUI while on home incarceration constituted a knowing and inexcusable disobedience of tribunal rules, in violation of SCR 3.130(3.4)(c). The Court does not reach the merits of this charge; it is dismissed as part of the negotiated sanction.

This approach:

• Preserves the integrity of negotiated resolutions where the central misconduct is sufficiently captured by another rule (here, 8.4(b)).
• Avoids unnecessary doctrinal development on the scope of “disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal” in the context of bond/home incarceration violations.
• Allows the Court to focus on the more obvious and well‑established vehicle for discipline—criminal conduct reflecting adversely on fitness.

(Practically, this also streamlines the case and avoids factual disputes about the precise contours of the bond conditions and the degree of knowing disobedience.)

E. Weighing Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Under the ABA Standards

The Court explicitly structures its reasoning around the ABA Standards’ aggravating and mitigating factors.

1. Aggravating Factor

The Court identifies a single aggravating factor:

• Illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances (ABA Standard § 9.22(k)).

This captures the recurrent alcohol‑related criminal behavior, including multiple DUIs, wanton endangerment, and assaultive conduct.

2. Mitigating Factors

Mitigation is extensive and documented in detail:

• Absence of prior disciplinary record (ABA Standard § 9.32(a)):
  • Over 20 years of practice with no prior discipline.
• Full and free disclosure / cooperative attitude (ABA Standard § 9.32(e)):
  • Immediate self‑reporting to KBA and KYLAP.
  • Cooperation with the Inquiry Commission and OBC.
• Imposition of other penalties or sanctions (ABA Standard § 9.32(k)):
  • Criminal penalties, including probation, fines, restitution, and jail (suspended).
  • Significant financial costs (over $10,000) and license suspensions.
  • Home incarceration, intensive testing, and treatment commitments.
• Remorse (ABA Standard § 9.32(l)):
  • Expressed acceptance of responsibility for the rule violation.
  • Sustained engagement in AA, counseling, medication‑assisted treatment, and pro bono work for flood victims.

The Court finds that these mitigating factors “outweigh” the single aggravating factor, thereby justifying a suspension that is entirely probated, rather than active.

F. Justification for a 181‑Day Probated Suspension with Conditions

With the framework of ABA Standards and Kentucky precedent in place, the Court concludes:

• Nature of Sanction: Suspension is warranted by the seriousness of the criminal conduct (ABA Standard § 5.12).
• Length of Suspension: A six‑month‑equivalent suspension (here, 181 days) is consistent with Dunn, Rankin, and Njuguna.
• Probation Instead of Active Suspension: Due to extensive mitigation, the entire 181‑day suspension is probated for two years.

The conditions placed on probation reflect a dual purpose:

• Public Protection and Oversight:
  • Quarterly KYLAP compliance reports to OBC ensure ongoing monitoring.
  • Authorizations for OBC to review KYLAP and mental health records allow early detection of relapse or noncompliance.
  • Payment of costs and maintenance of CLE and dues safeguard basic professional obligations.
• Rehabilitation and Prevention of Recidivism:
  • Continuing treatment, support meetings, and medication management encourage sustained sobriety.
  • The threat of converting the probated suspension into an active one creates a strong compliance incentive.

A notable nuance is the condition that if P’Pool “receives a charge of prosecutorial misconduct” during probation, the KBA may seek imposition of the 181‑day suspension. This suggests:

• The Court is aware of, and concerned about, his professional role (likely as a prosecutor or former prosecutor).
• Any future misconduct in that specific capacity would be treated as particularly serious, warranting reconsideration of his continued practice.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Continued Integration of ABA Standards into Kentucky Discipline

This opinion reinforces Kentucky’s practice of aligning bar discipline with the ABA Standards. Future cases involving:

• Alcohol or substance‑related criminal conduct,
• Multiple DUI incidents,
• Endangerment or injuries to others, and
• Post‑offense treatment and rehabilitation,

will likely be analyzed under the same framework:

• Start from § 5.12 (suspension typically appropriate for serious criminal conduct).
• Then adjust up or down based on § 9.22 (aggravating factors) and § 9.32 (mitigating factors).

B. Confirmation that Alford Pleas Do Not Avoid Discipline

The case confirms that:

• Alford pleas are not a safe harbor for attorneys facing discipline.
• Bar authorities and courts may treat Alford‑based convictions functionally like other guilty pleas, particularly where the lawyer, as here, admits the rule violation.

Attorneys cannot rely on the formal structure of a criminal plea to prevent a finding that their conduct violated professional rules.

C. Encouragement of Early Self‑Reporting and Engagement with KYLAP

By explicitly crediting P’Pool’s:

• Immediate self‑reporting to the KBA and KYLAP, and
• Robust participation in treatment and support programs,

the Court sends a clear message:

• Attorneys struggling with substance abuse who self‑report, cooperate, and meaningfully engage in treatment are more likely to receive probated suspensions and structured rehabilitation conditions rather than lengthy active suspensions or disbarment.

This has policy significance:

• It reinforces KYLAP’s role as a primary mechanism for addressing attorney substance issues.
• It incentivizes early intervention rather than concealment of problems until they harm clients or result in catastrophic events.

D. Tailoring Conditions to the Nature of Misconduct

The decision is also an example of sanction tailoring:

• Conditions focus on monitoring sobriety (KYLAP, therapist reports, medical supervision of Naltrexone).
• The “prosecutorial misconduct” trigger reflects heightened sensitivity to misconduct in a public‑office context.

Future disciplinary orders may similarly adapt conditions to:

• Specific practice roles (e.g., prosecutors, public defenders, transactional lawyers), and
• Particularized risk factors (e.g., client trust accounts, domestic violence, mental health conditions).

E. Consistency and Predictability in Alcohol‑Related Discipline

By closely situating this sanction alongside Dunn, Rankin, and Njuguna, the Court advances:

• Consistency: Similar conduct → similar range of suspension, often probated, with strong conditions.
• Predictability: Lawyers and bar counsel can more accurately anticipate the likely discipline spectrum for comparable fact patterns.

This fosters fairness and transparency in the disciplinary process and aids counsel in advising respondents about realistic outcomes of negotiated resolutions.

VII. Complex Concepts and Terms Explained

For non‑specialists, several legal and procedural concepts used in the opinion warrant clarification.

A. SCR 3.130(8.4)(b) – Criminal Conduct Reflecting on Fitness

This rule prohibits lawyers from committing criminal acts that reflect adversely on their:

• Honesty,
• Trustworthiness, or
• Overall fitness to practice law.

It does not require that the crime:

• Be felony rather than misdemeanor, or
• Occur in the practice of law or involve clients directly.

Instead, the question is whether the crime raises concerns about the lawyer’s judgment, reliability, respect for the law, or ability to safely and competently serve clients and the public.

B. Alford Plea

Under North Carolina v. Alford, a defendant may:

• Plead guilty to a criminal charge,
• Without expressly admitting factual guilt,
• When the plea is voluntary, informed, and supported by strong evidence of guilt.

It is often used where a defendant wishes to avoid the risk of trial (e.g., higher charges or longer sentences) but continues to assert actual innocence. For bar discipline purposes, the existence of the plea and resulting conviction, along with the factual record, can still support a finding of misconduct.

C. Probated Suspension

A “probated suspension” means:

• The Court formally imposes a suspension (e.g., 181 days).
• That suspension is not immediately enforced.
• If the lawyer successfully completes a probation period under specified conditions, the suspension never becomes active.
• If the lawyer violates probation conditions, the suspension can be activated—often after a show‑cause process.

In practice, a probated suspension functions like a serious warning backed by an enforceable consequence.

D. KYLAP – Kentucky Lawyer’s Assistance Program

KYLAP is a confidential assistance program for Kentucky lawyers facing:

• Substance abuse problems,
• Mental health issues, or
• Other personal impairments that may affect their ability to practice.

In disciplinary cases, KYLAP can:

• Assist lawyers in obtaining treatment and support.
• Report compliance (with the lawyer’s consent/order‑based authorizations).
• Serve as a monitoring mechanism to protect the public and the profession.

E. Wanton Endangerment and Assault – Basic Concepts

These are Kentucky criminal offenses that, in simplified terms, involve:

• Wanton Endangerment: Engaging in conduct that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person, while consciously disregarding that risk.
• Assault 3rd/4th Degree: Causing or attempting to cause physical injury to another; degrees vary based on victim status (e.g., police officer) and severity of injury.

These offenses are especially significant when directed at law enforcement, as in P’Pool’s case, because they reflect disregard for legal authority and public safety—core concerns for attorney discipline.

F. Terroristic Threatening 3rd Degree and Criminal Mischief 2nd Degree

Again, in simplified, non‑technical terms:

• Terroristic Threatening 3rd Degree: Threats that may cause fear of serious injury or property damage, though not at the highest statutory levels of severity.
• Criminal Mischief 2nd Degree: Intentional or wanton damage to another’s property above a certain monetary threshold.

In the disciplinary context, these offenses collectively portray volatility, impaired judgment, and disrespect for persons and property—factors relevant to assessing a lawyer’s fitness.

G. ABA Standards – Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

The ABA Standards organize discipline around:

• Baseline sanction: What discipline is normally appropriate for a given type of misconduct (e.g., admonition, reprimand, suspension, disbarment).
• Aggravating factors: Circumstances that justify increasing the sanction (e.g., prior discipline, dishonest or selfish motive, multiple offenses, illegal conduct).
• Mitigating factors: Circumstances that justify decreasing the sanction (e.g., no prior discipline, cooperation, remorse, personal or emotional problems, interim rehabilitation).

In P’Pool’s case, the balance is heavily weighted toward mitigation, making a probationary structure appropriate.

VIII. Conclusion

In re: J. Todd P’Pool is a significant reaffirmation of Kentucky’s approach to disciplining attorneys for alcohol‑related criminal misconduct. The Supreme Court of Kentucky:

• Confirms that multiple alcohol‑related offenses—including DUI, wanton endangerment, assaults on law enforcement, terroristic threatening, and criminal mischief—clearly fall within SCR 3.130(8.4)(b) as criminal conduct adversely reflecting on a lawyer’s fitness.
• Applies the ABA Standards to hold that suspension is the baseline sanction for such misconduct, but that extensive mitigating circumstances—particularly early self‑reporting, deep engagement with treatment, absence of prior discipline, and remorse—can justify a probated rather than active suspension.
• Aligns the sanction with prior Kentucky cases (Dunn, Rankin, Njuguna), reinforcing consistency and predictability in the disciplinary system.
• Demonstrates how KYLAP‑centered, treatment‑oriented conditions and structured monitoring can both protect the public and support attorney rehabilitation.
• Clarifies that an Alford plea in criminal court does not bar the Court from finding a rule violation based on the underlying conduct and the lawyer’s acknowledgment in the disciplinary forum.

In broader context, the opinion advances a balanced model of professional discipline: firm recognition that serious criminal misconduct by attorneys warrants suspension, coupled with a willingness to use probation, treatment conditions, and close monitoring when the lawyer demonstrates genuine rehabilitation and poses a manageable risk under structured oversight. This model will likely guide future disciplinary resolutions involving substance abuse and related criminal behavior by members of the Kentucky bar.