Reaffirming Prevailing-Party Status Through Judicially Sanctioned Relief in Post-Judgment Family Law Proceedings

Introduction

In the Supreme Court of Tennessee’s October 4, 2023 session, Vanessa Colley (formerly Turner) appealed the question of whether she qualified as the “prevailing party” in a post-judgment alimony modification proceeding and thus was entitled to attorney’s fees under both her marital dissolution agreement and Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c). The underlying facts are straightforward. A trial court approved a marital dissolution agreement granting alimony to Ms. Turner. Her ex-husband, John S. Colley, III, later filed a petition to modify that alimony award but voluntarily dismissed it without prejudice before any hearing. The majority held that Ms. Turner was the prevailing party because she maintained the status quo. Justice Sarah K. Campbell, joined in part by Justice Bivins, concurred with the judgment but wrote separately to clarify that prevailing-party status—as a term of art—requires a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties or a judicial rebuff of the plaintiff’s claims. She argued that a voluntary dismissal without such imprimatur alone cannot confer prevailing-party status.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court granted Ms. Turner her requested attorney’s fees, concluding that she “prevailed” when Mr. Colley voluntarily dismissed his modification petition, preserving the existing alimony award. Justice Campbell agreed with the outcome but diverged from the majority’s broader reasoning. She emphasized that prevailing-party status under both contract and statute must align with the settled meaning of the term as a legal term of art—one that ordinarily requires judicially sanctioned relief. Accordingly, Ms. Turner’s fee entitlement derived not from the mere voluntary dismissal but from her prior success in securing the court-approved marital dissolution agreement and her subsequent defense of that order.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001): Established that “prevailing party” is a term of art requiring a judicially sanctioned change in the parties’ relationship.
Lackey v. Stinnie, 145 S. Ct. 659 (2025): Reaffirmed that preliminary relief becoming permanent by external events does not suffice for prevailing-party status.
Fannon v. City of LaFollette, 329 S.W.3d 418 (Tenn. 2010): Tennessee adoption of Buckhannon’s definition, requiring “judicial imprimatur.”
CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 578 U.S. 419 (2016): Clarified that the touchstone is material alteration of legal relationship and that a defendant prevails by rebuffing the plaintiff’s challenge.
Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35 (Tenn. 2012): Confirmed that voluntary nonsuit restores parties to their original positions without adjudication on the merits.
Additional federal and state decisions (e.g., Rohrmoos Venture, Carpenter, Epps) underscore that voluntary dismissals without prejudice, absent judicial imprimatur, do not confer prevailing-party status.

Legal Reasoning

Justice Campbell’s concurring opinion proceeds from two core principles:

“Prevailing party” as a term of art: Black’s Law Dictionary and multiple federal and state opinions define it as a party in whose favor a judgment is rendered—requiring a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.
Defense of prior relief: When a party must undertake post-judgment proceedings to enforce or defend an earlier court-sanctioned order, the party may rely on its earlier prevailing-party status. The voluntary dismissal of the modification petition, while not itself a judicial rebuff, finalized the preservation of the prior alimony award and thus completed the defense of Ms. Turner’s earlier victory.

She rejected the majority’s view that any objective achievement—such as maintaining status quo via voluntary dismissal—automatically confers prevailing-party status. Instead, she anchored fee awards in the settled doctrine that only judicially sanctioned changes or rebuffs meet the definition, except when a party defends existing relief.

Impact

This concurring opinion provides critical guardrails for future fee disputes in family law and beyond:

It reinscribes the uniform, nationwide understanding of “prevailing party” and warns against family-law-specific deviations that lack broader doctrinal support.
It clarifies that post-judgment fee awards can rest on prior judicial relief, thereby protecting financially vulnerable spouses forced to defend existing awards without requiring additional merits rulings.
It invites lower courts to apply federal and out-of-state precedent when interpreting “prevailing party,” fostering consistency across jurisdictions.
It constrains plaintiffs from circumventing fee liability through tactical voluntary dismissals by reaffirming that dismissals without prejudice do not carry judicial imprimatur of a rebuff.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prevailing Party: A legal term of art meaning the party in whose favor the court issues a judgment or equivalent enforceable relief—requiring a court-ordered change in legal rights.
Judicial Imprimatur: A formal court endorsement—through judgment, consent decree, or order—that effects or acknowledges a change in parties’ rights.
Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice: A procedural move by which a plaintiff ends a case without barring refiling; it does not decide the merits nor alter the parties’ legal relationship.
Post-Judgment Proceedings: Actions taken after a final decree—such as enforcement, modification, or defense of orders already issued.

Conclusion

Justice Campbell’s concurring opinion sharpens the definition of “prevailing party” in family law fee statutes and contracts. By anchoring fee entitlement in judicially sanctioned relief and defending earlier orders, she preserves doctrinal coherence with federal and state jurisprudence. Parties and lower courts should read this decision as reaffirming that voluntary dismissals without prejudice, standing alone, cannot confer prevailing-party status—and that fee awards in post-judgment contexts properly rest on the earlier court-approved relief they seek to defend.