Reaffirming Partial Invalidation of Obscenity Statutes: Analysis of Brocket v. Spokane Arcades

Reaffirming Partial Invalidation of Obscenity Statutes: Analysis of Brocket v. Spokane Arcades

Introduction

Brocket v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., et al. (472 U.S. 491) is a significant decision by the United States Supreme Court that addresses the constitutionality of state obscenity laws under the First Amendment. The case originated when various individuals and corporations involved in the distribution of sexually oriented books and movies challenged a Washington state statute designed to regulate morally objectionable materials. The central issue revolved around whether the statute's definition of "prurient interest," particularly its inclusion of "lust," rendered it overly broad and thus unconstitutional.

This comprehensive commentary delves into the Court's rationale in reversing the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which had invalidated the statute in its entirety. By examining the judgment's background, key legal principles, and its implications for future jurisprudence, this analysis provides a thorough understanding of the Supreme Court's stance on partial versus facial invalidation of obscenity laws.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court, in a decision delivered by Justice White, reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling that had deemed the Washington state obscenity statute facially invalid. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in invalidating the statute entirely, emphasizing that partial invalidation was more appropriate. The statute in question defined "lewd matter" and "obscene matter" and included definitions of "prurient interest" and "lust." The Ninth Circuit had found that by including "lust" in its definition of "prurient interest," the statute was overbroad as it extended to materials that merely stimulated normal sexual responses, which are constitutionally protected.

The Supreme Court concluded that the statute could withstand constitutional scrutiny if it was interpreted to exclude materials that provoke only normal sexual interest. The presence of a severability clause in the statute further supported the argument for partial invalidation. Consequently, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively references several landmark cases that shape the legal landscape surrounding obscenity and free speech:

  • ROTH v. UNITED STATES (1957): Established the initial framework for defining obscenity, equating it with prurient interest and excluding it from First Amendment protection.
  • MEMOIRS v. MASSACHUSETTS (1966): Expanded the definition of obscenity, introducing a three-part test that considered literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
  • MILLER v. CALIFORNIA (1973): Further refined the obscenity test with the now-famous Miller test, which remains central to obscenity law.
  • BROADRICK v. OKLAHOMA (1973): Addressed the overbreadth doctrine, articulating when a statute may be deemed overly broad and thus invalid.
  • BUCKLEY v. VALEO (1976): Discussed severability in statutes, determining when a part of a law can be invalidated without affecting the whole.
  • PARIS ADULT THEATRE I v. SLATON (1973): Considered the constitutionality of state obscenity laws.
  • Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. (1941): Introduced the doctrine of Pullman abstention, which allows federal courts to abstain from reviewing state issues that can be resolved by state courts.

These precedents collectively inform the Court's approach to evaluating the Washington statute's constitutionality, particularly concerning the definition of "prurient interest" and the application of the overbreadth doctrine.

Impact

The decision in Brocket v. Spokane Arcades has several implications for future cases and the broader area of obscenity law:

  • Reaffirmation of Partial Invalidation: The Supreme Court reinforced the principle that partial invalidation is preferable to facial invalidation, promoting judicial restraint and legislative deference unless the statute is irreparably flawed.
  • Clarification of "Prurient Interest": By distinguishing between normal and morbid interests in sex, the Court provided clearer guidance for interpreting obscenity laws, aiding lower courts in applying the Miller test effectively.
  • Strengthening Severability Doctrine: The affirmation of the severability clause in the Washington statute underscores the necessity for clear legislative intent and the ability to preserve valid portions of a statute.
  • Overbreadth Application: The ruling clarifies that the overbreadth doctrine applies to pure speech challenges, even when conduct is not directly involved, thereby broadening the scope of when statutes can be challenged on overbreadth grounds.

Overall, the judgment promotes a balanced approach to regulating obscenity, ensuring that state laws can effectively target genuinely obscene materials without overreaching into constitutionally protected expression.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prurient Interest

Prurient interest refers to material that has a tendency to excite lustful or lascivious thoughts. In the context of obscenity law, it is used to determine whether a work appeals to an inappropriate or excessive interest in sex, going beyond normal or healthy sexual curiosity.

Overbreadth Doctrine

The overbreadth doctrine permits a statute to be invalidated if it restricts not only unprotected speech but also constitutionally protected expression. A law is considered overbroad if it reaches a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its legitimate sweep.

Facial vs. Partial Invalidation

Facial invalidation occurs when a statute is deemed unconstitutional in all of its applications, effectively nullifying the entire law. Partial invalidation, on the other hand, occurs when only specific provisions or applications of a statute are found unconstitutional, allowing the remainder of the law to stand.

Miller Test

The Miller Test is a three-part standard established in MILLER v. CALIFORNIA (1973) to determine whether material is obscene and thus not protected by the First Amendment. The test examines:

  1. Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest.
  2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct defined by state law.
  3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision in Brocket v. Spokane Arcades underscores the judiciary's preference for partial invalidation over facial invalidation of statutes, particularly in sensitive areas like obscenity regulation. By upholding the constitutionality of the Washington statute in its valid aspects, the Court maintained a balance between protecting First Amendment rights and allowing states to regulate genuinely obscene material.

This judgment not only clarifies the application of the overbreadth doctrine in the context of pure speech but also emphasizes the importance of precise statutory interpretation and legislative intent. The reaffirmation of severability clauses as a safeguard against total invalidation encourages legislators to draft well-defined laws while providing courts with the flexibility to preserve valid legislative objectives.

Moving forward, lower courts will likely reference Brocket v. Spokane Arcades when grappling with similar issues of overbreadth and the constitutionality of obscenity laws. The decision reinforces the necessity for meticulous judicial analysis in determining the extent to which statutes infringe upon constitutionally protected freedoms, ensuring that regulation targets only what is legitimately unprotected.

Case Details

Year: 1985
Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Judge(s)

Byron Raymond WhiteSandra Day O'ConnorWilliam Hubbs RehnquistWilliam Joseph BrennanThurgood Marshall

Attorney(S)

Christine O. Gregoire, Deputy Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for appellants in both cases. With her on the briefs were Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General, pro se, Jeffrey C. Sullivan, and Richard C. Robinson. David A. Saraceno filed a brief for appellant in No. 84-28. John H. Weston argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With him on the brief were David M. Brown, G. Randall Garrou, Jack Burns, James H. Lowe, Robert Eugene Smith, and Charles Stixrud. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, and William C. Bryson; for the State of Arizona et al. by Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Anthony B. Ching, Solicitor General, and Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana; for Tom Collins, as County Attorney for the County of Maricopa, Arizona, by Bruce A. Taylor and Sandor O. Shuch; for Lawrence J. Warren, as City Attorney for the City of Renton, Washington, by James J. Clancy, Lawrence J. Warren, pro se, and Daniel Kellogg; for Citizens for Decency Through Law, Inc., et al. by Paul C. McCommon III; for Concerned Women for America Education and Legal Defense Foundation by Michael P. Farris; and for Morality in Media, Inc., by John J. Walsh. Page 493 Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Mississippi Citizens for Decency Through Law by Jacqueline Smith Pierce; and for the American Booksellers Association, Inc., et al. by Michael A. Bamberger.

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