Reaffirming MDLEA Jurisdiction in Foreign Exclusive Economic Zones: Commentary on United States v. Salas Encarnacion

Reaffirming MDLEA Jurisdiction in Foreign Exclusive Economic Zones:
A Commentary on United States v. Salas Encarnacion (11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025)

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, non-argument decision in United States v. Juan Rafael Salas Encarnacion, No. 22‑11062, does not announce brand-new doctrine, but it significantly reinforces and operationalizes a line of recent precedents expanding the reach of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) in foreign Exclusive Economic Zones (“EEZs”).

The opinion addresses three recurring constitutional challenges to the MDLEA:

  1. Whether Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause to punish “Felonies committed on the high Seas” extends to conduct occurring in another nation’s EEZ.
  2. Whether Congress exceeded its Felonies Clause authority by defining “vessel without nationality” in the MDLEA more broadly than the concept of a “stateless” vessel under international law.
  3. Whether due process requires a nexus to the United States before foreign nationals can be prosecuted under the MDLEA for conduct wholly outside U.S. territory.

The court—relying heavily on its published precedents United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025), together with earlier cases such as United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014)—rejected all three arguments and affirmed the conviction and 65‑month sentence.

Although not itself precedential, Salas Encarnacion illustrates how the Eleventh Circuit now treats:

  • All foreign EEZs as part of the “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s Felonies Clause power and the MDLEA.
  • The MDLEA’s statutory definition of “vessel without nationality” as valid even when it diverges from customary international law.
  • MDLEA prosecutions of foreign nationals with no U.S. nexus as consistent with the Due Process Clause.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

In November 2020, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida indicted Juan Rafael Salas Encarnacion and two co-defendants on two MDLEA counts:

  • Count 1 – Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine aboard a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii) and 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(a)–(b).
  • Count 2 – Possession with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine on such a vessel, in violation of the same provisions except § 70506(b).

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Salas Encarnacion pled guilty to Count 1 in exchange for dismissal of Count 2. In a written factual proffer, he admitted the following key facts:

  • On November 8, 2020, a U.S. maritime patrol aircraft spotted a “go-fast” vessel with no indicia of nationality about 98 nautical miles north of Bahía Hondita, Colombia—in international waters (i.e., beyond Colombia’s territorial sea) but within Colombia’s EEZ.
  • A U.S. Coast Guard boarding team, which included a Coast Guard officer, approached and observed three persons aboard, including Salas Encarnacion.
  • The individuals identified no master and verbally claimed Dominican Republic nationality.
  • When contacted, the Dominican Republic government could “neither confirm nor deny” that the vessel was registered in the Dominican Republic.
  • On that basis, the Coast Guard treated the vessel as “without nationality” and therefore “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” boarded it, and discovered 323 kilogram‑bricks of cocaine.

The district court accepted the plea and sentenced him to 65 months’ imprisonment. Although his notice of appeal was untimely under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b), the government chose not to invoke the timeliness bar. Under United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2009), that deadline is a non‑jurisdictional claims‑processing rule; thus, the Eleventh Circuit reached the merits.

B. Issues Raised on Appeal

On appeal, Salas Encarnacion—acting pro se—raised three constitutional challenges:
  1. Felonies Clause (High Seas): Congress’s power to punish felonies on the “high Seas” does not reach conduct within a foreign nation’s EEZ. Because he was interdicted in Colombia’s EEZ (98 nm offshore), he argued that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied.
  2. Statelessness / “Vessel without Nationality”: The MDLEA’s definition of “vessel without nationality,” particularly 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C), is broader than the definition of stateless vessels under customary international law. He contended Congress exceeded its Felonies Clause authority by extending U.S. criminal jurisdiction to vessels that are not truly stateless in international law.
  3. Due Process / Nexus Requirement: Applying the MDLEA to a foreign national arrested on the high seas without any nexus to the United States supposedly violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. He acknowledged that this argument had already been rejected in United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014).

Because the first two arguments concern what the panel characterized as the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction (i.e., Congress’s power to prescribe and the MDLEA’s reach), they were reviewed de novo. Other constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed only for plain error.

C. Holding

The Eleventh Circuit, relying squarely on Alfonso, Canario‑Vilomar, and Campbell, rejected all three challenges:

  • The EEZ forms part of the “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s Felonies Clause power and the MDLEA.
  • International law does not limit Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause, and thus Congress may define “vessel without nationality” in 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) without being constrained by customary international law’s treatment of “stateless” vessels.
  • The MDLEA’s extraterritorial application requires no nexus to the United States and does not violate due process when applied to foreign nationals on stateless vessels on the high seas.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence: “AFFIRMED.”

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Posture and Standards of Review

Two procedural points are important in understanding the opinion:

  1. Untimely appeal but merits reached. Though the notice of appeal was late, the government did not invoke the Rule 4(b) time bar. Under United States v. Lopez, that filing deadline is not jurisdictional; it is a claims-processing rule that can be forfeited by the government. Hence, the panel reached the substantive issues.
  2. Standards of review.
    • Subject-matter jurisdiction questions—including whether Congress had constitutional authority to enact and apply the MDLEA to the offense—are reviewed de novo, even if raised for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016).
    • Other constitutional challenges raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed only for plain error. As summarized from Alfonso and Moriarty, plain error requires: (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights, and even then (4) the court will correct it only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

In practice, however, the court’s reliance on binding precedent means the standard of review does not meaningfully change the outcome: once prior published cases resolve the issues, a three‑judge panel is bound under the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule.

B. Issue One: Does “High Seas” Include a Foreign Nation’s EEZ?

1. The Statutory and Constitutional Framework

The MDLEA, 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a), makes it a federal crime to “knowingly or intentionally” possess with intent to distribute controlled substances while aboard a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Section 70503(b) expressly provides that the statute:

“applies even though the act is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”

Congress enacted the MDLEA pursuant to the Felonies Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8, cl. 10, which authorizes Congress:

“To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”

In United States v. Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit previously held that the MDLEA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Felonies Clause power to punish felonies committed on the high seas—even without a U.S. nexus—so long as the conduct occurs on the high seas and not in another nation’s territorial waters.

By contrast, in United States v. Bellaizac‑Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012), the court concluded that Congress could not rely on the Offences Clause to criminalize drug trafficking in another country’s territorial waters, because drug trafficking is not recognized as an “Offence against the Law of Nations” in customary international law. Thus, Bellaizac‑Hurtado recognized a territorial-waters limit on the MDLEA’s constitutional reach.

The question in Salas Encarnacion is where the EEZ fits: does conduct in a foreign EEZ count as “on the high Seas” (permissible under Campbell) or as effectively “territorial waters” (barred by Bellaizac‑Hurtado)?

2. The Defendant’s Argument

Salas Encarnacion argued that under international law, an EEZ is not part of the “high seas.” Under the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (widely treated as reflecting customary international law), the “high seas” generally begin beyond the outer limit of any state’s EEZ, which itself extends up to 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline.

Because he was seized 98 nautical miles off Colombia, he was within Colombia’s EEZ but outside its territorial sea. He argued that:

  • The EEZ is distinct from the “high seas” in international law.
  • Therefore, Congress’s Felonies Clause power to punish “Felonies committed on the high Seas” does not authorize the MDLEA’s application in Columbia’s EEZ.

3. The Court’s Reliance on Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar

The panel held that this argument is foreclosed by United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025).

In Alfonso, the Eleventh Circuit confronted the same issue. Defendants were intercepted aboard a go‑fast vessel in the EEZ of the Dominican Republic and argued that the MDLEA exceeded Congress’s Felonies Clause authority because the EEZ is not the “high seas.” The court held:

  • The EEZ is part of the “high seas” for purposes of the Felonies Clause and the MDLEA (104 F.4th at 818, 825).
  • International law does not limit the Felonies Clause; that is, the meaning of “high Seas” in the Constitution is not controlled by contemporary international law categories (id. at 826–27).
  • Accordingly, enforcement of the MDLEA in foreign EEZs is constitutionally proper.

In Canario‑Vilomar, involving defendants interdicted in the EEZs of Panama and Colombia, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed Alfonso and applied it to EEZ interdictions near those nations. The panel in Salas Encarnacion explicitly noted that it had already rejected “similar constitutional challenges” by defendants interdicted in the EEZs of Panama and Colombia as foreclosed by Alfonso.

Bound by its prior-panel-precedent rule (as articulated in United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008)), the court in Salas Encarnacion held that:

“enforcement of the MDLEA was proper here because the meaning of ‘high seas’ under the Felonies Clause and the MDLEA extends to the EEZs of foreign nations, including Colombia.”

4. Relationship with Bellaizac‑Hurtado

Bellaizac‑Hurtado remains good law: Congress may not use the Offences Clause to punish drug trafficking in another country’s territorial waters. But Salas Encarnacion, through Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar, draws a clear line:

  • Territorial sea (up to 12 nm) – Constitutionally off-limits for MDLEA prosecutions based solely on the Offences Clause.
  • EEZ and beyond (12–200+ nm) – Treated as the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, making MDLEA prosecutions constitutionally permissible.

Thus, the Eleventh Circuit now consistently characterizes EEZ areas as “high seas” for the limited—but critical—purpose of Congress’s power to define and punish felonies thereunder.

5. Commentary

This approach has several implications:

  • Decoupling from international law definitions. While UNCLOS formally distinguishes the EEZ from the high seas, the Eleventh Circuit holds that such distinctions do not restrict Congress’s enumerated powers. The Constitution’s phrase “high Seas” is interpreted as a domestic constitutional term whose scope Congress may reach consistent with its own understanding and practice, not as a dynamic reference to evolving treaty law.
  • Line-drawing at 12 nautical miles, not 200. By adopting EEZ‑as‑high‑seas for MDLEA purposes, the court effectively treats the limit of a coastal state’s territorial waters (about 12 nm) as the boundary of congressional authority under the Felonies Clause, not the EEZ’s outer limit (200 nm).
  • Strengthening U.S. maritime drug enforcement. The decision simplifies Coast Guard operations: if a foreign vessel is outside a coastal state’s territorial sea but within its EEZ, it may still be treated as on the “high seas” for MDLEA enforcement, so long as other statutory jurisdictional criteria (such as statelessness) are satisfied.

C. Issue Two: Congress’s Definition of “Vessel without Nationality”

1. Statutory Definition

Under the MDLEA, a vessel is “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” if it is a “vessel without nationality.” 46 U.S.C. § 70503(e)(1), § 70502(c)(1)(A). Section 70502(d) defines “vessel without nationality” in several ways; relevant here is § 70502(d)(1)(C), which includes:

“a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and for which the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality.”

Claims of nationality or registry may be made by various means, including:

“a verbal claim of nationality or registry by the master or individual in charge of the vessel.” 46 U.S.C. § 70502(e)(3).

In this case, the crew verbally claimed Dominican nationality, but the Dominican Republic could neither confirm nor deny registry. The Coast Guard therefore treated the vessel as lacking nationality and subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

2. The Defendant’s Argument

Salas Encarnacion made a constitutional argument under the Felonies Clause parallel to his EEZ claim:

  • Under customary international law, a verbal claim of nationality is at least prima facie evidence of that nationality.
  • Absent affirmative contrary evidence, international law would not treat such a vessel as stateless.
  • By defining “vessel without nationality” to include vessels where the claimed state merely “cannot confirm or deny” registry, Congress extended U.S. criminal jurisdiction to vessels that international law would not consider stateless.
  • Therefore, Congress exceeded its Felonies Clause power by treating those vessels as if they were on the high seas and stateless for MDLEA purposes.

3. Prior Cases: Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar

In Alfonso, the Eleventh Circuit considered an identical challenge, but because the argument was raised for the first time on appeal, it reviewed only for plain error. Defendants argued that § 70502(d)(1)(C) conflicts with international law’s treatment of verbal claims as prima facie proof of nationality. The Alfonso court found no “plain error” because neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court had yet held that this MDLEA definition exceeded Congress’s power.

In Canario‑Vilomar, however, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the same issue under de novo review and squarely rejected the constitutional challenge:

  • The court reaffirmed Alfonso’s holding that the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law.
  • It then reasoned that if international law does not limit the Felonies Clause, it also cannot limit Congress’s ability to define “stateless” or “vessel without nationality” in the MDLEA.
  • Thus, the inclusion in § 70502(d)(1)(C) of vessels whose claimed state of registry “can neither confirm nor deny” registration is not ultra vires.

4. Application in Salas Encarnacion

The panel in Salas Encarnacion simply followed Canario‑Vilomar under the prior-panel-precedent rule. It held that it was bound to accept Congress’s statutory definition as a valid exercise of the Felonies Clause power:

“Relying on Alfonso’s holding that the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law, this Court reasoned that ‘[i]t follows that international law cannot limit Congress’s authority to define “stateless vessel” for purposes of the MDLEA.’”

Accordingly, the vessel on which Salas Encarnacion was found—within Colombia’s EEZ and lacking confirmed registry—fell within the MDLEA’s jurisdictional reach as a “vessel without nationality.”

5. Commentary

The decision has three notable effects:

  • Expanded U.S. reach over ambiguous vessels. Even when a crew claims a particular nationality and that state does not deny it, U.S. authorities may treat the vessel as stateless if the state does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” confirm registration. This gives the U.S. broad flexibility to act in cases where foreign registry records are incomplete, slow, or ambiguous.
  • Diminished role for customary international law. The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning subordinates customary international norms—such as treating verbal claims as prima facie valid—to Congress’s statutory definitions in the MDLEA. While international law remains relevant to diplomatic and comity concerns, it is not treated as a constraint on Congress’s enumerated powers.
  • Risk of overbreadth in practice. Critics may worry that innocent or marginally connected crew members on vessels with poor paperwork—or victims of bureaucratic delay by their governments—can be swept into U.S. jurisdiction as if they were sailing under no flag at all. However, within the Eleventh Circuit, such policy concerns have been resolved in favor of robust MDLEA enforcement.

D. Issue Three: Due Process and the Lack of a U.S. Nexus

1. The Due Process Framework

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law. As the Eleventh Circuit noted in United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651 (11th Cir. 2016):

“The Due Process Clause prohibits the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a defendant when it would be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.”

A defendant mounting a facial challenge to a statute, per United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), must show that:

“no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.”

In Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit held:

  • The MDLEA’s conduct—drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas—is “condemned universally by law-abiding nations,” and thus its extraterritorial application is supported by the universal and protective principles of international law.
  • Because of this universal condemnation, it is not “fundamentally unfair” to prosecute foreign nationals under the MDLEA even without a nexus to the United States.
  • The MDLEA provides “clear notice” that such conduct is prohibited, thereby satisfying due process concerns about fair warning. See also United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 587 (11th Cir. 2020).

2. The Defendant’s Argument and the Court’s Response

Salas Encarnacion conceded that his due process “nexus” argument had been rejected in Campbell, but he raised it presumably to preserve the issue for potential higher review. He argued that prosecuting a foreign national, seized on the high seas with no connection to the United States, is unfair and violates the Due Process Clause.

The panel, applying the prior-panel-precedent rule, held that Campbell controls. The court reiterated that:

  • No nexus to the United States is required for MDLEA prosecutions of foreign nationals on stateless vessels on the high seas.

Accordingly, the due process claim failed.

3. Commentary

This reinforces a distinctive feature of Eleventh Circuit MDLEA jurisprudence:

  • No nexus requirement. Unlike some other circuits that have sometimes insisted on a minimal U.S. nexus in extraterritorial prosecutions, the Eleventh Circuit does not require any U.S. connection when the MDLEA applies to stateless vessels on the high seas or their functional equivalents (here, EEZs treated as such).
  • Reliance on universal condemnation. The Eleventh Circuit treats the global consensus against maritime drug trafficking as sufficient to justify the absence of a nexus and to meet the fairness and notice requirements of due process.
  • Practical effect. Any foreign national on a stateless (or MDLEA‑defined “without nationality”) vessel on the high seas carrying drugs can be prosecuted in U.S. courts regardless of whether the drugs were destined for the United States, or whether the defendant had any contact with U.S. territory, nationals, or interests.

E. The Role and Weight of Precedents Cited

The opinion relies on a web of prior decisions. Their functional roles are:

  • United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014) – Establishes that the MDLEA is a valid exercise of the Felonies Clause on the high seas without a nexus to the United States and that its extraterritorial application does not violate due process.
  • United States v. Bellaizac‑Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2012) – Limits Congress’s authority under the Offences Clause to define and punish drug trafficking in foreign territorial waters, thereby drawing a core distinction between territorial waters and high seas.
  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024) – Holds that the EEZ is part of the “high seas” under the Felonies Clause, that international law does not limit the Felonies Clause, and that MDLEA enforcement in foreign EEZs is constitutional. It also rejects, under plain‑error review, the argument that § 70502(d)(1)(C)’s definition of “vessel without nationality” exceeds Congress’s power.
  • United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025) – Applies Alfonso to other foreign EEZs (Panama and Colombia) and, under de novo review, upholds § 70502(d)(1)(C) against Felonies Clause challenge, holding that international law cannot limit Congress’s authority to define “stateless vessel” for MDLEA purposes.
  • United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) – Articulates the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule: a panel is bound by a prior panel’s holding unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc.
  • United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016) – Clarifies that questions about the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo, even if raised for the first time on appeal.
  • United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651 (11th Cir. 2016) – Provides the general due process standard for extraterritorial jurisdiction (“arbitrary or fundamentally unfair”).
  • United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) – Supplies the standard for facial constitutional challenges (no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid).
  • United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020) – Reaffirms that the MDLEA’s application to aliens captured on the high seas while drug trafficking does not violate the Due Process Clause.
  • United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2009) – Holds that Rule 4(b) criminal appeal deadlines are non‑jurisdictional claims‑processing rules.
  • United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019) – Provide the plain-error framework for reviewing unpreserved constitutional challenges.

Collectively, these cases create a tightly interlocking precedential structure within which Salas Encarnacion is resolved, leaving the panel no doctrinal room to deviate from the results reached.

IV. Impact and Future Implications

Even though labeled “Not for publication,” Salas Encarnacion has real-world significance:

  • Operational clarity for maritime enforcement. It confirms that the U.S. Coast Guard and federal prosecutors may treat vessels intercepted in foreign EEZs as on the “high seas” for MDLEA purposes, provided other statutory criteria are met.
  • Consolidation of the “MDLEA in EEZ” doctrine. Together with Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar, this case signals that, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, challenges based on the EEZ not being the high seas are foreclosed unless the Supreme Court or an en banc court revisits the issue.
  • Expanded concept of statelessness for MDLEA. The decision endorses, through prior precedent, Congress’s broad statutory definition of “vessel without nationality,” ensuring that U.S. jurisdiction is triggered in a wide range of registry-uncertain situations.
  • Entrenchment of “no nexus” due process doctrine. MDLEA defendants in the Eleventh Circuit cannot expect relief based on a lack of U.S. nexus where the vessel is stateless or treated as such under the statute and the conduct occurs on the high seas (including EEZs).
  • Potential tension with international norms. By explicitly subordinating customary international law to Congress’s domestic constitutional powers, these cases may raise comity and diplomatic concerns, although such issues are largely beyond the court’s immediate focus.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Maritime Zones: Territorial Sea, EEZ, and High Seas

  • Territorial Sea – Up to about 12 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline. The coastal state exercises sovereignty here, similar to its land territory. Under Bellaizac‑Hurtado, Congress cannot use the Offences Clause to criminalize drug trafficking in another nation’s territorial sea via the MDLEA.
  • Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) – From the outer edge of the territorial sea out to 200 nautical miles. The coastal state has special rights over natural resources (like fishing and seabed minerals) but does not have full sovereignty like in the territorial sea. Other states retain high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight.
  • High Seas (International Law Sense) – Areas beyond all national EEZs (and territorial seas). In Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar, the Eleventh Circuit held that this international-law definition does not constrain Congress’s constitutional authority. For the Felonies Clause, the court treats EEZs as falling within the functional category of “high seas.”

2. Felonies Clause vs. Offences Clause

  • Felonies Clause – Authorizes Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.” The MDLEA is grounded primarily in this clause for conduct outside any nation’s territorial waters.
  • Offences Clause – Authorizes Congress to “define and punish … Offences against the Law of Nations.” In Bellaizac‑Hurtado, the Eleventh Circuit held that drug trafficking in foreign territorial waters is not an “Offence against the Law of Nations,” limiting Congress’s use of this clause for MDLEA prosecutions.

3. “Vessel without Nationality” vs. Stateless Vessel

  • Stateless Vessel (Customary International Law) – Generally, a ship not entitled to fly the flag of any state—often because it has no valid registration or conflicting claims of nationality. Under international law, a mere verbal claim of nationality by the master is often accepted as prima facie proof unless contradicted.
  • “Vessel without Nationality” (MDLEA) – The MDLEA defines this category more broadly, including vessels where:
    • the master claims a nationality but the claimed state cannot confirm or deny registry; or
    • other statutory conditions indicating lack of nationality exist.
    This allows U.S. authorities to treat the vessel as stateless for MDLEA purposes even if international law might not.

4. Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule

In the Eleventh Circuit, once a published panel decision decides an issue, later panels must follow that decision unless it is:

  • Overruled by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc, or
  • Superseded by a contrary Supreme Court decision.

This rule ensures horizontal stare decisis and explains why Salas Encarnacion could not revisit questions resolved in Alfonso, Canario‑Vilomar, or Campbell.

5. Plain Error Review

For unpreserved constitutional objections, the appellate court asks:

  1. Was there an error?
  2. Was it “plain”—clear or obvious under current law?
  3. Did it affect the defendant’s substantial rights (i.e., affect the outcome)?
  4. Even then, should the court exercise its discretion to correct it because it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings?

Where existing precedent clearly supports the statute’s constitutionality, a defendant almost never meets this demanding standard.

6. Nexus and Due Process in Extraterritorial Cases

  • “Nexus” requirement – Some courts have suggested that, for due process to be satisfied, the defendant’s conduct abroad must have a sufficient connection (“nexus”) to the United States (such as intent to harm U.S. interests).
  • Eleventh Circuit’s approach under the MDLEA – For drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas, the Eleventh Circuit has held no such nexus is needed because:
    • Such conduct is universally condemned.
    • The MDLEA provides clear notice.
    • Thus, prosecution is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Salas Encarnacion exemplifies the Eleventh Circuit’s increasingly robust view of Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause to project U.S. criminal jurisdiction over maritime drug trafficking far beyond U.S. territorial waters. Though unpublished, it reinforces three core principles:

  1. Foreign EEZs are part of the “high seas” for purposes of MDLEA enforcement under the Felonies Clause.
  2. Congress’s MDLEA definition of “vessel without nationality” is valid even if it treats some vessels as stateless that customary international law might not.
  3. The MDLEA’s extraterritorial application to foreign nationals requires no nexus to the United States and does not, in the Eleventh Circuit’s view, offend the Due Process Clause.

Together with Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar, Salas Encarnacion effectively closes the door—at least in the Eleventh Circuit—to Felonies Clause, international-law, and nexus-based due process challenges to MDLEA prosecutions arising from interdictions in foreign EEZs of stateless (or statutorily “without nationality”) vessels. Any reconsideration of these issues will almost certainly have to come from the Supreme Court or from the Eleventh Circuit en banc.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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