Reaffirming Limits on Rule 33 New Trials, Intrinsic Evidence, and Defense Witness Immunity: Commentary on United States v. Beasley

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s published decision in United States v. Ronald Anthony Beasley, II, No. 24-10506 (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025), is not a radical reworking of criminal procedure, but it is an important consolidating opinion. It reinforces three key doctrinal boundaries that frequently arise in federal criminal practice:

the stringent standard governing motions for a new trial based on “newly discovered evidence” under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33;
the admissibility of uncharged misconduct as “intrinsic evidence” outside Rule 404(b); and
the limits on a defendant’s ability to overcome a witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege, particularly by demanding that the government grant immunity or insisting on in-camera questioning.

The case arose out of a Medicare fraud prosecution targeting a compound-pharmacy scheme in Florida. Ronald Beasley, the pharmacist-in-charge at NH Pharma, was convicted of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud and several substantive counts of health-care fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1347, 1349, and 2. On appeal, he challenged:

the denial of his Rule 33 motion for a new trial based on claims derived from his co-conspirator’s sentencing memorandum;
the admission of evidence that he stole approximately $200,000 in cash from the pharmacy (an uncharged theft);
the district court’s handling of a key defense witness—co-owner and technician Mehrshid Khatami—who invoked the Fifth Amendment; and
the government’s refusal to grant Khatami immunity, which he framed as a violation of his constitutional right to present a complete defense.

The Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion by Chief Judge William Pryor joined by Judges Branch and Abudu, affirmed the convictions. In doing so, the court reinforced:

the high bar for Rule 33 relief and clarified that counsel’s written arguments (such as a co-defendant’s sentencing memorandum) are ordinarily not “evidence” for Rule 33 purposes;
that uncharged conduct may be admitted as intrinsic evidence to show, among other things, motive, without implicating Rule 404(b); and
that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights must generally yield to a witness’s valid Fifth Amendment invocation, and courts have no power to compel the Executive Branch to grant use immunity.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

NH Pharma, a Florida pharmacy, billed Medicare for compounding medications. Many of these compounds used non-reimbursable “bulk” ingredients (powders), but the pharmacy allegedly billed Medicare for more expensive reimbursable forms (capsules, tablets, gels) of the same drugs. The indictment alleged that:

NH Pharma billed Medicare for compound medications it did not have inventory to fill; and
Beasley also billed Medicare for prescriptions never actually dispensed, i.e., “phantom scripts.”

The owner, Nava Hajiabadi, pled guilty to conspiracy to commit health-care fraud and cooperated with the government. Beasley went to trial, where the government presented:

testimony from Hajiabadi about the billing scheme and concealment (including “inventory” manipulations around audits);
evidence that Beasley stole about $200,000 in cash from the pharmacy (testimony, video of suspect cash handling, bank records, a private investigator’s testimony, and partial repayment);
testimony from three Medicare beneficiaries contradicting the supposed prescriptions billed in their names; and
expert testimony from a Medicare auditor (Calabrese) showing that NH Pharma billed for drugs it lacked the inventory to dispense and that the scripts’ quantity/duration patterns were suspect.

The jury convicted Beasley on all counts. At sentencing, Beasley denied stealing the pharmacy cash, instead claiming a side business in collectible merchandise explained his deposits. The district court appeared somewhat skeptical of the theft allegation and imposed a downward-variance sentence of 24 months (below the 51–63 month guideline range the government requested).

After trial, in her own sentencing memorandum, co-conspirator Hajiabadi argued that:

her scheme involved real patients and bona fide ailments;
she did dispense appropriate compound medications, but in a way that made them ineligible for Medicare reimbursement; and
her case was therefore less serious than schemes involving wholly “phantom patients.”

Beasley moved for a new trial under Rule 33, contending this memorandum was “newly discovered evidence” that undermined the government’s theory that he was involved in “phantom scripts” and provision of inappropriate or dangerous medications. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.

Separately, Beasley wanted to call co-owner and pharmacy technician Mehrshid Khatami as a defense witness. Khatami’s counsel advised that she would invoke the Fifth Amendment to virtually all relevant questions. The district court held a pretrial hearing (not in camera) where:

Beasley’s counsel outlined the topics he wished to cover;
Khatami’s counsel asserted a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege on all relevant subjects; and
the government refused to grant her immunity (noting that witness immunity is rare and decided at higher DOJ levels).

The district court accepted the Fifth Amendment invocation and declined to conduct in camera questioning. It excused Khatami from testifying.

B. Holdings

The Eleventh Circuit held:

Rule 33 / New Trial: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Beasley’s motion for a new trial based on “newly discovered evidence” from Hajiabadi’s sentencing memorandum, nor in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing. The memorandum was not “evidence” in the Rule 33 sense, was cumulative of information already available, and—if anything new—could have been uncovered with due diligence, and would not likely have changed the verdict.
Uncharged Theft Evidence: Beasley abandoned any valid appellate challenge to admission of the alleged theft by focusing on Rule 404(b) instead of the district court’s actual ruling: that the theft evidence was admissible as intrinsic evidence. In any event, the district court did not abuse its discretion: the theft evidence was relevant to Beasley’s motive, “completed the story” of the crime, and there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the theft occurred.
Immunity and the Right to Present a Defense: The government’s refusal to grant immunity to Khatami did not violate Beasley’s constitutional right to present a complete defense. The power to grant immunity lies exclusively in the Executive Branch, and a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights yield to a witness’s valid Fifth Amendment privilege.
No In-Camera Hearing Required: The district court acted within its discretion in declining to question Khatami in camera. The record already contained sufficient information to assess her blanket invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege.

The court therefore affirmed all of Beasley’s convictions.

III. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

A. Rule 33 and Newly Discovered Evidence

United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
Cited for the proposition that motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are “highly disfavored” and should be granted only “with great caution.” This sets the tone: Beasley faces an uphill climb.
United States v. Markovich, 95 F.4th 1367 (11th Cir. 2024)
Provides the now-standard five-part test for Rule 33 new-trial motions based on newly discovered evidence. The defendant must show:
1. the evidence was discovered after trial;
2. failure to discover it earlier was not due to lack of diligence;
3. the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching;
4. the evidence is material; and
5. it would probably produce a different result at a new trial.
The Eleventh Circuit applied this test and found Beasley failed multiple prongs.
United States v. Sweat, 555 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2009)
Cited for the standard of review: denial of an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 33 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. This supports the court’s deferential approach to the district court’s decision not to hold a hearing.
United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019)
Authority for the basic principle that “[a]rguments of counsel are not evidence.” The court used this to cast doubt on whether a sentencing memorandum—a vehicle for advocacy—can be treated as “evidence” at all. That conceptual move is important for cabining Rule 33.

B. Intrinsic Evidence and Rule 404(b)

United States v. Burnette, 65 F.4th 591 (11th Cir. 2023)
Cited for the abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing evidentiary rulings, including admission of uncharged misconduct.
United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2013)
Defines intrinsic evidence as uncharged conduct that:
1. arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense;
2. is necessary to complete the story of the crime; or
3. is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.
The Eleventh Circuit applied this taxonomy to uphold admission of the uncharged theft as “necessary to complete the story” and to explain motive.
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988)
Although Huddleston concerns Rule 404(b) and conditional relevance, its principle is broader: when evidence’s relevance depends on some factual condition (e.g., whether Beasley actually stole money), the court does not decide if the condition is true. Instead, the court asks whether a reasonable jury could find that the conditional fact exists by a preponderance of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit invoked this to justify admission of the theft evidence despite competing explanations.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014)
Provides a critical appellate practice rule: if an appellant fails to challenge one of the independent grounds supporting a decision, that ground is deemed abandoned, and the judgment must be affirmed on that basis alone. Beasley attacked the theft evidence only under Rule 404(b), ignoring the district court’s actual reliance on intrinsic-evidence doctrine; under Sapuppo, that omission is fatal.

C. Fifth Amendment, Immunity, and the Right to Present a Defense

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986)
Establishes that, whether rooted in due process or in the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Beasley invoked this principle to argue that barring Khatami’s testimony (without immunity) denied him that opportunity.
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998)
Clarifies that the right to present a defense is not absolute; it may be subject to reasonable restrictions that serve legitimate interests in the criminal process. The Eleventh Circuit relied on this to justify the priority given to a witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege.
United States v. Ahmed, 73 F.4th 1363 (11th Cir. 2023)
Reiterates that when a defendant’s right to compulsory process conflicts with a witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the conflict is generally resolved in favor of the witness. This underpins the court’s core holding that Beasley’s desire to call Khatami cannot overcome her valid invocation of the Fifth.
United States v. Merrill, 685 F.3d 1002 (11th Cir. 2012)
Articulates the institutional separation-of-powers rule that the power to confer immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1) lies “exclusively in the Executive Branch,” not the courts. The Eleventh Circuit used this to reject Beasley’s argument that the court should have compelled the government to immunize Khatami.
United States v. Mitrovic, 890 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2018)
Cited for the standard of review: constitutional challenges to refusals to grant immunity are reviewed de novo. The court nevertheless concluded, on the merits, that there was no constitutional violation.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
The leading case limiting admission of “testimonial” hearsay under the Confrontation Clause. The Eleventh Circuit invoked Crawford only to dispose of a largely undeveloped Confrontation Clause argument—no testimonial hearsay was admitted, so the Clause was not implicated.

D. In-Camera Review and Privilege

United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568 (11th Cir. 2011)
Used for the abuse-of-discretion standard on decisions about whether and how to inquire into a witness’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment.
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989)
Although Zolin concerns in-camera review related to the crime-fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege, it provides the general framework: district courts have discretion whether to conduct in-camera review based on the circumstances, including how likely such review is to reveal non-privileged material. The Eleventh Circuit analogized this to Fifth Amendment invocations, holding that the court need not conduct an in-camera examination if the existing record already suffices.
United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2006)
Addresses issue preservation. The court cited Massey to reject the government’s argument for plain-error review, concluding that Beasley’s request for an in-camera hearing was “adequately presented” below and therefore preserved.

IV. Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Analysis

A. The Rule 33 Motion: What Counts as “Newly Discovered Evidence”?

1. Is a sentencing memorandum “evidence”?

Central to Beasley’s Rule 33 claim was the idea that his co-conspirator’s sentencing memorandum constituted “newly discovered evidence” contradicting the government’s trial theory. The Eleventh Circuit was skeptical even at the level of definitional first principles:

Drawing on Black’s Law Dictionary, the court emphasized that “evidence” means material that tends to prove or disprove a fact.
A sentencing memorandum is a vehicle for “argument about the facts,” not proof of them. As Valois states, arguments of counsel are not evidence.

While the court did not squarely hold that such a memorandum can never be “evidence” for Rule 33 purposes, it “doubt[ed]” it could be so here, and then held that even if treated as evidence, Beasley still lost under the Rule 33 standard.

2. Lack of diligence and cumulative nature

Applying the Markovich five-part test, the court found Beasley’s motion deficient on multiple grounds:

Diligence: The gist of Hajiabadi’s sentencing argument—that her fraud involved real patients and real medications but improper billing of non-reimbursable bulk ingredients—was already:
- apparent from her criminal information, unsealed nearly a year before Beasley’s trial, which focused on reimbursement for compound medications prepared with non-reimbursable bulk ingredients, not “phantom scripts”; and
- expressly stated in her trial testimony, where she described billing Medicare for different (reimbursable) ingredients than those actually used, while still aiming to provide a product of the “same” quality that the doctor ordered.
If Beasley believed the government’s theory overstated or distorted the nature of the overall conspiracy, he could have teased that out through cross-examination at trial. To the extent he did not, that failure reflects “lack of diligence,” which is fatal under Rule 33.
Cumulative / Non-material: The sentencing memorandum did not materially change the nature of the case:
- It restated the same characterization of the fraud that was implicit in the information and explicit in trial testimony.
- It addressed her conduct and legal argument for leniency, not the full scope of Beasley’s conduct—especially his alleged involvement with “phantom scripts” and dangerous medications.
- Thus, it was “merely cumulative” of what was known or knowable at trial, and would not probably have produced a different verdict.

In short, the Eleventh Circuit used established precedents to reaffirm that Rule 33 is not a backdoor to relitigate strategic trial choices or to recast co-defendants’ sentencing advocacy as new factual revelations.

3. No evidentiary hearing required

The court then addressed the request for an evidentiary hearing. Citing Markovich, it noted that new-trial motions “may ordinarily be decided upon affidavits without an evidentiary hearing.” Here:

The core “new matter”—the text of Hajiabadi’s sentencing memorandum—was undisputed.
The district court explicitly accepted the memorandum as true and even interpreted it in the way Beasley urged.
An evidentiary hearing would thus have “served no purpose.”

This is a pragmatic application of the abuse-of-discretion standard: when factual disputes are absent and the “evidence” is pure written advocacy, a hearing is unnecessary.

B. Intrinsic Evidence and Uncharged Theft

1. Abandonment under Sapuppo

Beasley challenged admission of theft evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), arguing that the district court misapplied the rule on other-acts evidence. But the district court had expressly admitted the evidence as intrinsic—i.e., outside Rule 404(b) altogether. Under Sapuppo:

When a trial court’s ruling rests on alternative grounds, an appellant must challenge each ground to obtain reversal.
Beasley attacked the non-controlling ground (404(b)) while ignoring the actual operative ground (intrinsic evidence).
As a result, he “abandoned” any challenge to the intrinsic-evidence rationale, and the judgment had to be affirmed on that basis alone.

This is a reminder that appellate outcomes often turn less on substantive law than on precise issue framing and preservation.

2. Why the theft was intrinsic evidence

The panel then proceeded—essentially in the alternative—to explain that, even if reached, the intrinsic-evidence ruling was sound under Troya:

The theft “completed the story” of the fraud by explaining motive:
- At trial, Beasley argued he had no reason to join the fraud because he was a salaried employee who did not share in the profits.
- The government countered with evidence that he “skimmed” roughly $200,000 in cash from the pharmacy, and that when confronted, he said he felt “undervalued and underappreciated” given the pharmacy’s success.
- This evidence supports an inference that Beasley saw the cash withdrawals as his de facto share of fraud proceeds and therefore did have a financial interest in the scheme’s success.

On this theory, the theft was not a separate, unrelated bad act introduced merely to show propensity; it was woven into the narrative of why Beasley would knowingly participate in the larger conspiracy.

3. Sufficient proof under Huddleston

Beasley also argued that the theft was too weakly supported to go to the jury at all. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument under Huddleston’s conditional-relevance framework:

Courts do not resolve factual disputes when deciding conditional relevance; they ask only if a reasonable jury could find the act occurred by a preponderance.
Here, the jury had:
- Hajiabadi’s direct testimony that Beasley stole the money;
- video showing Beasley taking cash from a sale and not placing it in the register;
- bank records with large cash deposits beyond his salary;
- testimony from both Hajiabadi and a private investigator that Beasley did not deny the theft when confronted, but justified it as compensation; and
- evidence that he repaid about $60,000.

Although Beasley offered an alternative explanation (a cash-based collectibles business), the district court’s later doubts at sentencing about the theft did not negate the jury’s prerogative. Under Huddleston, this was more than enough for admission.

C. Fifth Amendment Privilege vs. Right to Present a Defense

1. Priority of the witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege

Beasley’s most constitutionally ambitious claim was that his right to present a complete defense was violated because he could not compel testimony from Khatami. The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis proceeded in two steps:

Recognizing the defense right: Citing Crane and Scheffer, the court acknowledged the baseline principle that defendants are entitled to a “meaningful opportunity” to present a defense, subject to reasonable procedural and evidentiary rules.
Resolving the conflict: When that right clashes with a witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege, Ahmed and related precedent make clear that “we resolve [the conflict] in favor of the witness.” The witness’s independent constitutional right not to incriminate herself prevails.

Because Beasley did not dispute the validity or scope of Khatami’s Fifth Amendment invocation, the panel had little difficulty concluding that his Sixth Amendment-based request had to yield.

2. Courts cannot compel immunity

To overcome this conflict, Beasley argued that the district court should have “compelled” the government to grant immunity to Khatami. Relying on Merrill and 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1), the court rejected this outright:

The decision to seek an immunity order is committed exclusively to the Executive Branch.
Courts may issue immunity orders only upon a formal request by the Executive (typically the U.S. Attorney, authorized by DOJ leadership).
There is no constitutional doctrine in the Eleventh Circuit permitting courts to override prosecutorial discretion and force the government to immunize a defense witness.

Thus, even if immunity would have been helpful or even crucial to Beasley’s defense, he had no legal right to demand it or to force judicial intervention.

3. Unsuccessful equal-protection and Confrontation Clause arguments

Beasley tried to frame the government’s refusal to immunize or prosecute Khatami as selective prosecution and an equal-protection violation. The panel dispatched this quickly:

He asserted, without elaboration, that “no showing of discriminatory intent is necessary when the equal protection claim is based on an overtly discriminatory classification,” but he never identified any such classification (e.g., by race, gender, or other protected category).
Because he failed to articulate the elements of selective prosecution (such as discriminatory effect and intent), the argument was effectively undeveloped and failed.

His Confrontation Clause argument fared no better:

Under Crawford, the Clause targets the admission of ex parte “testimonial” statements without prior cross-examination.
Beasley did not identify any testimonial hearsay from Khatami (or anyone else) admitted at trial.
Thus, there was nothing for the Confrontation Clause to remedy.

The panel also noted, citing Sapuppo, that these claims were essentially forfeited by being raised only in perfunctory fashion.

D. No In-Camera Hearing Required on the Fifth Amendment Invocation

Beasley’s final issue concerned the procedure the district court used to evaluate Khatami’s Fifth Amendment assertion. He argued the court should have questioned her in camera before permitting a blanket invocation.

The Eleventh Circuit applied:

Perez to set the abuse-of-discretion standard, and
Zolin to emphasize judicial discretion in deciding whether additional in-camera inquiry is necessary.

On the record:

Beasley’s counsel identified the topics he wished to address with Khatami (ownership, operations, finances, etc.).
Her counsel indicated she would assert the Fifth to “every single one” of those questions and topics, because all implicated potential self-incrimination in an ongoing fraud investigation.
There was no real factual dispute or ambiguity about the nature of the risk she faced.

Given this, the district court had enough information to rule on the privilege without an in-camera colloquy. Under Zolin’s logic, in-camera review is discretionarily reserved for cases where there is a meaningful chance that such review will reveal non-privileged material or narrow the privilege. Here, the court reasonably concluded that further inquiry would be redundant.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

This case intersects several doctrinal areas that can be opaque. The following brief explanations may help clarify key concepts.

1. Rule 33 “Newly Discovered Evidence” Motions

Rule 33 allows a defendant to request a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires” when based on “newly discovered evidence.” But the Eleventh Circuit treats such motions as “highly disfavored.” To win, a defendant must show:

The evidence was discovered after trial (not just newly appreciated or better spun).
He was diligent before trial and could not reasonably have discovered it earlier.
The evidence is not just cumulative or impeaching of a witness, but adds genuinely new facts.
The evidence is material to a central issue.
It would probably change the outcome with a new jury.

In practice, courts strictly police the diligence and materiality requirements, and are skeptical of attempts to repackage known information as “new.”

2. Intrinsic Evidence vs. Rule 404(b)

Rule 404(b) generally prohibits using “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to prove a defendant’s bad character and then reason that he acted in accordance with that character. But some uncharged acts are considered “intrinsic” to the charged offense and thus outside 404(b).

Evidence is intrinsic if it:

is part of the same series of transactions as the charged crime;
is necessary to tell a coherent story of the offense (e.g., why the defendant joined a conspiracy); or
is so intertwined with the charged conduct that separating it would confuse the jury.

Here, the alleged theft from the pharmacy was intrinsic because it helped explain Beasley’s financial motive and role in the fraud.

3. Conditional Relevance and Huddleston

Sometimes evidence is relevant only if some underlying fact is true (e.g., “if he really stole the money, then his motive changes”). Under Rule 104(b) and Huddleston:

The judge does not finally determine whether the underlying fact is true.
Instead, the judge asks: could a reasonable jury find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the fact is true?
If yes, the evidence is admitted, and the jury decides what actually happened.

4. Fifth Amendment vs. Compulsory Process

Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses in their favor (Compulsory Process) and to confront adverse witnesses. But every witness also has an independent Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate themselves.

When those rights conflict:

The Eleventh Circuit (following many circuits) gives priority to the witness’s Fifth Amendment right.
Defendants cannot force a witness to testify if legitimate self-incrimination concerns exist.

5. Immunity for Witnesses

“Immunity” means the government agrees not to use a witness’s testimony (and sometimes derivative evidence) against them. Under 18 U.S.C. § 6003:

Only the Executive Branch—typically the U.S. Attorney’s Office with DOJ authorization—can request an immunity order.
Courts cannot independently decide to immunize a witness.
Defendants have no constitutional right to demand that the government immunize their witnesses, even if those witnesses are exculpatory, absent extraordinary prosecutorial misconduct (which was not alleged or shown here).

6. In-Camera Hearings

An “in camera” hearing is held outside the presence of the public and usually outside the presence of the jury, sometimes with only the judge and the witness (or counsel) present. Courts use in-camera reviews to:

test claims of privilege (attorney–client, Fifth Amendment, etc.);
examine sensitive evidence without public disclosure; or
resolve disputes where full public airing could defeat the privilege’s purpose.

However, courts are not required to conduct such hearings whenever a privilege is invoked. They exercise discretion based on:

how clear the privilege claim already is from the record; and
whether in-camera review is likely to yield additional, non-privileged testimony.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Rule 33 Practice: Sentencing Advocacy is Not “New Evidence”

Beasley will be particularly relevant in post-conviction practice. It underscores that:

Co-defendants’ later sentencing filings—arguing about how to characterize the offense for guideline or § 3553(a) purposes—rarely qualify as “new evidence.”
If the factual themes in such filings were discoverable through pretrial discovery or cross-examination, a defendant’s failure to pursue them is likely to be deemed a lack of diligence.
Rule 33 is not a safety valve for re-litigating trial strategy or defense theory in light of how a co-conspirator later frames the case at sentencing.

This serves to keep Rule 33 within its traditional, narrow scope and may discourage creative efforts to leverage post-trial cooperator advocacy into new trials.

B. Strengthening Intrinsic-Evidence Doctrine

In affirming the admission of theft evidence as intrinsic, Beasley reinforces a relatively broad conception of intrinsic evidence in the Eleventh Circuit:

Uncharged financial misconduct that helps explain a defendant’s motive to commit the charged offense can qualify as “necessary to complete the story.”
Even where the district court later expresses doubt about the truth of the uncharged act (as at sentencing), admission remains proper if the jury had sufficient evidence to find the act occurred under Huddleston.

For practitioners, this means that:

Defendants should anticipate that related uncharged conduct—particularly involving money and motive—may come in as intrinsic, not as 404(b) “other acts.”
Defense briefs must clearly attack the intrinsic-evidence rationale itself (e.g., arguing that the act is too attenuated from the charged conduct), or else risk abandonment under Sapuppo.

C. Witness Immunity and Executive Discretion

The opinion reaffirms a strong separation-of-powers stance on immunity:

Courts cannot compel the government to grant immunity, even when such immunity would resolve a conflict between a witness’s self-incrimination rights and the defendant’s interest in exculpatory testimony.
The defendant’s right to present a defense typically yields to the witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege.

This keeps the Eleventh Circuit aligned with the majority of circuits that reject broader judicially-created immunity doctrines for defense witnesses. It leaves defendants with few tools to counter selective use of immunity (e.g., for government cooperators but not for defense witnesses) absent showing of egregious prosecutorial misconduct.

D. Procedural Rigor and Preservation on Appeal

Finally, Beasley is a cautionary tale on appellate practice:

Failure to address all independent grounds for a ruling (here, intrinsic evidence) can doom an otherwise colorable argument.
Raising complex constitutional claims (selective prosecution, Confrontation Clause) in cursory fashion will be treated as forfeiture under Sapuppo.
Conversely, precise trial objections (e.g., clearly requesting an in-camera hearing) can preserve more favorable standards of review, as seen in the court’s rejection of plain-error review in favor of abuse-of-discretion under Massey.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Beasley is a doctrinally dense, if factually straightforward, health-care fraud appeal. Its enduring significance lies in the way it:

reasserts the narrow, demanding nature of Rule 33 relief and questions whether post-trial advocacy documents can ever be “newly discovered evidence” in the Rule 33 sense;
solidifies the Eleventh Circuit’s flexible, prosecution-friendly approach to intrinsic evidence, allowing uncharged acts that illuminate motive and context to bypass Rule 404(b);
reinforces that defendants cannot compel immunity for defense witnesses or override legitimate Fifth Amendment invocations, even when important exculpatory testimony may be lost; and
illustrates the critical importance of issue framing and preservation on appeal, especially in multi-ground evidentiary rulings.

For practitioners, Beasley is a reminder that many of the most consequential battles in federal criminal cases are procedural: how evidence is categorized, how privileges are asserted and tested, and how post-trial motions and appellate briefs are crafted. The opinion keeps existing law largely intact but clarifies and reinforces several key limits that will shape trial and post-conviction strategy in health-care fraud prosecutions and beyond.