Reaffirming Key Sex‑Trafficking Sentencing Enhancements and Mandatory Restitution: Seventh Circuit Dismisses Appeal Under Anders in United States v. Arnold

Introduction

In United States v. Daryl S. Arnold (7th Cir. Sept. 3, 2025), the Seventh Circuit issued a nonprecedential order granting appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders v. California and dismissing Arnold’s appeal as frivolous. Arnold pleaded guilty to four counts of sex trafficking of minors in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and (c), and received a 288-month sentence—below the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 360 months to life (offense level 42; criminal history category III).

The case presents a thorough application of recurring federal sentencing issues in child sex-trafficking prosecutions: the § 2G1.3 enhancements for undue influence, use of a computer, and commission of a sex act; the § 3D1.4 multiple-count adjustment; and the § 4B1.5(b)(1) “repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors” enhancement based on a “pattern of activity.” The court also addresses standards for factual findings at sentencing, double counting, groupability of counts involving different minors, the presumption of reasonableness for below-Guidelines sentences, supervised release conditions, and mandatory restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 1593. Notably, the district court applied the 2023 amendment eliminating the former “status points” in § 4A1.1(d).

Although designated nonprecedential and thus not binding, the order consolidates and reaffirms controlling principles that govern similar sex-trafficking cases in the Seventh Circuit.

Summary of the Judgment

Arnold’s appointed counsel filed an Anders brief asserting no nonfrivolous appellate issues. The panel—Judges Easterbrook, Kirsch, and Pryor—accepted counsel’s analysis, reviewed the issues counsel identified and those Arnold raised in his Rule 51(b) response, and dismissed the appeal.

Key holdings and dispositions include:

Factual finding that Arnold had sex with three minors was not clearly erroneous; it was supported by grand jury testimony and Arnold’s own pro se admission.
The district court correctly applied several Guidelines enhancements:
- § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) (undue influence), based on a rebuttable presumption triggered by a >10-year age gap; the 20+ year gap applied and was not rebutted.
- § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B) (use of a computer), where Arnold used email and smartphones to facilitate the offenses.
- § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) (offense involved commission of a sex act), rejecting a “double counting” objection; double counting is permissible unless the Guidelines prohibit it.
- § 3D1.4 (multiple-count adjustment), because offenses involving multiple minors do not group under § 2G1.3(d)(1), cmt. n.6.
- § 4B1.5(b)(1) (repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors), where a “pattern of activity” was established by both the offense of conviction (as clarified in application notes) and credible evidence of sex with three minors.
The removal of “status points” under the 2023 amendment to § 4A1.1(d) was correctly recognized, yielding a criminal history category III; acceptance of responsibility was allowed despite some minimization.
The 288-month prison term, below the advisory range, was substantively reasonable given the seriousness of the offense and Arnold’s lack of remorse.
Challenges to supervised release conditions failed; the district court adequately tied the conditions to § 3553(a) and supervision needs.
Restitution of $136,700 under 18 U.S.C. § 1593 was mandatory and supported by the record; the court permissibly relied on evidence linking the amount to estimated costs of child sexual abuse.

Detailed Analysis

1) Anders Framework and Scope of Review

Under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), counsel may move to withdraw if, after conscientious examination, the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issues. The Seventh Circuit reviews the Anders submission, limits its merits review to the matters counsel and the defendant identify, and decides whether any nonfrivolous issue exists. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, counsel also complied with United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024), by consulting with Arnold and omitting plea-withdrawal issues because he did not wish to withdraw his guilty plea.

2) Standards of Review at Sentencing

Fact findings (e.g., whether Arnold committed sex acts) are reviewed for clear error and are upheld if plausible in light of the record. United States v. Shehadeh, 127 F.4th 1058, 1064 (7th Cir. 2025); United States v. McGraw, 571 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2009).
Legal interpretations and applications of the Guidelines are reviewed de novo. Shehadeh, 127 F.4th at 1064.
Substantive reasonableness of a below-Guidelines sentence is reviewed under a deferential standard and presumed reasonable. United States v. Moore, 851 F.3d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 2017).

3) The Contested Enhancements and Adjustments

A. Undue Influence – § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)

The court affirmed a two-level increase based on undue influence over minors, relying on Application Note 3(B)’s rebuttable presumption when the defendant is at least ten years older than the minor. Here, the 20+ year age differential easily triggered the presumption. Arnold’s argument that he did not use force failed; the enhancement turns on the effect of the defendant’s conduct on the minor’s voluntariness, not on the presence of physical coercion. United States v. Miller, 601 F.3d 734, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2010). The district court properly found the presumption unrebutted.

B. Use of a Computer – § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B)

Arnold’s plea admitted use of an email account and smartphone communications to arrange and manage paid encounters. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that such use supports the enhancement. United States v. McMillian, 777 F.3d 444, 449–50 (7th Cir. 2015). A challenge here would be frivolous.

C. Commission of a Sex Act – § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) and “Double Counting”

The district court found by a preponderance that Arnold had sex with three minors, supporting the two-level increase. Arnold argued that the base offense level already captured this conduct. The Seventh Circuit reiterated that “double counting is generally permissible unless the text of the guidelines expressly prohibits it.” United States v. Vizcarra, 668 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 2012). Section 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) expressly authorizes the additional increase; therefore, no prohibition exists, and the enhancement stands.

D. Multiple-Count Adjustment and Grouping – § 3D1.4

The court applied a four-level increase for four equally serious counts. Counts were not grouped because offenses involving different minors under § 2G1.3 generally do not group. See § 2G1.3(d)(1), cmt. n.6; McMillian, 777 F.3d at 449. This approach recognizes the distinct harms to separate victims.

E. Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors – § 4B1.5(b)(1)

The five-level enhancement applies when the offense of conviction is a “covered sex crime” and the defendant engaged in a “pattern of activity” involving prohibited sexual conduct. The court held: (1) sex trafficking of minors qualifies as a covered sex crime, § 4B1.5 cmt. n.2(A)(iv); and (2) a pattern was established by both the offense of conviction (as clarified in cmt. n.4(A), (B)(i)) and independent evidence that Arnold had sex with three minors. See United States v. Norwood, 982 F.3d 1032, 1059 (7th Cir. 2020). The enhancement was therefore properly imposed.

F. Acceptance of Responsibility and Criminal History

Despite the government’s objection, the court granted a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1, noting it was a close call but supported by Arnold’s guilty plea. On criminal history, the court (with the government’s agreement) removed two “status points” in light of the Sentencing Commission’s 2023 amendment eliminating former § 4A1.1(d). The result was criminal history category III. Although, at offense level 42, categories III and IV both yield 360–life, the correction was nevertheless appropriate and consistent with current Guidelines.

4) Substantive Reasonableness

The 288-month sentence—substantially below the advisory minimum of 360 months—was presumed reasonable. The district court weighed the “obvious extreme seriousness” of the offense and Arnold’s lack of remorse against mitigating factors such as his difficult childhood. On appeal, a defendant cannot prevail by asking the court to reweigh these considerations. United States v. Abriz‑Villa, 28 F.4th 786, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2022). Arnold could not meet the “particularly onerous burden” needed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness for below-Guidelines sentences. Moore, 851 F.3d at 674.

5) Supervised Release Conditions

Arnold challenged two conditions. The district court has “wide discretion” to impose conditions reasonably related to § 3553(a) factors and supervision needs, and must explain its reasons. United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 838, 845 (7th Cir. 2015). The court tied the conditions to Arnold’s offense conduct and the probation office’s need to verify employment. No nonfrivolous challenge existed.

6) Restitution Under 18 U.S.C. § 1593

Restitution for sex trafficking of children is mandatory. 18 U.S.C. § 1593. The district court has broad discretion in calculating the amount. United States v. Dickey, 52 F.4th 680, 687 (7th Cir. 2022). Here, the government grounded its request in evidence linking the award to estimated costs of child sexual abuse, and the court adopted a conservative figure ($136,700). The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed that uncertainty in prospective loss estimates does not render them speculative when supported by evidence. See United States v. Sainz, 827 F.3d 602, 604–06 (7th Cir. 2016). A challenge would be frivolous.

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): Framework for counsel’s withdrawal where no nonfrivolous issues exist; governs appellate screening here.
United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2014): Limits appellate review in Anders cases to issues identified by counsel and the defendant’s Rule 51(b) response.
United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020 (7th Cir. 2024): Counsel properly omitted plea-withdrawal arguments upon client’s instruction.
United States v. Shehadeh, 127 F.4th 1058 (7th Cir. 2025); United States v. McGraw, 571 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Raibley, 243 F.3d 1069 (7th Cir. 2001): Standards for factual findings (clear error) and plausibility in light of the record.
United States v. Miller, 601 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2010): Interprets “undue influence” under § 2G1.3; emphasizes effect on minor rather than force.
United States v. McMillian, 777 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2015): Confirms application of the “use of a computer” enhancement and addresses grouping in § 2G1.3 cases.
United States v. Vizcarra, 668 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 2012): Reiterates that double counting is allowed unless expressly prohibited by the Guidelines.
United States v. Norwood, 982 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2020): Discusses proof of “pattern of activity” for § 4B1.5(b) enhancement.
United States v. Moore, 851 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2017): Presumption of reasonableness for below-Guidelines sentences.
United States v. Abriz‑Villa, 28 F.4th 786 (7th Cir. 2022): Appellate courts do not reweigh § 3553(a) factors.
United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015): Requirements for tailoring and explaining supervised release conditions.
United States v. Dickey, 52 F.4th 680 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Sainz, 827 F.3d 602 (7th Cir. 2016): Breadth of discretion and evidentiary bases for restitution calculations, including prospective and cost-estimate methodologies.

Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Clarifications

Application Notes: The court relied on commentary to § 2G1.3 and § 4B1.5 to trigger presumptions (undue influence) and to define “pattern of activity,” consistent with longstanding practice that Guideline commentary is authoritative unless inconsistent with the text.
Double Counting: The decision underscores that the Guidelines often layer enhancements to capture different facets of harm; objections must identify an express textual prohibition to prevail.
Grouping: Offenses involving multiple minors do not group; each child’s victimization is treated discretely for offense-level aggregation, reflecting individualized harm.
Factual Findings: The court’s acceptance of grand jury testimony and a defendant’s own writings as support for sex-act findings illustrates the breadth of reliable information a sentencing court may consider.
Amendment 821 (2023): The district court correctly applied the elimination of § 4A1.1(d) “status points,” showing current Guidelines policy now reduces criminal history inflation tied solely to “status” at the time of the offense.
Restitution Methodology: The panel endorses reliance on credible cost-of-abuse estimates and victim-loss models under § 1593, emphasizing reasoned conservatism rather than mathematical precision.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although nonprecedential, the ruling is a practical roadmap for trafficking cases in the Seventh Circuit. Practitioners should expect:

Robust application of § 2G1.3 enhancements where facts support undue influence (especially large age disparities), computer facilitation, and commission of sex acts—even when force or violence is absent.
Little traction for “double counting” arguments unless a Guideline expressly forbids cumulative application.
No grouping of counts involving multiple minors, with substantial offense-level increases under § 3D1.4.
Regular use of § 4B1.5(b)(1)’s five-level increase where the offense of conviction and record evidence together show a “pattern of activity.”
Continued difficulty challenging below-Guidelines sentences as substantively unreasonable, given the presumption of reasonableness and deference to the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors.
Supervised release conditions will be upheld where the court ties them to the offense and supervision needs and explains its reasoning—even briefly.
Restitution under § 1593 will be mandatory and likely sizable, with courts accepting evidence-based estimates of victim costs, so long as the amounts are tethered to the record and not speculative.
Post‑2023 criminal history calculations should reflect the elimination of old “status points,” but in high offense-level cases the effect on the range may be limited.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Anders Appeal: A screening mechanism for appointed counsel to withdraw when no legitimate appellate issues exist. The appellate court independently verifies that the appeal is indeed frivolous.
Clear Error vs. De Novo:
- Clear error: The appellate court defers to the district judge’s factual findings and reverses only if left with a firm conviction a mistake was made.
- De novo: No deference; the appellate court decides legal questions anew.
Undue Influence (§ 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)): A presumption applies when the defendant is 10+ years older than the minor; the focus is on the defendant’s effect on the minor’s will, not on physical compulsion.
Use of a Computer (§ 2G1.3(b)(3)(B)): Email, texting, and smartphones are “computers” for enhancement purposes if used to facilitate the offense.
Double Counting: Applying more than one enhancement for overlapping conduct; allowed unless the Guidelines forbid it explicitly.
Grouping (§ 3D1.4): Determines how multiple counts affect the offense level. Crimes against separate victims typically do not group, increasing the offense level.
Pattern of Activity (§ 4B1.5(b)(1)): Two or more separate occasions of prohibited sexual conduct with a minor; can include the offense of conviction and additional proven conduct.
Presumption of Reasonableness: A below-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable; overturning it requires showing it is unreasonably high despite the district court’s balancing of factors.
Mandatory Restitution (§ 1593): The court must award the “full amount of the victim’s losses” in child sex-trafficking cases; reasonable estimates supported by evidence are acceptable.

Conclusion

United States v. Arnold offers a comprehensive and clear application of several key federal sentencing doctrines in child sex-trafficking prosecutions. The Seventh Circuit, acting within the Anders framework, affirmed the district court’s fact findings, endorsed the cumulative application of multiple § 2G1.3 enhancements, confirmed the non-grouping of counts involving different minors, and sustained the § 4B1.5(b)(1) enhancement based on a pattern of activity. It also recognized the post‑2023 elimination of status points in calculating criminal history and upheld a below-Guidelines sentence as substantively reasonable. Finally, the court reiterated the mandatory and flexible nature of restitution under § 1593, permitting reliance on evidence-grounded cost estimates of child sexual abuse.

While nonprecedential, the order synthesizes well-settled principles and provides practical guidance for litigants and judges handling sex-trafficking cases in the Seventh Circuit: enhancements in § 2G1.3 and § 4B1.5 will commonly apply where supported by the record; double-counting arguments face long odds; and restitution will be both mandatory and meaningful.

Key Takeaways

Anders dismissal: no nonfrivolous issues where Guidelines applications were orthodox and well-supported.
Undue influence presumption applies with large age disparities; lack of force does not defeat it.
Smartphones and email readily satisfy the “use of a computer” enhancement.
Commission-of-sex-act enhancement can coexist with the base offense; double counting is allowed absent a prohibition.
Counts involving different minors do not group; expect significant offense-level aggregation under § 3D1.4.
§ 4B1.5(b)(1)’s five-level increase is often available; the offense itself and additional conduct can establish a “pattern.”
Below-Guidelines sentences carry a presumption of reasonableness that is difficult to overcome.
Restitution under § 1593 is mandatory and may rely on evidence-based cost estimates of child sexual abuse.
Amendment 821’s removal of “status points” should be reflected in current criminal history computations.