Reaffirming Jurisdiction and the Acknowledgment Requirement in Abuse and Neglect Cases Involving Adoptive Parents: Commentary on In re T.P., S.P., M.P., E.P., and A.P.-1

1. Introduction

This memorandum decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, In re T.P., S.P., M.P., E.P., and A.P.-1, No. 24‑440 (Nov. 25, 2025), arises from an abuse and neglect proceeding in the Circuit Court of Fayette County. The case involves an adoptive mother (Petitioner A.P.-2) and five adopted children, all of whom had previously been the subjects of separate abuse and neglect proceedings against their biological parents, culminating in termination of those biological parents’ rights and subsequent adoption by the petitioner and her husband.

The Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a new abuse and neglect petition in 2023 alleging:

Physical abuse of multiple children (especially S.P. and T.P.), including excessive corporal punishment;
Educational neglect of homeschooled children, particularly T.P. and M.P.; and
Neglect in providing adequate nutrition to T.P., who at age seventeen weighed only sixty-six pounds and was later diagnosed with failure to thrive.

Following in camera interviews with the children, an adjudicatory hearing, and a dispositional hearing, the circuit court adjudicated all five children as abused and/or neglected and terminated the petitioner’s parental and custodial rights. On appeal, the petitioner mounted a three-pronged challenge:

Jurisdiction and venue: arguing that only the “court of origin” (the court that handled the earlier abuse/neglect cases involving the biological parents) had authority to proceed under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑606(b) and Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings;
Adjudication: asserting that the evidence was insufficient to support findings of abuse and neglect, especially regarding nutritional neglect of T.P.; and
Disposition: contending that the circuit court erred in denying a post‑adjudicatory improvement period and terminating her parental rights without employing a less restrictive alternative.

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order in full. Although issued as a memorandum decision (and thus not announcing new “syllabus points”), the case is significant for its:

Reaffirmation that § 49‑4‑606(b) does not restrict jurisdiction over new abuse and neglect petitions against adoptive parents to the “court of origin”; and
Strong reiteration of the long-standing principle that a parent’s refusal to acknowledge abuse or neglect can justify denial of an improvement period and support a finding that there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions can be corrected.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Holdings in Brief

The Supreme Court reached three core conclusions:

Jurisdiction and venue were proper in Fayette County.
The Court rejected the petitioner’s interpretation of West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑606(b) as limiting jurisdiction to the “court of origin.” Citing its earlier memorandum decision in In re A.F.-1, the Court held that § 49‑4‑606(b) relates to permanency and placement issues and does not bar filing a new abuse and neglect petition in a different county court. Venue was also proper in Fayette County under § 49‑4‑601(a) because the father, a named party abuser, resided there.
The adjudication of abuse and neglect was supported by clear and convincing evidence.
The Court upheld findings that the petitioner:
- Physically abused T.P., S.P., and M.P.;
- Educationally neglected T.P. and M.P. (homeschooled but doing essentially no schoolwork); and
- Neglected to provide adequate nutrition to T.P., as demonstrated by his extreme underweight status and dramatic post‑removal weight gain (approximately sixty pounds).
The Court emphasized the circuit court’s credibility determinations in favor of the children’s consistent disclosures and against the petitioner and her close associates.
Termination of parental rights without an improvement period was proper.
The circuit court correctly found:
- The petitioner had abandoned her request for a post‑adjudicatory improvement period when she insisted it was “moot” if further child evaluations were denied and then presented no evidence in support;
- Even on the merits, there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions could be substantially corrected because the petitioner refused to acknowledge any wrongdoing, rendering the problems untreatable; and
- Termination was necessary for the children’s welfare, so no less restrictive disposition was required.

The Court therefore affirmed the August 29, 2024, order terminating the petitioner’s parental and custodial rights.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Procedural Posture and Standard of Review

The decision applies the familiar abuse/neglect appellate framework:

“On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the circuit court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.”
– Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011).

Thus, while legal issues (such as statutory interpretation of § 49‑4‑606(b)) are reviewed without deference, factual findings (including abuse/neglect determinations based on witness credibility) are given substantial deference and may not be set aside unless “clearly erroneous,” a standard reaffirmed through In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).

3.2 Jurisdiction and Venue: The “Court of Origin” Argument

3.2.1 The Petitioner’s Theory

Relying on West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑606(b) and Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, the petitioner argued that when a child has already been the subject of an abuse and neglect proceeding (here, against the biological parents), and is later removed from an adoptive home, only the original circuit court that presided over the earlier case (the “court of origin”) has jurisdiction to address the new issues.

In essence, she attempted to convert § 49‑4‑606(b) into an exclusive jurisdiction statute that would require the DHS, and any aggrieved parties, to return to the original counties where the biological parents’ cases had been litigated—even though the new allegations concerned new abuse and neglect by adoptive parents in a different county.

3.2.2 Statutory Framework

Section 49‑4‑606(b) provides, in relevant part, that when a child is removed from an adoptive home after a prior abuse and neglect case has been dismissed, the parties must:

“Promptly report the matter to the circuit court of origin,” and then
The court and DHS must take further steps relating to the change in placement and permanency.

The Rule 45 provisions and § 49‑4‑606(b) are primarily oriented toward ensuring continuous judicial oversight of a child’s permanency and placement stability after an abuse/neglect case has concluded.

3.2.3 The Supreme Court’s Rejection of the Jurisdictional Challenge

The Court directly disposed of the petitioner’s interpretation by invoking its earlier memorandum decision:

“West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑606(b) does not limit jurisdiction of an abuse and neglect case against adoptive parents to the circuit court that presided over the abuse and neglect involving the biological parents.”
– In re A.F.-1, No. 21‑0712, 2022 WL 3949414, at *4 (W. Va. Aug. 31, 2022).

In A.F.-1, the Court emphasized that § 49‑4‑606(b):

“Implicitly references a situation where the child's permanency is the only issue—not where new issues of abuse and neglect are raised.” (2022 WL 3949414, at *5), and
That the petitioner’s restrictive reading “does not comport generally with a respondent's right to due process pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑601.”

The same reasoning applies here:

The present case involves new, substantive allegations of abuse and neglect against the adoptive parents, not merely a question about where and with whom the child should live under an already‑established permanency plan.
Denying the local circuit court the ability to hear such new allegations would undermine the core due process protections in § 49‑4‑601 (e.g., right to a timely petition, appointment of counsel, proper hearing, etc.).

By reiterating the A.F.-1 interpretation, the Court squarely confirms that:

New abuse and neglect petitions against adoptive parents are not confined to the “court of origin.” Local circuit courts retain jurisdiction to adjudicate such petitions under the general abuse/neglect framework.

3.2.4 Venue in Fayette County

The petitioner also questioned venue, though she did not dispute the key fact that the father—also a named party abuser—resided in Fayette County.

The Court cited West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑601(a), which authorizes filing of a petition:

“in the county in which the custodial respondent or other named party abuser resides.”

Because the father, a named abuser, lived in Fayette County, venue there was plainly proper. The Court therefore did not need to engage in any complex venue balancing; the statutory text resolved the question.

3.3 Adjudication: Abuse, Educational Neglect, and Nutritional Neglect

3.3.1 Standard of Proof and Appellate Deference

The Court reiterated that abuse and neglect must be proven by clear and convincing evidence under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑601(i). Drawing on In re A.M., 243 W. Va. 593, 849 S.E.2d 371 (2020), it defined this standard:

“Clear and convincing evidence means that more than a mere scintilla of evidence has been presented to establish the veracity of the allegations of abuse and/or neglect, but it does not impose as exacting an evidentiary burden as criminal proceedings which generally require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Once the circuit court has made factual findings under that standard, an appellate court:

Will not set them aside unless “clearly erroneous” (Tiffany Marie S.); and
Will not reweigh evidence or second‑guess credibility determinations (Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201 W. Va. 381, 497 S.E.2d 531 (1997); State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995)).

This deference is central to the Court’s refusal to revisit the petitioner’s complaints about how the trial court weighed conflicting testimony.

3.3.2 Evidence of Physical Abuse

The abuse allegations centered on:

An incident in which the petitioner allegedly attacked S.P., including corroboration from:
- S.P.’s own disclosures to a school social worker;
- M.P.’s confirmation that the petitioner struck S.P.; and
- A neighbor’s daughter who allegedly saw the petitioner “beat the shit out of” S.P.
An incident in which T.P. was seen with a black eye after being heard screaming while the father bathed him;
In camera testimony by multiple children describing:
- Excessive corporal punishment;
- Physical attacks by the parents;
- Instructions from parents to lie to Child Protective Services (CPS) or face repercussions.

The petitioner denied physical abuse and characterized her conduct as self-defense, asserting that she merely “had to get on top” of S.P. She cast the allegations as part of a “conspiracy by the older children to be removed from the home,” extending that theory to claim the older children had persuaded the younger ones to lie.

The circuit court, however, found:

The children’s testimony was “credible,” based on their demeanor, emotions, and consistency across forensic and in camera interviews;
The disclosures were “wholly conflicting [with] and contradictory” to the parents’ and their witnesses’ testimony;
The defense witnesses (adult children and a family friend) had:
- Close familial relationships with the petitioner, raising questions about impartiality; and
- Difficulty recalling specific past events.

The Supreme Court expressly refused to disturb these credibility determinations, citing its well‑established rule that the trier of fact, not the appellate court, is uniquely positioned to judge witness credibility. This effectively disposes of the petitioner’s claim that her own and her witnesses’ testimony proved her fitness as a parent.

3.3.3 Educational Neglect of Homeschooled Children

DHS alleged that T.P. and M.P., who were homeschooled, were educationally neglected. A CPS worker observed their “assignments” but was shown very little completed work. One child testified that when the parents took over schooling, she “did no schoolwork.”

Crucially, the circuit court found the evidence that the homeschooled children were doing no schoolwork to be:

“unrebutted.”

On appeal, the petitioner did not meaningfully engage with this finding. She largely ignored it, focusing instead on nutritional issues and generalized assertions of her competence.

By failing to address the unrebutted evidence of educational neglect, the petitioner effectively left that ground for adjudication untouched. The Supreme Court explicitly noted this and affirmed adjudication on this basis as well.

3.3.4 Nutritional Neglect and “Failure to Thrive” Diagnosis

The most medically complex issue involved T.P.’s extremely low weight. At age seventeen, he weighed only sixty‑six pounds, leading to a diagnosis of “failure to thrive” after his removal from the home.

Key evidence included:

T.P.’s testimony that he frequently asked siblings for food, that parents sometimes gave him different (and less) food than siblings, and that he could be deprived of food for days; a number of siblings corroborated this, though one (E.P.) disputed total deprivation, saying he was given foods he did not like.
Medical evidence:
- A nurse practitioner (Brittany Menei) who treated T.P. post‑removal diagnosed failure to thrive, citing:
  - “Concerning” bloodwork showing malnutrition;
  - Pill counts indicating improper medication administration;
  - Concerns about a high Adderall dosage (an appetite suppressant).
- A registered nurse who had previously treated T.P. testified that T.P. gained weight even while on Adderall, undermining the claim that medication alone explained his underweight status.
Post‑removal transformation:
- T.P. gained nearly sixty pounds after removal from the petitioner’s care.
- Another provider reported that T.P. had a healthy appetite and enjoyed many foods.

The petitioner’s theory was that:

T.P.’s weight loss began when he was in long‑term residential treatment at Fox Run Center, outside her care;
His large Adderall dose caused decreased appetite;
Medical professionals had not warned her about his weight or recommended a nutritionist or gastroenterologist.

The circuit court found these explanations unpersuasive, emphasizing:

The petitioner never raised concerns about T.P.’s weight while he was at Fox Run, if indeed that is where the weight loss began;
T.P. did not gain weight after returning from Fox Run to the petitioner’s care;
Medical evidence showed T.P. could gain weight even while on Adderall.

Based on the stark contrast between T.P.’s condition in the home and after removal, the circuit court found clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner neglected to provide appropriate food, even though it declined to find “medical neglect” regarding her interactions with healthcare providers.

On appeal, the Supreme Court underscored that:

The petitioner’s arguments “ignore critical discrepancies” in her own narrative;
The “overwhelming” evidence—especially the dramatic weight gain after removal—supported the finding of nutritional neglect;
It was not the Court’s role to reweigh competing medical interpretations or revisit credibility determinations.

Accordingly, the nutritional‑neglect adjudication was affirmed.

3.3.5 Derivative Abuse Findings

The circuit court concluded that E.P. and A.P.-1, even though not physically abused themselves, were “abused children” by virtue of residing in a home where other children were subjected to abuse and neglect.

While the opinion does not quote the statutory definition, West Virginia law recognizes that a child may qualify as an “abused child” if they reside in a household where other children are abused or neglected, because exposure to such an environment in itself seriously threatens their welfare.

The Supreme Court accepted this reasoning without extended discussion, treating it as consistent with established doctrine of “derivative” or “environmental” abuse.

3.4 Disposition: Improvement Periods, Acknowledgment, and Termination

3.4.1 The Petitioner’s Motions at Disposition

After adjudication, the petitioner sought:

A post‑adjudicatory improvement period; and
An order for independent evaluations of all children.

At the dispositional hearing in July 2024:

Petitioner’s counsel argued for the evaluations, emphasizing that the petitioner “maintained her innocence” and suggesting that:
- Text messages from S.P. expressing a desire to return home meant the children were “backtracking”; and
- This undermined their prior disclosures.
When the court denied the motion for further evaluations (finding them unnecessary given extensive in camera testimony), petitioner’s counsel declared that the improvement period motion was “moot” and that:

“This is a type of case to where an Improvement Period is not possible. It's an aggravated circumstances case.”
Counsel then presented no evidence in support of an improvement period.

Thus, on the record, the petitioner effectively abandoned her request for an improvement period by conditioning it on a separate motion and failing to carry her burden of proof once that condition failed.

3.4.2 The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Abandonment Issue

The Court noted that the petitioner:

“Essentially abandoned” her improvement period motion by deeming it moot after the denial of further evaluations; and
“Failed to present any evidence in support of her motion.”

Nonetheless, because the circuit court went on to expressly deny the improvement period in its written order, the Supreme Court addressed the issue on the merits, rather than resting solely on procedural abandonment.

3.4.3 The “Acknowledgment” Requirement and Untreatable Conditions

At the heart of the Court’s dispositional analysis is a well-established principle: a parent must acknowledge the existence of the abuse or neglect before it can be remedied.

The Court quoted In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013), which in turn relied on In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004):

“In order to remedy the abuse and/or neglect problem, the problem must first be acknowledged. … Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem … results in making the problem untreatable and in making an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child's expense.”

Here:

Even at disposition, the petitioner denied all abusive and neglectful conduct;
She characterized the case as a “conspiracy” by the children and insisted on her innocence;
Her strategy appeared directed at getting children to “change their story,” as the circuit court noted, rather than at understanding and addressing any parental deficiencies.

Given this stance, the Supreme Court held that:

The circuit court properly found that the problems were effectively untreatable in the near future; and
Granting an improvement period would have been “an exercise in futility at the child's expense.”

This dovetails with the broader statutory standard in West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(d), defining when there is “no reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected”:

“‘No reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected’ means that … the abusing adult … [has] demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on their own or with help.”

Refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing is compelling evidence of such “inadequate capacity.”

3.4.4 Discretion to Deny Improvement Periods

The Supreme Court also reaffirmed that circuit courts have discretion to deny an improvement period when the evidence indicates no meaningful improvement is likely:

“[C]ircuit courts have discretion to deny an improvement period when no improvement is likely.”
– In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002).

The petitioner’s complete denial of any wrongdoing, coupled with the seriousness of the findings, comfortably supported the circuit court’s discretionary refusal to grant an improvement period.

3.4.5 Termination Without Lesser Alternatives

West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6) permits termination of parental rights:

Upon a finding that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future; and
When termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

The Supreme Court reiterated its holding in In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), quoting In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980):

“Termination of parental rights … may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood … that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.”

Applying those principles, the circuit court found, and the Supreme Court agreed, that:

There was no reasonable likelihood that the petitioner could correct the conditions, owing largely to her refusal to acknowledge any abuse or neglect; and
Termination was necessary for the children’s welfare.

The Court thus upheld the termination of parental and custodial rights without requiring the circuit court to attempt less restrictive options (such as a supervised or conditional improvement period).

3.4.6 The Subsidy Finding

The circuit court also found that the petitioner was motivated by the monthly adoption subsidy, noting that she:

Continued to receive a “large sum of money” to care for children even after they were removed from her custody; and
Had not been forthright about this or other aspects of her conduct.

While the Supreme Court did not dwell on the subsidy issue, it left undisturbed the circuit court’s inference that financial motives and lack of candor further undermined the petitioner’s credibility and commitment to the children’s best interests. Those findings bolster the overall conclusion that she could not be trusted to remedy the conditions.

4. Precedents and Authorities Cited

4.1 In re A.F.-1 (2022)

This earlier memorandum decision is central to the jurisdictional question. In both A.F.-1 and the present case, adoptive parents argued that § 49‑4‑606(b) forced DHS to proceed only in the original county court that handled the biological parents’ case.

A.F.-1 firmly rejected this reading, and this case reaffirms that holding:

§ 49‑4‑606(b) concerns changes in placement and permanency, not new abuse/neglect allegations;
It does not divest local circuit courts of jurisdiction over new abuse/neglect petitions against adoptive parents;
Reading it otherwise would conflict with due process protections codified in § 49‑4‑601.

By explicitly citing and applying A.F.-1, the Court consolidates a consistent line of authority on this jurisdictional issue, providing clear guidance to DHS and practitioners.

4.2 Standards of Review and Evidence

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011) – Sets out mixed standard of review in abuse/neglect appeals (de novo on legal issues, clear error on facts).
In re A.M., 243 W. Va. 593, 849 S.E.2d 371 (2020) – Clarifies “clear and convincing” as more than a scintilla but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996) – Reinforces deference to trial courts on factual findings in abuse/neglect cases.
Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201 W. Va. 381, 497 S.E.2d 531 (1997) – Appellate court cannot assess witness credibility or reweigh evidence.
State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995) – Appellate courts cannot decide credibility; that task is exclusively for the fact‑finder.

4.3 Acknowledgment, Improvement Periods, and Termination

In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004) & In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013) – Stand for the proposition that:
- Parents must acknowledge abuse/neglect to remedy it;
- Failure to acknowledge makes conditions “untreatable” and makes an improvement period futile.
In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002) – Confirming circuit courts’ discretion to deny an improvement period when improvement is unlikely.
In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), quoting In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980) – Termination may be ordered without attempting less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions can be corrected.

4.4 Statutory References

West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑601 – Governs institution of abuse and neglect proceedings, venue, and due process safeguards (right to petition, counsel, hearings, etc.).
West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604 – Sets dispositional options, including termination of parental rights upon findings of:
- No reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future; and
- Necessity of termination for the child’s welfare.
West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑606(b) – Addresses reporting and procedures when children are removed from adoptive homes post‑dismissal of a prior abuse/neglect case; interpreted here as not limiting jurisdiction over new abuse/neglect petitions.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Abuse and Neglect Proceedings

These are civil cases in which the state (DHS) alleges that a child is an “abused child” or “neglected child” under statutory definitions. They are not criminal prosecutions, but the consequences for parental rights are very serious, including potential termination.

5.2 Adjudication vs. Disposition

Adjudication – The phase where the court determines whether the alleged abuse or neglect is proven by clear and convincing evidence. The outcome is a finding that the child is (or is not) abused and/or neglected, and that the respondent is an abusing or neglecting parent.
Disposition – The phase where the court decides what to do after adjudication:
- Return the child home;
- Impose an improvement period with services;
- Place the child with relatives; or
- Terminate parental rights, among other options.

5.3 Clear and Convincing Evidence

This is a high civil standard of proof—stronger than “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not), but not as demanding as “beyond a reasonable doubt” (used in criminal cases). It requires the evidence to be highly persuasive and to leave the fact‑finder with a firm belief in the truth of the allegations.

5.4 Improvement Period

An improvement period is a court‑ordered, time‑limited opportunity for a parent to receive services (e.g., counseling, parenting classes, substance abuse treatment) and demonstrate their capacity to correct the conditions of abuse or neglect. The parent must:

Request it;
Show by evidence that they are likely to fully participate and benefit; and
Comply with the court’s terms and DHS’s case plan.

Courts may deny an improvement period if they conclude that it would be futile, particularly when a parent refuses to acknowledge the underlying problems.

5.5 No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction

Under § 49‑4‑604(d), there is “no reasonable likelihood” that conditions can be “substantially corrected” when the parent has shown an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect, even with help. Examples may include:

Chronic failure to respond to services;
Persistent denial that any problem exists; or
Repeated re‑offending after interventions.

5.6 Aggravated Circumstances

The term “aggravated circumstances” is used in child welfare statutes to describe particularly severe types of abuse or neglect (such as torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse), in which case the state need not provide certain services or may bypass some reasonable efforts.

In this case, the petitioner’s counsel loosely described it as “an aggravated circumstances case” when arguing that no improvement period was possible. The Supreme Court, however, did not rely on a statutory “aggravated circumstances” finding; instead, it relied on the petitioner’s refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing and the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” standard.

5.7 In Camera and Forensic Interviews

In camera interview – A private interview of a child by the judge, outside the presence of the parents, often to obtain candid testimony and protect the child from the emotional strain of testifying in open court.
Forensic interview – A structured, usually video‑recorded interview conducted by a trained professional (often at a child advocacy center) using child‑appropriate, non‑leading techniques to gather detailed, reliable information about alleged abuse.

5.8 Memorandum Decision

A memorandum decision, under West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure 21, is a shorter decision used where the law is settled and the case does not require a full, syllabus‑point opinion. While such decisions may not announce new points of law, they apply and clarify existing principles and can be cited to show how the Court interprets and applies statutes and precedents.

6. Impact and Broader Significance

6.1 Jurisdiction Over Abuse/Neglect Allegations Against Adoptive Parents

Together with In re A.F.-1, this case provides unambiguous guidance:

DHS may file new abuse and neglect petitions against adoptive parents in any county where jurisdiction and venue are otherwise proper, such as where a custodial respondent or party abuser resides;
Section 49‑4‑606(b) does not lock all future disputes into the original county court that adjudicated the biological parents’ case;
The local circuit court where the child is living (or where the respondent resides) can and should act promptly upon credible new allegations.

This promotes:

Timely intervention when new risks arise;
Efficient use of local resources (CPS workers, courts, service providers); and
Meaningful due process for adoptive parents, who can defend against new allegations in the court of their current residence.

6.2 Reinforcement of the Acknowledgment Doctrine

The decision strongly reiterates a core theme in West Virginia abuse/neglect jurisprudence: a parent’s refusal to admit any wrongdoing is a major barrier to reunification.

By grounding its denial of an improvement period in the petitioner’s ongoing denial, and by linking that denial to the statutory “no reasonable likelihood of correction” standard, the Court underscores that:

Parents seeking services must at least accept the court’s findings or recognize the existence of serious issues;
Defensive denial and blame‑shifting (e.g., to children, medical providers, or conspiracies) can be themselves evidence of an inability to correct the conditions;
Circuit courts are not required to order improvement periods that are unlikely to succeed.

6.3 Guidance on Evidence in Failure‑to‑Thrive and Nutritional Neglect Cases

The case also illustrates how courts may evaluate allegations of nutritional neglect in medically complex situations:

Objective medical data (bloodwork, weight history, pill counts) carry substantial weight;
A child’s substantial improvement after removal—especially dramatic weight gain—can be powerful evidence that the prior care was inadequate;
Arguments that prescription medication alone is responsible must be weighed against evidence that the child can and does gain weight while medicated in a different environment.

This has practical implications for:

DHS, which should thoroughly document a child’s physical condition before and after removal;
Medical providers, whose testimony can be decisive in differentiating medical conditions from neglect; and
Courts, in balancing parental explanations against hard data and expert testimony.

6.4 Educational Neglect in the Context of Homeschooling

Although not elaborated at great length, the decision quietly reinforces an important point: labeling a child as “homeschooled” does not shield parents from educational neglect findings if little or no actual instruction or work is provided.

Courts may look at:

The presence (or absence) of completed assignments;
Children’s own descriptions of their schoolwork (or lack thereof);
Whether homeschooling is being used as a pretext to avoid oversight.

6.5 Practical Lessons for Counsel

From a practice perspective, the case offers several cautionary points:

Arguments that a motion is “moot” may abandon rights; counsel should be precise about preserving or withdrawing requests (such as improvement periods).
On appeal, simply asserting that the trial court “didn’t give adequate consideration” to defense witnesses is seldom effective when credibility was explicitly addressed and explained below.
Text messages or later statements from children expressing a desire to return home do not automatically negate prior credible disclosures of abuse, especially where the record includes consistent forensic and in camera testimony.

7. Conclusion

In re T.P., S.P., M.P., E.P., and A.P.-1 is an important application—and reaffirmation—of West Virginia’s abuse and neglect jurisprudence in the context of adoptive families. While the decision does not establish a new rule of law, it solidifies several significant principles:

Jurisdictional clarity: West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑606(b) does not confine new abuse and neglect proceedings against adoptive parents to the original court that handled the biological parents’ case. Local circuit courts retain authority to adjudicate new petitions, consistent with due process and statutory venue provisions.
Centrality of acknowledgment: A parent’s refusal to acknowledge any abuse or neglect can render conditions effectively untreatable, justify denial of improvement periods, and support a finding that there is no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future.
Deference to trial‑level credibility findings: Where the circuit court carefully explains why it found children’s testimony credible and defense witnesses not credible, appellate courts will not reweigh the evidence or disturb those findings.
Robust evidence of neglect: Dramatic improvement in a child’s physical health (including substantial weight gain) after removal can be powerful circumstantial evidence of prior neglect, particularly when corroborated by medical testimony and sibling disclosures.

Taken together, these threads underscore the Court’s overarching priority: the safety and welfare of children, even when that requires the difficult step of terminating parental rights of adoptive parents who had once been entrusted with protecting children from prior abuse. The decision thus serves as a clear guidepost for courts, agencies, and practitioners navigating the complex intersection of adoption, abuse and neglect, and the rights and responsibilities of parents under West Virginia law.