Reaffirming Judicial Discretion and Best-Interest Standard in Minor Name-Change Petitions Involving Gender Transition

Reaffirming Judicial Discretion and Best-Interest Standard in Minor Name-Change Petitions Involving Gender Transition

Introduction

In In the Matter of the Petition of S.M.-B. v. Mississippi State Board of Health, 2025 WL _____ (Miss. 2025), the Supreme Court of Mississippi addressed whether a chancery court abused its discretion by dismissing, without prejudice, a 16-year-old’s petition to change her legal name as part of her gender transition. The petition, filed by the minor’s mother with the father’s consent, sought to replace traditionally feminine given names with a masculine first name, align the middle name with the mother’s, and adopt the father’s surname alone. Although uncontested, the chancellor concluded the minor should “mature” before a name change would be determined, citing best-interest considerations and Mississippi’s public policy on medical gender-transition assistance for minors. The State Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under Marshall v. Marshall, 230 Miss. 719, 93 So. 2d 822 (1957), minor name changes require a “clearly in the best interest of the child” showing and are committed to chancellor discretion.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the dismissal of S.M.-B.’s name-change petition under the abuse-of-discretion/manifest-error standard. It held:

  • Mississippi common law, as articulated in Marshall v. Marshall, draws a fundamental distinction between name changes for minors and adults. Minors may petition for a name change only “where to do so is clearly in the best interest of the child.”
  • That standard applies equally to contested and uncontested petitions; parental consent does not remove the chancellor’s duty to protect the minor’s welfare.
  • The chancellor’s determination—that the minor lacked sufficient maturity to make a life-altering decision—fell squarely within her discretion and did not constitute manifest error.
  • Mississippi’s public policy, embodied in the 2023 REAP Act (Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-141-1 to ‑9), underscores the Legislature’s view that persons under eighteen lack the maturity for irreversible gender-transition procedures, supporting the chancellor’s caution in granting a name change tied to gender identity.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s order dismissing the petition without prejudice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Marshall v. Marshall, 230 Miss. 719, 93 So. 2d 822 (1957): Established that name changes for minors require a best-interest finding; adults of “mature years” may change their names absent fraud or infringement.
  • Rice v. Merkich, 34 So. 3d 555 (Miss. 2010): Articulated the manifest-error/abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing chancery findings of fact.
  • Vaughn v. Vaughn, 798 So. 2d 431 (Miss. 2001) and Pearson v. Pearson, 761 So. 2d 157 (Miss. 2000): Reinforced deference to chancellors’ factual findings.
  • Powers v. Tiebauer, 939 So. 2d 749 (Miss. 2005): Clarified de novo review of questions of law.
  • Cases emphasizing chancery courts’ duty to minors’ best interests: Union Chevrolet Co. v. Arrington, 138 So. 593 (Miss. 1932); May v. Harrison County DHS, 883 So. 2d 74 (Miss. 2004); Riley v. Doerner, 677 So. 2d 740 (Miss. 1996); Miss. State Bar Ass’n v. Moyo, 525 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1988).

Legal Reasoning

1. Discretion in Minor Name Changes
The Court rejected the notion that uncontested petitions eliminate judicial scrutiny. Rather, under Marshall, chancellors may grant a minor’s name change only if “clearly in the best interest of the child.” The adult-centered common-law rule—permitting unrestricted changes absent fraud or infringement—“has no application” to minors.

2. Scope of Best-Interest Analysis
The inquiry is not confined to a fixed factor test (e.g., the child-custody Albright factors). Instead, chancellors must weigh “all relevant facts and equities” in light of the minor’s welfare. Here, the chancellor reasonably found the 16-year-old’s maturity incomplete for a legally recognized identity shift.

3. Public-Policy Alignment
Although the Legislature has not expressly regulated name changes, the REAP Act’s bar on medical or surgical gender-transition procedures for those under eighteen reflects a policy judgment: minors are too immature to make such consequential decisions. The chancellor’s reliance on maturity considerations comports with that policy.

Impact on Future Cases

  • Chancellors will continue to apply the “best interest” standard to all minor name-change petitions, regardless of parental agreement.
  • Attorneys must prepare evidence and argument on a minor’s maturity and overall welfare, not merely demonstrate parental consent.
  • The decision signals judicial support for legislative efforts (e.g., the REAP Act) limiting minors’ access to gender-related interventions.
  • Other jurisdictions may look to Mississippi’s framework when addressing the interplay between minors’ identity decisions and the best-interest doctrine.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Best-Interest of the Child: A legal standard requiring courts to prioritize a minor’s welfare, safety, stability, and development when making decisions affecting them.
  • Abuse-of-Discretion/Manifest-Error Review: Appellate courts defer to chancery findings if supported by substantial, credible evidence; they reverse only if the trial court’s decision is plainly wrong or based on erroneous law.
  • REAP Act (Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-141-1 to ‑9): State law prohibiting gender-transition surgeries and hormone treatments for individuals under eighteen, reflecting a policy that minors lack maturity for irreversible procedures.
  • Contested vs. Uncontested Petitions: “Contested” means an opposing party raises issues; “uncontested” means all parties agree. In Mississippi, even uncontested minor-name-change petitions require judicial best-interest review.

Conclusion

Key Takeaways:
• Marshall v. Marshall remains the touchstone for minor name changes: courts may grant them only if clearly in the child’s best interest.
• Parental consent and lack of opposition do not eliminate judicial responsibility to protect the minor’s welfare.
• Chancellors retain broad discretion to consider factors such as maturity, emotional stability, and public-policy guidance (e.g., the REAP Act).
• This ruling underscores Mississippi’s commitment to treating minors’ gender-transition decisions with heightened caution and reaffirms the judiciary’s role as protector of the best interests of children in all chancery matters.

Case Details

Comments