Reaffirming Implied and Voluntary Consent to Warrantless Home Searches:
Commentary on United States v. Brooks (2d Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in United States v. Brooks, No. 23‑8041 (2d Cir. Nov. 24, 2025), concerns a classic Fourth Amendment problem: when may law enforcement, without a warrant, enter and search a home based on a resident’s “consent,” and under what circumstances will an appellate court overturn a trial court’s finding that such consent was voluntarily given?

Although this is a summary order—and therefore non‑precedential under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1—it is citable under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and functions as a detailed application of settled law on:

the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement;
the standard of review for suppression rulings and credibility determinations; and
the forfeiture of arguments not raised in an appellant’s opening brief.

The case arises from an ATF investigation into alleged “straw purchases” of firearms for a convicted felon, and culminates in the Second Circuit affirming the denial of a suppression motion and, thereby, the defendant’s conviction for aiding and abetting unlawful possession of firearms by a felon.

II. Overview of the Case

A. Parties

Appellee: United States of America
Defendant–Appellant: Kharisma Brooks
Co‑defendant (not an appellant here): Darnell Macon, Sr.

B. Charges and Trial Outcome

Brooks was charged in federal court with:

Making false statements in connection with the purchase of a firearm; and
Aiding and abetting a convicted felon’s unlawful possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 2.

After a jury trial in the District of Connecticut (Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer), the jury returned a split verdict:

Not guilty on the false statement count;
Guilty on aiding and abetting the felon‑in‑possession offense.

The district court sentenced Brooks to twelve months and one day of imprisonment and a three‑year term of supervised release.

C. The Core Appellate Issue

The appeal is narrowly focused. Brooks challenges only the denial of her motion to suppress firearms seized in a warrantless search of her apartment. She contends that the search was unconstitutional because her “consent” to the officers’ entry and search was not voluntary.

The Second Circuit, applying well‑established consent‑search and appellate‑review doctrines, affirms the district court’s findings that:

Brooks and Macon impliedly consented to the officers’ entry and search; and
Their consent was voluntary, not the product of coercion.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The ATF Investigation and Home Visit

ATF agents received a tip that Brooks had purchased firearms on behalf of Darnell Macon, Sr., a convicted felon prohibited from possessing firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Both Brooks and Macon lived in the same apartment complex.

Without securing a warrant, ATF agents and local police arrived at the complex to interview Brooks concerning the gun purchases. Key facts, as credited by the district court and summarized by the Second Circuit, include:

Officers approached Brooks’s apartment.
Outside the apartment, an ATF agent asked Brooks if she would [w]ould show [him] where the firearms are.
Brooks responded [s]ure in what the officers described as a very certain manner, and walked back into her apartment, aware the agents followed her inside.
Once inside, Brooks was unable immediately to locate the firearms.
She then returned to the front door and called to Macon, who was outside speaking with local officers: [W]here are those guns? Can you find those guns?
Macon entered the apartment, aware that the agents followed him upstairs, and retrieved two firearms from a bedroom closet.
At no point did Brooks or Macon ask the officers to leave or object to their presence in the apartment.

The officers seized the firearms, which later became the subject of the defendants’ suppression motion.

B. The Suppression Hearing

Before trial, Brooks and Macon jointly moved to suppress the seized firearms, asserting that the search was unconstitutional. The district court held a two‑day evidentiary hearing:

Two ATF agents and one local police officer testified for the government.
Brooks and Macon did not testify, but submitted affidavits that contradicted the officers’ version of events.

The district court credited the officers’ testimony and rejected the defense affidavits where they conflicted. On those factual findings, the court ruled that Brooks and Macon had voluntarily consented to the officers’ entry and to the subsequent search for the firearms. It therefore denied the suppression motion.

C. Subsequent Trial and Appeal

With the firearms admitted in evidence, Brooks proceeded to a jury trial, resulting in the conviction described above. On appeal, Brooks challenges only the suppression ruling—the legal and factual determination that she voluntarily consented to the search of her apartment.

IV. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Opinion

The Second Circuit’s core holdings may be distilled as follows:

Standard of Review — The court reviews:
- Legal conclusions in suppression rulings de novo (from scratch); and
- Underlying factual findings, including voluntariness of consent and witness credibility, for clear error.
Finding of Consent — The district court did not clearly err in concluding that Brooks consented to the officers’ entry and search, where she:
- said “sure” to the request to show where the firearms were;
- re‑entered her apartment with officers following, without objection;
- called out to Macon asking him to help find “those guns”; and
- allowed Macon to retrieve the guns with the agents present.
These actions, under governing precedent, suffice to imply consent.
Voluntariness — Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the court holds there is no basis to overturn the district court’s finding that the consent was voluntary:
- No threats or restraints by officers;
- Brooks and Macon’s son engaged in friendly conversations with agents;
- Macon was allowed to leave the scene briefly during the search;
- The mere presence of four officers was not inherently coercive; and
- The officers’ failure to advise Brooks of a right to refuse consent did not render the consent involuntary.
Forfeiture of New Argument — In her reply brief, Brooks argued for the first time that the agents’ credibility should be doubted due to their late production of certain discovery. The Second Circuit holds this argument is forfeited because it was not raised in the opening brief, and in any event, there is no “manifest injustice” that would justify deviating from the forfeiture rule.

Consequently, the Second Circuit affirms the district court’s judgment of conviction.

V. Legal Framework

A. The Fourth Amendment and Consent Searches

The Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant, supported by probable cause, for searches of homes. However, there are recognized exceptions, one of which is a search conducted pursuant to voluntary consent by someone with authority over the premises.

The Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), established that:

Whether consent was voluntary is a question of fact determined based on the totality of the circumstances;
Consent need not be knowing in the “Miranda” sense; the government is not required to show that the person knew she could refuse consent;
Knowledge of the right to refuse is only one factor among many in assessing voluntariness.

Brooks is a straightforward application of Schneckloth to a home search conducted without a warrant, where officers relied on implied consent.

B. Aiding and Abetting a Felon‑in‑Possession Offense

Brooks was convicted under:

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) — making it a crime for anyone “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm; and
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) — prescribing penalties for violation of § 922(g);
18 U.S.C. § 2 — the federal aiding‑and‑abetting statute, which punishes as a principal “whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission.”

While the felon‑in‑possession and aiding‑and‑abetting doctrines are critical to the ultimate conviction, the appellate decision turns solely on the admissibility of the firearms—which in turn depends on the validity of the consent search.

C. Appellate Standards of Review for Suppression Rulings

The court reiterates the standard articulated in United States v. McKenzie, 13 F.4th 223 (2d Cir. 2021):

Conclusions of law (e.g., whether the facts as found amount to consent under the Fourth Amendment) are reviewed de novo.
Findings of fact (e.g., what Brooks said, how she behaved, whether her consent was voluntary) are reviewed for clear error.

Moreover, whether consent was voluntary is itself treated as a question of fact under Schneckloth. The Second Circuit must:

View evidence in the light most favorable to the government; and
Give special deference to district court determinations that depend on witness credibility.

These deference principles are emphasized through citation to United States v. Delva, 858 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2017).

VI. Precedents Cited and Their Influence on the Decision

1. United States v. McKenzie, 13 F.4th 223 (2d Cir. 2021)

McKenzie is cited for the standard of review: de novo for legal questions, clear error for factual findings. This sets the threshold the appellant must overcome to reverse the denial of suppression.

Influence on Brooks: It anchors the court’s highly deferential posture toward the district court’s factual findings on consent and voluntariness, especially where the trial judge has weighed conflicting narratives and made credibility calls.

2. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)

Schneckloth is the foundational Supreme Court case on consent searches. It holds that:

Voluntariness is assessed from the totality of the circumstances;
Knowledge of a right to refuse consent is relevant but not determinative;
The government need not prove that the consenter knew of that right for consent to be effective.

In Brooks, this precedent is used to reject the argument (explicitly or implicitly) that the officers’ failure to inform Brooks of her right to refuse consent makes her consent involuntary. The Second Circuit reiterates:

“[K]nowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, [but] the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.”

3. United States v. Delva, 858 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2017)

Delva emphasizes that in reviewing suppression rulings, the appellate court:

Views evidence in the light most favorable to the government; and
Gives “special deference” to the district court’s credibility determinations.

In Brooks, this principle is pivotal. The district court explicitly chose to credit the testimony of the officers over the defense affidavits. Under Delva, the Second Circuit will disturb such credibility findings only in extraordinary circumstances, which Brooks did not establish.

4. United States v. Buettner‑Janusch, 646 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1981)

Buettner‑Janusch rejects the notion that consent must be expressed in “magic words”:

“[A] search may be lawful even if the person giving consent does not recite the talismanic phrase: ‘You have my permission to search.’”

The decision also acknowledges that consent may be inferred from words, gestures, or conduct.

In Brooks, this case supports the conclusion that Brooks’s short verbal response (“sure”), followed by her conduct (walking back into the apartment with agents in tow and asking Macon to locate “those guns” in the agents’ presence), was enough to communicate consent. No formal or explicit “I consent” statement was required.

5. United States v. Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1993)

In Deutsch, the defendant told officers his identification was inside his house and entered for the purpose of showing it to them; the Second Circuit held he had “unmistakably invited the officers inside.”

Deutsch thus illustrates that inviting officers into one’s home to accomplish some stated purpose can reasonably be understood as consent to their presence, even when not framed as “I consent.”

In Brooks, the parallel is clear: Brooks’s agreement to show where the firearms were, and her subsequent actions, function similarly to the invitation in Deutsch. The court analogizes her conduct to that of a person inviting officers into the home to retrieve something they have asked to see.

6. United States v. Garcia, 56 F.3d 418 (2d Cir. 1995)

Garcia is cited for the proposition that consent searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “[s]o long as the police do not coerce consent.” In other words, the focus is on the presence or absence of coercive police conduct.

In Brooks, the court finds no evidence that officers threatened, restrained, or otherwise exerted overt coercion over Brooks or Macon. It notes that:

Macon was allowed to leave to “run an errand” during the officers’ presence;
Their son had friendly conversations with the agents;

Applying Garcia, the court concludes that absent coercion, the consent is constitutionally sufficient.

7. United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980)

Sanchez holds that the presence of multiple officers—four in that case—does not, standing alone, render a situation “inherently coercive.”

In Brooks, there were four law enforcement officers on scene (two ATF agents and two local police officers). The court cites Sanchez to reject the idea that the number of officers, by itself, undermines voluntariness.

8. United States v. Kon Yu‑Leung, 910 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1990)

Kon Yu‑Leung similarly affirmed a finding of voluntary consent despite the presence of six officers. This further underscores that the mere numerical strength of law enforcement does not automatically equate to coercion.

Together, Sanchez and Kon Yu‑Leung supply the doctrinal basis for discounting the “multiple officers” factor as determinative in Brooks.

9. United States v. O’Brien, 926 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2019)

In O’Brien, the Second Circuit reiterates that “Fourth Amendment standards do not make it mandatory to advise a suspect of [her] right to refuse consent to search.”

O’Brien thus reaffirms Schneckloth and forecloses any argument that an advisement of the right to refuse is a prerequisite to valid consent.

In Brooks, the officers did not tell Brooks she could refuse their request. The court acknowledges this fact, but, following O’Brien, treats it as one factor bearing on voluntariness, not a fatal flaw.

10. JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418 (2d Cir. 2005)

Although a civil case, Altos Hornos provides the key appellate rule governing Brooks’s newly raised argument:

Arguments not raised in the opening brief are generally forfeited on appeal.
The court has discretion to consider such arguments only if manifest injustice would otherwise result.

Brooks, for the first time in her reply brief, asserted that late production of discovery by the ATF agents undermined their credibility, and thus the suppression ruling. Under Altos Hornos, the Second Circuit holds that this argument is forfeited, and finds no manifest injustice warranting an exception.

VII. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Establishing Consent Under the Totality of the Circumstances

The critical question is whether Brooks consentedvoluntary. The court breaks this into two related inquiries:

Did Brooks and/or Macon manifest consent to entry and search?
Was that consent voluntary or the product of coercion?

As to the first, the court emphasizes:

Brooks’s verbal sure in response to the agent’s question if she would “show [him] where the firearms are,” described as a very certain manner;
Her act of re‑entering her apartment, aware the officers followed her inside;
Her request to Macon: [W]here are those guns? Can you find those guns? in the agents’ presence; and
Macon’s entry, with awareness that agents were following him upstairs while he retrieved the firearms.

From these facts, the court concludes that the agents reasonably believed they had consent to enter and search the apartment. Citing Buettner‑Janusch and Deutsch, the court stresses that:

No “magic words” are required;
Consent can be inferred from context, conduct, and practical invitations to enter or search.

B. Voluntariness: Is There Coercion?

The second, and more contested, component is whether this consent was voluntary. Under Schneckloth, the court considers the totality of circumstances, highlighting:

There was no evidence of threats or physical restraint of either Brooks or Macon.
Macon was permitted to leave the premises temporarily during the agents’ presence.
Brooks and Macon’s son engaged in friendly conversations with the agents, indicating a non‑hostile environment.
The presence of four officers, without more, is not “inherently coercive” under Sanchez and Kon Yu‑Leung.
The officers did not advise Brooks of a right to refuse, but under Schneckloth and O’Brien, that is not dispositive.

On these facts, the Second Circuit holds that the district court did not clearly err in finding that consent was voluntary, and therefore the warrantless search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

C. Deference to Credibility Determinations

A central—though often underappreciated—feature of suppression appeals is the deference owed to trial‑level credibility determinations. Here:

The officers testified to one version of events (including Brooks’s “sure” and her behavior);
Brooks and Macon submitted affidavits contradicting that version.

The trial judge, after a two‑day hearing, credited the officers. The Second Circuit, under Delva, gives “special deference” to that decision. In effect, unless there is strong evidence that the district court’s credibility finding was implausible or internally inconsistent, the appellate court will not second‑guess it.

This dynamic is outcome‑determinative. If the appellate court had adopted the defendants’ version of the events, it might have cast doubt on whether consent was ever given or whether it was free from coercion. But once the officers’ testimony is accepted, the path to affirmance is straightforward.

D. Forfeiture of the Credibility‑Attack Argument

Brooks attempted, in her reply brief, to undermine the officers’ credibility by pointing to their failure to produce certain discovery until shortly before trial, after the suppression hearing had already occurred.

The Second Circuit refuses to consider this new argument on the merits, citing Altos Hornos:

Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited;
Only in cases of manifest injustice will the court consider such an argument anyway.

The panel finds no manifest injustice:

Brooks does not explain why the late‑produced discovery would materially undermine the officers’ earlier testimony;
Brooks and Macon never asked the district court to reconsider the suppression ruling based on the late disclosure.

As a result, the district court’s credibility findings remain undisturbed, and the path to affirming the suppression ruling remains clear.

VIII. Impact and Implications

A. Non‑Precedential but Persuasive Authority

The order explicitly notes that summary orders do not have precedential effect in the Second Circuit. However, under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, they may be cited and can carry persuasive weight.

United States v. Brooks thus:

Does not formally “change” the law of consent searches;
Does reaffirm how the Second Circuit applies existing consent and voluntariness doctrines in a home‑search context, particularly where “consent” is partly implied by conduct.

B. Practical Effects for Law Enforcement

For investigators and patrol officers engaging in “knock‑and‑talk” tactics at residences, Brooks underscores:

Officers may reasonably rely on relatively brief expressions like “sure,” combined with cooperative behavior, as consent to enter and search.
They are not required to advise occupants that they may refuse consent, although doing so may still be prudent as a matter of policy or to strengthen later litigation positions.
The mere fact that several officers are present will not, without more, invalidate consent as coerced.

That said, law enforcement agencies mindful of risk management may still choose to:

Document verbal consent with more precision (e.g., body‑worn cameras, explicit verbal confirmation of consent);
Train officers to avoid any indicia of coercion (e.g., unnecessary displays of authority) when conducting consent‑based home entries.

C. Guidance for Defense Counsel

For defense attorneys, Brooks illustrates several recurring themes:

The Centrality of the Suppression Record — Because the appellate court defers to the district court’s view of the facts, the suppression hearing is often the only real chance to win a consent dispute.
- Cross‑examination aimed at undermining officer credibility is crucial.
- Introducing contemporaneous evidence (e.g., video, audio, neutral witnesses) can be critical.
Importance of Raising All Theories in the Opening Brief — Brooks’s attempt to raise a new credibility‑based argument in her reply brief was deemed forfeited.
- Appellate counsel must identify and include all substantial arguments in the opening brief.
- Arguments premised on later‑discovered facts should, when possible, prompt motions for reconsideration in the district court, preserving the record for appeal.
Difficulty of Overturning Voluntariness Findings — Because voluntariness is treated as a question of fact, and because of “special deference” to credibility determinations, appellate reversal is rare absent extreme facts or clear contradictions in the record.

D. Doctrinal Clarifications on Implied Consent

Brooks highlights that consent need not be explicit or formal. The Second Circuit treats:

a simple “sure” to an officer’s request, combined with
an invitation‑like sequence of conduct (leading officers into the home, requesting help from a co‑resident to produce the items sought),

as enough to constitute implied consent to a search. Defense arguments that such responses reflect mere acquiescence to authority will face an uphill battle without evidence of overt coercion.

E. Subtle Social Pressures vs. Legal “Coercion”

Although not discussed explicitly by the court, Brooks sits against the backdrop of ongoing debates about how the law conceptualizes “coercion” in consent cases:

Legal coercion focuses on overt threats, physical restraint, or explicit pressure.
Social or psychological pressure—such as the instinct to comply with authority, or fear of consequences for refusal— is harder to quantify and is often discounted by courts absent clear evidence.

Brooks continues the longstanding trend in which the absence of overt coercion is ordinarily sufficient for courts to deem consent “voluntary,” even when the setting (home, multiple officers, ongoing investigation) might carry implicit pressures.

IX. Explanation of Complex Legal Concepts

A. “De Novo” vs. “Clear Error” Review

De novo review — The appellate court gives no deference to the district court’s legal conclusions; it decides the legal issue as if for the first time.
Clear error review — The appellate court will overturn a factual finding only if it has a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”. It is not enough for the appellate judges simply to think they might have weighed the evidence differently.

In Brooks, voluntariness of consent is treated as a fact question, so it is reviewed for clear error, making reversal unlikely.

B. Consent Searches and the “Totality of the Circumstances”

A consent search is a search that would otherwise require a warrant but is conducted lawfully because someone with authority agrees to let officers search.

“Totality of the circumstances” means courts consider all relevant details together, such as:

Number of officers;
Time of day;
Physical setting (home, street, stationhouse);
Whether weapons were drawn;
Officer tone and demeanor;
Whether the person was informed of a right to refuse;
Whether the person was restrained or free to leave.

No single factor controls; instead, the court must decide whether, in context, the person’s decision looks like a free and unconstrained choice.

C. Aiding and Abetting (`18 U.S.C. § 2`)

A person is guilty as an aider and abettor if he or she:

Intentionally assists in the commission of the crime; and
Shares the intent required for the underlying offense.

In this case, the underlying crime was a felon‑in‑possession offense. The jury found that Brooks intentionally helped Macon, a convicted felon, possess firearms, and that she did so with the required criminal intent.

D. Forfeiture vs. Waiver on Appeal

Forfeiture — Failure to timely assert a right or argument (e.g., not raising an issue in the opening brief). Courts may sometimes excuse forfeiture if justice requires.
Waiver — Intentional relinquishment of a known right. Waived arguments are generally not reviewable at all.

In Brooks, the court treats the new reply‑brief argument as forfeited, and then declines to excuse that forfeiture because there is no manifest injustice.

E. Summary Orders vs. Published Opinions

Summary orders (like the one in Brooks) are typically shorter, resolve cases that do not present novel questions, and are designated non‑precedential under local rules.
Published opinions create binding precedent within the circuit on the issues they decide.

While summary orders do not formally set precedent, attorneys and courts still cite them for their persuasive reasoning, especially when they apply existing doctrine to fact patterns similar to those at issue.

X. Conclusion

United States v. Brooks does not break new doctrinal ground, but it does provide a clear, focused application of long‑standing consent‑search doctrine in a residential setting. It underlines:

The power of implied consent—where brief words and cooperative conduct can sustain a warrantless home search;
The high level of deference appellate courts give to trial‑level factual and credibility findings in suppression disputes; and
The strict enforcement of forfeiture rules when appellants attempt to raise new arguments on appeal.

For criminal practitioners, Brooks is a reminder that:

Consent and voluntariness arguments are often won or lost in the district court, not on appeal;
Full, early development of all credibility challenges and legal theories is crucial;
Warrantless home searches remain constitutionally sustainable when prosecutors can show even relatively modest but uncoerced cooperation by occupants.

As a citable but non‑precedential decision, Brooks will likely be used to bolster arguments on both sides of future consent‑search disputes:

For the government, as an example of how minimal verbal assent plus cooperative actions can constitute voluntary consent;
For the defense, as a cautionary benchmark illustrating just how much deference appellate courts will give to trial judges in assessing whether that consent was truly voluntary.

Reaffirming Implied and Voluntary Consent to Warrantless Home Searches: Commentary on United States v. Brooks (2d Cir. 2025)