Reaffirming Deference to Strategic Defense Choices and Federal-Exhaustion Requirements in Habeas Review: DiTullio v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Introduction

DiTullio v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on March 12, 2025, addresses two recurring issues in federal habeas corpus practice: (1) the degree of deference given to defense counsel’s strategic decisions under the Sixth Amendment and AEDPA, and (2) the specificity required to exhaust federal claims in state court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner‐appellant John DiTullio, serving a life sentence for murder and attempted murder in Florida state court, challenged his second‐trial conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel for declining to call a key witness (Samantha Troupe) and various alleged trial‐court errors (a juror question, testimony of a jail‐house assault, and admission of a prejudicial Christmas card). The District Court denied habeas relief, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that DiTullio’s counsel made a reasonable strategic choice with the client’s full acquiescence and that DiTullio failed to properly lodge his federal claims in state court.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the denial of DiTullio’s § 2254 petition on both fronts. First, the court held that counsel’s decision not to call Samantha Troupe at the second trial—a choice made after weighing the state’s rebuttal witnesses and Troupe’s personal circumstances and expressly approved by DiTullio—constituted a reasonable strategic decision under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its progeny. Under AEDPA deference, the state courts’ conclusion that counsel’s performance was not deficient was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Second, the court found that DiTullio procedurally defaulted his three other claims by failing to alert the Florida courts to their federal constitutional underpinning. Citing Lucas v. Secretary, Dep’t of Corr., 682 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2012) and Preston v. Secretary, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 785 F.3d 449 (11th Cir. 2015), the panel held that a mere passing reference to “due process” or the federal Constitution does not suffice to exhaust a federal claim in state court.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Established the two-prong test for ineffective assistance (deficient performance and prejudice) and the high deference given to strategic choices.
Knight v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 936 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2019): Reaffirmed that witness-calling decisions are quintessentially strategic and “seldom, if ever, second guessed.”
Hammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2009); Lobosco v. Thomas, 928 F.2d 1054 (11th Cir. 1991); Ross v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1984): Held that a defendant’s knowing acquiescence to trial strategy weighs against finding deficient performance.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011): Clarified that, on federal habeas review under AEDPA, a court asks whether any reasonable argument supports the state-court decision.
Bowen v. Secretary, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 92 F.4th 1328 (11th Cir. 2024): Emphasized AEDPA’s requirement to give the state‐court decision the benefit of the doubt.
Lucas v. Secretary, Dep’t of Corr., 682 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2012); Preston v. Secretary, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 785 F.3d 449 (11th Cir. 2015); McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005): Articulated the “fair presentation” rule for exhaustion, requiring clear notice of federal constitutional claims in state court.

Legal Reasoning

On the ineffective‐assistance claim, the court applied Strickland’s deferential standard in conjunction with AEDPA’s § 2254(d). Defense counsel decided, after discussing the pros and cons with DiTullio, that calling Samantha Troupe a second time risked meeting new rebuttal witnesses and forcing Troupe to leave her hospitalized baby. The Eleventh Circuit found no reasonable basis to second-guess that judgment. Under § 2254(d)(1), the state court’s conclusion that this was a reasonable strategic choice was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. Further, DiTullio’s repeated on-the-record affirmations that he fully endorsed the decision reinforced that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred.

On the exhaustion issue, the court reviewed Eleventh Circuit law requiring that a petitioner “clearly indicate” the federal basis of his claims to the state courts. DiTullio’s state appellate briefs primarily relied on Florida procedural and evidentiary rules, with only a fleeting reference to due process under the federal Constitution. The panel held this insufficient to exhaust federal claims, thereby procedurally defaulting them. Absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence, the default barred federal review.

Impact

DiTullio reinforces two vital principles for criminal defense and habeas practitioners:

Counsel’s strategic decisions—especially about which witnesses to call—are entitled to substantial deference, particularly when the client explicitly approves on the record. Future litigants will find it more difficult to overturn such choices as “deficient,” absent extraordinary circumstances.
To preserve federal issues, state‐court briefs must expressly frame claims in federal constitutional terms. Vague allusions to due process or the U.S. Constitution in passing will not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Counsel must draft petitions and briefs with precise federal citations and analysis.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Strickland Test): To win on this claim, a defendant must show both (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that this deficiency prejudiced the outcome. Courts give wide latitude to strategic choices by trial lawyers.
AEDPA Deference (§ 2254(d)): Federal habeas courts may not grant relief unless the state court’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or based on an unreasonable factual finding.
Exhaustion and Procedural Default: A state prisoner must first raise all federal constitutional claims in state court. If a claim is not “fairly presented” as federal, it becomes procedurally defaulted and ordinarily cannot be heard in a federal habeas petition.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in DiTullio v. Secretary, Department of Corrections reaffirms the high bar for proving ineffective assistance of counsel when the appellant fully endorses the trial strategy and underscores the necessity of explicitly invoking federal constitutional grounds in state‐court proceedings. These twin rules—deference to strategic choices and strict exhaustion requirements—will guide defense counsel and habeas practitioners in structuring trial tactics and appellate submissions, ensuring clarity and preserving rights under both the Sixth Amendment and the federal habeas corpus statutes.