Reaffirming Deference to Adverse Credibility Findings and the Chenery/Bagamasbad Limits on Appellate Review When the BIA Denies on Credibility Alone

Introduction

In Sakib Ahmod v. U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit (per curiam) denied a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum and withholding of removal. The petitioners were principal applicant Sakib Ahmod and derivative applicants MST Monita and Mohammad Musabbi. The IJ had denied relief primarily on an adverse-credibility determination, and the BIA affirmed on that basis, declining to address whether, independent of credibility, the record established either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.

On petition for review, Ahmod challenged (1) the adverse-credibility determination as unsupported by substantial evidence and (2) argued, in the alternative, that the record (including country-conditions evidence) established a well-founded fear of future persecution due to his involvement with the Liberal Democratic Party of Bangladesh (LDP). The Eleventh Circuit rejected the credibility challenge and declined to consider the alternative “well-founded fear” theory because the agency had not reached those merits issues.

Although designated “Not for Publication,” the opinion is a compact but thorough reassertion of two enduring themes in immigration review: (a) the highly deferential substantial-evidence standard governing credibility findings and (b) the Chenery/Bagamasbad rule that the court of appeals reviews what the agency decided—not what it could have decided.

Summary of the Opinion

• Scope of review: Because the BIA explicitly agreed with the IJ, the court reviewed both decisions to the extent of the BIA’s agreement and any independent BIA reasoning.
• Adverse credibility: Substantial evidence supported the IJ’s adverse-credibility finding under the Real ID Act’s “totality of the circumstances” factors. The IJ cited multiple inconsistencies, implausibilities, and non-responsiveness; the BIA concluded Ahmod failed to adequately explain them. The court held that the record did not compel a contrary credibility finding.
• Disposition on alternative merits: Invoking INS v. Bagamasbad and the Chenery line, the court refused to adjudicate whether the record otherwise established past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, because the BIA had denied solely on credibility and did not reach those issues.
• Result: Petition for review denied.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Role

• Ayala v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 605 F.3d 941 (11th Cir. 2010) and Seck v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 2011): Clarify that when the BIA expressly agrees with or adopts the IJ’s analysis, the court reviews both the BIA decision and the IJ’s reasoning to the extent endorsed by the BIA.
• Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2006) and D-Muhumed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 388 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2004): Establish the heavy deference owed to agency credibility findings and the requirement that the IJ provide “specific, cogent reasons” for an adverse-credibility determination.
• Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) and Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001): Define the substantial-evidence standard as “highly deferential” and require affirmance if the agency’s decision is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the agency.
• 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (Real ID Act credibility provision): Permits credibility assessments based on demeanor; plausibility; consistency across oral and written statements; internal consistency; consistency with other record evidence; and inaccuracies, even if not going to the “heart” of the claim.
• Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2005): States that credible testimony alone can carry an asylum claim; conversely, an adverse credibility finding—absent corroboration—can support denial, though the IJ still must consider other evidence offered.
• Xia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 608 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2010): Confirms that even “one internal inconsistency” and “one omission,” if unrebutted by corroboration, can sustain an adverse-credibility finding; reversal requires that evidence “compel” the opposite result.
• Diallo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 596 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2010) and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13: State the general asylum eligibility framework: past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground.
• De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 2008) and Li Shan Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 672 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2011): Address the presumption arising from past persecution and the objective/subjective components of a well-founded fear.
• Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2005) and Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2009): Set the “more likely than not” standard for withholding of removal and the general principle that failure to meet the asylum standard usually precludes withholding.
• INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976): Holds that agencies need not make findings on issues unnecessary to the result.
• Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) and INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002): Require remand for agency consideration of issues not decided below; courts are not to conduct de novo factfinding or decide matters the agency has not addressed in the first instance.
• Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023); Kemokai v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 83 F.4th 886 (11th Cir. 2023); Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 792 (11th Cir. 2016); Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2015): Clarify that § 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement is a claim-processing rule (not jurisdictional) and that petitioners must present the “core issue” and discrete supporting arguments to the BIA to permit review.
• Clement v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 75 F.4th 1193 (11th Cir. 2023) and SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943): Limit judicial review to the grounds the agency actually invoked.
• 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D): Emphasizes the “compel” standard—administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel applied the familiar, highly deferential substantial-evidence standard. Because the BIA expressly agreed with the IJ, the court reviewed both decisions. The IJ identified multiple inconsistencies, implausibilities, and non-responsiveness, providing “specific, cogent reasons” as required by Chen. The BIA concluded that Ahmod did not adequately reconcile these problems, and the Eleventh Circuit held that the record did not “compel” a contrary credibility finding.

The opinion highlights several discrepancies that collectively supported the adverse-credibility determination under § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii):

• Conflict between testimony and an affidavit: Ahmod testified he stayed at his sister’s home only a few days, while his sister’s affidavit stated he stayed for months.
• Visa/timeline ambiguity: He failed to directly answer how he obtained a Brazilian visa for his 2019–2020 stay, instead offering inconsistent travel timelines.
• Employment history inconsistency: He testified he worked in a grocery store from 2016 to 2017 and never owned a business, contradicting his application’s statement that he owned a business.
• Inherent implausibility: The IJ found implausible his claim that he traversed many countries with a pregnant spouse and young child without assistance from a smuggler.
• Return-to-Bangladesh inconsistency: He testified he fled to Brazil and then returned to Bangladesh, contradicting his application where he said he had not returned to Bangladesh after leaving.
• Entry-date discrepancy: The application reflected entry to the United States in November 2023, while he testified he entered in October 2022.
• Non-responsiveness: The IJ repeatedly noted unresponsive answers, particularly regarding the Brazilian visa and travel chronology.

Although Ahmod attempted explanations (e.g., characterizing some statements as mistakes in the affidavit or application), the BIA found them insufficient, and the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that, even where alternative explanations exist, reversal is proper only if the record compels the opposite view. Citing Xia and Chen, the panel underscored that even a single inconsistency and omission can support an adverse-credibility finding when unrebutted by corroboration. Here, there were multiple.

Having sustained the adverse credibility determination, the court addressed the petitioner’s request to grant relief on an alternative ground: that the independent country-condition evidence and his political profile (LDP affiliation) established a well-founded fear. The panel declined to reach that argument for two reasons rooted in administrative law:

• Bagamasbad/Chenery rule: Agencies need not decide unnecessary issues, and courts review agency decisions on the grounds invoked. The BIA denied on credibility alone and did not address whether the remaining record independently established past persecution or a well-founded fear. The court thus could not reach those unaddressed merits issues.
• Thomas/Ventura remand rule: If an agency has not decided the merits, courts generally must remand rather than decide issues in the first instance. Here, because the adverse-credibility finding itself was supported by substantial evidence, remand for merits consideration was unnecessary—the credibility ground adequately supported denial.

The opinion also rehearsed the exhaustion framework under § 1252(d)(1) (now a claim-processing rule after Santos-Zacaria). While exhaustion was not the dispositive basis for rejecting the alternative argument here, the panel reinforced that appellate review is confined to issues the agency actually addressed (Clement/Chenery), and petitioners must duly present issues to the BIA (Jeune/Indrawati).

Impact and Practical Significance

• Adverse credibility as a dispositive ground: The case reinforces that, in the Eleventh Circuit, detailed and well-documented IJ credibility determinations—particularly those citing multiple inconsistencies, implausibilities, and non-responsiveness—will be sustained unless the record compels the contrary conclusion. Petitioners who cannot overcome adverse credibility with persuasive explanations and corroboration will likely see their claims denied without the BIA addressing alternative evidentiary theories.
• Limits of appellate review: The decision underscores that appellate courts will not decide (or even consider) merits issues the BIA did not reach. Even robust country-conditions evidence cannot be leveraged on petition for review if the BIA based its decision solely on credibility and never addressed whether that independent evidence sufficed.
• Litigation strategy for asylum seekers:
  • Front-load accuracy and consistency: Ensure that I-589 applications, affidavits (including those from family members), and testimony are aligned. Seemingly small inconsistencies (dates, durations, employment history) can be fatal.
  • Prepare to explain visas, travel routes, and logistics: Be ready with documentation or clear explanations for international travel, particularly where the IJ may view the narrative as implausible under the Real ID factors.
  • Corroborate where possible: If credibility is questioned, documentary corroboration (e.g., travel records, party membership proof, police reports, medical records) can mitigate or overcome inconsistencies.
  • Preserve issues at the BIA: If seeking relief based on independent documentary evidence notwithstanding credibility concerns, clearly present that theory to the BIA and request BIA findings, to enable judicial review.
• Agency adjudication: The opinion reaffirms that IJs must provide “specific, cogent reasons” for adverse credibility findings, and the BIA may treat credibility as dispositive where the applicant fails to rehabilitate testimony or provide corroboration.
• Not-for-publication status: While nonprecedential, the decision reflects stable Eleventh Circuit doctrine on substantial evidence review and administrative-law limits, and it is consistent with Supreme Court guidance (Bagamasbad, Chenery, Thomas/Ventura).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantial-evidence review: A highly deferential standard. The court asks whether reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence supports the agency’s decision. The court must uphold the decision unless the record compels the opposite result.
• Adverse-credibility determination: A finding that the applicant’s testimony is not reliable. Under the Real ID Act, the IJ may consider inconsistencies, implausibilities, demeanor, and contradictions with the record—even if those do not go to the heart of the claim.
• “Compel” standard: To overturn the agency’s factual findings, the evidence must require any reasonable adjudicator to find the opposite. It’s more demanding than merely showing a different outcome is plausible.
• Well-founded fear vs. withholding of removal: Asylum requires a “reasonable possibility” of persecution (a lower standard). Withholding requires showing persecution is “more likely than not” (higher). If you fail asylum’s standard, you typically cannot meet withholding’s.
• Bagamasbad/Chenery principle: Courts review what the agency actually decided on the grounds it invoked. If the BIA denied on credibility alone, the court will not decide additional merits issues the BIA never reached.
• Thomas/Ventura remand rule: When the agency hasn’t decided an issue, courts generally must remand for the agency to address it first, rather than deciding it themselves.
• Exhaustion as a claim-processing rule: Under Santos-Zacaria, the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies before judicial review is not jurisdictional, but courts apply it if invoked. Petitioners must raise the core issue and supporting arguments to the BIA.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Ahmod reiterates two central constraints in immigration appeals. First, adverse-credibility determinations supported by multiple, well-documented inconsistencies, implausibilities, and non-responsiveness will be upheld under the substantial-evidence standard unless the record compels a contrary conclusion. Second, when the BIA denies relief solely on credibility grounds and does not reach merits issues such as past persecution or well-founded fear, the court of appeals will not adjudicate those unaddressed issues, consistent with Bagamasbad, Chenery, and Thomas/Ventura.

For applicants and counsel, the case underscores the premium on meticulous consistency across applications, affidavits, and testimony, the importance of prompt and plausible explanations for discrepancies, and the strategic necessity of both presenting and insisting the BIA address any alternative merits theories supported by independent evidence. Doctrinally, the opinion does not forge new law but provides a clear and up-to-date application of the Real ID Act’s credibility rubric and the administrative-law limits on appellate review—principles that will continue to shape asylum litigation in the Eleventh Circuit.