Reaffirming Deference to Adverse Credibility Determinations Based on Cumulative Inconsistencies in Asylum Cases

Introduction

In Singh v. Bondi (No. 23-6186, 2d Cir. May 27, 2025), the Second Circuit addressed a petition for review filed by Rajneet Singh, a native and citizen of India, challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) and an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. At issue was the propriety of an adverse credibility determination based on inconsistencies between Singh’s written submissions, oral testimony, and supporting documents. The respondent is Pamela Bondi, Acting United States Attorney General. This commentary examines the procedural posture, the court’s ruling, and the broader implications for asylum and credibility jurisprudence.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, in a summary order, denied Singh’s petition for review. Applying the substantial-evidence standard to fact findings and de novo review to legal questions, the court concluded that:

The BIA’s and IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by multiple, material inconsistencies regarding Singh’s political affiliation and his family’s post-detention residence.
Singh failed to offer coherent explanations or reliable documentary corroboration sufficient to compel a different outcome.
Because all forms of relief—namely asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief—rested on the same factual predicate, the adverse credibility finding was dispositive of all claims.

Accordingly, the petition for review was denied, all pending motions were denied, and any stays were vacated.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court’s decision draws heavily on established Second Circuit precedents that govern credibility assessments, the standard of review, and the weight to afford supporting affidavits:

Substantial Evidence and “Compelled to Conclude” Standard: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to conclude otherwise).
Singh v. Garland, 6 F.4th 418, 426 (2d Cir. 2021): clarifying that factual findings must rest on “reasonable, substantial and probative evidence” when viewed in totality.
Totality of Circumstances in Credibility Determination: 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) authorizes reliance on discrepancies “between written and oral statements,” “internal consistency,” and consistency with “other evidence of record.”
Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008): upholding deference to IJs when “no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
Weight to Affidavits and Corroboration: Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007): absence of corroboration can reinforce an adverse credibility finding once testimony is impeached.
Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 2020): IJ may discount affidavits from interested parties unavailable for cross-examination.
Minor vs. Cumulative Inconsistencies: Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167: IJ may rely on the “cumulative effect” of seemingly minor inconsistencies.
Singh v. Garland, 6 F.4th at 427 n.2: reaffirming that multiple small discrepancies can justify disbelief.
Explanation Requirement: Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005): a petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation—he must show a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.
Two Permissible Views: Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2007): if two logical interpretations of the evidence exist, the agency’s choice is not clearly erroneous.

Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit’s analysis proceeded in three major steps:

Standards of Review: The court reaffirmed that factual findings—including credibility determinations—are reviewed for substantial evidence, while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
Identification of Key Inconsistencies:
- Political affiliation: Singh’s initial and amended applications conflicted regarding his membership in the Akali Dal Mann Party.
- Family residence: statements and testimony about where his mother and sister lived after their 2014 arrest varied between Begowal, Jalandhar, and Australia, with no consistent or coherent explanation.
The IJ concluded that these discrepancies—some of which bore directly on Singh’s fear of persecution—undermined his credibility under § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
Failure of Documentary Corroboration: Affidavits from family members and acquaintances were largely drafted by interested parties, not subject to cross-examination, and failed to resolve critical inconsistencies. Under Biao Yang and Likai Gao, such evidence carries little weight when it does not rehabilitate an impeached witness.

Having found substantial evidence supported each aspect of the adverse credibility determination, the court concluded that no reasonable fact-finder would be “compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Because Singh’s claims for asylum, withholding, and CAT relief all shared the same factual basis, the adverse credibility finding resolved the entire case.

Impact

Singh v. Bondi underscores several important lessons for practitioners and tribunals in the immigration context:

Cumulative Inconsistencies Matter: Even minor or peripheral discrepancies can tip the balance when considered together.
Explanations Must Be Coherent and Timely: A petitioner’s failure to address inconsistencies during proceedings, or to provide a plausible, contemporaneous rationale, may foreclose relief.
Corroboration Is Not a Panacea: Affidavits from interested parties lacking cross-examination value offer limited rehabilitation of damaged credibility.
Reaffirmation of Deference: Courts will continue to defer to IJs and the BIA on credibility unless the record compels the opposite finding.

Future claimants should carefully ensure that written applications and oral testimony align, and that documentary support addresses, rather than ignores, any discrepancies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantial Evidence Standard: A court upholds factual findings so long as a “reasonable fact-finder” could reach the same conclusion based on record evidence.
Adverse Credibility Determination: When an IJ deems a witness not believable, that finding can doom asylum and related claims if petitioner cannot rehabilitate credibility.
“Compelled to Conclude” (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)): Courts may overturn fact findings only if no reasonable adjudicator could agree with the agency.
Withholding of Removal vs. Asylum: Asylum requires a lower burden (“well-founded fear”) than withholding (“more likely than not”); both depend on credible evidence of persecution.
Convention Against Torture (CAT) Relief: Petitioners must show it is more likely than not they would be tortured if returned, also hinging on credible testimony.

Conclusion

Singh v. Bondi reaffirms the high degree of deference accorded to immigration judges and the BIA in assessing credibility. By upholding an adverse credibility finding based on cumulative inconsistencies and rejecting post-hoc attempts at corroboration, the Second Circuit underscored the imperative of internal consistency and coherent explanation in asylum claims. This decision will serve as a touchstone for future challenges to credibility determinations, emphasizing that petitioners must present a unified narrative and reliable evidence from the outset.