Reaffirming Clear and Convincing Evidence Standards in Parental Rights Termination

Introduction

This commentary examines the dissenting opinion in In the Interest of E.D.A. III, et al., 23-27 MAP 2024 (Pa. 2025), a consolidated appeal concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights by the York County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court, and subsequent affirmance by the Superior Court. The parents—E.D.A., Jr. and T.M.A.—appealed orders terminating their rights to five minor children. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted. Justice Donohue’s dissent argues that the record does not support termination by clear and convincing evidence and that the Court should decide the merits, not dismiss the appeals. Key issues include:

The constitutional requirement of “clear and convincing” proof before terminating fundamental parental rights.
Whether the trial court improperly relied on uncorroborated testimony of a single caseworker while ignoring contrary competent evidence.
The proper application of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) (statutory grounds for termination) and § 2511(b) (child’s needs and welfare).
The scope of appellate review in ensuring that factual findings rest on specific, corroborated, competent evidence.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court, by a per curiam order, dismissed the consolidated appeals as improvidently granted, effectively leaving in place the termination decrees issued by the York County Orphans’ Court and affirmed by the Superior Court. The majority provided no substantive opinion on the merits. In his dissent, Justice Donohue contends that the trial court’s decrees lack the requisite clear and convincing support:

The court based its termination rulings almost entirely on the credibility determinations of a single York County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) caseworker.
Multiple professionals (family advocates, therapists, drug‐treatment counselors) testified that the parents had remedied the conditions leading to dependency and that their home, finances, and parenting skills were suitable.
Evidence of physical‐abuse concerns related to events in late 2020 was stale, belatedly investigated, and contradicted by subsequent therapeutic progress.
The court ignored favorable evidence, applied outdated circumstances, and failed to conduct the required bifurcated analysis under § 2511(a) and (b).

Justice Donohue would have reversed or remanded for a full consideration of the record rather than dismissing the appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) – Held that due process requires “clear and convincing” proof before the state may terminate parental rights.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) – Discussed the function of standards of proof in civil adjudications.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) – Justice Harlan’s concurrence highlighted the importance of confidence in factual findings.
Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006) – Recognized parental rights as fundamental under Pennsylvania law.
In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343 (Pa. 2021) – Clarified that factual findings must be supported by specific, corroborated evidence and that credibility does not substitute for competency.
In re T.R., 465 A.2d 624 (Pa. 1983) – Adopted the clear and convincing standard in Pennsylvania following Santosky.
Interest of S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012) – Emphasized appellate deference only when findings are record‐supported and legal conclusions are sound.
Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108 (Pa. 2021) – Stressed the trial court’s duty to weigh all evidence in termination hearings.
Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88 (Pa. 1998) – Confirmed appellate review must ensure competent evidence supports trial decrees in involuntary termination.
Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2023) – Reinforced that § 2511(b) analysis must focus on each child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including necessity and benefit of parent–child bond.

Legal Reasoning

Justice Donohue’s dissent centers on two pillars of due process and statutory construction:

Fundamental Nature of Parental Rights: Terminating parental rights is likened to “the civil equivalent of the death penalty.” The United States Supreme Court in Santosky mandates clear and convincing evidence when a parent’s fundamental liberty interest to care for a child is at stake.
Bifurcated Statutory Analysis under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511:
- Stage 1 – § 2511(a): The petitioner must prove one of the statutory grounds (e.g., failure to remedy conditions, prolonged removal) by clear and convincing evidence. Findings must rest on specific, competent testimony, not uncorroborated opinions.
- Stage 2 – § 2511(b): Even if grounds are proven, termination must serve the child’s best interests—assessed through the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and the necessity and benefit of the parental bond (per K.T.).

The dissent details multiple failures in the trial courts’ approach:

Reliance on a single CYF caseworker whose generalized, conclusory testimony was neither specific nor corroborated by records.
Disregard of consistent testimony from Pressley Ridge advocates and therapists that parents achieved stable housing, financial security, and parenting skills.
Use of stale evidence (2020 housing conditions, belatedly adjudicated abuse allegations) rather than current, favorable evidence from termination‐hearing witnesses.
An inadequate § 2511(b) analysis that did not assess each child’s needs, the benefit of parental bonds, or the psychological harm of severance.
Dismissal of a well‐developed, multi‐witness record as a “close call,” despite the statutory requirement that “close calls” defeat a civil clear and convincing standard.

Impact

If adopted, the dissent’s framework would significantly influence child‐welfare and appellate practice in Pennsylvania:

Trial courts would be compelled to identify and discuss specific, corroborated evidence for each § 2511(a) ground and each child’s § 2511(b) needs.
Appellate courts would conduct granular reviews of termination records to ensure clear and convincing proof, rather than deferring to credibility findings alone.
The decision would reinforce procedural protections for parents facing potential destruction of familial bonds, emphasizing due process and high standards of proof.
Child‐welfare agencies would need to maintain detailed documentation of services, progress, and professional assessments, anticipating close scrutiny in termination hearings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Clear and Convincing Evidence: A civil proof standard requiring a high degree of certainty (more than “preponderance,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt”)—the factfinder must have a firm belief in the truth of the contested facts.
Competent Evidence vs. Credibility: Competent evidence is specific testimony or documentation that directly supports a fact; credibility concerns whether a witness is believable. A credible but unsupported opinion is insufficient under clear-and-convincing review.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5) and (8): Grounds for termination when a child removed for at least six months or twelve months, respectively, and parents cannot or will not remedy removal conditions within a reasonable time.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b): The court must consider a child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including whether maintaining the parent–child bond is necessary and beneficial.

Conclusion

Justice Donohue’s dissent underscores the vital importance of:

Adhering strictly to the “clear and convincing” standard when terminating the most fundamental of civil liberties—parental rights.
Ensuring that findings of fact rest on specific, corroborated, competent evidence rather than unsubstantiated credibility calls.
Conducting a full, bifurcated analysis under § 2511(a) and (b), with attention to each child’s individual needs and the benefits of the parent–child bond.
Preserving due process by reviewing the entire record, not merely accepting a truncated or hindsight‐tinged narrative of older case history.

By demanding rigorous evidentiary support and a child-centered inquiry, the principles advanced in the dissent, if adopted, would strengthen procedural protections, guide trial and appellate courts, and protect parental rights against insufficiently supported termination decrees.