Reaffirming Christiansburg for Title II: Second Circuit Vacates Defense Fee Award Against Pro Se Plaintiff and Affirms Dismissal of § 1981/NYCHRL Claims

Case: Alexander v. Private Protective Services, Inc., No. 24-853-cv (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 2025) (summary order)

Panel: Cabranes, Chin, and Robinson, Circuit Judges

Disposition: Affirmed in part; Vacated in part

Caution: This is a Summary Order under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1; it has no precedential effect but may be cited pursuant to FRAP 32.1.

Introduction

This appeal arises from a pro se civil-rights suit by Jeriel Alexander against Private Protective Services, Inc. (“PPS”). Alexander alleged race discrimination after a PPS employee denied him entry to a New York City reality television shoot at “Pier 132,” where he had been invited to work as an “extra.” His initial pleading invoked Title II of the Civil Rights Act (public accommodations) and sought money damages. PPS moved to dismiss and sought attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b), arguing the Title II claim was frivolous because Title II does not provide damages. Alexander, in turn, sought to amend to plead claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, New York law, and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), dropping Title II.

The district court (Oetken, J.; Aaron, M.J.) dismissed, awarded PPS $16,760 in attorney’s fees, denied leave to add § 1981 and state-law claims as futile, allowed amendment only as to NYCHRL, and later granted summary judgment to PPS on the NYCHRL claim. On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the fee award but otherwise affirmed, offering important guidance on fee-shifting against pro se litigants under Title II, the use of the summary-judgment record to deny leave to amend a § 1981 claim, and the evidentiary showing required to survive summary judgment under the NYCHRL.

Summary of the Opinion

Attorney’s fees vacated: The district court abused its discretion in awarding fees to PPS under § 2000a-3(b). Mislabeling a claim (seeking damages under Title II) did not render the suit frivolous, particularly given the pro se status and Alexander’s prompt effort to amend.
§ 1981 claim: Affirmed denial of leave to amend, not on the district court’s futility reasoning at the pleading stage, but on the alternative ground that, in light of the summary-judgment record developed on the NYCHRL claim, Alexander could not establish a triable case of race discrimination.
NYCHRL claim: Summary judgment affirmed. Alexander failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact that the denial of entry was because of his race. Undisputed facts showed non-discriminatory reasons: capacity had been reached; the event’s demographics (majority attendees were Black or other people of color) undermined an inference of racial exclusion; and PPS pointed to a prior-employment non-customer clause as a legitimate reason (without the court resolving the clause’s legal applicability).

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978): Establishes that prevailing defendants in civil-rights cases may recover fees only if the plaintiff’s claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless,” or if the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. Central to vacating the fee award.
Independent Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989): Notes materially similar fee-shifting language among § 2000e-5(k), § 2000a-3(b), and § 1988 should be interpreted alike, reinforcing Christiansburg’s application to Title II fee-shifting.
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980): Cautions against penalizing pro se civil-rights litigants for failure to recognize subtle legal deficiencies—a key point in vacating fees against Alexander.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983): Legislative history of § 1988 aligns standards with Civil Rights Act fee provisions, supporting consistent application of Christiansburg across statutes.
McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2017): “Failure to cite the correct statute does not affect the merits.” Especially potent for pro se litigants. Anchors the holding that Alexander’s mislabeling did not make his claim frivolous.
H.C. v. New York City Dept. of Education, 71 F.4th 120 (2d Cir. 2023): Confirms abuse-of-discretion review for fee awards.
Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015): Standards on leave to amend and futility.
Bruh v. Bessemer Venture Partners III L.P., 464 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2006); TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d 493 (2d Cir. 2014); Hutchison v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., 647 F.3d 479 (2d Cir. 2011): Appellate authority to affirm on any basis supported by the record, including alternative grounds not relied upon by the district court.
Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001): Permits use of the summary-judgment standard when assessing leave to amend at that procedural posture.
Peoples v. Leon, 63 F.4th 132 (2d Cir. 2023): Summary judgment standard: de novo review, drawing all reasonable inferences for the non-movant.
Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of New York, 805 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2015): Cited to illustrate that the court may credit an employer’s legitimate reason in the absence of evidence creating a triable issue of pretext; here, the Panel references the employment agreement as a legitimate reason without deciding its ultimate legal enforceability in this context.

Legal Reasoning

I. Attorney’s Fees Under Title II (42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b))

The court vacated the district court’s fee award to PPS, grounding its analysis in Christiansburg and the special solicitude afforded pro se litigants.

Mislabeling is not frivolity: The district court deemed Alexander’s claim frivolous because Title II does not provide money damages. The Second Circuit rejected that rationale, relying on McLeod to stress that citing the wrong statute—especially by a pro se litigant—does not render the claim frivolous where the factual allegations have substance. Indeed, Alexander’s allegations supported a NYCHRL claim that proceeded to summary judgment, showing the case was not “groundless.”
No “continuation” of a frivolous claim: The district court also faulted Alexander for not withdrawing his Title II claim after the court flagged the damages problem when setting aside PPS’s default. But within two weeks of that order, PPS moved to dismiss and Alexander moved to amend to drop Title II and add other claims. Thus, he did not “continue to litigate” a clearly frivolous claim within the meaning of Christiansburg.
Pro se caution: Hughes underscores that unrepresented litigants should not be punished for failure to recognize subtle legal deficiencies. This caution is aligned with Hensley’s cross-statute fee-shifting principles and Zipes’s interpretive uniformity among fee provisions.

Taken together, the panel determined the strict Christiansburg threshold for awarding fees to prevailing defendants was not met and vacated the $16,760 fee award.

II. Denial of Leave to Amend to Add a § 1981 Claim

While leave to amend should generally be “freely” granted, it may be denied as futile. The district court denied leave at the pleading stage, but the Second Circuit affirmed on a different, stronger basis: the summary-judgment record developed on Alexander’s NYCHRL claim showed no triable issue of race discrimination. Under Bruh, TechnoMarine, and Hutchison, the appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record; under Milanese, it is appropriate to apply a summary-judgment lens when leave to amend is sought at that stage.

Because the NYCHRL—which is construed liberally—could not survive summary judgment on these facts, the proposed § 1981 claim would necessarily fail to present a triable issue as well. Accordingly, denying leave to amend to add § 1981 was proper.

III. Summary Judgment on NYCHRL

The panel affirmed summary judgment for PPS on Alexander’s NYCHRL claim on the alternative ground that he failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact that race motivated the denial of his entry. Crucial to this conclusion were several undisputed facts, deemed admitted because Alexander did not oppose PPS’s Rule 56.1 statement:

The event was a shoot for VH1’s “Love & Hip Hop,” a show that “caters primarily to Black and Indigenous viewers,” and the majority of attendees at the shoot were Black and other people of color.
By the time Alexander arrived, capacity for extras had been met.
Alexander was a former PPS security guard; his hiring packet included a clause stating that for five years after his employment ended, he would not work for PPS’s customers. The production company at the shoot was a PPS customer.

The court expressly did not decide whether the employment agreement actually extended to the kind of “extra” work Alexander sought. Instead, it credited the clause as part of PPS’s legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for the exclusion in the absence of evidence from Alexander creating a triable issue of pretext. Against this backdrop, no reasonable jury could conclude race was the reason for the denial.

Impact and Practice Implications

Fee-shifting against pro se plaintiffs under Title II: This decision reinforces that a prevailing defendant faces a high bar when seeking fees from a pro se plaintiff. Mispleading the statute (such as seeking damages under Title II) does not establish frivolousness if the factual allegations have potential merit and the plaintiff acts promptly to correct course.
Christiansburg applied uniformly across fee provisions: By invoking Zipes and Hensley, the panel reiterates that Christiansburg’s standard governs § 2000a-3(b), discouraging fee awards that could chill civil-rights claims—even when plaintiffs err in statutory selection.
Strategic timing and amendment: Plaintiffs who promptly move to amend after an adverse legal flag bolster their protection against defense fee-shifting. Defendants seeking fees should document not only frivolity but also the plaintiff’s persistence in litigating after the defect became clear.
Using the developed record to assess amendment futility: At later stages, courts may deny leave to amend based on the extant summary-judgment record. Plaintiffs should be prepared that failure of a broad, plaintiff-friendly claim (like NYCHRL) can doom parallel federal claims (e.g., § 1981) for lack of triable evidence.
Rule 56.1 compliance is critical: Unopposed statements of material fact are deemed admitted. Pro se litigants must heed local rules; failure to respond can effectively concede the record.
NYCHRL still requires evidence linking action to bias: Even under NYCHRL’s liberal framework, plaintiffs must marshal competent evidence of discriminatory motive. Where undisputed facts reveal non-discriminatory reasons—capacity limits, demographic context, or employer-relationship constraints—summary judgment may be appropriate.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Title II remedies: Title II (public accommodations) primarily offers injunctive relief, not money damages. Suing for damages under Title II is a legal misstep, but not automatically “frivolous,” particularly for pro se litigants with otherwise substantive allegations.
Fee shifting for prevailing defendants: Under Christiansburg, defense fee awards in civil-rights cases are reserved for claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless—or where the plaintiff keeps litigating after the defect is clear. The standard aims to avoid deterring legitimate civil-rights claims.
“Affirm on any ground” doctrine: An appellate court can uphold a judgment for reasons different from those used by the district court if the record supports it.
Futility of amendment: Courts may deny leave to amend if the proposed claim would not survive dismissal or, at later stages, summary judgment.
Rule 56.1 statements: In summary judgment practice, each side submits statements of material facts. If you don’t oppose your opponent’s statement as required, the court may accept those facts as true.
Legitimate reason vs. pretext: If a defendant articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an action, the plaintiff must produce evidence raising a triable issue that the reason is a pretext masking discrimination.
Summary order status: In the Second Circuit, summary orders are not precedential but can be cited. They often provide persuasive guidance on applying established rules.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s decision offers clear, practical guidance across three fronts. First, it tightens adherence to Christiansburg in Title II fee-shifting against pro se litigants: mislabeling a claim and promptly moving to amend is not the stuff of “frivolous” litigation. Second, it confirms that appellate courts may use the developed summary-judgment record to uphold the denial of leave to add a § 1981 claim where the plaintiff cannot raise a triable issue of discrimination. Third, it underscores that, even under the NYCHRL’s expansive protections, plaintiffs must come forward with evidence linking the challenged action to discriminatory motive, especially when defendants proffer plausible, undisputed non-discriminatory reasons.

Although non-precedential, this summary order is instructive: defense fee awards in civil-rights cases remain exceptional, not routine, particularly against pro se litigants; and plaintiffs must rigorously engage the summary-judgment record, as unopposed facts and credible non-discriminatory explanations will carry the day in the absence of countervailing evidence.