Reaffirming Broad Sentencing Discretion to Rely on Unadjudicated Conduct: Commentary on United States v. Jhan Carlos Lugo Ruiz

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in United States v. Jhan Carlos Lugo Ruiz, No. 25‑12838 (11th Cir. Dec. 9, 2025). Although the opinion is marked “Not for Publication” and therefore is not binding precedent under the Eleventh Circuit’s rules, it is a useful and clear application of several important sentencing principles that recur in federal practice:

• The scope of information a district court may consider at sentencing, including detailed arrest reports and pending or unadjudicated charges.
• The standards governing factual findings at sentencing when the defendant objects to a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”).
• The distinction between procedural and substantive reasonableness review on appeal.
• The degree of appellate deference to modest upward variances from the Sentencing Guidelines range in illegal reentry cases.

The case arises from a prosecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) for illegal reentry after deportation. The defendant, Jhan Carlos Lugo Ruiz, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, had entered or attempted to enter the United States illegally at least three times and had twice been removed. After his most recent illegal entry by boat into Palm Beach, Florida, he pled guilty to illegal reentry. The district court imposed a nine‑month sentence—an upward variance from the advisory Guidelines range of 0–6 months—followed by one year of supervised release.

On appeal, Lugo Ruiz challenged both the procedural reasonableness of his sentence—arguing that the district court improperly relied on a police arrest report describing a 2018 heroin possession incident—and the substantive reasonableness of the above‑Guidelines sentence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit’s disposition can be summarized as follows:

1. No procedural error in relying on the arrest report and sworn complaint.
   The court held that the district court did not commit procedural error by considering an arrest report and a related sworn complaint describing a 2018 incident in Massachusetts where a state trooper allegedly found six baggies (“twists”) of heroin in Lugo Ruiz’s mouth following a traffic stop. Even though the related state charges remained pending and there was no conviction, the district court permissibly found by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct occurred, based on “specific chronology” and “concrete details” in the trooper’s report corroborated by the complaint.
2. Guidelines properly calculated and sentencing factors properly considered.
   The court noted that the Guidelines range (0–6 months) was correctly calculated and not affected by the 2018 heroin incident. The district court heard argument, considered the statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and adequately explained its reasons for an upward variance, especially the need for specific deterrence in light of repeated illegal entries.
3. Reliance on broad sentencing information is authorized by statute and precedent.
   Citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661 and Witte v. United States, the court reiterated that sentencing judges may consider any information about a defendant’s “background, character, and conduct,” including hearsay, as long as it bears sufficient indicia of reliability.
4. The upward variance to nine months was substantively reasonable.
   Applying deferential abuse‑of‑discretion review, and relying on cases like United States v. Early and United States v. Shaw, the court concluded that a nine‑month sentence—three months above the top of the Guidelines range but far below the two‑year statutory maximum—fell comfortably within the range of reasonable sentences. The district court permissibly gave “great weight” to specific deterrence in light of Lugo Ruiz’s repeated violations.

The opinion thus reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s broad view of what a sentencing court may consider, and confirms that modest upward variances tailored to deterrence in recidivist illegal reentry cases are unlikely to be overturned on appeal.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Defendant’s Immigration and Criminal History

The opinion outlines a concise but important chronology:

• 2016 – First encounter and conviction: Near Laredo, Texas, immigration officials encountered Lugo Ruiz after he waded across the Rio Grande River. He was convicted of illegal entry and served a 5‑day sentence before being deported in 2018.
• Second deportation in 2022: After returning unlawfully again, he was deported a second time in 2022 (the opinion does not detail the circumstances of that entry).
• 2018 Massachusetts arrest (disputed conduct): In February 2018, Massachusetts State Trooper James Farrell stopped Lugo Ruiz for operating a vehicle without license plate lights. During the encounter, Trooper Farrell noticed objects in his mouth, which proved to be six “twists” of a tan substance identified as heroin. A sworn complaint alleged:
  • a license plate violation,
  • driving without a license, and
  • possession of heroin with intent to distribute.
  According to state court records, Lugo Ruiz was transferred to immigration custody soon after his arrest and the state charges remained pending (i.e., there had been no final adjudication).
• May 2025 – Current offense: Lugo Ruiz was apprehended after entering the United States illegally by boat in Palm Beach, Florida. He subsequently pled guilty to reentering after removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).

B. Presentence Investigation Report and Objection

A probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) describing Lugo Ruiz’s background and criminal history. The PSR included the 2018 Massachusetts arrest and summarized the trooper’s account that six baggies of heroin were found in Lugo Ruiz’s mouth.

Defense counsel objected to the PSR’s inclusion of that episode as “criminal history,” arguing:

• The related state charges had been “dropped” or, at least, not adjudicated; there were no judicial or jury findings establishing guilt.
• The PSR relied on an arrest report, which alone was insufficiently reliable to prove that the conduct occurred as described.

In response, the government submitted:

• The arrest report prepared by State Trooper Farrell, offering a detailed narrative of the traffic stop, the basis for the stop (license plate light violation), the trooper’s observations (objects in the defendant’s mouth), and the seizure and identification of the heroin “twists.”
• State court records including a sworn complaint, dated the same day as the arrest, referencing the same incident number, and charging Lugo Ruiz with license plate, driving, and heroin distribution offenses.

The district court overruled the objection, finding the combined documentation sufficiently reliable to support the PSR’s description of the 2018 heroin possession. Crucially, the court observed that Lugo Ruiz had not specifically denied the trooper’s account or offered contrary evidence; he challenged only its reliability as a basis for fact‑finding.

C. Sentencing: Guidelines Calculation and Upward Variance

The district court adopted the PSR’s Guidelines calculations, which yielded a range of 0 to 6 months of imprisonment (for an illegal reentry conviction under § 1326(a)). The 2018 heroin episode did not affect:

• the offense level under the Guidelines, or
• the criminal history category as calculated.

Nevertheless, after considering the parties’ joint recommendation for a mid‑range sentence, the court imposed:

• 9 months’ imprisonment (3 months above the top of the Guidelines range), plus
• 1 year of supervised release.

The court grounded the upward variance in the statutory sentencing factors, particularly:

• Lugo Ruiz’s repeated illegal entries and prior deportations.
• The ineffectiveness of prior, more lenient sanctions (e.g., the 5‑day sentence) in deterring him.
• The need for specific deterrence—to make it less likely that this particular defendant would reoffend.

On appeal, Lugo Ruiz challenged:

1. Procedural reasonableness: He claimed it was error for the district court to rely on the 2018 arrest report to find that he had possessed heroin, given the absence of a conviction or jury finding.
2. Substantive reasonableness: He argued that the nine‑month sentence was greater than necessary, that the court placed undue weight on deterrence, and that the upward variance ignored the Guidelines and the goal of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities.

IV. Legal Framework

A. Standards of Appellate Review: Abuse of Discretion and Clear Error

The Eleventh Circuit follows the now‑canonical framework set out in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), for reviewing sentences:

• Abuse of discretion is the overarching standard for both procedural and substantive reasonableness.
• Factual findings at sentencing (e.g., whether the 2018 heroin conduct occurred) are reviewed for clear error, a highly deferential standard. See United States v. Davis, 130 F.4th 1272, 1290 (11th Cir. 2025).

Clear error exists only if, after reviewing the entire record, the appellate court is left with the “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made. If the district court’s view of the evidence is plausible, it stands.

B. Two-Tiered Reasonableness Review

1. Procedural reasonableness focuses on the process:
   • Correct calculation of the Guidelines range.
   • Consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.
   • Adequate explanation of the chosen sentence.
   • No reliance on clearly erroneous facts.
   A significant procedural error can require resentencing even if the sentence length might otherwise be reasonable.
2. Substantive reasonableness addresses whether the sentence is too long or too short relative to the facts and statutory factors. The appellate court asks whether the sentence falls within the “range of reasonable sentences” and will vacate only for a clear error of judgment. See United States v. Rosales‑Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2012).

C. Scope of Information at Sentencing: 18 U.S.C. § 3661 and U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3

Two sources are central to the court’s discussion:

• 18 U.S.C. § 3661 – provides that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may
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