Reaffirming Broad District Court Discretion in § 3582(c)(2) Motions After Amendment 821: Emphasis on Unchanged Criminal History Is Permissible

Introduction

In United States v. Ahmed (No. 24-2629), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Southern District of New York’s denial of a motion to reduce a previously imposed sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The motion was premised on the November 2023 amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines—most notably Amendment 821—which retroactively altered the calculation of criminal history points and thereby lowered certain defendants’ advisory ranges. The defendant-appellant, Shahzad Ahmed, argued that the district court erred by giving outsized weight to his criminal history and insufficient attention to other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and to his post-sentencing conduct and age.

The Second Circuit, in a non-precedential summary order, rejected that contention and held that the district court acted within its discretion in concluding that the unchanged seriousness of Ahmed’s criminal history continued to justify the original sentence. The panel—comprising Circuit Judges Myrna Pérez and Sarah A. L. Merriam—reiterated core principles: the two-step framework for § 3582(c)(2) motions, the deference owed to district courts in weighing § 3553(a) factors, and the presumption that sentencing judges consider all relevant factors even when they do not discuss each one expressly.

Summary of the Opinion

Procedural posture: Ahmed pled guilty in 2019 to conspiring to import and distribute heroin and received a 135-month sentence. Following the 2023 Guidelines amendments, his advisory range dropped to 120–121 months because his Criminal History Category was reduced; however, a 10-year statutory mandatory minimum continued to set the bottom of the range at 120 months.
Motion: Ahmed moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 for a reduction based on the retroactive changes (Amendment 821). The district court denied the motion by memo endorsement (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2024, ECF No. 139).
Holding: The Second Circuit affirmed. It found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to deny a reduction after considering § 3553(a) factors, emphasizing the gravity and persistence of Ahmed’s criminal history—which included a “long record of committing previous drug offenses together” with a co-defendant—and concluding those factors outweighed any changed circumstances.
Key rationale: The weight assigned to any § 3553(a) factor is entrusted to the sentencing judge. A district court need not mechanically discuss every factor to demonstrate consideration, and it may give dispositive weight to unchanged aggravating factors such as criminal history when deciding whether to grant § 3582(c)(2) relief, even after retroactive guideline reductions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010): The Supreme Court established the two-step framework governing § 3582(c)(2) motions. First, the court determines eligibility for a reduction based on a retroactive Guidelines amendment as implemented through U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. Second, if eligible, the court exercises discretion to decide whether a reduction is warranted in light of § 3553(a) factors. The panel expressly relied on this framework.
United States v. Williams, 102 F.4th 618 (2d Cir. 2024): Reiterated that courts evaluating § 3582(c)(2) motions must consider § 3553(a) and applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements. The panel cited Williams both for the two-step procedure and for the presumption that district judges consider relevant § 3553(a) factors absent indications to the contrary.
United States v. Wilson, 716 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2013): Cited through Williams for the eligibility-first, discretion-second structure of § 3582(c)(2) analysis. This underlines that even when a defendant is eligible because an amendment applies retroactively, the outcome remains discretionary.
United States v. Borden, 564 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2009): Provided the standard of review (abuse of discretion). The opinion quotes the familiar formulation that an abuse occurs when a decision rests on an erroneous view of the law, a clearly erroneous view of the evidence, or falls outside the range of permissible choices.
Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008): Quoted via Borden to explain the contours of abuse-of-discretion review. This precedent supports the strong deference given to district court sentencing judgments.
United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2006): Emphasized that the weight assigned to § 3553(a) factors is “firmly committed” to the sentencing judge and is “beyond our review” if the ultimate sentence is reasonable. The Ahmed panel invoked this principle to reject the appellant’s quarrel with the district court’s prioritization of criminal history.
United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566 (2d Cir. 2022) and United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008): These decisions underscore that a court’s failure to discuss every § 3553(a) factor does not imply failure to consider it. The Ahmed panel relied on this to reject the argument that the district court “ignored” mitigating aspects.
United States v. Smith, 982 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2020): Supports the presumption that the sentencing judge considered all relevant factors unless the record suggests otherwise. The panel saw nothing in the record to rebut this presumption.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning tracks the well-settled two-step framework for retroactive Guideline reduction motions:

Eligibility: The district court determined—and the parties did not dispute—that Amendment 821 applied retroactively under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 and reduced Ahmed’s Criminal History Category, thereby narrowing his advisory range to 120–121 months. Because the underlying statutes imposed a 10-year mandatory minimum (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 960(b)(1)(A)), the bottom of the range remained 120 months notwithstanding the lower advisory calculations.
Discretion under § 3553(a): The district court concluded that, notwithstanding the revised range, the § 3553(a) factors continued to support the originally imposed 135-month sentence, with particular emphasis on the defendant’s “very troubling criminal history” and “long record of committing previous drug offenses together” with a co-defendant. The court noted that post-sentencing conduct and the defendant’s age did not change the balance. This reasoning directly engages core § 3553(a) considerations, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the sentence to reflect seriousness and promote respect for law.

On appeal, the court applied abuse-of-discretion review and reiterated several controlling principles:

The assignment of weight to § 3553(a) factors lies within the district court’s sound discretion (Fernandez), and the appellate court does not re-weigh those factors.
A district court is not required to explicitly discuss each § 3553(a) factor or every piece of evidence for its consideration to be adequate (Halvon; Verkhoglyad). A failure to specifically mention a factor does not equal a failure to consider it.
There is a presumption that the sentencing judge considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors unless the record indicates otherwise (Smith), and here the record did not overcome that presumption. Indeed, the district court expressly referenced post-sentencing conduct and age and nevertheless placed greater weight on the enduring seriousness of the criminal history.
It is permissible for a court to decide that unchanged aggravating factors (e.g., repeated drug offenses) outweigh changed circumstances arising from a retroactive Guideline amendment, especially where a statutory mandatory minimum constrains the bottom of the range and the recalculated range reduction is slight (here, narrowing the top end from 135 to 121 months).

Impact

While this decision is a non-precedential summary order, it is consistent with and reinforces binding Second Circuit and Supreme Court authority on § 3582(c)(2) practice. Several practical implications flow from the panel’s reasoning:

No automatic reductions under Amendment 821: Even where a defendant is eligible due to a retroactive change in criminal history scoring, resentencing relief remains discretionary. Defendants should not assume eligibility equals entitlement.
District courts may give decisive weight to unchanged criminal history: The order underscores that courts can anchor their decision in the seriousness and persistence of past conduct, including patterns of recidivism, notwithstanding positive post-sentencing developments.
Mandatory minimums limit practical effect: Where a statutory minimum fixes the floor—here, 120 months—the scope of relief from a reduced advisory range may be modest or nil unless other legal mechanisms (such as safety valve or substantial assistance) apply. This case illustrates that a lowered top-end (from 135 to 121 months) did not persuade the court to reduce the sentence in light of the other § 3553(a) considerations.
Appellate review is highly deferential: Challenges that effectively re-argue the weight of § 3553(a) factors are unlikely to succeed. Absent legal error, clear factual error, or an outcome beyond the range of permissible decisions, denials will be affirmed.
Strategic considerations for defendants: To maximize prospects for relief, defendants should build robust records demonstrating transformative post-sentencing rehabilitation, concrete reentry planning, and evidence that directly addresses the court’s original aggravating concerns. Where criminal history drove the original sentence, persuasive proof of reduced recidivism risk may be crucial.
Guidance for district courts: The decision supports the sufficiency of concise orders that show engagement with relevant factors. Courts need not produce extensive opinions so long as the record reflects consideration of § 3553(a) and explains the central rationale.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary order: A decision designated as a “summary order” in the Second Circuit does not have precedential effect. Parties may cite it under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, but it serves as persuasive rather than binding authority.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) vs. § 3582(c)(1)(A):
- § 3582(c)(2) allows sentence reductions when the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the applicable guideline range. The court first determines eligibility, then exercises discretion under § 3553(a).
- § 3582(c)(1)(A) (compassionate release) permits reductions based on “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” distinct from Guideline amendments. Ahmed had previously filed compassionate release motions without success; this appeal concerned only § 3582(c)(2).
Amendment 821: An amendment effective November 2023 that, among other changes, modified the calculation of criminal history points. One widely discussed feature involves alterations to “status points” and the creation of a “zero-point offender” adjustment, though the order here only indicates that Ahmed’s criminal history category fell and his advisory range narrowed. The exact mechanism of his reduction is not specified in the order.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10: The policy statement governing retroactive application of Guideline amendments. It identifies which amendments are retroactive and prescribes how courts calculate the amended range in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings.
Mandatory minimum vs. advisory Guidelines: Even when the advisory range is lowered, a statutory mandatory minimum can set an absolute floor. As a result, the effective range may remain bounded by that floor, constraining relief. In practice, the Guidelines cannot authorize a sentence below a statutory minimum absent an applicable exception.
Abuse-of-discretion review: On appeal, the decision is overturned only if based on legal error, clearly erroneous factual findings, or an unreasonable outcome. Disagreement with how the district court weighed competing factors is not enough if the decision falls within a range of reasonable choices.
Consideration vs. discussion of § 3553(a) factors: Courts must consider all relevant § 3553(a) factors, but they are not obliged to discuss each one explicitly in writing. There is a presumption they have done so unless the record indicates otherwise.

Conclusion

United States v. Ahmed reiterates, in the § 3582(c)(2) context post–Amendment 821, that district courts retain broad discretion to deny sentence reductions after weighing § 3553(a) factors—even when the defendant is eligible and the advisory range has fallen. The Second Circuit’s affirmation rests on familiar pillars: the two-step Dillon framework, deference to the district court’s weighing of factors (Fernandez), the presumption of consideration absent contrary indications (Smith), and the principle that courts need not address every factor expressly (Halvon, Verkhoglyad). The presence of a mandatory minimum and a modest range reduction further contextualize the district court’s decision to leave the original sentence intact.

Although non-precedential, the order provides persuasive guidance for § 3582(c)(2) litigation in the Second Circuit: eligibility under Amendment 821 is only the starting point; the decisive question remains whether the § 3553(a) factors, as applied to the individual, warrant an actual reduction. Where unchanged criminal history continues to signal seriousness and recidivism risk, courts may reasonably decline to adjust a sentence—even after retroactive guideline relief becomes available.