Introduction

In United States v. Carmel Linot, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 7-year total sentence—comprised of a 60-month upward variance for bank fraud and a mandatory consecutive 24-month term for aggravated identity theft—imposed on a defendant who had repeatedly engaged in identity-based financial fraud. The central appellate issue was whether the district court’s above-Guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable because, according to the defendant, the court over-relied on his prior criminal sentences and discounted mitigating factors such as acceptance of responsibility and the relatively low loss amount.

The panel (Judges Jordan, Branch, and Kidd) held that the district court acted within its discretion. The opinion reiterates fundamental sentencing principles: appellate review is deferential; district courts may place substantial weight on a defendant’s criminal history and the ineffectiveness of prior (even lengthy) sentences; and a sentence well below the statutory maximum may indicate reasonableness. The court also distinguishes an unpublished decision (Ochoa-Molina) where reliance on a prior sentence became a de facto mandatory floor—a line the district court did not cross here.

Summary of the Opinion

Linot pleaded guilty to bank fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft. The Presentence Investigation Report showed he opened a bank account at Community First Credit Union (CFCU) using a minor’s Social Security number and a counterfeit driver’s license, then obtained a Visa card and caused a loss of $1,322.73. He had multiple prior, similar fraud convictions, including a 2017 federal aggravated identity theft conviction. He committed the instant offenses while under supervision.

The advisory Guidelines range for bank fraud was 6–12 months, and aggravated identity theft carried a mandatory 24-month consecutive term. The government sought an upward variance to 120 months total; alternatively, it proposed an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. The district court chose the variance route and imposed 60 months for bank fraud plus the 24 months for the identity-theft count, and five years of supervised release.

On appeal, Linot argued the sentence was substantively unreasonable. Applying abuse-of-discretion review under Gall, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held that:

• District courts may consider prior offenses and the length of prior sentences under § 3553(a), even when criminal history already influences the Guidelines.
• The district court reasonably emphasized deterrence, respect for the law, and the nature and circumstances of the offense (including the use of a minor’s Social Security number and commission while under supervision).
• The court considered—but permissibly assigned less weight to—acceptance of responsibility and the relatively small loss amount.
• The sentence was well below the 30-year statutory maximum for bank fraud, supporting reasonableness.
• Unlike in the unpublished Ochoa-Molina, the district court did not treat prior sentences as a de facto mandatory floor and conducted a holistic § 3553(a) analysis.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) — Establishes the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard for sentencing and authorizes variances based on § 3553(a) factors without a presumption of unreasonableness for outside-Guidelines sentences. The panel applied Gall’s totality-of-the-circumstances review and deference to the district court’s weighing of factors and extent of variance.
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) — Clarifies the “definite and firm conviction” benchmark for vacating sentences and reinforces deference to the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors. The panel quoted Irey’s formulation for when reversal is appropriate and found no clear error of judgment here.
• United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015) — Confirms district courts need not give equal weight to all § 3553(a) factors; the weight assigned is committed to the court’s discretion. The panel leaned on this to reject the defendant’s claim that the court overemphasized criminal history.
• United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2021) — Support the principle that courts may place substantial weight on a defendant’s criminal record and may consider prior conduct even when the Guidelines already reflect it. These cases undergird the panel’s rejection of “double counting” complaints in the variance context.
• United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009) — Approves consideration of the length of prior sentences to calibrate a new sentence that will achieve deterrence. The panel invoked Shaw squarely to uphold the district court’s reliance on the ineffectiveness of a prior five-year sentence in deterring Linot.
• United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022) — Reiterates there is no presumption for or against outside-Guidelines sentences and that upward variances must be justified by § 3553(a) factors with adequate explanation. The district court’s on-the-record reasoning met this standard.
• United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008) — Notes that a sentence below the statutory maximum is an indicator (though not dispositive proof) of reasonableness. The panel emphasized this as an additional data point.
• United States v. Ochoa-Molina, 664 F. App’x 898 (11th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) — Distinguished and deemed non-binding. That case reversed where the district court effectively imposed a mandatory floor based on a prior sentence and failed to conduct an independent § 3553(a) analysis. Here, the district court articulated an individualized analysis and did not adopt a prior sentence as a floor.
• United States v. Morris, 131 F.4th 1288, 1293 n.3 (11th Cir. 2025) — Cited for the proposition that unpublished Eleventh Circuit decisions are not binding. This undercuts any reliance on Ochoa-Molina as controlling precedent.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied the familiar, deferential framework. First, it reiterated that a district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to accomplish § 3553(a)’s purposes—reflecting seriousness, promoting respect for law, providing just punishment, deterring criminal conduct, and protecting the public. It must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the Guidelines, available sentences, the need to avoid unwarranted disparities, and restitution.

Against that framework, several facts were decisive:

• Recidivism and deterrence failure: Linot’s prior convictions for similar conduct, including a federal aggravated identity theft case for which he received a five-year sentence, had “no deterrent effect whatsoever.” Under Shaw, the court could consider both the existence and the length of those prior sentences to set a new term more likely to deter.
• Commission while under supervision: The present offenses occurred during supervision, aggravating the risk of recidivism and the need for specific deterrence and incapacitation.
• Use of a minor’s Social Security number: The nature of the offense was particularly harmful because it victimized a minor, a factor the court could properly weigh in assessing the seriousness of the offense and the need for just punishment.
• Victim impact: The victim’s mother described concrete life effects and ongoing fears for her child’s future credit. The court could consider this in assessing the harm caused, even though the out-of-pocket loss was small.
• Consideration of mitigation: The district court expressly acknowledged Linot’s intelligence, education, family support, mental-health struggles, and acceptance of responsibility, but concluded these were outweighed by the need to promote respect for the law and deter future crimes, especially given his continued pattern of deception and the ineffectiveness of prior custodial terms.

The panel held that assigning substantial weight to criminal history and deterrence was permissible. It rejected the argument that the district court’s emphasis on prior sentences was improper “double counting”; Williams and Riley confirm that prior misconduct may be considered beyond its role in calculating the advisory range. Moreover, the district court did not replicate the error flagged in Ochoa-Molina: it did not adopt a prior sentence as a mandatory minimum for the new case, nor did it abdicate its own independent § 3553(a) analysis.

The extent of the variance—60 months on a 6–12 month advisory range for bank fraud—was significant, but not unreasonable. Gall and Butler permit large variances when supported by case-specific reasons grounded in § 3553(a). The court’s explanation centered on persistent recidivism, commission under supervision, and the vulnerable nature of the victim, all classic aggravators. The total sentence remained well below the 30-year statutory maximum for bank fraud, which Gonzalez recognizes as an additional indicator of reasonableness.

Impact and Significance

Although the decision is unpublished and thus non-precedential, it carries practical significance for sentencing practice within the Eleventh Circuit:

• Robust discretion affirmed: District courts retain wide latitude to impose substantial upward variances in recidivist fraud cases, even when the monetary loss is small, if the record supports the need for deterrence, respect for law, and protection of the public.
• Criminal history can dominate: Prior sentences and their failure to deter can legitimately drive the § 3553(a) analysis, and courts may consider both the existence and length of prior terms without committing “double counting.”
• Ochoa-Molina boundary clarified: Heavy reliance on prior sentencing outcomes is permissible so long as the district court does not convert them into a de facto floor and still conducts an individualized, holistic § 3553(a) analysis.
• Loss amount is not dispositive: Particularly in identity theft matters—especially those involving minors—qualitative harms (psychological impact, credit risks, long-term insecurity) may outweigh small pecuniary loss in the variance calculus.
• Mental health mitigation may be outweighed: Even substantial mitigation (mental health challenges, acceptance of responsibility, strong family ties) can be overcome by persistent recidivism and offense circumstances.
• Strategic charging and sentencing advocacy: Prosecutors seeking variances should build records emphasizing recidivism, offense-on-supervision, and victim impact. Defense counsel should be prepared with concrete post-release treatment plans and corroborated mitigation, and should develop arguments distinguishing their case from the “deterrence failure” narrative.
• Extent-of-variance tolerance: The affirmance of a 5x increase above the top of the advisory range (from 12 months to 60 months for the bank fraud count) underscores that magnitude alone will not doom a variance if the district court articulates case-specific justifications.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantive reasonableness: Focuses on whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. The appellate court asks whether the district court made a clear error in judgment in weighing those factors.
• Procedural vs. substantive review: Procedural looks at how the sentence was imposed (e.g., correct Guidelines calculation, consideration of factors); substantive looks at whether the sentence length itself is reasonable. Only substantive reasonableness was at issue on appeal here.
• Upward variance vs. upward departure: A variance is a sentence outside the advisory Guidelines range based on § 3553(a) factors. A departure is a change within the Guidelines framework using a specific policy provision (e.g., U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 for under-represented criminal history). The court here chose a variance, not a departure.
• § 3553(a) factors: Statutory considerations for sentencing, including seriousness of the offense, deterrence, protection of the public, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the advisory Guidelines, avoiding unwarranted disparities, and restitution.
• Mandatory consecutive term for aggravated identity theft: 18 U.S.C. § 1028A requires a two-year term that must run consecutively to other sentences, which is why the total sentence was 84 months (60 + 24).
• Appellate deference: Under Gall and Irey, courts of appeals give significant leeway to sentencing judges. They will not reweigh the factors or substitute their judgment absent a “definite and firm conviction” of clear error in balancing the § 3553(a) factors.
• Below statutory maximum as an indicator: While not decisive, a sentence far below the statutory maximum often supports a finding of reasonableness on appeal.
• De facto mandatory floor error: A district court may not treat a prior sentence as a fixed minimum for the new sentence; it must conduct an individualized analysis. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed because the district court did not commit this error.

Conclusion

United States v. Linot reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s deferential posture toward district courts’ sentencing judgments, particularly in repeat-fraud cases involving identity theft. The court approved a substantial upward variance driven by persistent recidivism, offense commission while under supervision, and the exploitation of a minor’s identity—despite a small monetary loss and mitigating personal factors.

The key takeaways are practical and clear: district courts may place substantial weight on a defendant’s criminal history and the demonstrated failure of prior sentences to deter; they may consider the length of those prior sentences in calibrating a new term; and they need not assign equal weight to all mitigating factors. So long as the court conducts an individualized § 3553(a) analysis and avoids converting prior sentences into a de facto floor, substantial upward variances will withstand appellate scrutiny. While unpublished and non-binding, Linot offers a robust blueprint for how such variances can be justified and sustained within the Eleventh Circuit.