Reaffirming Arreguin: First Circuit Requires the BIA to Identify Corroboration Before Heavily Relying on Non‑Conviction Police Reports to Deny Adjustment of Status

Introduction

In Maurice v. Bondi, No. 21-1395 (1st Cir. Oct. 2, 2025), the First Circuit granted in part a Haitian noncitizen’s petition for review, vacating the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) discretionary denial of adjustment of status and remanding for further proceedings. The court held that when the agency gives substantial weight to police reports that did not culminate in convictions, it must grapple with the corroboration requirement articulated in In re Arreguin de Rodriguez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1995). Although hearsay police reports can be considered if reliable and not fundamentally unfair, the agency may not assign “substantial weight” to such reports absent corroborating evidence—and the BIA’s decision must reflect consideration of that requirement.

The panel (Barron, C.J., Gelpí and Aframe, JJ.) otherwise rejected challenges to the evidentiary use of police reports on fundamental fairness grounds, reaffirming that no express fairness finding is required so long as the noncitizen had an opportunity to rebut. The court also dismissed challenges to the denial of cancellation of removal, holding that the stop-time rule was triggered by a notice to appear (NTA) listing time and place, and that newly raised defects were unexhausted.

Case Background and Issues

Petitioner Roobens Maurice, a native and citizen of Haiti, entered the United States on a temporary visa in April 2010. He was served an NTA in February 2012, and his proceedings were administratively closed while he had Temporary Protected Status (TPS) through July 2017. After DHS denied a further TPS extension in 2018, Maurice was arrested in New Hampshire in 2018 and twice in 2020 in domestic-violence-related incidents. Those arrests did not yield convictions. DHS detained Maurice and resumed removal proceedings in 2020.

The IJ found Maurice removable, denied adjustment of status as a matter of discretion after giving “great weight” to the police reports and related factors (including perceived lack of remorse and rehabilitation), and denied cancellation of removal because the stop-time rule cut off continuous presence at the 2012 NTA. The BIA affirmed.

Before the First Circuit, Maurice raised two principal issues:

Adjustment of status: Whether the BIA erred by allowing the IJ to give substantial weight to uncorroborated police reports that did not result in convictions, and whether the use of those reports was unreliable or fundamentally unfair.
Cancellation of removal: Whether the NTA was defective such that it did not trigger the stop-time rule for continuous physical presence.

Summary of the Opinion

The court held:

Jurisdiction. While courts generally lack jurisdiction to review discretionary denials of adjustment (8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)), they may review colorable constitutional claims and questions of law (§ 1252(a)(2)(D)). Maurice’s challenges to the BIA’s application of its own precedent (Arreguin) and to fundamental fairness were reviewable legal questions.
Reliability/fundamental fairness. Maurice’s claim that the IJ failed to make an express reliability finding was unexhausted and therefore unreviewable. His fundamental fairness claim failed on the merits: no express fairness finding was required and he had an opportunity to rebut the police reports.
Arreguin corroboration requirement. The BIA affirmed a discretionary denial that placed “substantial weight” on non-conviction police reports. Under Arreguin, the agency may not assign such weight absent corroborating evidence. Although the record might contain corroboration (including admissions by Maurice), the BIA’s decision did not indicate that it recognized or applied the corroboration requirement. The court vacated and remanded for the BIA to consider whether the administrative record contains corroboration sufficient to justify the weight assigned to the police reports.
Due process. Maurice’s due process challenge to the use of police reports failed because he has no protected property or liberty interest in discretionary relief such as adjustment of status.
Cancellation of removal. The stop-time rule was triggered by an NTA listing time and place. Additional defects newly asserted on petition for review (e.g., petitioner’s age at service, procedural posture, administrative closure) were unexhausted and thus unreviewable.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents and Authorities Cited

In re Arreguin de Rodriguez (BIA 1995), 21 I. & N. Dec. 38. Establishes that arrest reports that did not result in convictions may be considered, but may not be given “substantial weight” absent corroborating evidence of the allegations.
Rosa v. Garland, 114 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2024).
- Clarifies that police reports are admissible if reliable and their use is not fundamentally unfair; no express fairness finding is required so long as the petitioner had an opportunity to rebut.
- Reaffirms Arreguin’s corroboration requirement when heavy weight is placed on non-conviction reports, and requires the BIA to demonstrate it appreciated and applied that requirement; remand is appropriate if not.
- Confirms jurisdiction to review whether the BIA exceeded the scope of its binding precedent (a legal question reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D)).
Arias‑Minaya v. Holder, 779 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2015). A police report may be considered if the IJ determines it is reliable and its use is not fundamentally unfair; fairness is satisfied if the petitioner had an opportunity to challenge and refute the report.
Mele v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2015). Even absent a conviction, police reports may be considered in discretionary immigration decisions.
Lee v. Barr, 975 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2020). Opportunity to rebut a report with indicia of reliability satisfies fundamental fairness.
Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198 (2018). The stop-time rule is triggered only by an NTA that includes time and place of the removal hearing; if those are missing, the NTA does not stop the accrual of continuous physical presence.
Moreno v. Garland, 51 F.4th 40 (1st Cir. 2022). Courts generally lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of adjustment; only legal or constitutional claims are reviewable.
Chavez v. Garland, 51 F.4th 424 (1st Cir. 2022). Articulates the standard for reviewing the BIA’s decision, including when the court looks to both the BIA and IJ decisions.
Paiz‑Morales v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 238 (1st Cir. 2015); Silva v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2006); Garcia Sarmiento v. Garland, 45 F.4th 560 (1st Cir. 2022). Reinforce the administrative exhaustion requirement; claims not raised before the BIA cannot be raised in the court of appeals.
Thomas v. Garland, 25 F.4th 50 (1st Cir. 2022); Naeem v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2006). No protected liberty or property interest in discretionary immigration relief; due process claims premised on denial of such relief fail at the threshold.
Martinez v. Bondi, 132 F.4th 74 (1st Cir. 2025). The “ordinary remand rule”—when the agency has not addressed a required issue, the proper course is to remand for the agency’s consideration in the first instance.
Statutes. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D) (jurisdiction); § 1229(a)(1) (NTA requirements); § 1229b(b)(1), (d)(1)(A) (cancellation; stop-time rule).

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review

The panel reviewed the BIA’s decision, along with the IJ’s reasoning where adopted. See Rosa; Chavez. The court acknowledged the jurisdictional bar over pure discretionary denials of adjustment of status (§ 1252(a)(2)(B)), but exercised jurisdiction over legal questions and constitutional claims (§ 1252(a)(2)(D)), including whether the BIA adhered to its own binding precedent (Rosa).

b. Reliability and Fundamental Fairness of Police Reports

Maurice argued the IJ failed to make an express finding that the police reports were reliable. Because he did not present that specific claim to the BIA, the court deemed it unexhausted and unreviewable (8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Paiz‑Morales).

On fundamental fairness, the court reaffirmed that no express fairness finding is required so long as the petitioner had an opportunity to rebut the reports. See Rosa (no express finding required); Arias‑Minaya; Lee. Maurice testified and called witnesses to challenge the reports. That opportunity to rebut sufficed to satisfy fundamental fairness.

c. Weight Given to Non‑Conviction Police Reports: The Arreguin Corroboration Rule

The decisive legal error was the BIA’s failure to demonstrate that it understood and applied Arreguin’s corroboration requirement before affirming the IJ’s denial of adjustment based on heavy reliance on non-conviction police reports. The court emphasized the distinction between:

Admissibility and basic use of police reports (permissible when reliable and fair; hearsay is allowed in immigration proceedings), and
Assigning “substantial weight” to non-conviction reports—permissible only if corroborated by other evidence in the record. See Arreguin; Rosa.

Here, the IJ and BIA gave “great” or “substantial” weight to three arrest episodes (2018; May 2020; July 2020), and those reports drove the discretionary denial (including related assessments of remorse and rehabilitation). Although the government argued on appeal that Maurice’s own testimony corroborated aspects of the reports (e.g., entering his estranged wife’s home despite a stay-away order; striking his wife with a drill albeit accidentally; fleeing before arrest), the BIA’s decision did not indicate it treated those admissions as corroboration or that it appreciated Arreguin’s corroboration requirement. Instead, the BIA focused on relative weight between conflicting testimony and the contemporaneity of police reports.

Because the BIA’s reasoning did not reflect the required corroboration analysis, and the government did not argue harmlessness, the court applied the ordinary remand rule (Martinez) and vacated the adjustment-of-status disposition for the BIA to determine, in the first instance, whether the record contains sufficient corroboration to justify the “substantial weight” assigned to the non-conviction police reports. See Rosa (remand where BIA fails to address corroboration).

d. Due Process Claim

Maurice’s due process challenge to the agency’s reliance on police reports failed because he lacks a protected liberty or property interest in discretionary relief such as adjustment of status. See Thomas; Naeem. Without such an interest, a due process claim cannot proceed.

e. Cancellation of Removal and the Stop‑Time Rule

The court affirmed the denial of cancellation. The stop-time rule terminates the accrual of continuous physical presence when an NTA including time and place is served. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A); Pereira. Maurice was served with an NTA in 2012, within two years of entry, that specified the time and place, so he could not meet the ten-year presence requirement (§ 1229b(b)(1)(A)).

Maurice’s additional NTA-related defects (minor status at service, absence of pleadings by the original IJ, administrative closure) were not raised before the BIA and thus were unexhausted and unreviewable. See Silva; Garcia Sarmiento.

3. Impact and Implications

a. For Agency Adjudication (IJs and the BIA)

Articulate corroboration when assigning substantial weight. If an IJ or the BIA gives substantial weight to non-conviction police reports in a discretionary decision (e.g., adjustment of status), the decision should expressly identify the corroborating evidence supporting the allegations reported. Silence on corroboration invites remand under Rosa and now Maurice.
Distinguish between admissibility/fairness and weight. Even if hearsay police reports are admissible and their use is fair (opportunity to rebut), Arreguin imposes a separate, additional constraint before those reports can carry dispositive or “great” weight.
Record development matters. Where the agency intends to rely on police-reported conduct without a conviction, it should ensure the record contains and identifies corroboration (e.g., petitioner admissions, medical records, consistent witness testimony, photographs, contemporaneous communications).
Avoid conflating credibility resolutions with corroboration. Preferring police reports over testimony to resolve inconsistencies does not satisfy Arreguin’s corroboration requirement; the decision must show that independent corroboration supports the alleged conduct.

b. For Practitioners

Preserve specific objections. To obtain review, raise at the BIA:
- Any claim that the IJ failed to make a reliability finding;
- The argument that Arreguin’s corroboration requirement was not met or not addressed;
- All NTA-related and stop-time challenges beyond Pereira’s time/place defect.
Build (or attack) corroboration. If representing the government, develop corroborating evidence to support substantial reliance on non-conviction reports. If representing the noncitizen, highlight the absence of corroboration and argue that, under Arreguin and Rosa, the reports cannot bear “substantial weight.”
Frame reviewable legal issues. Challenges to the weight assigned to evidence are typically discretionary and unreviewable. But asserting that the BIA failed to follow its binding precedent (Arreguin) or conflated fairness/admissibility with corroboration states a reviewable legal question.
Due process limits. Do not premise due process on the denial of discretionary relief; instead, focus on procedural fairness within the hearing (e.g., opportunity to rebut) and adherence to governing precedent.

c. Substantive Law Trajectory

Maurice consolidates a coherent First Circuit framework for the evidentiary use of police reports in discretionary relief adjudications:

Step 1: Admissibility and fairness. Hearsay police reports may be considered if reliable and their use is not fundamentally unfair; an opportunity to rebut suffices (Arias‑Minaya; Lee; Rosa).
Step 2: Weight. When reports did not lead to convictions, the agency may not assign “substantial weight” to those reports absent corroboration (Arreguin; Rosa; Maurice). The BIA must demonstrate that it understood and applied this corroboration requirement.

On cancellation, the opinion underscores that Pereira’s time-and-place rule for triggering stop-time remains decisive: if the NTA set time and place, the stop-time rule is triggered, and alternative arguments must be fully exhausted at the BIA to be reviewable.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Adjustment of status. A discretionary form of relief allowing some noncitizens to become lawful permanent residents if statutory criteria are met and favorable discretion is warranted. Because it is discretionary, courts generally cannot second-guess the agency’s weighing of equities, except to correct legal errors.
Police reports vs. convictions. A police report describes alleged conduct from law enforcement’s perspective. A conviction is a formal judicial finding of guilt. Immigration adjudicators may consider police reports even without a conviction, but cannot give them heavy weight unless independently corroborated.
Hearsay and fundamental fairness. Immigration hearings are not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Hearsay can be used if it is reliable and the process is fundamentally fair—meaning the noncitizen had a meaningful chance to challenge it.
Arreguin corroboration rule. When relying heavily on an arrest report that did not lead to a conviction, the agency must identify corroborating evidence supporting the report’s allegations; otherwise, the report cannot carry substantial weight.
Stop-time rule. For cancellation of removal based on continuous physical presence, time accrual stops when DHS serves a valid NTA that includes the hearing’s time and place. If served early in a person’s residence, it can prevent meeting the ten-year requirement.
Exhaustion. To have an issue reviewed by the court of appeals, the noncitizen must have raised that specific argument to the BIA. New theories introduced for the first time on petition for review are typically dismissed.
Ordinary remand rule. When the agency has not addressed a dispositive legal element (such as corroboration under Arreguin), the court will not decide it in the first instance but will remand for the agency to consider the issue.

Conclusion

Maurice v. Bondi strengthens the First Circuit’s insistence that the BIA adhere to Arreguin when assigning substantial weight to non-conviction police reports in discretionary relief adjudications. While police reports remain admissible—so long as their use is fair—the agency must identify corroboration before allowing such reports to drive a discretionary denial. The court’s remand underscores that merely preferring police reports over conflicting testimony does not satisfy the corroboration requirement; the BIA must show it understands and applies that constraint.

The opinion also clarifies procedural boundaries: courts retain jurisdiction over legal questions such as adherence to binding precedent and fundamental fairness, but not over pure discretionary weighing; due process claims premised on discretionary relief will fail for lack of a protected interest; and cancellation challenges turn on Pereira’s time-and-place rule and must be fully exhausted. For adjudicators and advocates alike, Maurice provides a roadmap: develop and identify corroboration when relying on arrest reports without convictions, preserve specific legal objections before the BIA, and maintain the critical distinction between admissibility, fairness, and the quantum of weight assigned to contested evidence.