Reaffirming § 922(g)(1)’s Constitutionality and Intended Loss in Fraud Sentencing: Commentary on United States v. Romuel Angrand

I. Introduction

The unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision in United States v. Romuel Angrand, No. 24‑10370 (11th Cir. Dec. 12, 2025), is not a path‑breaking opinion in the sense of announcing new doctrine. Instead, it is doctrinally important because it illustrates—in a highly compressed way—how firmly the Eleventh Circuit has now settled two hotly litigated issues:

The continuing constitutionality of the federal felon‑in‑possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), after the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment decisions in Bruen and Rahimi; and
The inclusion of intended loss (not just actual loss) in calculating fraud loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1), even after the en banc ruling in Dupree limiting deference to Guidelines commentary.

The panel—Judges Newsom, Luck, and Lagoa, per curiam—grants the government’s motion for summary affirmance, signaling that, in the court’s view, the government’s legal position is “clearly correct” and the appellant’s arguments are foreclosed by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

In doing so, the court relies primarily on two recent circuit decisions:

United States v. Dubois (Dubois II), 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025), reaffirming that Eleventh Circuit precedent upholding § 922(g)(1) (Rozier) remains binding after Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi; and
United States v. Horn, 129 F.4th 1275 (11th Cir. 2025), holding that the term “loss” in former § 2B1.1(b)(1) unambiguously includes intended loss and that Guideline Amendment 827 is a clarifying amendment applicable on direct appeal.

This commentary explains the opinion, situates it in the larger doctrinal landscape, and explores its implications for Second Amendment litigation and federal fraud sentencing within the Eleventh Circuit.

II. Background and Issues on Appeal

A. Parties and Charges

The United States prosecuted Romuel Angrand in the Southern District of Florida. The opinion does not detail the facts, but it identifies the convictions:

Conspiracy to commit access device fraud;
Possession of 15 or more unauthorized access devices;
Aggravated identity theft;
Possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance; and
Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

After conviction and sentencing, Angrand appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

B. Issues Raised by Angrand

On appeal, Angrand advanced two principal arguments:

Second Amendment / § 922(g)(1) challenge He argued that the felon‑in‑possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is unconstitutional:
- Facially – that it is invalid in all or nearly all of its applications; and
- As applied to him – that even if valid in general, it is unconstitutional as applied to his circumstances, under the framework announced in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
Sentencing Guidelines / loss calculation challenge He contended that the district court erred in calculating the loss amount for his fraud‑related offenses under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) by relying on Guidelines commentary that incorporates intended loss, rather than limiting loss to actual loss. He invoked the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023), which restricts deference to commentary.

After Angrand filed his opening brief, the government moved for summary affirmance, arguing that binding circuit precedent squarely foreclosed both arguments.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The court grants the government’s motion for summary affirmance and affirms the convictions and sentence. In doing so, it holds:

On § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality: Angrand’s facial and as‑applied Second Amendment challenges are foreclosed by Eleventh Circuit precedent, particularly United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010), as reaffirmed after Bruen and Rahimi in United States v. Dubois (Dubois II), 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025). As a result, § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional in the Eleventh Circuit.
On the fraud loss calculation: The district court lawfully used intended loss to calculate loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1). That approach is compelled by United States v. Horn, 129 F.4th 1275 (11th Cir. 2025), which holds that:
- The term “loss” in the pre‑2024 text of § 2B1.1(b)(1) is unambiguous and includes intended loss, via the relevant‑conduct rules of § 1B1.3(a)(3); and
- Guideline Amendment 827—which explicitly defines “loss” as “the greater of actual loss or intended loss” and moves that definition into the text—is a clarifying amendment that applies to cases pending on direct appeal.
Thus, “loss” under § 2B1.1(b)(1) in this Circuit unambiguously includes intended loss.
On procedure: Because established precedent rendered the government’s position “clearly correct as a matter of law,” the panel holds that summary affirmance under Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969), is appropriate.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Summary Affirmance Framework

1. Groendyke and the summary disposition standard

The court begins by invoking Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969). Under Groendyke, summary disposition is appropriate when:

Time is of the essence, including “situations where important public policy issues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied”; or
“The position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where … the appeal is frivolous.”

Because the Eleventh Circuit inherited Fifth Circuit precedent predating its creation, Groendyke remains binding. The panel does not suggest urgency here; rather, it relies on the second Groendyke ground: the government is “clearly correct as a matter of law.”

2. Standards of review noted by the court

The panel recites general standards that would apply absent a dispositive precedent:

Constitutionality of a statute – Generally reviewed de novo (United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010)), but when the constitutional challenge is raised for the first time on appeal, review is under the more deferential plain-error standard.
Guidelines loss determination – Reviewed for clear error; the appellate court must affirm so long as the district court’s finding is “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety” (United States v. Whitman, 887 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir. 2018)).

In practice, however, the panel does not conduct a fact‑focused loss review or a full Second Amendment analysis, because legal precedent renders both issues effectively non‑debatable under circuit law.

3. The prior-panel-precedent rule

The backbone of the court’s analysis is the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule, as summarized in United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016):

A three‑judge panel is bound by prior published panel decisions unless:
The earlier decision is overruled by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc or is abrogated by a clearly on point Supreme Court decision.

United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009), adds that a Supreme Court decision overrules circuit precedent only if it is “clearly on point.” Dubois II, quoted here, further tightens the standard: to abrogate circuit precedent, the Supreme Court’s decision must “demolish and eviscerate each of its fundamental props.”

This strict approach to stare decisis explains why the panel does not engage fresh historical analysis under Bruen or revisit the meaning of “loss” under § 2B1.1(b)(1): those issues have already been decided in Rozier, Dubois II, and Horn.

B. The Second Amendment Challenge to § 922(g)(1)

1. Statutory and constitutional framework

Section 922(g)(1) makes it a federal crime for any person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm or ammunition. After Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019), the government must prove that the defendant:

Knowingly possessed a firearm; and
Knew that he belonged to the prohibited class (i.e., that he had been convicted of a felony).

The constitutional challenge arises from the Second Amendment, which protects “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.”

2. Key Supreme Court precedents

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
- Recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms for lawful self‑defense, unconnected with militia service.
- Emphasized that the right is not unlimited, and explicitly stated that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” (describing such laws as “presumptively lawful”).
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
- Rejected means‑end scrutiny (like intermediate scrutiny) for Second Amendment challenges.
- Announced a two‑step, text‑and‑history test:
  1. Does the challenged law regulate conduct covered by the “plain text” of the Second Amendment?
  2. If yes, the government must demonstrate that the law is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
- Reiterated that the Second Amendment protects “law‑abiding citizens” and did not purport to overrule Heller’s discussion of “presumptively lawful” felon‑in‑possession bans.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)
- Upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits firearm possession by individuals subject to certain domestic‑violence restraining orders.
- Confirmed that restrictions such as bans on firearm possession by felons and the mentally ill remain “presumptively lawful.”

Thus, even after Bruen and Rahimi, the Supreme Court has never held § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional, and it continues to treat felon‑in‑possession restrictions as historically grounded.

3. Eleventh Circuit precedent: Rozier and Dubois

United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010) Shortly after Heller, the Eleventh Circuit held in Rozier that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional. The court:
- Relied on Heller’s endorsement of “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” as “presumptively lawful.”
- Concluded that laws like § 922(g)(1) are valid “avenue[s] to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of people.”
Rozier is the foundational Eleventh Circuit authority upholding felon‑in‑possession bans.
United States v. Dubois (Dubois I), 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024)
- Decided after Bruen but before Rahimi.
- Held that Bruen did not “cast doubt” on felon‑in‑possession prohibitions, and therefore did not overrule Rozier under the prior‑panel‑precedent rule.
United States v. Dubois (Dubois II), 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025)
- Issued after the Supreme Court granted, vacated, and remanded (GVR’d) Dubois I in light of Rahimi.
- On remand, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogates Rozier.
- Stated that Rahimi “reinforced—not undermined—Rozier,” particularly through its reaffirmation of the presumptive lawfulness of felon‑in‑possession bans.
- Reemphasized a strict abrogation standard: a Supreme Court decision must “demolish and eviscerate each of [a precedent’s] fundamental props” to displace circuit precedent.

4. Application to Angrand

Armed with Dubois II, the panel in Angrand concludes that the government is “clearly correct, as a matter of law” in arguing that:

Rozier remains good law; and
There is no room, within the Eleventh Circuit, to hold § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional—either facially or as applied—on the basis of Bruen or Rahimi.

Because Dubois II already grappled with these Supreme Court decisions and reaffirmed Rozier, this panel is bound. It does not revisit the historical record or conduct a fresh Bruen analysis. Instead, it simply recognizes that:

“Our holding in Rozier that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional continues to be binding precedent for this Circuit.”

Accordingly, Angrand’s Second Amendment challenge is rejected summarily.

5. Practical impact on Second Amendment litigation in the Eleventh Circuit

The Angrand decision, though short, sends a clear signal:

As long as Rozier stands and Dubois II remains controlling, § 922(g)(1) is safe from Second Amendment invalidation in the Eleventh Circuit, absent en banc intervention or a clearly contrary Supreme Court ruling.
Facial or as‑applied § 922(g)(1) challenges premised on Bruen‑style text‑and‑history arguments are effectively non‑starters at the panel level.
Defense counsel should assume that felon‑in‑possession convictions will be upheld against Second Amendment challenges, and that such arguments will likely be rejected via summary disposition unless they raise some distinct question (e.g., knowledge under Rehaif or factual issues).

C. The Fraud Sentencing Issue: Intended Loss Under § 2B1.1(b)(1)

1. The Guidelines framework and loss enhancements

For theft and fraud offenses, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) increases offense levels based on “the loss.” Under the 2023 Guidelines in effect at Angrand’s sentencing:

Any loss exceeding $6,500 triggers an enhancement.
A loss exceeding $40,000 but less than or equal to $95,000 produces a 6‑level increase. See § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G)-(H).

At the time of sentencing (January 30, 2024), the definition of “loss” did not appear in the Guideline text but only in the commentary to § 2B1.1, specifically Application Note 3.

During the appeal, however, Amendment 827 (effective November 1, 2024) came into force. That amendment:

Moved the definition of “loss” into the text itself; and
Defined “loss” as “the greater of actual loss or intended loss.”

Although Amendment 827 was not designated retroactive under § 1B1.10(d) (the Guideline governing retroactive application in sentence‑reduction proceedings), the Eleventh Circuit in Horn held that it can be applied in cases pending on direct appeal because it is a clarifying amendment.

2. Dupree and the problem of commentary deference

In United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit confronted how much weight courts should give to Guidelines commentary after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie. The en banc court adopted a “text‑first” approach:

Courts may defer to commentary only if the Guideline text is genuinely ambiguous.
If the text is clear, commentary that adds or contradicts that text is not controlling.

In the fraud context, this raised a question: Did the term “loss” in § 2B1.1(b)(1) inherently include intended loss—or was that concept introduced only via commentary, which would be suspect under Dupree if the text were unambiguous in some narrower sense?

3. Horn’s resolution: “loss” unambiguously includes intended loss

United States v. Horn, 129 F.4th 1275 (11th Cir. 2025), addressed that question directly, applying the Dupree framework. According to the summary in Angrand:

Horn held that the word “loss” in the pre‑2024 version of § 2B1.1(b)(1) is unambiguous.
It concluded that “loss” naturally includes intended loss by way of the relevant‑conduct principles of § 1B1.3(a)(3), which encompass “all harm that resulted from the defendant’s acts and omissions” and that was “intended” to result from those acts.
Because the text is unambiguous, Dupree’s limitation on commentary deference is essentially satisfied: the commentary defining loss as the greater of actual or intended loss is fully consistent with the text read in context.

Horn also treated Amendment 827 as:

Clarifying the existing, long‑standing interpretation of “loss” in this Circuit; and
Therefore applicable to cases on direct review, even though not listed as retroactive in § 1B1.10(d).

The Angrand panel quotes Horn’s conclusion that the Amendment “maintains the same longstanding approach for calculating loss used in this Circuit’s case precedent,” thereby reinforcing that intended loss has long been part of loss calculations here.

4. Application to Angrand’s sentencing

Against that backdrop, Angrand argued that the district court erred by using intended loss rather than actual loss, pointing to the fact that the loss definition was in the commentary—and invoking Dupree to limit reliance on commentary.

The panel rejects this argument as foreclosed by Horn. It holds:

“The government is clearly correct, as a matter of law, that Angrand's argument as to the district court's inclusion of intended loss in the fraud calculation is foreclosed by our holding in Horn that ‘loss’ under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) ‘unambiguously’ includes ‘intended loss.’”

Because:

“Loss” includes intended loss by the unambiguous meaning of the text, viewed in the full Guidelines framework; and
Amendment 827 confirms, rather than alters, that meaning,

the district court’s use of intended loss was not error—let alone clear error. There is no need for a detailed factual discussion: once the legal rule is fixed by Horn, loss calculations that follow it are insulated from this particular type of challenge.

5. Practical impact on fraud sentencing

Within the Eleventh Circuit, Angrand cements the following propositions:

Intended loss remains central to fraud sentencing under § 2B1.1(b)(1). Courts will look to the greater of actual or intended loss.
Dupree does not limit the use of intended loss because the relevant Guideline text is considered unambiguous in this regard.
Amendment 827 is effectively treated as a codification of pre‑existing Eleventh Circuit practice, not a substantive change—at least for cases on direct appeal.
Defendants seeking to argue that only actual loss should count will find the door closed at the panel level; any change would need to come from the Supreme Court, the Sentencing Commission taking a different substantive direction, or an en banc reconsideration.

D. Broader Doctrinal and Practical Implications

1. Reinforced deference to binding circuit precedent

Angrand exemplifies the Eleventh Circuit’s strong adherence to its own precedent in two contentious areas:

Second Amendment / felon‑in‑possession: Rozier and Dubois II keep § 922(g)(1) intact.
Guidelines / loss calculations: Horn maintains the longstanding use of intended loss despite the potential destabilizing effect of Dupree.

By resolving the appeal via summary affirmance, the court signals that in its view there is no “substantial question” about these legal issues left to be resolved by a three‑judge panel.

2. The role of Supreme Court decisions in abrogating circuit law

The decision underscores a demanding standard for when Supreme Court decisions overturn circuit precedent. Supreme Court rulings like Bruen or Rahimi do not automatically unsettle lower‑court precedent unless they clearly conflict with and undermine its fundamental premises.

This has practical consequences:

Even sweeping Supreme Court constitutional decisions will not be read to invalidate established circuit rules unless they specifically and directly collide with those rules.
Advocates must show not just tension, but direct and decisive inconsistency with existing circuit precedent to argue that a Supreme Court case has abrogated that precedent.

3. Stability in fraud sentencing after Dupree and Amendment 827

For several years, there has been substantial litigation over the legal status of Guidelines commentary and, in particular, the use of intended loss. Dupree raised the possibility that reliance on commentary might be sharply curtailed. But Horn—and now Angrand, applying it—reassure district courts that:

They may continue using intended loss in § 2B1.1(b)(1) calculations.
The shift of the definition from commentary to text (Amendment 827) simply confirms the pre‑existing approach.

For prosecutors and probation officers, this removes uncertainty and encourages continued use of intended loss theories (e.g., intended credit card charges, intended fraudulent loan amounts) so long as they can be supported by evidence.

4. Summary affirmance as a doctrinal signal

Finally, the use of summary affirmance here, coupled with explicit references to Dubois II and Horn, serves as a message to the bar:

Appeals raising the same § 922(g)(1) Second Amendment arguments or the same “no intended loss” arguments under § 2B1.1 are likely to be summarily rejected.
District courts may confidently apply Rozier/Dubois II and Horn without fearing that they are out of step with current Eleventh Circuit law.

V. Key Concepts Simplified

A. Facial vs. As‑Applied Constitutional Challenges

Facial challenge: Argues that a statute is unconstitutional in virtually all of its applications. If successful, the statute is invalidated broadly.
As‑applied challenge: Concedes that the statute may be valid in general, but claims it is unconstitutional as applied to the particular facts or characteristics of one defendant (e.g., a non‑violent felon with remote prior convictions).

Angrand raised both, but both are foreclosed by existing Eleventh Circuit precedent upholding § 922(g)(1).

B. Plain Error Review

When a defendant fails to raise an issue in the district court and raises it for the first time on appeal (such as a late‑raised constitutional challenge), the appellate court reviews for plain error. To obtain relief, the defendant must show:

An error occurred;
The error was “plain” (clear or obvious) under current law;
The error affected substantial rights (usually, the outcome); and
The error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Where binding precedent rejects the defendant’s position, there is no “plain” error.

C. Intended Loss vs. Actual Loss

Actual loss: The real, quantifiable financial harm that victims actually suffered (e.g., money successfully stolen or charged).
Intended loss: The financial harm the defendant intended to inflict, even if it did not actually occur (e.g., the total credit limit of stolen cards that the defendant planned to exploit but was stopped before completing).

Under the rule confirmed in Horn and applied in Angrand, “loss” under § 2B1.1(b)(1) is the greater of actual loss or intended loss.

D. Clarifying vs. Substantive Guideline Amendments

Substantive amendment: Changes the meaning or operation of a Guideline. It generally applies only prospectively (to sentences after the amendment), unless specifically made retroactive.
Clarifying amendment: Explains or confirms an interpretation of a Guideline that the Commission (and often the courts) already understood. Such amendments may be used in cases pending on direct appeal as evidence of what the Guideline always meant.

Horn treats Amendment 827 as clarifying, not substantive, meaning it did not change the law but made explicit that “loss” includes intended loss.

E. Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule

This Eleventh Circuit rule means:

A later three‑judge panel must follow earlier panel decisions.
Only the full court en banc, or the U.S. Supreme Court, can overrule that earlier precedent.
A Supreme Court decision must be clearly inconsistent and undermine the earlier precedent’s basis to have that effect.

Because Rozier and Dubois II uphold § 922(g)(1), and Horn interprets “loss” to include intended loss, the panel in Angrand is required to apply those decisions.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Romuel Angrand is short but significant in what it confirms:

§ 922(g)(1) remains constitutional in the Eleventh Circuit after Bruen and Rahimi, by virtue of the binding precedent in Rozier and Dubois II.
Loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) unambiguously includes intended loss, as held in Horn, and Amendment 827 is a clarifying amendment that codifies, rather than changes, that understanding.
Summary affirmance is an appropriate vehicle when precedent renders one side’s legal position “clearly correct,” and the appeal raises no substantial question.

In the broader legal context, Angrand underscores the durability of felon‑in‑possession prohibitions and the continued centrality of intended loss in federal fraud sentencing, at least within the Eleventh Circuit. It also illustrates how the combination of a strict prior‑panel‑precedent rule and clarifying Guideline amendments can stabilize contentious areas of law, even amid shifting constitutional and administrative‑law doctrines.