Reaffirmation of the Rebuttable Automobile Presumption for Constructive Possession in People v. Smith

Introduction

People v. Smith (2025 NYSlipOp 02244) was decided by the Appellate Division, Third Department, on April 17, 2025. The defendant, Matthew C. Smith, was convicted of multiple drug offenses—including second-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance and third-degree sale—after a State Police traffic stop led to the discovery of large quantities of methamphetamine in a vehicle and later fentanyl in the Tioga County Jail. On appeal, Smith challenged the legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence, the constitutionality of the stop, the trial court’s Molineux ruling, and the effectiveness of trial counsel. The Court affirmed, reaffirming key principles governing constructive possession and the automobile presumption under New York law.

Summary of the Judgment

• Background: In March 2019, a trooper stopped a car driven by Jessica Forsythe—wanted on a warrant and driving with a suspended license. Occupants included defendant in the front passenger seat, with William McClintic and Adrianna Blake in back. A canine sweep revealed under-hood baggies containing 290 grams of methamphetamine, plus packaging materials and marijuana. Additional drugs and paraphernalia were found inside the car and trunk. Defendant had a digital scale in his pocket and a cutting agent on his seat. While in jail, he allegedly sold fentanyl to another inmate, William Stern.

• Verdict and Sentence: After denying suppression and allowing a limited Molineux inquiry into a prior arrest, the County Court convicted Smith on all counts and sentenced him, as a second-felony offender, to eight years’ incarceration plus five years’ postrelease supervision.

• Appeal: Smith argued (1) insufficient evidence of possession and intent to sell; (2) weight of the evidence; (3) invalid traffic stop; (4) erroneous admission of uncharged misconduct; (5) ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division rejected each claim and affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

People v. Santiago, 206 AD3d 1466 (3d Dept 2022) – standard for legal sufficiency review.
People v. Durfey, 170 AD3d 1331 (3d Dept 2019) – elements of constructive possession.
Penal Law § 10.00(8) – definition of “possession.”
Penal Law § 220.25(1) – automobile presumption of knowing possession.
People v. Adorno, 216 AD2d 686 (3d Dept 1995) – rebuttal of the automobile presumption.
People v. Williams, 301 AD2d 794 (3d Dept 2003) – scope of presumption and rebuttal.
People v. Crooks, 129 AD3d 1207 (3d Dept 2015), aff’d 27 NY3d 609 (2016) – factors indicating intent to sell.
People v. Gagnier, 146 AD3d 1019 (3d Dept 2017) – sufficiency of evidence for in-jail sale.

Legal Reasoning

1. Constructive Possession and Automobile Presumption The Court confirmed that, when a defendant is not found in direct physical possession, the People may prove constructive possession by showing dominion and control over the area where contraband was found (Durfey). Because the drugs were hidden under the hood of a car and discovered during a lawful stop, Penal Law § 220.25(1) created a rebuttable presumption that each occupant knowingly possessed them. Here:

Defendant had shared access to and had driven the rental vehicle;
He was seen discarding a wrapped bundle of methamphetamine during the stop;
A digital scale and cutting agent were found on his person and seat;
Packaging materials matched those in the under-hood bag;
Surveillance footage showed him handling the vehicle’s compartments at a casino prior to the stop.

The Court held these facts, viewed in the People’s favor, were sufficient to sustain constructive possession and intent to sell (see Crooks; People v. Smith, 201 AD3d 1126 [3d Dept 2022]).

2. Weight of the Evidence The defendant’s co-occupant, Forsythe, claimed sole ownership of the drugs, but the jury declined to credit her testimony in light of video evidence and other witness accounts. The Appellate Division gave deference to the jury’s credibility determinations and found the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

3. Validity of the Traffic Stop The trooper’s identification of Forsythe (active warrant and suspended license) provided reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The Court deferred to the suppression hearing findings and upheld the denial of defendant’s motion (People v. Hinshaw, 35 NY3d 427 [2020]).

4. Admission of Uncharged Misconduct (Molineux) Evidence that defendant was present and arrested with Forsythe in another county was offered to explain their relationship and context for joint drug activity, not to show criminal propensity. Proper limiting instructions were given; no abuse of discretion occurred.

5. Effective Assistance of Counsel Although counsel did not request an accomplice-as-a-matter-of-law charge for some witnesses, substantial corroboration from video and physical evidence meant no prejudice resulted. Counsel’s performance fell within reasonable professional norms.

Impact

• Reinforces the broad application of the automobile presumption under Penal Law § 220.25(1), even where the contraband is concealed under the hood. • Illustrates how modern surveillance footage can buttress constructive possession findings. • Clarifies that Molineux evidence may be admitted to illuminate relationships and background, subject to limiting instructions. • Affirms that reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle may rest on a combination of an arrest warrant and suspension of license. • Emphasizes the high bar for overturning jury credibility assessments and for proving ineffective assistance of counsel.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Constructive Possession: Proof that a defendant had the power and intent to control contraband, even if not caught holding it directly.
Automobile Presumption (Penal Law § 220.25[1]): An evidentiary rule deeming every occupant of a vehicle to know of drugs found in it, unless successfully rebutted.
Molineux Evidence: Uncharged misconduct evidence. Admissible to show motive, intent, or background—not just bad character—when paired with proper jury instructions.
Accomplice as a Matter of Law vs. Fact: Law: the witness must be treated as an accomplice beyond a reasonable doubt.
Fact: the jury decides if the witness was actually an accomplice based on evidence.
Suppression Hearing Standards: Stops require reasonable suspicion of a crime or traffic violation, or probable cause. Courts defer to the trial court’s findings unless clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

People v. Smith reaffirms that a large cache of drugs, paired with indicia of packaging, scales, furtive movements, and shared vehicle access, suffices to prove constructive possession under the automobile presumption. The decision underscores deference to jury credibility choices, the narrow circumstances for reversing suppression rulings, and the limited scope of reversible Molineux and ineffective-counsel claims. Going forward, prosecutors will view this ruling as bolstering the utility of the automobile presumption and surveillance evidence, while defense counsel must carefully consider both rebuttal strategies and the tactical implications of ancillary evidentiary objections.