Reaffirmation of the Distinct Enterprise Requirement in RICO §1962(c): Brittingham v. Mobil Corporation

Reaffirmation of the Distinct Enterprise Requirement in RICO §1962(c): Brittingham v. Mobil Corporation

Introduction

The case R.R. Brittingham, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Mobil Corporation and Mobil Oil Corporation d/b/a Mobil Chemical Company, Inc., decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on August 23, 1991, addresses significant issues concerning the application of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The plaintiffs, individual consumers, filed a class action lawsuit against Mobil Corporation and its subsidiaries, alleging false advertising and violations of RICO provisions. This commentary delves into the court's analysis and the implications of its decision on future RICO litigation.

Summary of the Judgment

The plaintiffs alleged that Mobil Chemical's marketing of "Hefty Degradable" garbage bags was fraudulent, as the bags did not degrade as advertised. They asserted violations under RICO §1962(a) and §1962(c), claiming that Mobil engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity through mail and wire fraud. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mobil, dismissing the RICO claims. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed this decision, holding that the alleged enterprise was not distinct from the defendant corporation, thereby failing the requirements of §1962(c). Additionally, the court found the plaintiffs' §1962(a) claims insufficient to establish causation between the use of racketeering income and the alleged consumer injuries.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court extensively referenced prior cases to elucidate the requirements for establishing a RICO enterprise:

  • B.F. HIRSCH v. ENRIGHT REFINING CO., INC. - Established that the individual named as a defendant must be distinct from the enterprise.
  • Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North America - Reinforced that a corporate enterprise cannot be held vicariously liable for the racketeering activities of its employees.
  • SHEARIN v. E.F. HUTTON GROUP, INC. and others - Provided additional context on the association-in-fact enterprise requirements.

These precedents collectively emphasize that for a RICO claim under §1962(c), the enterprise must involve parties beyond the defendant corporation and its immediate employees or agents.

Legal Reasoning

The core issue revolved around whether the alleged enterprise was distinct from Mobil Corporation and its subsidiaries. The court held that an enterprise under §1962(c) must be more than just a collection of individuals or entities conducting the business of the defendant. Since Mobil operates through its employees and agents, any enterprise comprising these entities would not be distinct. This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent of RICO to target corrupt individuals or groups rather than legitimate corporations inadvertently affected by racketeering activities.

Regarding §1962(a), the plaintiffs failed to establish that their injuries were directly caused by the use or investment of racketeering income. The court underscored the necessity of demonstrating a substantial and proximate link between the alleged RICO violations and the plaintiffs' damages, which was not sufficiently met in this case.

Impact

This judgment reinforces the stringent requirements for establishing an enterprise under RICO §1962(c). It clarifies that corporations cannot be held liable for racketeering activities solely based on the actions of their employees or agents unless there is a distinct and separate entity involved. This decision limits the scope of RICO claims against large corporations, ensuring that sanctions are appropriately directed at the actual perpetrators of racketeering activities. Future litigants must carefully delineate the enterprise to meet the distinctiveness criteria established by this and related cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)

RICO is a federal law designed to combat organized crime in the United States. It allows for extended criminal penalties and civil causes of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization.

Enterprise

In the context of RICO, an "enterprise" refers to any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. The enterprise must be distinct from the individuals committing the racketeering activities.

Pattern of Racketeering Activity

A "pattern" consists of at least two predicate acts within a 10-year period. These acts must be related and demonstrate continuity in the criminal behavior.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit's decision in Brittingham v. Mobil Corporation underscores the critical necessity of demonstrating a distinct enterprise separate from the defendant corporation in RICO §1962(c) claims. By affirming the district court's summary judgment, the court delineates the boundaries within which RICO can be effectively applied against large corporate entities. This judgment serves as a pivotal reference point for future RICO litigation, emphasizing the importance of structural distinctions within alleged enterprises and reinforcing the targeted application of RICO sanctions.

Practitioners must heed the stringent requirements for establishing a separate enterprise and ensure that claims under §1962(a) are substantiated with clear causal links to racketeering activities. The decision maintains the balance intended by RICO legislation, preventing its misuse against legitimate business entities while providing recourse against actual perpetrators of organized crime.

Case Details

Year: 1991
Court: United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Judge(s)

Anthony Joseph Scirica

Attorney(S)

C. Oliver Burt, III (argued), Greenfield Chimicles, Haverford, Pa., for appellant, R.R. Brittingham. Roberta D. Liebenberg, Wolf, Block, Schorr Solis-Cohen, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant, Matthew D. Roazen. Deborah R. Gross, Gross, Sklar Metzger, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant, Jack Dorf. Phyllis C. Kaufman, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant, Beth Dunnington. Dianne M. Nast, Kohn, Savett, Klein Graf, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant, s.A. Poncet-Pitkow. William E. Haggerty, Morgan, Hallgren, Crosswell Kane, Lancaster, Pa., for appellant, Leo Geiger. John B. Williams (argued), Karen M. Lockwood, Judith L. Oldham, Collier, Shannon and Scott, Washington, D.C., Charles J. Bloom, Kleinbard, Bell Brecker, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees, Mobil Corp., Mobil Oil Corp. d/b/a Mobil Chemical Co.

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