Reaffirmation of the Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Federal Jurisdictional Principles

Introduction

United States v. Gibson is a per curiam decision of the Fifth Circuit rendered on May 9, 2025. The appellant, Marland Henry Gibson, a convicted felon, was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of firearms after a routine traffic stop and record check revealed an outstanding probation warrant from Indiana. Gibson, representing himself, challenged the indictment on multiple fronts: jurisdictional grounds, facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) under the Second, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments, sufficiency of the charging document, Speedy Trial Act violations, and constructive amendment of the indictment. The Fifth Circuit rejected all arguments and affirmed Gibson’s conviction and forfeiture findings.

Summary of the Judgment

The appellate court addressed five categories of Gibson’s arguments:

Subject‐Matter Jurisdiction: Held that federal courts retain jurisdiction over prosecutions even if the underlying statute is later deemed unconstitutional, citing United States v. Williams.
Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1): Reaffirmed that facial challenges to the felon‐in‐possession ban are foreclosed by circuit precedent (United States v. Diaz) and that forfeiture provisions fit within historical tradition.
Indictment Sufficiency: Upheld the indictment as facially valid, concluding it tracked the statutory language and sufficiently alleged each essential element, including the interstate commerce nexus.
Speedy Trial Act Compliance: Determined no violation of the 70‐day rule (18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1)) or the “oppressive delay” provision (18 U.S.C. § 3161(j)), as Gibson’s trial commenced within the prescribed period and he failed to show the government’s knowledge of his Indiana custody.
Constructive Amendment: Found no variance between the indictment and jury instructions; the government presented a single, consistent theory of felon‐in‐possession.

Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Gibson’s 48-month sentence and forfeiture order.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024): Foreclosed facial Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) and upheld forfeiture under § 924(d)(1).
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998): Emphasized the necessity of subject‐matter jurisdiction as a threshold issue.
United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951): Held that courts do not lose jurisdiction based on a statute’s alleged unconstitutionality.
United States v. Scruggs, 714 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2013): Confirmed that an indictment need only mirror the statutory language to invoke jurisdiction.
Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320 (2014): Clarified that a grand jury’s “fair” indictment conclusively establishes probable cause without needing a detailed element‐by‐element finding.
United States v. Webb, 747 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1984): Set the standard for indictment sufficiency—alleging each essential element to afford fair notice and protect against double jeopardy.
United States v. Guidry, 406 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2005): Defined the three elements of a § 922(g)(1) offense: prior felony conviction, possession of a firearm, and interstate commerce nexus.
United States v. Anderton, 752 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1985): Interpreted § 3161(j)(1)’s “continuous confinement” requirement for Speedy Trial Act purposes.
United States v. Rider, 94 F.4th 445 (5th Cir. 2024): Described the doctrine of constructive amendment and the requirement of a single, consistent theory of conviction.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeded systematically through each of Gibson’s arguments:

Jurisdiction: Citing Williams and Steel Co., the court held that a statute’s constitutionality has no bearing on the district court’s jurisdiction to hear a federal criminal case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. An indictment that charges an offense “against the laws of the United States” suffices to invoke subject‐matter jurisdiction (Scruggs).
Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1): The Fifth Circuit adhered to Diaz, finding no plausible reason to deviate from its prior holding that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment on its face. It rejected Gibson’s Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendment attacks by reference to Lewis v. United States, Darrington, and Broussard.
Indictment Sufficiency: Under Webb, an indictment must allege essential elements to enable defense preparation and double jeopardy protection. It need not recite a grand jury’s internal findings (Kaley), nor prove commerce by detailed facts; conclusory allegations suffice (Williams, 1982).
Speedy Trial Act: § 3161(c)(1) requires trial within 70 days of arraignment; Gibson’s trial began 47 days after his first appearance. § 3161(j)(1) applies only if the government knew of and participated in a defendant’s ongoing confinement; Gibson produced no record support.
Constructive Amendment: The indictment and jury instructions consistently charged Gibson as a felon in possession of specific firearms affecting commerce. No new factual theory was introduced to the jury.

Impact

United States v. Gibson reaffirms several important principles for federal criminal practice:

It cements Fifth Circuit precedent barring facial constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1), providing predictability for prosecutions of felons in possession of firearms.
It underscores the minimal requirements for charging documents, discouraging hyper‐technical attacks on indictment language so long as statutory elements are mirrored.
It clarifies the Speedy Trial Act application to defendants arrested on federal indictments while held in state custody, emphasizing the need for record evidence of government knowledge of confinement.
It fortifies the doctrine that jurisdiction cannot be ousted by claims of statutory unconstitutionality, ensuring that challenges to statutory validity proceed on the merits rather than by dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Facial Challenge: An attack on a law’s constitutionality as applied to everyone, not just the defendant.
Subject‐Matter Jurisdiction: A court’s power to hear a type of case—here, all federal offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
Grand Jury Indictment: A formal accusation that charges a person with a crime, issued by a panel of citizens based on probable cause.
Speedy Trial Act (§ 3161): Federal statute requiring criminal trials to start within a set time frame to protect the defendant’s right to a prompt proceeding.
Constructive Amendment: An impermissible widening of charges at trial beyond what the indictment alleges, changing the theory of prosecution.

Conclusion

United States v. Gibson stands as a comprehensive affirmation of established Fifth Circuit law on felon‐in‐possession prosecutions. By rejecting jurisdictional and constitutional objections, upholding indictment sufficiency, confirming compliance with the Speedy Trial Act, and finding no constructive amendment, the court delivered a structured, precedent‐based ruling. The decision reinforces procedural safeguards without opening new avenues for defendants to evade or delay accountability under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Future litigants in this circuit will encounter a reaffirmed landscape in which the core doctrines of jurisdiction, indictment practice, and speedy trial rights remain firmly anchored in existing case law.