Reaffirmation of Substantial-Change and Procedural Compliance in Child Custody Modifications

Introduction

In Edward H. v. Sarah B., No. S-19072 (Alaska Sup. Ct. June 4, 2025), the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the Third Judicial District’s denial of a father’s repeated motions to modify child custody and support. Since their 2018 divorce, Edward and Sarah have clashed over the care of their two daughters, culminating in multiple custody orders, allegations of domestic violence and alcohol misuse, and interim agreements. The key issues before the court were (1) whether Edward had complied with procedural rules—particularly deadlines for witness and exhibit lists—and (2) whether he had demonstrated the “substantial change in circumstances” required to revisit existing custody and support orders.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously held:

• The superior court did not abuse its broad discretion in enforcing pretrial deadlines and granting a motion in limine that barred appellant Edward from presenting witnesses or exhibits after he failed to file the required lists.
• Edward’s initial motion to modify custody failed because (a) the alleged intoxication incident lacked credible evidence, and (b) a time-limited interim agreement—expressly labeled “temporary” and expiring January 31, 2024—did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances under Alaska law.
• His motion to modify child support was addressed only to reflect the parties’ mediated, interim support arrangement; Edward’s later claim that $1,000 per month was unfair was raised first in a motion for reconsideration, contrary to Civil Rule 77(k). The court declined to entertain new arguments at that stage.
• The second motion to modify custody—filed weeks after the evidentiary hearing—offered only conclusory assertions that Edward had “done the work necessary” to overcome the domestic violence presumption. The superior court properly denied it without a hearing because no prima facie factual showing of changed circumstances was made.

The Supreme Court affirmed every aspect of the superior court’s judgment.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

a. Broad Discretion and Enforcement of Pretrial Deadlines
Nelson-Lizardi v. Lizardi, 49 P.3d 236 (Alaska 2002), and Alaska R. Civ. P. 16(e) establish that trial courts may set—and strictly enforce—scheduling orders. Johnson v. State, 636 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1981), underscores that a party seeking to modify such orders must show “manifest injustice.”

b. Standard for Custody Modification: Substantial Change & Best Interests
Collier v. Harris, 377 P.3d 15 (Alaska 2016), and Heather W. v. Rudy R., 274 P.3d 478 (Alaska 2012), confirm that custody orders may be modified only upon a prima facie showing of a “substantial change in circumstances” affecting the child’s welfare. Peterson v. Swarthout, 214 P.3d 332 (Alaska 2009), and Morino v. Swayman, 970 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1999), emphasize finality and discourage repeated relitigation.

c. Temporary or De Facto Custody Arrangements
McLane v. Paul, 189 P.3d 1039 (Alaska 2008), and Naquin v. Naquin, 974 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1999), draw the line between short-term experiments (which do not qualify as substantial changes) and longer de facto transfers that should be formalized. Here, the express “temporary” label and fixed expiration date distinguished the arrangement from Naquin’s open-ended de facto custody.

d. Domestic Violence Presumption
AS 25.24.150(g)–(h) creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent with a history of domestic violence. To overcome it, a parent must present objective proof—certificates, affidavits, or provider letters—of completed intervention programs.

e. Motions for Reconsideration & Discovery
Katz v. Murphy, 165 P.3d 649 (Alaska 2007), holds that Civil Rule 77(k) bars new grounds on reconsideration. Lee v. State, 141 P.3d 342 (Alaska 2006), applies the abuse-of-discretion standard to discovery rulings.

2. Legal Reasoning

• Procedural Rulings
The court reasoned that procedural compliance is central to fair adjudication. Edward missed the March 1 deadline for witness lists and the March 29 deadline for exhibits. Having been represented by counsel, he bore responsibility for meeting those dates or moving for relief. His later plea—“I was hoping the court would allow witnesses”—came too late. Under Rule 16(e), pretrial orders are binding unless a party demonstrates manifest injustice. Edward neither sought an extension nor showed any prejudice meriting relief.

• Substantial-Change Requirement
Modification of custody requires two steps: (1) prima facie proof of a substantial change since the last order; (2) a best-interests analysis if a hearing is granted. The court found no credible evidence for the alleged August 2023 drunkenness incident—video and witness affidavits contradicted Edward’s account. And the September 2023 “temporary” arrangement, expressly non-precedential and set to expire, failed to meet the Morino/McLane threshold. The court therefore did not proceed to a best-interests inquiry.

• Domestic Violence Presumption
Edward’s bald assertion that he had “done the work necessary” was a legal conclusion without factual support. He offered no certificates evidencing completion of the required 12-week batterers intervention or parenting program dating after the 2021 presumption finding. In the absence of such proof, the presumption remained unrebutted.

• Child Support Modification
Civil Rule 90.3(h)(1) permits modification upon a material change in circumstances—here the de facto custody shift. The superior court appropriately implemented the parties’ mediated $1,000/month agreement for the interim period. Edward’s later attack on that figure was first raised only in a motion for reconsideration, violating Rule 77(k).

3. Potential Impact

This decision sends several clear signals:

• Courts will enforce pretrial deadlines even in pro se contexts. Parties cannot present evidence or witnesses after missing mandatory scheduling cut-offs.
• Temporary custody or support arrangements, if expressly limited in duration and non-precedential, generally will not satisfy the substantial-change requirement.
• Domestic violence custody presumptions require robust, objective proof of program completion; conclusory assertions will not suffice.
• Motions for reconsideration cannot be used to introduce entirely new arguments or evidence.

Practitioners and litigants will need to plan carefully: file timely witness/exhibit lists, convert interim arrangements into formal orders if they are to have lasting effect, and prepare documented proof to rebut statutory presumptions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantial Change in Circumstances: A significant shift—versus minor or experimental tweaks—in family life since the last custody order, such that reopening the custody decision may serve the child’s welfare.
• Domestic Violence Presumption: A statutory rule that a parent with a history of domestic violence is presumed unfit for custody unless they complete court-approved intervention programs.
• Motion in Limine: A request to the court, before trial or hearing, to exclude certain evidence or testimony.
• Prima Facie Showing: Enough factual detail, if accepted as true, to justify moving forward to a full hearing.
• Abuse of Discretion: A standard of review meaning the lower court’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, or based on irrelevant considerations.
• Motion for Reconsideration: A post-judgment request revisiting errors of law or fact that were already presented; new issues generally cannot be raised.

Conclusion

Edward H. v. Sarah B. reaffirms core principles governing child custody litigation in Alaska:

1. Strict adherence to procedural deadlines is essential—even for pro se litigants.
2. Court-approved “temporary” custody changes do not automatically become permanent judgments of the court.
3. The substantial-change requirement remains a robust gatekeeper against repeated custody battles.
4. Statutory domestic violence presumptions demand concrete, documented proof to overcome.
5. Motions for reconsideration are not vehicles for new arguments or evidence.

Together, these principles preserve judicial economy, promote stability for children, and underscore the importance of thorough preparation by litigants and their counsel.