Reaffirmation of Reasonable-Care Standard Over “Judgmental Immunity” in Georgia Legal Malpractice Claims

Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Cox-Ott v. Barnes & Thornburg, LLP (No. S24G0739, May 13, 2025), a case that addresses the proper standard for evaluating attorney professional negligence claims. Cynthia Cox-Ott sued her former lawyer, Jim Leonard, and his firm, Barnes & Thornburg, alleging negligence in strategy, choice of law, and claim selection that led to the unfavorable dismissal of her insurance dispute. The trial court and the Court of Appeals applied a doctrine known as “judgmental immunity” to bar her claim. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether that doctrine correctly reflects Georgia law on legal malpractice or whether Georgia should instead adhere to the long-standing objective standard of reasonable care.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that:

The Court of Appeals erred in relying on the “judgmental immunity” doctrine, a creation of its own decisional law, which insulated attorneys from negligence claims based solely on an “honest exercise of judgment.”
Georgia law requires an objective inquiry—whether the attorney exercised the degree of care, skill, and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would under similar circumstances—when evaluating a legal malpractice claim.
Although the judgmental immunity concept is overruled, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment on the independent ground that Cox-Ott failed to prove causation in her negligence claim.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court surveyed nearly two centuries of Georgia and English common-law decisions establishing the duty of reasonable care in attorney-client relationships:

Cox v. Sullivan (7 Ga. 144, 1849): Recognized that attorneys are bound only by “reasonable skill and diligence,” not extraordinary or infallible performance.
O’Barr v. Alexander (37 Ga. 195, 1867): Emphasized that errors in judgment are not actionable if the attorney acted in good faith and with the competence expected of the profession.
Various English cases (e.g., Pitt v. Yalden, Russell v. Palmer) imported into Georgia law by statute, confirming an attorney’s duty to use reasonable care in all professional undertakings.
Hudson v. Windholz (202 Ga. App. 882, 1992): Introduced the terminology “judgmental immunity” but departed from the objective reasonable-care standard by focusing solely on whether the attorney honestly exercised judgment.
Woodruff v. Tomlin (6th Cir. 616 F.2d 924, 1980) and Berman v. Rubin (138 Ga. App. 849, 1976): Actually reaffirmed that attorneys remain liable for professional mistakes when they fail to use reasonable care, despite acknowledging discretion in litigation tactics.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s reasoning unfolded in several key steps:

Definition of Legal Malpractice: A legal malpractice claim is a professional negligence action requiring proof of (1) attorney‐client relationship, (2) breach of duty (failure to exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence), and (3) causation of damages.
Duty and Standard of Care: Attorneys owe a duty of reasonable care grounded in long-established common-law principles. “Judgment” calls for strategic discretion, but that discretion must be exercised with the care of a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances.
Overruling Hudson’s Distortion: Hudson’s adoption of a purely subjective “judgmental immunity” doctrine—shielding any tactical decision made in good faith—was inconsistent with Georgia’s historic objective standard. The Supreme Court overruled Hudson and all cases relying on it to the extent they exclude reasonable-care analysis.
Affirmance on Causation: Although the Court disapproved the judgmental immunity rationale, it affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment because Cox-Ott failed to show that, but for Leonard’s alleged negligence, she would have prevailed in the underlying insurance dispute.

Impact

This decision has immediate and far-reaching consequences:

It reestablishes the objective reasonable-care standard as the sole test for breach of duty in Georgia legal malpractice cases.
It discourages a purely subjective “good faith” shield for attorneys’ strategic errors and restores client access to malpractice remedies when an attorney’s judgment falls below professional norms.
It clarifies that trial and appellate courts must evaluate malpractice claims under the same duty standards applied to other professionals—no special immunity for litigators beyond ordinary negligence principles.
It may prompt attorneys to document thoroughly their strategic analyses and to communicate the objective bases for their recommendations, thereby strengthening the attorney-client relationship and evidentiary record in case of future malpractice claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal concepts in the Court’s opinion benefit from plain-language clarification:

Professional Negligence vs. Judgmental Immunity: Professional negligence (legal malpractice) requires proof that an attorney fell below the objective standard of a reasonably prudent lawyer. “Judgmental immunity,” as misapplied by some Georgia decisions, wrongly suggested that any error in strategy—even if poorly considered—could never be actionable if done in “good faith.”
Reasonable Care: This is the level of skill and diligence that a competent attorney in the same community would exercise. It is not perfection or guarantee of success.
Causation in Malpractice: Beyond proving negligence, a client must show that the negligence caused the harm and that, absent the attorney’s mistake, the client would have won or achieved a better result.
Overruling Precedent: When a higher court finds a lower court’s past decision inconsistent with foundational principles, it “overrules” it—meaning that decision no longer represents good law.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Cox-Ott v. Barnes & Thornburg, LLP restores clarity to professional negligence doctrine in legal malpractice claims. By overruling the erroneous “judgmental immunity” doctrine, the Court reaffirmed that all attorneys in Georgia are held to an objective standard of reasonable care, skill, and diligence. Errors in judgment are not inherently protected; strategic choices must still meet the baseline of competence expected within the profession. Although Cox-Ott’s claims were ultimately dismissed on causation grounds, the ruling safeguards clients’ ability to seek redress when an attorney’s conduct falls measurably below the accepted standard. This decision realigns Georgia law with two centuries of precedent and ensures that legal professionals remain accountable for negligence in the practice of their craft.