Re-Drawing the Boundaries of Equitable Relief: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D. (606 U.S. ___, 2025)

Introduction

On 23 June 2025 the U.S. Supreme Court, acting on an emergency application, stayed a nationwide preliminary injunction that had required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to give non-citizens written notice and a meaningful opportunity to assert Convention Against Torture (CAT) claims before being removed to a “third country.” In a terse order the Court granted the stay pending appeal and any subsequent petition for certiorari. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, issued a vigorous 19-page dissent accusing the Government of serial defiance of court orders and the Court of “gross abuse” of its equitable authority.

The case lies at the intersection of (i) the Government’s push to expedite removals to countries with which non-citizens may have no prior connection, (ii) international obligations under the CAT, (iii) the ever-expanding use of the Supreme Court’s “shadow docket,” and (iv) restrictions on lower-court power to issue class-wide injunctions in immigration matters, particularly 8 U.S.C. §1252(f)(1).

The parties:

• Applicants (Defendants below): Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Noem, and Attorney General Bondi.
• Respondents (Plaintiffs below): D.V.D. and a certified class of non-citizens subject to removal orders or purported “third-country” removals.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Court granted DHS’s application for a stay of the district court’s 18 April 2025 preliminary injunction.
• The stay remains effective through resolution of the Government’s appeal in the First Circuit and, if sought, through any Supreme Court review.
• No majority reasoning accompanied the order; only the dissent elaborated on the legal and factual background.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) – Sets forth the traditional four-factor stay test (likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest). The dissent applies Nken rigorously, asserting the Government failed every factor; the majority implicitly relaxes the test by granting the stay without explanation.
• Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 463 U.S. 1315 (1983) (Blackmun, J., in chambers) – Quoted to underscore that extraordinary circumstances are required for a stay. The dissent argues those circumstances are absent.
• Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945) – Source of the “clean-hands” doctrine. Justice Sotomayor cites it to argue that equity should be denied to a party that repeatedly disobeys court orders.
• Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543 (2022) – Addresses §1252(f)(1) limits on class-wide immigration injunctions. Both sides invoke it on the scope of lower-court power; the dissent views §1252(f)(1) as at most uncertain, insufficient to justify a stay.
• Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020) – Recognizes judicial review of factual CAT claims, undermining DHS’s contention that executive assurances about torture are unreviewable.
• Additional citations (e.g., Winter, Mullane, Munaf, Kiyemba) appear primarily in the dissent to emphasize notice, due process, and national-security exceptions.

2. Legal Reasoning (Inferred)

1. Likelihood of Success.
   • DHS challenges the district court’s jurisdiction, stressing the channeling provisions of 8 U.S.C. §1252(a) & (b)(9) and the class-wide bar in §1252(f)(1).
   • The Government maintains that its March 2025 guidance is within the broad discretion Congress granted under §1231(b) to select any “country that will accept the alien” once prior options are impracticable.
   • By staying the injunction, the Court signaled (without explanation) that at least four Justices see a reasonable probability that the Government will prevail on one or more of these positions.
2. Irreparable Harm.
   • DHS pleaded operational paralysis: the injunction purportedly forces it to hold removable non-citizens indefinitely, strains detention capacity, and undermines diplomatic negotiations.
   • The dissent, conversely, argues any harm is self-inflicted and pales beside the risk of torture to the class.
3. Equitable Considerations & “Clean Hands.”
   • The dissent marshals a detailed record of DHS’s non-compliance (unauthorized removals to Mexico, El Salvador, South Sudan, attempted removals to Libya) to contend that equitable relief should be denied outright. The majority’s silence nonetheless grants the stay, implicitly discounting the misconduct or crediting DHS assurances of future compliance.
4. Public Interest.
   • National-security and foreign-policy prerogatives traditionally weigh in the Government’s favor. The stay order tacitly privileges those interests over systemic due-process concerns.

3. Impact on Future Litigation and Immigration Law

a) Shadow-Docket Precedent. By granting a stay with no written majority rationale, the Court continues a pattern of substantive immigration rulings through emergency orders, effectively creating binding precedent without full briefing. Lower courts will read the stay as a signal that broad class-wide injunctions against removal procedures face steep odds.

b) Section 1252(f)(1) as a Tactical Shield. The Government’s reliance on §1252(f)(1) may encourage future litigants to frame nationwide immigration injunctions as ultra vires unless they squarely target a statute’s “operation.” Expect district courts to craft narrower, plaintiff-specific relief to avoid immediate stays.

c) Due-Process Baseline Eroded? Although no merits decision issued, the stay permits DHS, for the foreseeable future, to resume no-notice third-country removals. This practical reality may shift the default procedural baseline, placing the burden on non-citizens to secure emergency relief in each individual case.

d) Diplomatic Leverage. The executive branch gains negotiating flexibility with receiving countries, having shed (temporarily at least) the district court’s notice requirements.

e) Congressional Attention. The dissent’s factual catalogue of removals to dangerous locales, including Guantanamo transfers and alleged CAT violations, may spur oversight hearings or legislative attempts to codify minimum notice periods for any third-country removal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Third-Country Removal

A deportation to a nation other than (1) the country of the non-citizen’s nationality, (2) the country from which the person entered the U.S., or (3) a country the person affirmatively selects. Congress allows it only after all statutory alternatives prove “impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible.”

Convention Against Torture (CAT) Claim

An assertion that the person’s return would likely result in torture by or with the acquiescence of a foreign government. U.S. regulations prohibit executing a removal if that threshold showing is made.

Preliminary Injunction vs. Stay

A preliminary injunction orders parties to act or refrain from acting pending trial. A stay suspends the injunction’s effect while a higher court reviews its validity.

Clean-Hands Doctrine

An equitable principle denying relief to a party that has acted inequitably regarding the subject of the litigation. Justice Sotomayor argues DHS’s repeated violations of court orders trigger this bar.

8 U.S.C. §1252(f)(1)

A jurisdiction-stripping provision barring lower courts from enjoining “the operation” of specified immigration statutes—except as to individual aliens. Its scope and constitutional limits remain contested.

Shadow Docket

The colloquial term for the Court’s handling of emergency applications and other summary dispositions outside its regular merits docket. These orders can have sweeping effects despite the absence of full briefing.

Conclusion

DHS v. D.V.D. does not finally resolve the legality of DHS’s notice-free third-country removal policy, but it does set an influential marker. The Supreme Court’s readiness to grant the Government extraordinary relief—despite documented disobedience and the availability of traditional appellate process—tilts the scales toward executive flexibility in immigration enforcement and away from broad district-court oversight. At a doctrinal level, the order:

• Signals a more expansive reading of §1252(f)(1) and a willingness to stay class-wide injunctions that impede removal operations.
• Suggests the Court will defer to asserted national-security harms even where the factual record shows individual rights violations.
• Highlights, through the dissent, the emerging tension between equitable stay standards and governmental non-compliance with lower-court orders.

Whether the First Circuit or the Supreme Court on certiorari will confront the underlying merits remains uncertain. In the meantime, the practical precedent is unmistakable: nationwide procedural safeguards against removal may be difficult to maintain when they collide with the executive’s evolving enforcement priorities. Advocates will need to recalibrate litigation strategies, potentially focusing on individualized relief and rapid filings, while policymakers evaluate statutory reforms to reinstate clear, enforceable notice requirements.