Re-affirming Sovereign and Quasi-Judicial Immunity in Attorney Discipline: A Commentary on Salis v. DoPico (2d Cir. 2025)

Re-affirming Sovereign and Quasi-Judicial Immunity in Attorney Discipline:
A Comprehensive Commentary on Salis v. DoPico (2d Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

Background. In Salis v. DoPico, the Second Circuit reviewed the Eastern District of New York’s dismissal of a wide-ranging § 1983 action lodged by Owolabi Salis, a recently disbarred lawyer. Salis asserted that a host of actors—state disciplinary officials, the New York Attorney General, the U.S. Attorney General, the Kings County District Attorney, Thomson Reuters, and the New York State Bar Association—violated his constitutional rights during and after his attorney-disciplinary proceedings.

Key Issues. The appeal presented three central questions:

  • Whether sovereign immunity shielded federal and state officials sued in their official capacities from § 1983 liability.
  • Whether disciplinary counsel and referees enjoyed absolute/quasi-judicial immunity when sued in their individual capacities.
  • Whether Salis adequately pled personal involvement by various defendants, and whether unserved parties could remain in the case.

Parties. Salis appeared pro se; appellees included:

  • Federal – U.S. Attorney General (substituted: Pamela Bondi)
  • State – N.Y. Attorney General Letitia James; members of the First Department Grievance Committee (Dopico, Doyle, Zolin)
  • Local – Kings County District Attorney’s Office / Eric Gonzalez
  • Private – Thomson Reuters; New York State Bar Association

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court in all respects, holding that:

  • Official-capacity claims against the U.S. Attorney General, the N.Y. Attorney General, and Committee officials were barred by sovereign immunity (U.S.) and the Eleventh Amendment (state).
  • Individual-capacity claims against Committee members failed because those officials possessed absolute immunity—quasi-judicial for the referee and prosecutorial for disciplinary counsel.
  • Claims against the Kings County District Attorney and Thomson Reuters were dismissed for want of any allegation of personal involvement; NYSBA was dismissed for lack of service.
  • As a recently disbarred lawyer, Salis was not entitled to the “special solicitude” normally accorded pro se litigants.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2004) – Reiterated the axiom of federal sovereign immunity; provided doctrinal basis to dismiss the § 1983 claim against the U.S. Attorney General.
  • Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2005) – Clarified that immunity extends to officers acting in official capacity, sealing the fate of federal defendants.
  • Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) & Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1977) – Confirmed that § 1983 neither abrogates nor waives state sovereign immunity, undergirding dismissal of claims against the NYAG and Committee officials in their official capacities.
  • Anonymous v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1975) – Characterized grievance-committee proceedings as “quasi-judicial,” the springboard for extending quasi-judicial immunity to the referee (Zolin).
  • DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 2003); Finn v. Anderson, 592 F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2014) – Provided grammatical structure to apply prosecutorial immunity to attorney-disciplinary counsel (Dopico & Doyle).
  • Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2010) – Removed enhanced pro se leniency for Salis, affecting pleading standards.
  • Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1987) – Used to reject claims lacking specific factual allegations against Reuters and KCDA.

Collectively, these authorities allowed the panel to dispose of every claim via jurisdictional bars or immunity doctrines without reaching underlying factual disputes.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

  1. Sovereign Immunity (Federal Defendants).
    Because § 1983 only addresses actions under color of state law, it supplies no waiver of federal immunity. The court thus lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the U.S. Attorney General.
  2. Eleventh-Amendment Immunity (State Defendants).
    Monetary relief against state officials in their official capacities is treated as a suit against the state. New York has not consented to such suits in federal court, and Congress has not abrogated that immunity in § 1983.
  3. Absolute Immunity (Individual-capacity Claims).
    a) Quasi-Judicial Immunity: The referee performed adjudicative functions analogous to a judge.
    b) Prosecutorial Immunity: The grievance chief attorney and counsel performed advocacy similar to criminal prosecutors in disciplinary litigation.
  4. Pleading Deficiency & Personal Involvement.
    No factual allegations tied Reuters or the KCDA to any constitutional deprivation; NYSBA was never served. Rule 19 “necessary party” arguments were labelled “frivolous.”

3.3 Anticipated Impact

Although issued as a non-precedential “summary order,” the opinion is a useful sign-post for litigants in four respects:

  • It reinforces the virtually impregnable nature of sovereign and Eleventh-Amendment immunity against § 1983 claims seeking money damages.
  • It cements a line of Second Circuit authorities extending absolute immunity to the entire range of participants in attorney-disciplinary proceedings (referees, investigators, counsel).
  • It signals that disbarred or suspended attorneys will not obtain the relaxed pro se construction otherwise given to lay litigants, raising their burden at the pleading stage.
  • It warns plaintiffs that naming high-profile institutions (e.g., global publishers, prosecutors) without concrete allegations of personal involvement invites rapid dismissal and, potentially, sanctions.

Future suits challenging bar disciplinary measures are therefore likely to funnel into narrow channels: (1) claims for prospective equitable relief under Ex parte Young, and (2) state-court Article 78 or equivalent review—not federal damages actions under § 1983.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Sovereign Immunity: The legal doctrine that the government cannot be sued without its consent. For the federal government, that consent must be expressed by Congress in a statute.
  • Eleventh Amendment: Constitutional provision interpreted to bar suits in federal court against a state by its own citizens for money damages, absent consent or a valid federal override.
  • Quasi-Judicial Immunity: Absolute immunity extended to officials performing duties functionally comparable to judges (e.g., disciplinary referees).
  • Prosecutorial Immunity: Absolute immunity for officials acting as advocates in initiating and prosecuting legal proceedings.
  • § 1983: Federal statute enabling suits against persons who, under color of state law, deprive others of constitutional or federal statutory rights.
  • Personal Involvement: Requirement that each defendant have direct, personal participation in the alleged wrong before being liable under § 1983.
  • Special Solicitude for Pro Se Litigants: Courts ordinarily construe pleadings by non-lawyers liberally. Attorneys representing themselves do not receive that benefit.

5. Conclusion

Salis v. DoPico offers a textbook application—not an expansion—of immunity doctrines at the intersection of federal, state, and disciplinary authority. The Second Circuit’s succinct affirmance underscores that:

  1. § 1983 cannot be leveraged to sidestep federal or state sovereign immunity for monetary relief.
  2. Attorney-disciplinary actors enjoy broad absolute immunity when functioning in adjudicative or prosecutorial capacities.
  3. Pleadings must allege concrete, individualized misconduct; mere indignation over the results of disciplinary proceedings is insufficient.
  4. Disbarred attorneys litigating pro se will be treated as sophisticated parties held to normal pleading standards.

These lessons collectively raise the bar for future challenges to bar disciplinary outcomes in federal court and maintain clear boundaries around sovereign and quasi-judicial protections. While non-precedential, the order’s reasoning will likely be cited for its persuasive clarity whenever similar suits arise.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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