Re-affirming Credibility and Corroboration Duties in Asylum Law:
A Commentary on Trejo Gomez v. Bondi (2d Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

Trejo Gomez v. Bondi, No. 23-6468, is a 2025 summary order from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denying a Salvadoran petitioner’s request for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision. Although summary orders lack formal precedential force under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, this decision articulates—and rigorously applies—principles that have become touchstones of modern asylum adjudication: (1) the “totality of the circumstances” approach to credibility determinations; (2) the pivotal role of corroborative evidence; and (3) the limits of appellate review under the “substantial evidence” standard.

Parties: Fani Yamileth Trejo Gomez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection, alleging persecution by a death squad that mistook her for a police informant. The respondent is the Attorney General of the United States, here captioned as Pamela Bondi.

Key appellate issue: Did the BIA err in affirming the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding, and, by extension, the denial of all three forms of relief?

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The court denied the petition for review, upholding the IJ’s adverse credibility finding under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
• Critical inconsistencies existed between the applicant’s I-589 application and her hearing testimony regarding (a) police involvement during an alleged assassination attempt, (b) whether she reported the incident, and (c) the motive for the attempt.
• Petitioner’s explanation—nervousness and limited education—did not compel a contrary finding under Majidi v. Gonzales.
• Failure to supply reliable corroboration (e.g., newspaper articles, consistent family affidavits) further undermined credibility.
• Because the same factual predicate underpinned asylum, withholding, and CAT claims, the adverse credibility ruling disposed of all three.
• The panel rebuked counsel for a non-compliant brief, invoking Fed. R. App. P. 28 and Shunfu Li v. Mukasey.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2005)
  Governs the practice of reviewing the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. It anchors the appellate lens used in this case.
• Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2018)
  Reiterates that adverse credibility rulings are reviewed for “substantial evidence” and, when they dispose of the factual predicate, they foreclose all relief. The panel quotes Gao repeatedly.
• Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008)
  Affirms deference owed to IJ credibility findings unless no reasonable fact-finder could agree. Provides the deferential backdrop.
• Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2020)
  States that even a single inconsistency can be fatal; multiple inconsistencies cut “even more forcefully.” Cited to emphasize the gravity of petitioner’s conflicting statements.
• Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005)
  Holds that offering a plausible explanation is insufficient; the explanation must compel belief. The court used Majidi to reject petitioner’s nervousness rationale.
• Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2007)
  Links lack of corroboration to credibility analysis. Guided the court’s treatment of missing newspaper articles and inconsistent affidavits.
• Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2013) & Likai Gao (again)
  Support assigning limited weight to interested-party affidavits not subject to cross-examination.
• INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976)
  Reaffirms that agencies need not reach immaterial issues once a dispositive ground (here, credibility) is found. This justified bypassing petitioner’s social-group theory under Matter of A-B-.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The crux of the decision is a textbook application of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), which permits IJs to base credibility on any inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood, without regard to materiality. The court walked through a four-step analytical path:

1. Identify inconsistencies—the IJ contrasted the I-589 with live testimony on three factual points.
2. Evaluate explanations—petitioner offered “nervousness”; under Majidi it was deemed non-compelling.
3. Assess corroboration—newspaper articles absent; familial affidavits both inconsistent and self-interested.
4. Apply deferential review—under Hong Fei Gao and § 1252(b)(4)(B), a reasonable adjudicator was not compelled to disagree with the IJ.

Because the same factual narrative underlay all forms of protection, once credibility collapsed, asylum, withholding, and CAT relief necessarily failed (Gao, supra). The panel also chastised counsel for procedural deficiencies, signaling renewed enforcement of FRAP 28 and professional-conduct norms.

3.3 Likely Impact

• Doctrine – While not precedential, the decision reinforces the Second Circuit’s uncompromising stance on credibility and corroboration, providing persuasive authority that lower tribunals may cite informally.
• Practice – Asylum advocates will redouble efforts to: (a) ensure all written submissions mirror intended testimony, (b) gather independent corroboration early, (c) cure translation or educational hurdles before hearings.
• Professional Responsibility – The explicit warning to counsel foreshadows stricter sanctioning for sub-standard briefing. Immigration practitioners, a bar already under scrutiny, face amplified stakes.
• Policy Discourse – The case highlights tension between evidentiary rigor and the realities of traumatized, often unrepresented asylum seekers—fueling debate on access to corroboration.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adverse Credibility Determination – A finding by the IJ that the applicant’s story is not believable. Once made, all claims relying on that story generally fail.
• Substantial Evidence Standard – A highly deferential appellate standard. The court asks only whether any reasonable fact-finder could agree with the agency’s decision.
• Withholding of Removal – A form of relief narrower than asylum: removal is barred only to the specific country of feared harm, without a path to permanent residence.
• CAT Protection – Relief under the Convention Against Torture, requiring proof that a person would more likely than not be tortured with government involvement or acquiescence.
• Particular Social Group (“PSG”) – One of five protected grounds in asylum law. Must be (i) defined with particularity and (ii) socially distinct in the home country.
• Summary Order – A non-precedential disposition. Can be cited (with “SUMMARY ORDER” notation) but does not bind future panels.

5. Conclusion

Trejo Gomez v. Bondi reinforces a fundamental message: credibility is the linchpin of humanitarian relief in U.S. immigration law. Inconsistent statements—however peripheral—can doom an application, and the absence of solid corroboration will rarely save it. Though formally non-precedential, the ruling adds to the Second Circuit’s robust body of persuasive authority on credibility doctrine, signals stricter scrutiny of attorney performance, and serves as a cautionary tale for applicants and advocates alike. Going forward, practitioners must treat the written application, hearing testimony, and supporting documentation as a seamless, mutually reinforcing whole, lest minor fractures expand into fatal fault lines.