Re-affirming AEDPA Deference and Rejecting the “Easily Movable Object” DNA Rule
Commentary on Gregory Tucker v. Noah Nagy, 24-1723 (6th Cir. June 17 2025)

Introduction

In Gregory Tucker v. Noah Nagy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of habeas relief to a state prisoner convicted of breaking and entering. At the center of the dispute lay a single piece of circumstantial evidence—Tucker’s DNA on a discarded Coke bottle found at the crime scene—and the question whether that evidence, viewed under the deferential standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), was legally sufficient to sustain the conviction. The district court found the evidence inadequate, relying on several out-of-circuit decisions that warn against drawing culpability inferences from DNA left on “easily movable objects.” The Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that (1) the Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably applied the Supreme Court’s sufficiency-of-evidence test in Jackson v. Virginia, and (2) the so-called “easily movable object” principle is not clearly established federal law for AEDPA purposes. The decision reiterates the high bar habeas petitioners face when attacking state convictions and clarifies that federal district courts may not bootstrap circuit-level doctrines into the “clearly established” category.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Sixth Circuit reversed the Eastern District of Michigan’s grant of Gregory Tucker’s § 2254 petition and remanded with instructions to deny relief.
• The panel (Chief Judge Sutton, and Judges Batchelder and Ritz) unanimously held that the Michigan Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Jackson v. Virginia when it found the DNA evidence sufficient for a rational juror to identify Tucker as the burglar.
• The district court erred by relying on non-Supreme-Court precedent to craft an “easily movable object” rule that heightened the sufficiency threshold.
• Under AEDPA deference, even “slim” circumstantial evidence, if rationally credited by a jury, can survive habeas review.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) — The bedrock test: evidence is sufficient if, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Both the Michigan Court of Appeals (state review) and the Sixth Circuit (federal habeas review) framed the inquiry through Jackson.
2. Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650 (2012) — Reaffirmed that habeas sufficiency review under AEDPA is “twice-deferential”: first to the jury’s fact-finding, then to the state court’s assessment.
3. Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43 (2010); Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21 (2014); Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58 (2013) — Each underscores that “clearly established Federal law” means Supreme Court holdings, not lower-court dicta or circuit trends.
4. United States v. Sherer, 770 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2014) — Demonstrated the Sixth Circuit’s willingness on direct appeal to uphold convictions based on DNA on portable items when combined with circumstantial facts—contrasting with out-of-circuit skepticism.
5. Out-of-Circuit DNA cases (Travillion, Strayhorn, Bonner, Mikes) were only cited by the district court; the Sixth Circuit dismissed them as irrelevant under AEDPA.

2. Core Legal Reasoning

• Twice-Deferential Lens. The panel reiterated that a federal habeas court may disturb a state verdict only when the state appellate court’s decision is so lacking in rational justification that it is “beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.”
• No Supreme-Level “Easily Movable” Rule. Because the Supreme Court has never required separate corroboration when DNA is found on an object capable of being transported, importing such a test violates AEDPA § 2254(d)(1).
• Plausible Inference vs. Exclusive Inference. Jackson does not mandate that the prosecution negate every innocent explanation. It is enough that the inference of guilt be rational. The jury could—permissibly—conclude that the Coke bottle was left by the burglar and that the DNA’s major donor (Tucker) was that burglar.
• Circumstantial ≠ Second-Class Evidence. Citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the court reminded that circumstantial evidence bears equal weight to direct testimony under American evidentiary principles.

3. Projected Impact on Future Litigation

The decision is likely to reverberate in three principal ways:

1. Constraining District Courts. District judges within the Sixth Circuit must resist relying on non-Supreme-Court authorities to craft new sufficiency frameworks for habeas review.
2. DNA-Only Prosecutions. State prosecutors can take comfort that convictions resting primarily on DNA found at crime scenes—even on portable items—will enjoy robust protection on habeas so long as jurors drew rational inferences.
3. Uniformity Across Circuits? The Sixth Circuit’s stance diverges from some other circuits’ skepticism toward “movable object” DNA. Unless the Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve the split, habeas outcomes will continue to vary by geography, but AEDPA’s “clearly established” limitation will curb federal intervention.

Complex Concepts Simplified

AEDPA Deference (§ 2254)

Congress’ 1996 statute sharply narrows federal power to overturn state convictions. Relief is available only if the state court decision is (a) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent, or (b) based on an unreasonable factual determination.

“Clearly Established Federal Law”

Only holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court—not dicta, not lower-court decisions—count. If no Supreme Court case addresses a specific rule (e.g., the “easily movable object” inference), it is not clearly established.

Jackson Sufficiency Standard

The jury’s verdict stands if, viewing evidence most favorably to prosecution, any rational factfinder could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Habeas courts must give this finding additional deference.

Circumstantial Evidence

Evidence that implies a fact through inference (e.g., DNA on a bottle) as opposed to direct testimony (e.g., an eyewitness). U.S. law treats the two as equally probative.

Conclusion

Tucker v. Nagy reinforces two enduring truths of federal habeas jurisprudence: the near-insurmountable deference owed to state adjudications under AEDPA, and the limited universe of “clearly established” law that can support relief. By declining to elevate the “easily movable object” DNA concern to constitutional stature, the Sixth Circuit aligns with the Supreme Court’s emphasis on juror discretion and evidentiary breadth. For practitioners, the decision is a cautionary tale—creative doctrinal arguments rooted in circuit precedent alone will seldom suffice on habeas; for state courts and prosecutors, it offers assurance that rational, even if slender, circumstantial cases will survive the federal gauntlet.