Ransom Crimes Against Relatives and Perceived Wealth Do Not Establish Withholding or CAT Relief Without Individualized Targeting, PSG Nexus, and Government Acquiescence

Ransom Crimes Against Relatives and Perceived Wealth Do Not Establish Withholding or CAT Relief Without Individualized Targeting, PSG Nexus, and Government Acquiescence

1. Introduction

In Jesus Cruz-Arias v. Pamela Bondi, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Jesus Fabian Cruz-Arias, a Mexican national, relied primarily on three cartel-related incidents involving members of his extended family (kidnappings and ransom demands), along with country-conditions materials describing cartel violence and corruption in Mexico. He did not challenge the denial of asylum.

The central issues were whether the family incidents amounted to past persecution of Cruz-Arias (triggering a presumption of future persecution), whether he showed a clear probability of future persecution directed at him, whether any feared harm would be on account of membership in a proposed particular social group (“Mexican landowners and their extended family”), and whether he established a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence for CAT protection.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court denied the petition for review. It held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusions that: (1) Cruz-Arias did not establish past persecution because the harm was directed at relatives, not him; (2) he did not show a clear probability that he would be individually targeted in the future, especially given the age/attenuation of the incidents and the continued safety of his immediate family in Mexico; (3) he failed to prove the required nexus between feared harm and membership in his proposed particular social group because the record indicated financially motivated targeting based on perceived wealth, not animus toward landowners or their family; and (4) his CAT claim was too speculative and lacked evidence of likely torture or government acquiescence specific to him.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Martinez-Martinez v. Bondi (standard of review posture): the Seventh Circuit reviews “the immigration judge’s order as modified by the Board,” framing what portions of the IJ’s reasoning remain operative on judicial review.
  • Mateo-Mateo v. Garland and Borjas Cruz v. Garland (review framework): legal questions are reviewed de novo, while factual findings are upheld if supported by substantial evidence.
  • de Paz-Peraza v. Bondi, Jamal-Daoud v. Gonzales, and INS v. Elias-Zacarias (deference): reversal is appropriate only where the record compels a contrary result—critical to the court’s refusal to reweigh evidence of cartel violence and family kidnappings.
  • Almutairi v. Holder (attribution requirement): for withholding, threats must be attributable to the government or to actors the government is unable or unwilling to control—part of the baseline withholding framework, though the case turned primarily on probability and nexus rather than state protection.
  • Zhou Ji Ni v. Holder (“derivative persecution”): generally, an applicant cannot establish past persecution based solely on harm to others. This principle directly undercut Cruz-Arias’s effort to convert kidnappings of relatives into “past persecution” of himself.
  • Stanojkova v. Holder (attenuation): even when harm occurs in the applicant’s environment, attenuated or indirect harm may not rise to persecution of the applicant. The court treated the family incidents as too remote from Cruz-Arias personally.
  • Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch (future persecution and CAT definitions): for future persecution without the past-persecution presumption, the applicant must present specific evidence he is more likely than not to be individually targeted; for CAT, it articulates both the torture threshold and the acquiescence standard.
  • Granados Arias v. Garland (particularized evidence; wealth motive; expert cross-examination): used to support the Board’s treatment of generalized country conditions, the need for a motive distinct from perceived wealth, and the weight given to expert materials when the expert is not available for cross-examination.
  • W.G.A. v. Sessions (“clear probability” for withholding): confirms the burden level and anchors the court’s conclusion that Cruz-Arias did not meet it.
  • Casas v. Garland (nexus as causal link): emphasizes that establishing persecution requires a causal link between harm and a protected ground.
  • Orellana-Arias v. Sessions and Dominguez-Pulido v. Lynch (wealth not a cognizable PSG trait standing alone): these cases informed the court’s view that evidence of financially motivated crime does not satisfy the protected-ground requirement for withholding.
  • Melnik v. Sessions (animus toward the group “as such”): supports the court’s demand for evidence of a persecutor’s specific animus toward landowners (or comparable groups) beyond mere extortion incentives.
  • Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen (CAT risk and acquiescence; “general fear” insufficient): reinforces that generalized corruption and violence do not establish government acquiescence without a concrete, individualized showing.
  • Lopez v. Lynch (acquiescence definition): provides the key articulation of acquiescence—prior awareness plus breach of legal duty to intervene.
  • Borovsky v. Holder (torture threshold): clarifies torture as severe pain or suffering intentionally inflicted for coercion, punishment, or discrimination, excluding lesser mistreatment.
  • P.A.-V. v. Bondi and Khan v. Filip (withholding vs. CAT burden relationship): the court relied on the logic that failing the “clear probability” standard for withholding generally forecloses meeting CAT’s likelihood-of-torture burden on the same factual record.
  • Lenjinac v. Holder (country reports insufficient without individualized link): supports rejecting CAT claims grounded in evidence that torture occurs in the country absent evidence the petitioner specifically will be tortured.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Past persecution and the presumption of future persecution

The court agreed that Cruz-Arias could not obtain the regulatory presumption (8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)) because the record did not establish that he “suffered past persecution.” The kidnappings involved an uncle and a cousin, and Cruz-Arias testified he had never been harmed in Mexico. Relying on Zhou Ji Ni v. Holder and Stanojkova v. Holder, the court treated these incidents as either impermissible “derivative persecution” or too attenuated from Cruz-Arias to count as persecution of him.

2) Future persecution—individualized likelihood

Without the presumption, Cruz-Arias had to show a “clear probability” and specific evidence that he would be individually targeted (Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch; W.G.A. v. Sessions). The Board’s reasoning—endorsed as supported by substantial evidence— emphasized (i) the lack of threats or harm toward Cruz-Arias personally, (ii) the dated nature of the incidents (the last dated event over a decade earlier), and (iii) the continued safety of his immediate family in Mexico.

The court also approved the Board’s skepticism toward generalized country-conditions evidence not particularized to Cruz-Arias and noted the Board’s concern that an expert author was not available for cross-examination (Granados Arias v. Garland).

3) Particular social group and nexus (“on account of”)

Even assuming “Mexican landowners and their extended family” could be a cognizable group, the case turned on nexus. Under Borjas Cruz v. Garland and Casas v. Garland, Cruz-Arias needed evidence that persecution would occur because of group membership, not merely alongside it.

The court upheld the finding that the record showed financially motivated crime: kidnappings for ransom and fear grounded in perceived wealth. Drawing on Orellana-Arias v. Sessions (quoting Dominguez-Pulido v. Lynch) and Granados Arias v. Garland, the court reiterated that “wealth, standing alone,” is not an immutable PSG characteristic, and that the applicant must show a motive “sufficiently distinct from perceived wealth.” Under Melnik v. Sessions, that requires evidence of animus toward landowners “as landowners.” Cruz-Arias lacked such proof.

The court also rejected the argument that the Board used unharmed relatives to defeat nexus; it clarified that the Board considered family safety only when assessing likelihood of future harm, not protected-ground motivation.

4) CAT—likelihood of torture and government acquiescence

For CAT, the petitioner had to show a substantial risk of torture and that torture would be inflicted with official involvement or acquiescence (Granados Arias v. Garland; Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch). The court found the claim speculative given the same deficits that undermined withholding—no individualized targeting evidence, no personal history of harm, and a fact pattern consistent with financially motivated criminality.

Applying P.A.-V. v. Bondi (citing Khan v. Filip), the court reasoned that failing to establish a clear probability of future persecution made it even harder to meet CAT’s likelihood-of-torture burden on this record. It further relied on Lenjinac v. Holder to reject generalized evidence of cartel brutality as insufficient without an individualized link, and on Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen to reject a generalized fear of corruption and gang activity as insufficient to prove acquiescence.

C. Impact

Although labeled a nonprecedential disposition, the decision reinforces several recurring Seventh Circuit themes in cartel/extortion-based claims:

  • Family-victimization is not automatically applicant-victimization: harm to relatives, even serious harm like kidnapping, will not establish the applicant’s past persecution without a tighter connection to the applicant personally (Zhou Ji Ni v. Holder; Stanojkova v. Holder).
  • Extortion/ransom narratives face a nexus hurdle: where the evidence points to perceived wealth, the applicant must produce proof of motive beyond money— e.g., hostility to landowners as such—to satisfy the protected-ground requirement (Orellana-Arias v. Sessions; Granados Arias v. Garland; Melnik v. Sessions).
  • CAT requires individualized risk and a concrete acquiescence showing: generalized cartel violence and generalized corruption do not establish that this applicant is likely to be tortured, nor that officials will knowingly breach a duty to intervene (Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch; Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen; Lenjinac v. Holder).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Withholding of removal: a form of protection requiring proof that it is more likely than not the applicant will be persecuted in the home country on a protected ground. It is harder to win than asylum and does not provide a path to permanent status.
  • Past persecution presumption: if the applicant personally suffered past persecution on a protected ground, the law presumes future persecution—shifting the burden to the government to rebut.
  • Derivative persecution: trying to prove one’s own persecution using harm inflicted on others (like relatives). Courts generally require the applicant to show harm directed at the applicant (or a legally sufficient, direct spillover), not just family tragedy.
  • Particular social group (PSG): a protected category defined by specific legal criteria. Even if a group is arguable, the applicant must still prove the persecutor’s motive is tied to that group membership.
  • Nexus (“on account of”): the “why” of the harm. If criminals act for money, that usually does not equal persecution on a protected ground without proof that the protected characteristic is a central reason for targeting.
  • CAT torture and acquiescence: CAT is not about general danger; it requires a likelihood of torture (severe, intentional pain or suffering) and requires that officials participate, consent, or knowingly fail to intervene despite awareness and a legal duty to act.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of withholding and CAT relief because Cruz-Arias’s evidence showed, at most, historic, financially motivated crimes against extended relatives and generalized cartel violence—insufficient to establish (i) past persecution of Cruz-Arias, (ii) an individualized clear probability of future persecution, (iii) a protected-ground nexus distinct from perceived wealth, or (iv) a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence. The decision illustrates the evidentiary premium placed on individualized targeting and motive in cartel/extortion-based claims.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Judge(s)

PerCuriam

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