Ramos-Hernandez v. Bondi: Limits on Economic-Status and Family-Based Particular Social Groups in Extortion-Based Asylum Claims

I. Introduction

A. The Case in Context

In Ramos-Hernandez v. Bondi, No. 25-1038 (1st Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming—without opinion—an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

The case squarely addresses a recurring pattern in Central American asylum claims: small business owners subjected to extortion and violent crime by unidentified actors (often suspected gangs), who seek protection in the United States based on:

• Alleged membership in particular social groups (PSGs) such as “Guatemalan small business owners”, and/or
• Family-based PSGs (nuclear family), and/or
• Alleged anti-gang political opinion.

The First Circuit reaffirms and sharpens two core doctrinal limits:

1. Economic-status and occupation-based groups such as “Guatemalan small business owners” are not cognizable PSGs absent specific, compelling evidence linking that characteristic to immutable identity and social distinction in the relevant society.
2. Family-based PSGs, while generally cognizable, do not satisfy the nexus requirement where the harm is motivated by economic opportunity (e.g., targeting a profitable business) rather than by animus toward the family as a family.

The decision also reiterates demanding standards for:

• Establishing an anti-gang political opinion nexus.
• Meeting the “past persecution” and “well-founded fear” thresholds.
• Overcoming the internal relocation bar.
• Satisfying the higher standards for withholding of removal and CAT protection.

B. Parties and Procedural Posture

Petitioners were:

• Edwin David Ramos-Hernandez,
• his partner and later wife Sheyly Cristabel Lopez, and
• their minor daughter D.Z.R.L.

All are Guatemalan citizens. They entered the United States on September 8, 2021 and were charged as removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) for being present without admission or parole. They conceded removability but applied for:

• Asylum (8 U.S.C. § 1158),
• Withholding of removal (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)), and
• CAT protection (8 C.F.R. § 1208.16).

The IJ conducted a merits hearing in July 2024. While noting some inconsistencies in the record, the IJ nevertheless found the petitioners credible but concluded they had not met the legal burdens for any form of relief. The BIA affirmed without opinion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), making the IJ’s decision the final agency determination. The petitioners then sought review in the First Circuit.

C. Factual Background in Brief

Lopez, a trained teacher, struggled to obtain work in Guatemala, partly due to discrimination stemming from the loss of a finger in a childhood accident. She eventually worked in her uncle’s hardware store and, in 2018, purchased the store with Ramos-Hernandez when the uncle retired.

Around 2019, the couple:

• Began receiving extortion demands:
  • A text message from an unknown number demanding payment to continue operating the store.
  • A subsequent written note also demanding payment.
• Experienced a violent attack on Ramos-Hernandez while he was riding his motorcycle:
  • Unknown assailants hit him from behind with a tree branch, knocked him unconscious, and beat him.
  • There was some inconsistency in the record about the date of this attack relative to the threats.

The couple:

• Reduced the store’s operating hours in response to the threats.
• Eventually closed the business in approximately 2019.
• Continued to live in Guatemala for roughly two years after closing the store without further incident.

They expressed generalized fears about deteriorating security conditions, criminality, and violence in Guatemala, particularly with respect to their children.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit (Judge Lynch, joined by Judges Rikelman and Howard) denied the petition for review and upheld the IJ’s decision in full, holding:

1. No cognizable particular social group (PSG): The proposed group “Guatemalan small business owners” is not a valid PSG under established First Circuit precedent because it lacks immutability and particularity, and is overly broad and economically defined.
2. No nexus for family-based PSG: Even assuming the “Lopez–Ramos-Hernandez nuclear family” is a cognizable PSG, the evidence showed that any harm was based on the petitioners’ operation of a successful business, not on animus toward the family as such, so the required causal nexus was absent.
3. No anti-gang political opinion nexus: The petitioners failed to demonstrate that any persecutor knew of, or targeted them because of, an actual or imputed anti-gang political opinion. Private refusal to pay extortion and filing police reports did not suffice.
4. No past persecution: The incidents—two or three threats and one physical attack with an unclear motive—did not rise to the “fairly high threshold of seriousness” and regularity needed to constitute persecution.
5. No well-founded fear of future persecution:
   • There was inadequate evidence of a reasonable possibility of future, individualized persecution—especially given the two-year incident-free period after closing the store.
   • The petitioners failed to show they could not reasonably relocate within Guatemala.
6. Withholding of removal necessarily fails: Because the petitioners could not satisfy the lower burden for asylum, they necessarily failed the higher “clear probability” standard for withholding.
7. CAT protection denied: The record did not show it was more likely than not they would face torture, much less with government involvement or acquiescence. Their safe residence post-closure and lack of specific evidence of state complicity were fatal to the CAT claim.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review and Deference

Because the BIA affirmed without opinion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), the court, following Alvarado-Reyes v. Garland, 118 F.4th 462, 470 (1st Cir. 2024), treated the IJ’s opinion as the final agency decision.

The opinion reiterates:

• Factual findings (e.g., whether persecution occurred, the likelihood of future harm, nexus to a protected ground) are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard:

  “We apply the deferential substantial evidence standard to the IJ's factual findings, upholding them ‘unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” (quoting Alves v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 297, 298 (1st Cir. 2025), in turn quoting Singh v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008)).

  This tracks the Supreme Court’s teaching in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992): the reviewing court may reverse only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.
• Legal conclusions (e.g., whether a proposed PSG is cognizable under the INA) are reviewed de novo. See Ramos-Gutierrez v. Garland, 110 F.4th 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2024).

This deferential framework is critical: even sympathetic or plausible alternative views of the evidence do not permit reversal unless the record commands a different result.

B. Asylum: Protected Grounds and Particular Social Groups

1. Legal Framework

To qualify as a “refugee” for asylum purposes under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), an applicant must show:

• Persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
• On account of one of five protected grounds:
  • race,
  • religion,
  • nationality,
  • membership in a particular social group, or
  • political opinion.

The court follows Esteban-Garcia v. Garland, 94 F.4th 186, 191 (1st Cir. 2024), which distilled the three elements of “persecution”:

1. A threshold level of past or anticipated serious harm;
2. A nexus between that harm and government action or inaction (e.g., inability or unwillingness to control persecutors); and
3. A causal connection (“on account of”) to one of the five protected grounds.

The “nexus” requirement is further sharpened by the statutory “one central reason” standard, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), as elaborated in Montoya-Lopez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 71, 80 (1st Cir. 2023).

2. The Proposed PSG: “Guatemalan Small Business Owners”

The petitioners advanced “Guatemalan small business owners” as a PSG. Under Sanchez v. Garland, 74 F.4th 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2023), a cognizable PSG must:

1. Share a common immutable characteristic;
2. Be defined with particularity; and
3. Be socially distinct in the relevant society.

Immutability is the key sticking point. A characteristic can be “constructively immutable” even if changeable in theory, when individuals “should not be required to change [it] because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.” Montoya-Lopez, 80 F.4th at 82.

The court relied heavily on recent First Circuit precedent:

• Cabrera v. Garland, 100 F.4th 312, 322 (1st Cir. 2024): Petitioners claiming to be “small business owners” in Guatemala failed to establish that business ownership was fundamental to identity; the record contained “exactly zero evidence” on that point.
• Sanchez v. Garland, 74 F.4th at 6: The group “Salvadoran business owners perceived as wealthy” was held non-cognizable.
• Hernandez-Martinez v. Garland, 59 F.4th 33, 37–39 (1st Cir. 2023): The group “business owners in Guatemala who have a high profit” was also held invalid as a PSG.

In Ramos-Hernandez, the panel concluded that “Guatemalan small business owners” is not “meaningfully different” from these previously rejected, economically defined groups. It emphasized:

• Lack of immutability:

  “[B]usiness ownership can change without impacting identity.”

  The petitioners had, in fact, closed the hardware store after the extortion began, undermining any claim that business ownership was a characteristic they could not or should not change.
• Lack of particularity and over-breadth: The group “seemingly includes all small business owners [in Guatemala] of many ages and backgrounds” and is “vaguely defined.”

Lopez argued that business ownership was core to her identity because:

• It enabled her to overcome discrimination related to her missing finger.
• The hardware store was a “family business.”

But the court held the record did not compel that conclusion. It stressed:

• She had obtained a teaching certification and had originally sought to work as a teacher.
• In the United States she found work in a daycare and as a house cleaner.

Thus, being a small business owner did not appear fundamental or essential to her identity in the way, for example, religion or kinship would.

The petitioners also argued that their decision to keep the store open in the face of threats showed how integral business ownership was to their identity. The court described this as “circular,” noting they in fact closed the business “shortly after the extortion began.”

3. The Family-Based PSG: “Lopez–Ramos-Hernandez Nuclear Family”

Nuclear family is generally recognized as a classic, cognizable PSG. The IJ and the court did not dispute that a “nuclear family” can qualify. But both emphasized a distinct requirement: nexus. It is not enough that:

• A valid family-based PSG exists, and
• Members of that family have been harmed.

Rather, the family relationship must be “at the root of the harm” such that:

• Persecutors target the person because she is part of that family, or
• Family status is “one central reason” for the harm, not merely incidental or coincidental.

Here, the IJ and the First Circuit found the evidence showed the family was targeted for extortion because:

“[T]he family was extorted because they operated a successful hardware business, not because of kinship itself.”

Lopez’s own testimony reinforced this understanding: her concerns about return focused on “a lot of attacks happening” and “a lot of violence” in Guatemala generally—not on any special persecution of the Lopez–Ramos-Hernandez family.

The court grounded this in prior decisions:

• Cano v. Bondi, 152 F.4th 237, 247 (1st Cir. 2025): No nexus where the petitioner was threatened by gangs because her father ran a successful business, not due to family membership as such.
• Perlera-Sola v. Holder, 699 F.3d 572, 576 (1st Cir. 2012): Family-based persecution claim failed where “multiple family members happen to be persecuted for a common reason but the animus [was] not kinship.”

Thus, the case emphasizes a key doctrinal point: economic targeting of a family unit does not automatically satisfy the family-based PSG nexus requirement. The motive (here, economic extortion) must be distinguished from any independent hostility toward the family relationship.

4. Political Opinion: Anti-Gang Resistance

The petitioners also invoked an alleged anti-gang political opinion. They characterized their refusal to pay extortion and their reports to the police as expressions of such a view.

The First Circuit reaffirmed strict requirements for political-opinion-based asylum, drawing on Urgilez Mendez v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 566, 571 (1st Cir. 2018), and Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010):

“[W]e have required, at a minimum, ‘evidence that the would-be persecutors knew of the [political] beliefs and targeted the belief holder for that reason.’”

In this case:

• The petitioners had not publicly expressed any anti-gang political views; their resistance was private.
• The only “expression” was reporting the extortion to police—conduct held in Urgilez Mendez to be insufficient, standing alone, to establish persecution on account of political opinion.
• Crucially, petitioners did not even know the identity of the extortionists or assailants, making it impossible to show that those actors:
  • knew of the petitioners’ alleged political beliefs; and
  • targeted them because of those beliefs.

As in other gang-related extortion cases, the court rejected an attempt to bootstrap common criminal extortion into political persecution absent concrete evidence of political motive or awareness.

C. Asylum: Past Persecution

Having rejected the protected-ground theories, the court nevertheless addressed whether the harm rose to the level of “persecution.”

The First Circuit has long distinguished persecution from lesser harms:

• Santos Garcia v. Garland, 67 F.4th 455, 461 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Nelson v. INS, 232 F.3d 258, 263 (1st Cir. 2000)):

  “Persecution goes beyond ‘unpleasantness, harassment, and even basic suffering.’”

• Martínez-Pérez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 33, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2018), quoting Alibeaj v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 2006):

  “[T]he discriminatory experiences must have reached a fairly high threshold of seriousness, as well as [occurred with] some regularity and frequency.”

In Ramos-Hernandez, the harm consisted of:

• Two to three vague threats of extortion (via text and note); and
• One attack on Ramos-Hernandez:
  • The attack caused loss of consciousness and required emergency assistance.
  • However, the record was unclear as to:
    • Its exact timing relative to the extortion demands; and
    • The motive (no clear evidence it was linked to the extortion or to any protected ground).

The court emphasized the IJ “had reason to believe that the attack … was not necessarily related to the prior extortion,” given inconsistencies in timing and the lack of evidence about motive.

The First Circuit compared these facts to prior, more severe cases where it still found no past persecution:

• Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005): Two police beatings and death threats, including one resulting in loss of consciousness and hospitalization, did not amount to persecution.
• Gilca v. Holder, 680 F.3d 109, 115 (1st Cir. 2012): Past persecution was rejected where there was no established linkage between verbal threats and an incident of physical violence.

Against that backdrop, the court held substantial evidence supported the IJ’s conclusion that the record demonstrated only:

“Sporadic mistreatment on a couple of isolated events.”

Thus, the petitioners failed to show “past persecution.”

D. Asylum: Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution and Internal Relocation

1. Well-Founded Fear Standard

Without past persecution, the petitioners could not benefit from the rebuttable presumption of future persecution under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). They therefore had to independently establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.

The First Circuit, citing Sunarto Ang v. Holder, 723 F.3d 6, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2013) and Sugiarto v. Holder, 586 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 2009), reiterated that this requires:

• A subjectively genuine fear; and
• An objectively reasonable fear—i.e., a reasonable person in the applicant’s circumstances would fear persecution.

Objective reasonableness may be shown by:

• “Credible, direct, and specific evidence” of individualized risk; or
• Evidence of a “pattern or practice” of persecution of a group of persons “similarly situated” to the applicant on account of a protected ground (8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)), as explained in Decky v. Holder, 587 F.3d 104, 112 (1st Cir. 2009).

The court held that:

• The petitioners had closed the store, the apparent basis for the extortion.
• They remained in Guatemala for about two years after closure without incident.

On this record, there was insufficient “credible, direct, and specific” evidence of a continuing, individualized threat.

Nor could they show a “pattern or practice” of persecution of a similarly situated protected group, because:

• The proposed PSG (“Guatemalan small business owners”) was legally invalid; and
• They had not proven nexus between any harm and a valid PSG or political opinion.

2. Internal Relocation

Even if a petitioner has a well-founded fear in some part of the country, asylum may still be denied if they can reasonably and safely relocate internally.

Because the petitioners did not establish past persecution, they carried the burden to show relocation would be unreasonable. See Camara v. Holder, 725 F.3d 11, 15 n.3 (1st Cir. 2013).

The First Circuit framed the question under Caz v. Garland, 84 F.4th 22, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2023):

“The question we must answer is not whether the record included any evidence suggesting [the petitioners] could not relocate safely within Guatemala…. The question is whether a reasonable factfinder, having considered all the evidence, would be compelled to conclude that [they] could not safely relocate within Guatemala.”

The court underscored that:

• The family continued to live in Guatemala for over a year (indeed, approximately two years) after the threats and attack without incident.
• They did not know who had threatened or attacked them, weakening the claim that such unknown perpetrators could track them elsewhere in the country.
• They offered only generalized evidence of crime, corruption, and violence in Guatemala, not specific evidence showing why relocation would be unsafe for them personally.
  • This echoes Amouri v. Holder, 572 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2009), where generalized country reports did not override petitioner-specific facts.

The court also cited Chen Qin v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2016), noting that unimpeded movement or residence in other parts of the home country tends to show that safe internal relocation is possible.

Under the deferential substantial evidence standard, the First Circuit held the IJ was entitled to find that petitioners had not shown that internal relocation in Guatemala would be unreasonable or unsafe.

E. Withholding of Removal

Withholding of removal requires a higher burden than asylum: the applicant must show a “clear probability” of persecution—i.e., that it is more likely than not that they would suffer persecution on account of a protected ground if returned. See, e.g., López-Pérez v. Garland, 26 F.4th 104, 111 (1st Cir. 2022).

The First Circuit applied its well-established rule:

“[A] noncitizen who cannot meet the lower asylum standard will necessarily fail to make out a counterpart claim under the higher standard for withholding of removal.”

Because the petitioners failed on both:

• Protected-ground nexus, and
• The lower “well-founded fear” threshold for asylum,

the withholding claims were necessarily rejected as well.

F. Convention Against Torture (CAT) Protection

For CAT relief, the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that:

• They are more likely than not to be subjected to torture if returned; and
• Such torture would be inflicted by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official. See Perez-Trujillo v. Garland, 3 F.4th 10, 18 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2014)).

The IJ—and the First Circuit—found:

• No “objectively reasonable basis” to conclude that the petitioners would face serious harm on return, let alone torture.
• Their ability to live peacefully for more than a year after closing the business strongly undercut any prediction of future torture.
• They had not shown that any future harm would involve:
  • severe pain or suffering rising to the level of torture, or
  • government officials’ authorization, support, or willful blindness.

The court further noted that the same internal relocation analysis that undermined the asylum claim also weighed against CAT relief. If petitioners can relocate safely within Guatemala, it is difficult to say they are “more likely than not” to be tortured anywhere in the country.

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Jurisprudence on Review and Deference

• Alvarado-Reyes v. Garland, 118 F.4th 462 (1st Cir. 2024):
  • Clarifies that when the BIA affirms without opinion, courts review the IJ’s decision as if it were the BIA’s.
• Alves v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 297 (1st Cir. 2025); Singh v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008):
  • Reiterate the “compelled to conclude to the contrary” standard for overturning agency fact-finding.
• Montoya-Lopez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 71 (1st Cir. 2023); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992):
  • Confirm the high threshold for reversing the BIA on factual issues, including nexus and persecution.
• Ramos-Gutierrez v. Garland, 110 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2024):
  • Recognizes that PSG cognizability and other legal interpretations are reviewed de novo.

B. Persecution Elements and Protected Grounds

• Esteban-Garcia v. Garland, 94 F.4th 186 (1st Cir. 2024); Aguilar-De Guillen v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2018):
  • Provide the three-element framework for proving persecution and emphasize that failure to establish any one element is fatal to the asylum claim.
• Sanchez v. Garland, 74 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2023); Hernandez-Martinez v. Garland, 59 F.4th 33 (1st Cir. 2023); Cabrera v. Garland, 100 F.4th 312 (1st Cir. 2024):
  • These cases collectively form a robust line holding that groups defined primarily by economic activity, perceived wealth, or business ownership in Central America are typically not cognizable PSGs.
  • Ramos-Hernandez explicitly situates “Guatemalan small business owners” within this disfavored category.
• Montoya-Lopez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 71 (1st Cir. 2023):
  • Clarifies the refined PSG standard, including when changeable characteristics can be treated as immutable because they are fundamental to identity or conscience.
• Cano v. Bondi, 152 F.4th 237 (1st Cir. 2025); Perlera-Sola v. Holder, 699 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 2012):
  • Anchor the court’s approach to family-based PSG claims: multiple family members suffering similar harm does not, by itself, show that the harm was “on account of” family membership.
• Urgilez Mendez v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 566 (1st Cir. 2018); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2010):
  • Set the bar for political-opinion nexus: persecutors must know and act because of the political view.
  • Ramos-Hernandez uses these to reject the anti-gang political opinion theory.

C. Severity of Harm, Future Fear, and Relocation

• Santos Garcia v. Garland, 67 F.4th 455 (1st Cir. 2023); Nelson v. INS, 232 F.3d 258 (1st Cir. 2000); Martínez-Pérez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2018); Alibeaj v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 188 (1st Cir. 2006):
  • Define persecution as requiring a “fairly high threshold of seriousness” and frequency, beyond harassment and basic suffering.
• Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257 (1st Cir. 2005); Gilca v. Holder, 680 F.3d 109 (1st Cir. 2012):
  • Demonstrate that even significant physical harm and threats can fall short of persecution, especially where motive and linkage are unclear.
• Sunarto Ang v. Holder, 723 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2013); Sugiarto v. Holder, 586 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2009); Decky v. Holder, 587 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2009):
  • Explain the subjective/objective components of “well-founded fear” and the path to demonstrating a pattern or practice of persecution.
• Caz v. Garland, 84 F.4th 22 (1st Cir. 2023); Camara v. Holder, 725 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2013); Chen Qin v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2016):
  • Shape the court’s approach to internal relocation: the burden of proof, the relevance of unimpeded residence or movement, and how appellate courts assess whether the record compels a contrary result.

D. Higher Burdens for Withholding and CAT

• López-Pérez v. Garland, 26 F.4th 104 (1st Cir. 2022):
  • Confirms that failure to meet the asylum standard necessarily defeats withholding claims under the higher “clear probability” standard.
• Perez-Trujillo v. Garland, 3 F.4th 10 (1st Cir. 2021); Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2014):
  • Articulate the CAT standard: more-likely-than-not torture, plus government involvement or acquiescence.
• Amouri v. Holder, 572 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2009):
  • Warns that country condition reports do not automatically control over individualized evidence—relevant both for asylum and CAT.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Extortion-Based Central American Asylum Claims

Ramos-Hernandez reinforces a clear trajectory in the First Circuit: asylum claims based on:

• Extortion,
• Business ownership, and
• Generalized gang or criminal violence,

will face significant hurdles unless the applicant can:

1. Anchor the harm to a valid PSG or political opinion; and
2. Produce concrete evidence that the persecutor’s central motive was that protected characteristic, not opportunistic crime.

The repeated rejection of “business owner” and “perceived wealth” PSGs means that, for many Guatemalan and Salvadoran applicants, the favored litigation strategy must shift away from generic “small business owner” framing. Applicants will need:

• More nuanced, country-specific evidence of social distinction and immutability if they press PSGs involving economic roles; or
• Alternative theories (e.g., particular family-based persecution, or politically salient opposition to gangs) supported by specific, compelling evidence of persecutor motive and awareness.

B. Family-Based PSGs: Nexus Clarified

While nuclear family remains a paradigmatic PSG, Ramos-Hernandez, read alongside Cano and Perlera-Sola, clarifies that:

• The existence of a valid family PSG does not by itself satisfy asylum’s nexus requirement.
• When a family is targeted as a convenient vehicle for extortion (e.g., due to owning a lucrative business), the protected ground (family) is not usually “one central reason” for the harm.

Practitioners must therefore:

• Develop evidence that persecutors expressed hostility to the family as such (e.g., threats referencing the family name, history of inter-family conflict, or political prominence of the family) rather than mere financial opportunism.
• Distinguish extortion of a family from persecution of a family as a social identity.

C. Anti-Gang Political Opinion Claims

The decision underscores the First Circuit’s skepticism toward political-opinion theories in ordinary gang extortion scenarios:

• Mere refusal to pay extortion is usually seen as economic resistance, not political expression.
• Where the persecutor’s identity is unknown, it is particularly difficult to prove the required knowledge and motive regarding political beliefs.

Going forward, applicants asserting anti-gang political opinion will need:

• Evidence of:
  • Public denunciations of gangs;
  • Involvement in anti-gang or civic organizations; or
  • Explicit statements by persecutors referencing politics or ideology.
• Testimony or corroboration showing that the persecutors knew of, and acted because of, these political stances.

D. Internal Relocation as a Recurrent Barrier

Internal relocation has become a powerful tool for the government in opposing asylum, particularly in countries with regionalized violence. Ramos-Hernandez illustrates:

• Petitioners’ ability to remain unharmed in the same country—even in the same locality—after initial harm can be decisive.
• General country conditions evidence (crime, corruption, violence) will rarely suffice to overcome a demonstrated period of safe residence or to show nationwide risk.

Applicants must therefore be prepared to:

• Explain why their persecutors can and will track them anywhere in the country; and
• Show why relocation would be unduly harsh, unsafe, or impossible (e.g., due to state-level or national persecution, targeted surveillance, or pervasive control by the persecutor).

E. Effect on Withholding and CAT Practice

The decision reinforces a practical reality: in the First Circuit, asylum remains the gateway. If an applicant fails at the asylum stage for lack of:

• Protected ground nexus,
• Persecution severity, or
• Future risk,

it will be exceptionally difficult to prevail on withholding (higher threshold) or CAT (different, but demanding, standard) on the same underlying facts. Litigators may need to:

• Develop distinct theory and evidence for CAT—focused on torture and government acquiescence—if they hope to succeed where asylum fails.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Asylum vs. Withholding of Removal vs. CAT

• Asylum:
  • Discretionary relief.
  • Standard: “Well-founded fear” of persecution (roughly a 10–20% chance can satisfy this) on account of a protected ground.
  • If granted, can lead to lawful permanent residence and a path to citizenship.
• Withholding of Removal:
  • Mandatory if the standard is met.
  • Standard: “Clear probability” (more likely than not) of persecution on account of a protected ground if removed.
  • More limited benefits: employment authorization and protection from removal to a particular country, but no direct path to a green card.
• CAT Protection:
  • Purely about torture, not about protected grounds.
  • Standard: More likely than not the person will be tortured, and that torture would involve government actors or occur with their acquiescence.
  • Remedy is protection from removal to the country where torture is likely; no asylum-like status.

B. Particular Social Group (PSG)

PSG is a flexible but tightly policed category. To qualify, a group must:

1. Share a characteristic that is immutable or so fundamental that members should not be forced to change it (e.g., family ties, gender, sexual orientation; sometimes occupation if truly core to identity).
2. Be defined with particularity: not vague or overly broad; the group’s boundaries must be clear.
3. Be socially distinct: society at large must recognize the group as a distinct set of persons.

In Ramos-Hernandez, “Guatemalan small business owners” failed mainly on immutability and particularity.

C. Nexus and “One Central Reason”

“Nexus” asks: Why did the persecutor harm the applicant? Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), a protected ground must be “at least one central reason for the harm alleged.” This means:

• It need not be the only reason, but must be more than incidental or tangential.
• Economic motives (extortion, theft) usually do not satisfy nexus, unless intertwined with a protected ground (e.g., targeting a group because of ethnicity and also for financial gain).

D. Past Persecution vs. Well-Founded Fear

• Past persecution:
  • Must involve serious, repeated, or particularly severe harm—beyond harassment or transient threats.
  • If proven, raises a presumption of future persecution.
• Well-founded fear:
  • Can be established without past persecution.
  • Requires both genuine (subjective) fear and an objectively reasonable likelihood of persecution in the future.

E. Internal Relocation

Even if a person faces danger in one part of their country, asylum can be denied if they can safely move to another region where:

• The persecutor does not have reach or interest in pursuing them; and
• Relocation is not unduly harsh (considering factors like family, language, employment prospects, and regional conditions).

Who bears the burden on relocation depends on whether past persecution is established:

• If past persecution is proven: The government generally must show safe internal relocation is possible.
• If not: The applicant must prove relocation would be unreasonable or unsafe.

“Torture” under CAT is:

• Severe physical or mental pain or suffering,
• Intentionally inflicted,
• For a specific purpose (e.g., punishment, coercion, intimidation),
• By or with the consent, acquiescence, or willful blindness of a public official.

Private criminal violence, even severe, does not meet CAT’s requirements unless the state is complicit or deliberately indifferent.

VII. Conclusion

Ramos-Hernandez v. Bondi is a significant reaffirmation of First Circuit doctrine on asylum and related protections in the context of Central American extortion and gang-related violence. It firmly:

• Continues the line of cases rejecting economically defined PSGs such as “Guatemalan small business owners.”
• Clarifies that family-based PSGs require specific proof of familial animus, not just harm shared among family members for economic reasons.
• Confirms strict standards for anti-gang political-opinion claims, demanding clear evidence of persecutor knowledge and political motive.
• Applies a high threshold for both past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution, particularly where post-incident residence in the home country has been safe.
• Demonstrates the decisive role internal relocation and deferential fact review play in sustaining agency denials of relief.

For practitioners and applicants alike, the decision underscores the need for:

• Precise PSG formulation supported by robust, country-specific evidence of immutability, particularity, and social distinction;
• Detailed, credible proof of persecutor motive and awareness of any protected characteristics;
• Strong, individualized evidence to overcome internal relocation and establish likelihood of future harm or torture.

In the broader legal landscape, Ramos-Hernandez continues the First Circuit’s trend of constraining the asylum system’s reach in cases rooted in widespread criminality and economic extortion, reserving protection for situations where there is a demonstrable, central link between the harm feared and the statutorily protected grounds identified by Congress.