Raising a Reasonable Inference: Standards for Third-Party Perpetrator Evidence and Harmless-Error Review in Morgan v. State

Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Morgan v. State, decided May 6, 2025. The case arises from the October 15, 2018 fatal shooting of Sabron Mosby and the aggravated assault of Donoven King in Bacon County, Georgia. Defendant Deangelo Deshawn Morgan was tried separately from co-indicted friends Cleavanta Jerrideau and Glenn Darius Smith, both later acquitted. At Morgan’s October 2023 trial, the jury found him guilty of malice murder and aggravated assault. He received a life sentence (with parole eligibility) for the murder and a consecutive twenty-year term for assault. On appeal, Morgan challenged (1) the exclusion of drug-related evidence and third-party-perpetrator evidence, and (2) the effectiveness of his trial counsel in failing to admit that excluded evidence and advising him not to testify. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court addressed two principal issues:

Evidentiary Exclusions: Morgan argued the trial court abused its discretion by excluding (a) evidence suggesting the shooting was drug-related—specifically, untested “suspected drugs” found in Mosby’s pockets and drugs and firearms seized at co-indicttee Smith’s residence—and (b) evidence implicating other suspects (Devante Batton’s incarceration on an unrelated murder charge and witnesses' testimony about Jerrideau and Smith disposing of weapons).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Morgan claimed his lawyer was constitutionally deficient by failing to pursue admission of the excluded evidence (and to seek immediate review) and by advising him not to testify.

The Court held:

Any error in excluding the untested drug evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the strong DNA evidence (Morgan’s DNA on the clown mask) and his own confessions.
The trial court properly applied the Klinect test (now embodied in OCGA § 24-4-401) in excluding third-party-perpetrator evidence that did not raise a “reasonable inference” of Morgan’s innocence nor directly connect another person to the corpus delicti.
Morgan’s counsel did not perform deficiently under Strickland v. Washington by declining to pursue unspecified arguments or by advising Morgan not to testify after weighing credibility risks.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed Morgan’s convictions and sentences.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Klinect v. State (269 Ga. 570 (1998)): Established the test for admitting evidence that another person committed the charged crime. Under this test, proffered evidence must (1) raise a reasonable inference of the defendant’s innocence, and (2) directly connect the third party to the corpus delicti unless the third party committed a similar crime in the recent past.
Roberts v. State (315 Ga. 229 (2022)): Clarified that “intrinsic evidence” completes the story of the crime and may be admissible when inextricably intertwined with the charged offense.
Jivens v. State (317 Ga. 859 (2023)), Wilson v. State (319 Ga. 550 (2024)), and Jones v. State (315 Ga. 177 (2022)): Reaffirmed Georgia’s harmless-error standard under OCGA § 24-4-403, emphasizing reversal only if it is not “highly probable” the error did not contribute to the verdict.
Pittman v. State (318 Ga. 819 (2024)): Reinforced that speculative evidence of third-party guilt is inadmissible because it fails to raise a reasonable inference of the defendant’s innocence.
Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668 (1984)): Set forth the two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel—deficiency and prejudice.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds in two major strands:

Exclusion of Drug and Third-Party Evidence:
- The untested drug residue in Mosby’s pockets was irrelevant to motive or identity and risked unfair prejudice under OCGA § 24-4-403. Given Morgan’s own admissions and DNA on the mask, any error was harmless.
- Evidence suggesting Batton’s unrelated murder charge and testimony about co-defendants disposing of weapons failed the Klinect threshold. Neither established a link between another person and the killing of Mosby, nor did they raise a reasonable inference that Morgan was innocent.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:
- Counsel’s failure to advance unspecified additional arguments or to seek immediate review of evidentiary rulings was not shown to be objectively unreasonable. Morgan did not identify the unmade arguments.
- Counsel’s advice that Morgan not testify was a strategic decision made after weighing credibility risks—including contradictory alibi evidence—and did not fall below professional norms.

Impact

Morgan v. State reinforces and clarifies several important points in Georgia criminal practice:

Third-Party Perpetrator Evidence: Defendants must satisfy the Klinect standard under the current Evidence Code. Mere suspicion or unconnected wrongdoing by others is insufficient. Trial judges will continue to exclude speculative evidence.
Harmless-Error Doctrine: Georgia courts will uphold convictions when properly excluded evidence would have had minimal impact in light of compelling inculpatory proof.
Ineffective Assistance Claims: Strategic choices—like advising against testimony—will seldom satisfy Strickland unless shown to be patently unreasonable or prejudicial.

Future litigants should ensure that proffered third-party evidence includes specific facts linking another individual to the crime scene or method of killing. Defense counsel should preserve objections and articulate on the record any alternative arguments to enhance chances of immediate appellate review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Corpus delicti”: The “body of the crime”—evidence that the crime actually occurred.
Klinect Test: A two-part rule for admitting “someone else did it” evidence: (1) it must create a reasonable inference the defendant didn’t do it, and (2) it must directly connect the third party to the crime. Otherwise, it is excluded as speculation.
OCGA § 24-4-403: Provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Harmless-Error Standard: A conviction will stand if it is “highly probable” that an exclusionary error did not contribute to the guilty verdict.
Strickland Two-Prong Test: (1) Deficiency: Lawyer’s performance falls below objective norms. (2) Prejudice: There is a reasonable probability that, without the deficiency, the outcome would differ.

Conclusion

Morgan v. State solidifies Georgia’s evidentiary boundaries for third-party-perpetrator proof and underscores the rigorous application of harmless-error review. It affirms that untested, marginally relevant evidence and speculative pointers to other suspects cannot undermine strong DNA or confession evidence. On ineffective assistance claims, the decision affirms the deference afforded to reasonable strategic choices by counsel. Together, these principles will guide trial and appellate courts in evaluating evidentiary disputes and post-conviction challenges, ensuring both fairness and finality in the criminal justice system.