Rademacher v. State – North Dakota Supreme Court Clarifies the Evidentiary Burden for Post-Conviction Ineffective-Assistance Claims Involving Unobtained Expert Evaluations

Introduction

Steven Charles Rademacher petitioned for post-conviction relief after his 2019 convictions for murder, attempted murder, and terrorizing were affirmed on direct appeal. He alleged that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in two respects:

Failing to secure a complete examination of his truck’s brake system to support a theory that the brakes were tampered with;
Failing to obtain an independent psychiatric evaluation on criminal responsibility, beyond the evaluation performed by the North Dakota State Hospital (NDSH).

The district court denied relief; the North Dakota Supreme Court (Bahr, J.) affirmed. While the Court faulted the district court for conflating “fitness to proceed” with “criminal responsibility,” it nevertheless upheld the judgment, holding that Rademacher failed to produce any evidence of prejudice—an indispensable component under Strickland v. Washington. The decision crystallises a key post-conviction principle: an applicant who faults counsel for not securing expert testing or evaluation must introduce concrete evidence—such as affidavits or testimony—showing what the expert would have said and how it would probably have changed the outcome.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The Court reviewed the ineffective-assistance claims under the familiar two-prong Strickland test.
2. On the brake-examination issue, the Court upheld the district court’s factual finding that no evidence pointed to brake failure and that counsel’s decision not to pursue that avenue was objectively reasonable.
3. On the psychiatric-evaluation issue, the Court observed that the district court misidentified the legal question (it analysed a second fitness evaluation rather than a second criminal-responsibility evaluation). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court affirmed because Rademacher failed to satisfy the prejudice prong: he offered no evidence that a second examiner would have supported a lack-of-responsibility defence.
4. The Court emphasised that mere speculation (“a second opinion might help”) does not meet post-conviction burdens; applicants must supply affidavits, testimony or other proof of the expert opinion allegedly forgone.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – foundational two-prong test (deficient performance + prejudice).
Urrabazo v. State, 2024 ND 67 – summarises standard of review for post-conviction proceedings.
Hunter v. State, 2020 ND 224 – reiterates “high bar” for Strickland claims and court’s discretion to address the easier prong.
Johnson v. State, 2006 ND 122 – petitioner entitled to one competent mental evaluation at public expense; second evaluation discretionary.
Lindeman v. State, 2024 ND 228 – failure to present evidence of prejudice (expert testimony) is dispositive.
Schlickenmayer, 364 N.W.2d 108 (N.D. 1985) – conclusory allegations about uncalled witnesses insufficient.
Other supportive precedents: Chisholm v. State, Almklov v. State, Matthews v. State, etc., all requiring concrete evidence of prejudice.

Legal Reasoning

Deficient-performance analysis (prong one):
- Brake issue: Counsel’s performance deemed reasonable because (a) Rademacher never raised brake concerns pre-trial, (b) objective evidence—his own driving maneuvers—contradicted brake failure, and (c) counsel testified he had no factual basis to pursue that line.
- Psychiatric evaluation: The district court mishandled the issue by focusing on “fitness” rather than “responsibility,” but the Supreme Court did not decide deficiency because it could resolve the appeal on prejudice grounds.
Prejudice analysis (prong two):
The crux of the opinion. To show prejudice from the absence of a second criminal-responsibility evaluation, Rademacher needed something beyond speculation—e.g., an affidavit from a psychiatrist outlining a likely opinion, or empirical data supporting insanity/diminished-capacity. He produced nothing. Following Lindeman and earlier cases, the Court held that a naked assertion that a second expert “might” help cannot undermine confidence in the verdict.
Appellate affirmation on alternative grounds:
Even though the district court’s findings were inadequate on the first prong, the Supreme Court can affirm if the result is correct on other grounds (“right-result, wrong-reason” doctrine).

Impact of the Decision

Heightened evidentiary expectation: Post-conviction applicants in North Dakota must now anticipate that any ineffective-assistance claim premised on uncalled experts or unrequested examinations will fail unless supported by specific, admissible evidence of the missing expert’s favorable opinion.
District-court practice: Trial judges reviewing post-conviction petitions should explicitly identify each Strickland prong and make fact-findings accordingly, yet the Supreme Court’s willingness to affirm on prejudice alone encourages efficiency where the record is patently devoid of such evidence.
Criminal-defence counsel strategy: Defence lawyers gain reaffirmation that strategic decisions not to seek further testing are usually protected if based on reasonable investigation and client consultation.
Clarification between “fitness” and “responsibility”: Although the Court noted the district court’s confusion, it signalled that litigants must plead and prove these are distinct concepts and supply separate evidentiary support.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Fitness to Proceed vs. Criminal Responsibility
• Fitness (Competency) asks: Is the defendant presently able to understand proceedings and assist counsel?
• Criminal Responsibility (Insanity/Lack of Responsibility) asks: At the time of the offense, could the defendant appreciate the wrongfulness of the act or conform behaviour to the law?
Strickland Two-Prong Test
1. Deficient Performance: Did counsel’s conduct fall below professional norms?
2. Prejudice: Is there a reasonable probability the outcome would have differed but for the deficiency?
Right-result, wrong-reason doctrine
An appellate court may affirm a decision even if the lower court applied faulty reasoning, provided the outcome is sustainable on a correct legal ground evident in the record.

Conclusion

Rademacher’s appeal illustrates a recurring lesson in post-conviction jurisprudence: speculation is no substitute for proof. Even when a district court mislabels legal concepts or offers sparse findings, an applicant must still carry the heavy Strickland burden, particularly on the prejudice prong. The North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision reaffirms that:

An attorney’s strategic omission (here, not obtaining additional expert evaluations) will rarely be deemed unreasonable if grounded in facts and client consultation.
Absent concrete evidence—affidavits, testimony, reports—showing what an unobtained expert would have said, the prejudice prong fails as a matter of law.

Rademacher v. State therefore stands as a stern reminder to post-conviction applicants and their counsel: prepare a robust evidentiary record or risk summary defeat, regardless of perceived errors below. The ruling fortifies the stability of convictions against speculative ineffective-assistance claims and sharpens the evidentiary expectations in North Dakota habeas practice.