Quo Warranto Is the Exclusive Vehicle to Remove a Committee-Appointed Township Trustee; Probate Judge’s Duty to Appoint under R.C. 503.24 Arises Only When a Vacancy Exists

Case: State ex rel. Jennewine v. Puffenberger, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-3041 (Supreme Court of Ohio, Aug. 28, 2025)

Author: Per Curiam (Kennedy, C.J., Fischer, DeWine, Brunner, Deters, Hawkins, and Shanahan, JJ., concurring)

Remedy Sought: Mandamus (and initially procedendo and quo warranto, later dismissed)

Disposition: Writ of mandamus denied

Introduction

This case arises out of a contested appointment to a Sylvania Township trustee seat under Ohio Revised Code 503.24. After a trustee resigned, the remaining trustees did not fill the vacancy within 30 days. Appointment authority therefore shifted to the “committee of five” identified on the last-filed nominating petition of the former trustee. Two of three participating committee members voted to appoint Jill Johnson, who then took the oath, posted bond, and began serving.

Relator John Jennewine, an elected Sylvania Township trustee, claimed the committee failed to comply with R.C. 503.24 and asked the Supreme Court of Ohio to issue a writ of mandamus compelling Lucas County Probate Judge Jack Puffenberger to appoint someone to the seat. The central legal issues were:

Whether mandamus can be used to compel a probate judge to appoint a township trustee under R.C. 503.24 when a committee appointee is already serving.
Whether the alleged defects in the committee’s process create a “vacancy” triggering the judge’s duty to appoint.
What is the proper remedy to challenge the right of the appointee to hold the office—mandamus or quo warranto?

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of mandamus. The Court held:

Quo warranto is the exclusive remedy to challenge a person’s right to hold public office (¶ 12).
Even if the committee did not strictly comply with R.C. 503.24, Johnson is at least a de facto officer because she took the oath, posted bond, and has been performing trustee duties (¶¶ 10–12). Her removal can be pursued only through quo warranto brought by the attorney general, a county prosecutor, or a person asserting a personal claim to the office (R.C. 2733.05, 2733.06; ¶ 13).
The probate judge’s statutory duty to appoint under R.C. 503.24 is contingent on the existence of an actual vacancy. Because Johnson occupies the seat, there is no vacancy; therefore, no clear legal duty exists for the judge to appoint, and mandamus will not lie (¶¶ 14–16).

Statutory Framework: R.C. 503.24’s Appointment Chain

R.C. 503.24 prescribes a cascading appointment mechanism for township trustee vacancies:

Within 30 days, the remaining trustees must appoint a qualified elector to the vacancy.
If they fail, a majority of the “committee of five” named on the last-filed nominating petition of the vacating officer—who are residents of the township—must appoint within a 10-day window.
If at least three committee members who are residents cannot be found, or if that number fails to appoint within the prescribed period, the presiding probate judge “shall appoint” a suitable qualified elector for the remainder of the term or until a successor is elected.

In this case, the remaining trustees did not act, the committee voted 2–0 (with one abstention) to appoint Johnson and later formalized the appointment via resolution. Johnson assumed office by oath and bond and is actively serving.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State ex rel. Beavercreek Twp. Fiscal Officer v. Graff, 2018-Ohio-3749, ¶ 11 — Sets out the three-part mandamus test: (1) clear legal right; (2) clear legal duty; (3) lack of adequate remedy. The Court uses this framework to conclude that without a vacancy there is no clear legal duty for the judge to appoint (¶¶ 8, 16–17).
State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 2008-Ohio-1593, ¶ 9 — Mandamus is appropriate to compel a public entity to perform a statutory duty. The Court recognizes the principle but explains the duty to appoint arises only when a vacancy exists (¶ 8).
State ex rel. Union Cty. Veterans Serv. Comm. v. Parrott, 2006-Ohio-92, ¶ 19 — Mandamus may compel an appointing authority to fill a vacancy. The Court distinguishes this case because here there is no vacancy (¶¶ 8, 15).
State ex rel. Democratic Executive Comm. v. Brown, 39 Ohio St.2d 157 (1974) (lead opinion) — Relied upon by relator to argue mandamus can compel appointment. The Court clarifies Brown does not authorize mandamus to displace an incumbent; the statute imposes a duty to appoint only when a vacancy exists (¶ 14).
State ex rel. Habe v. South Euclid, 56 Ohio St.3d 117 (1990) — Mandamus will not issue to compel appointments where no vacancies exist. This decision is central: even assuming statutory noncompliance, the presence of a de facto officeholder means no vacancy; thus no duty to appoint (¶¶ 15–16).
State ex rel. Purola v. Cable, 48 Ohio St.2d 239 (1976); State ex rel. Calvaruso v. Brown, 2014-Ohio-1018, ¶ 33; State ex rel. Witten v. Ferguson, 148 Ohio St. 702 (1947); State ex rel. Paul v. Russell, 162 Ohio St. 254 (1954); State ex rel. Huron Cty. Prosecutor v. Westerhold, 1995-Ohio-86 — These establish and elaborate the de facto officer doctrine: a person who assumes office under color of right is treated as an officer in fact; their acts are valid as to the public until ousted in a proper proceeding; only quo warranto can remove them (¶¶ 10–11).
State ex rel. Martin v. Shabazz, 2024-Ohio-5450, ¶ 15 — Reaffirms that quo warranto is the exclusive remedy to litigate title to public office (¶ 12).

Legal Reasoning

1) The de facto officer doctrine forecloses mandamus as a displacement tool

Once Johnson took the oath, posted bond, and began performing trustee duties, she became at least a de facto trustee, even if the appointment process could later be shown noncompliant. Under Ohio law, the validity of a de facto officer’s acts is preserved to protect the public and third parties. Crucially, any challenge to her title to the office must proceed by quo warranto, the only vehicle that can oust an incumbent (¶¶ 10–12).

2) Quo warranto is the exclusive remedy to test title to the office

Relator attempted to proceed in mandamus against the probate judge, not in quo warranto against Johnson. The Court emphasizes that quo warranto is exclusive for resolving who has the right to hold the office. Moreover, only the attorney general, a county prosecutor, or a person asserting a claim to the office can bring such an action (R.C. 2733.05, 2733.06). Relator is none of these. His quo warranto claim had already been dismissed, leaving only mandamus (¶ 13).

3) No vacancy means no clear legal duty to appoint under R.C. 503.24

Mandamus can compel action only if the respondent has a clear legal duty. The probate judge’s duty under R.C. 503.24 arises only when a vacancy exists and the statutory triggers are met (e.g., the trustees failed to appoint; the committee failed or could not act as required). Because the seat is currently occupied—at least by a de facto trustee—there is no vacancy. Therefore, the judge has no duty to appoint, and mandamus cannot be used to create one or to remove an incumbent (¶¶ 14–16).

4) The Court intentionally avoids the merits of the committee’s compliance

Even “assuming” the committee’s appointment was invalid, the Court’s holding would not change because the threshold defect for mandamus is the absence of a vacancy when a de facto officer is in place. The Court thus declines to adjudicate the committee’s compliance within the mandamus posture (¶ 16).

Procedural Posture Matters

The Court dismissed all claims against Johnson and dismissed her as a party earlier in the case, and it dismissed the procedendo and quo warranto claims against the judge (2024-Ohio-5572) (¶ 6).
The prosecutor had declined to bring a quo warranto action; relator did not claim personal entitlement to the office, so he lacked standing to maintain quo warranto independently (¶ 5, ¶ 13).
With only mandamus remaining, the Court confined its analysis to whether the judge had a present duty to appoint. He did not, because no vacancy existed (¶¶ 14–17).

Impact and Implications

For township governance and appointment contests

Challengers cannot use mandamus to bypass quo warranto when a committee appointee is already serving. Strategic attempts to “force” probate judges to appoint by claiming committee error will fail absent a true vacancy.
Township operations remain stable: the de facto officer doctrine ensures the appointee’s acts are valid unless and until removed in quo warranto.
Committees of five should still comply scrupulously with R.C. 503.24 (notice, quorum, voting, residency, timing). While this case did not decide compliance questions, noncompliance could support removal in a properly filed quo warranto.

For probate judges

Judges should not be compelled by mandamus to appoint where a person is already occupying the office under color of right. Their duty to appoint under R.C. 503.24 is triggered only by a genuine vacancy (e.g., trustees and committee fail or cannot act under statutory conditions).
This decision protects judicial neutrality in political appointment disputes and preserves the statute’s sequential appointment design.

For litigants and prosecutors

Quo warranto remains the exclusive remedy to challenge title to public office. Litigants must either persuade the attorney general or county prosecutor to bring the action or themselves assert a personal claim to the office to have standing under R.C. 2733.05–.06.
Prosecutorial gatekeeping is consequential: declining to sue can, in practical terms, leave a disputed appointee in place until election.

For future cases under R.C. 503.24

The Court’s logic will likely apply uniformly to other local offices with similar cascading appointment mechanisms: once someone occupies the office under color of law, removal must come through quo warranto; mandamus cannot be used to dislodge or leapfrog the process.
Expect greater emphasis on documenting the committee of five’s composition (residency), notice, attendance, voting records, and the formalization of the appointment (e.g., resolution, oath, bond) to support or resist a later quo warranto challenge.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandamus: An extraordinary court order directing a public official to perform a clear legal duty. It cannot be used to remove someone from office or to create a duty where statutory conditions are not met.
Quo warranto: A special proceeding that tests a person’s legal right to hold a public office. It is the only way to oust an incumbent. In Ohio, it may be brought by the attorney general, a county prosecutor, or a private relator claiming entitlement to the office (R.C. 2733.05–.06).
Procedendo: A writ directing a lower court to proceed to judgment. It played no role here because the claims were dismissed at the pleading stage.
De jure vs. de facto officer: A de jure officer holds office through a valid election or appointment; a de facto officer occupies and performs the office under color of right (e.g., took oath and bond) even if later found ineligible or improperly appointed. Acts of de facto officers are valid as to the public until they are removed in quo warranto.
“Committee of five” under R.C. 503.24: A group designated on the last-filed nominating petition of the vacating officer. If the trustees fail to appoint within 30 days, a majority of the committee members who are residents of the township must appoint within a statutory window; otherwise, the duty shifts to the presiding probate judge.
Vacancy: The legal absence of an officeholder. A seat occupied by a de facto officer is not “vacant” for purposes of triggering a judge’s duty to appoint.

Key Takeaways and Practice Pointers

If a committee appointee has taken the oath and is serving, pursue quo warranto in the appropriate forum; do not attempt to force a probate judge’s appointment via mandamus.
To secure standing for quo warranto if the prosecutor declines, the private relator must assert a legitimate personal claim to the office (e.g., eligibility and right to be appointed) under R.C. 2733.06.
Document every step of the committee’s process: attendance, votes, residency, the timing of meetings, and the formalization of appointments. These facts will be pivotal in any quo warranto challenge.
Probate judges should assess the statutory triggers carefully and act only when a true vacancy exists. Active service by an appointee under color of right means no vacancy.
Township boards should be proactive: if trustees are unable to agree within 30 days, coordinate with the committee early to avoid missed windows that could shift the appointment power.

Conclusion

State ex rel. Jennewine v. Puffenberger reinforces two core principles in Ohio’s law of public offices. First, quo warranto is the exclusive mechanism to challenge a person’s right to hold public office; mandamus cannot be used to displace an incumbent. Second, the probate judge’s duty to appoint a township trustee under R.C. 503.24 arises only if a vacancy exists—an office presently occupied, even by a de facto officer, is not vacant. By applying long-settled doctrines to the township trustee appointment scheme, the Court preserves continuity in local governance and provides a clear roadmap for litigants: removal challenges belong in quo warranto, not in mandamus against appointing authorities.

Note: This commentary synthesizes the Court’s reasoning using the slip opinion paragraphs cited above (¶¶ 1–18). It is intended for informational purposes and is not legal advice.