Introduction

This decision answers a long-contested question in Arizona real property law: Can an owner quiet title against a recorded deed of trust when the debt remains unpaid, but the time to sue on or otherwise enforce the debt has expired? The Arizona Supreme Court says yes.

The case pits century-old equitable doctrine against modern statutory directives. In 1914, the Court in Provident Mutual Building-Loan Association v. Schwertner held that equity would not cancel a mortgage lien in a quiet title action unless the borrower first paid the underlying debt—even if the statute of limitations (SOL) barred suit on the debt. In 1941, the Legislature enacted A.R.S. § 12-1104(B), which expressly authorizes a quiet title judgment where “the interest or lien or the remedy for enforcement thereof is barred by limitation.”

In Aroca, the Court resolves this conflict. It holds that § 12-1104(B) controls, quieting title where lien enforcement is time-barred. The Court further clarifies that A.R.S. § 33-714 is not a statute of limitations extending enforcement rights for 10 or 50 years; instead, it sets an outer expiration date for liens that have not otherwise been discharged. The decision overrules Provident to the extent it conflicts with § 12-1104(B) and harmonizes §§ 12-1104(B), 33-816, and 12-548.

• Parties: Jose and Kirstin Aroca (borrowers/homeowners) and Tang Investment Company, LLC (lender/beneficiary of deed of trust).
• Key issue: Whether a quiet title action can discharge a deed of trust when the debt is unpaid but any action to enforce the debt or deed of trust is time-barred.
• Holding: Yes. Under § 12-1104(B), a plaintiff is entitled to quiet title where the remedy to enforce the lien is barred by limitation. Equity cannot defeat these statutory rights.

Summary of the Opinion

In 2007, the Arocas executed a $40,000 Note secured by a recorded Deed of Trust on Pinal County property. They made interest-only payments for one year and then stopped; the balloon balance came due April 30, 2012. Tang neither foreclosed nor commenced a trustee’s sale. In 2022, the Arocas sued to quiet title, asserting that the six-year limitations period on the Note (§ 12-548(A)(1)) had run, and thus the lien could no longer be enforced. The Superior Court dismissed, accepting Tang’s argument that § 33-714 allowed the lien to persist and be enforceable until 2057. The Court of Appeals reversed.

The Arizona Supreme Court granted review and held:

• Quiet title must be granted under § 12-1104(B) once the remedy to enforce the lien is time-barred. Because the six-year statute in § 12-548(A)(1) bars an action on the Note, § 33-816 likewise bars foreclosure or a trustee’s sale after the same period. With all remedies time-barred, § 12-1104(B) requires judgment barring and estopping assertion of the lien.
• Provident is overruled to the extent of conflict with § 12-1104(B). Equitable principles cannot alter substantive statutory rights. See A.R.S. § 1-201; Seisinger v. Siebel; Valley Drive-In Theatre Corp.
• Section 33-714 is not a statute of limitations. It sets an outer expiration date for liens that are not otherwise satisfied or discharged. It does not extend the time to bring foreclosure or trustee’s sale.

Accordingly, the Court vacated paragraphs 1–16 and 19 of the Court of Appeals’ opinion (substituting its own reasoning), left the attorney-fee portions (paragraphs 17–18) undisturbed, reversed the Superior Court’s dismissal, and remanded for entry of judgment for the Arocas.

Detailed Analysis

1) Statutory Framework and the Court’s Harmonization

• A.R.S. § 12-1104(B) (1941): In a quiet title action, if “the interest or lien or the remedy for enforcement thereof is barred by limitation,” the court “shall” enter judgment barring and forever estopping assertion of the interest or lien against the property. The statute turns a limitations bar into an affirmative quiet title remedy.
• A.R.S. § 12-548(A)(1): A six-year statute of limitations for written contract debts executed in Arizona. The parties agreed that suit on the Note was time-barred under this statute.
• A.R.S. § 33-816: Foreclosure and trustee’s sales must be commenced “within the period prescribed by law for the commencement of an action on the contract secured by the trust deed.” This pegs lien-enforcement timing to the same limitations period governing the Note—here, six years under § 12-548(A)(1).
• A.R.S. § 33-714: Sets expiration dates for liens—10 years after a recorded, ascertainable final maturity date; or otherwise 50 years after recordation—unless “otherwise satisfied or discharged.” It is not a statute of limitations; it sets the maximum duration of a lien that has not otherwise been discharged or satisfied. It does not extend the time to file foreclosure or commence a trustee’s sale.

The Court harmonizes these statutes: the six-year limitations period in § 12-548(A)(1) bars actions on the Note; § 33-816 applies the same six-year bar to foreclosure and trustee’s-sale remedies; once those remedies are barred, § 12-1104(B) authorizes a quiet title judgment discharging the lien. Section 33-714 simply provides an outer sunset for liens that have not been otherwise satisfied or discharged; it does not postpone or revive a time-barred enforcement remedy.

2) Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Provident Mut. Bldg.-Loan Ass’n v. Schwertner, 15 Ariz. 517 (1914): Held that equity will not cancel an unsatisfied mortgage in a quiet title action even if limitations bars suit on the debt; “he who seeks equity must do equity.” The Court expressly overrules Provident to the extent it conflicts with § 12-1104(B), reaffirming that equitable principles yield to clear statutory rights (A.R.S. § 1-201).
• Valley Drive-In Theatre Corp. v. Superior Court, 79 Ariz. 396 (1955) and Cloeter v. Superior Court, 86 Ariz. 400 (1959): Equity cannot alter rights “clearly established and defined by a statute.”
• Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85 (2009): Common-law doctrines are subordinate to contrary legislative enactments under separation-of-powers principles.
• De Anza Land & Leisure Corp. v. Raineri, 137 Ariz. 262 (App. 1983): The statute of limitations that applies to the debt also applies to foreclosure. The Court relies on De Anza in applying the six-year period to lien enforcement under § 33-816.
• Other Court of Appeals cases reciting Provident were deemed unpersuasive or overruled to the extent inconsistent (e.g., Farrell v. West, Manicom, RCBT, Andra R Miller). The Court also notes a memorandum decision, Wood v. Fitz-Simmons, that correctly applied § 12-1104.
• In re Riggins, 257 Ariz. 28 (2024) and UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Craig, 200 Ariz. 327 (2001): Repeal by implication is disfavored; courts should reconcile statutes when possible. This supports reading § 33-714 as complementary, not as impliedly repealing § 33-816.
• State v. Ewer, 254 Ariz. 326 (2023) and Columbus Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Trust, N.A., 255 Ariz. 382 (2023): Focus on plain statutory text and context; avoid legislative history when text is clear. The Court therefore rejects reliance on legislative summaries and non-Arizona authorities interpreting California statutes.

3) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Step 1: The Court identifies a direct conflict between Provident’s equitable rule and the statutory quiet title remedy created by § 12-1104(B). Provident would deny quiet title unless the borrower pays the debt even if limitations has run; § 12-1104(B) mandates judgment barring the lien when the enforcement remedy is time-barred. Both rules cannot operate simultaneously.

Step 2: The Court applies A.R.S. § 1-201 and separation-of-powers doctrine. Statutes control over contrary common-law or equitable doctrines. Because § 12-1104(B) creates a substantive right to quiet title when enforcement is time-barred, equity cannot impose a “pay-to-quiet” condition. Provident is overruled to the extent of conflict.

Step 3: The Court determines that enforcement of the Note is time-barred by § 12-548(A)(1)’s six-year period. Under § 33-816, foreclosure or a trustee’s sale must be commenced within the same period that would apply to an action on the Note. Tang failed to commence either within six years, so lien enforcement is time-barred.

Step 4: With the remedy to enforce the lien barred, § 12-1104(B) requires a quiet title judgment “barring and forever estopping” assertion of the deed of trust lien. The Court emphasizes that § 12-1104(B) is not merely procedural; it confers a substantive entitlement to quiet title once the limitations bar is established.

Step 5: The Court rejects Tang’s reliance on § 33-714 as an “extension” of the enforcement period. The statute is not a limitations period; it provides the outer life of a lien “that is not otherwise satisfied or discharged.” Because a deed of trust may be “otherwise discharged” before the 10- or 50-year expiration—for example, via a § 12-1104(B) quiet title judgment after limitations has run—§ 33-714 does not revive or extend time-barred enforcement remedies.

Step 6: The Court harmonizes the statutory scheme and avoids implied repeal. Section 33-714 continues to serve important functions: it clears lingering, stale liens automatically after a set period when no party has taken steps to discharge them; it also reflects that liens can be “otherwise” satisfied or discharged earlier by payment or court judgment.

4) Practical Impact and Prospective Effects

This decision significantly reorients Arizona real property practice in several ways:

• Quiet title is now affirmatively available to discharge a deed of trust once enforcement remedies are time-barred—even if the borrower never paid the debt. Lenders cannot invoke Provident’s equitable “do equity/pay the debt” bar to defeat quiet title.
• Six-year clock for enforcement. For deeds of trust securing a written Arizona contract, lenders must commence a trustee’s sale or judicial foreclosure within six years of accrual, because § 33-816 incorporates the same limitations period as applies to the Note under § 12-548(A)(1). After that, the lien cannot be enforced and is vulnerable to being discharged through quiet title.
• Section 33-714 is not an enforcement backstop. It does not provide 10 or 50 years to foreclose. It deals with lien expiration when no earlier “satisfaction or discharge” has occurred, serving as a housekeeping measure to clear stale record liens by the passage of time.
• Title marketability improves. Owners and title insurers now have a clear statutory pathway to remove old, unenforceable deeds of trust without waiting a decade or more. This should reduce clouds on title and facilitate transactions.
• Portfolio and servicing practices must change. Lenders and servicers need systems to track accrual and the six-year enforcement deadline. Where appropriate and lawful, they may seek written and signed acknowledgments or new promises to pay to reset limitations. They cannot rely on § 33-714 to preserve enforcement.
• Litigation posture. Borrowers may file quiet title actions once they can show that both the debt action and the lien enforcement remedies are time-barred. Courts should apply § 12-1104(B) as a mandatory remedy when those conditions are met.

Open or fact-sensitive questions likely to recur include:

• Accrual timing: When does the six-year period begin for enforcement under § 33-816—upon default, acceleration, or maturity? The Court here did not refine accrual principles beyond noting Tang failed to act within six years of default. Accrual may vary by contract terms (e.g., installments, acceleration clauses, balloon maturity).
• Tolling and revival: Certain events may toll limitations (e.g., bankruptcy stays under 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)) or revive claims (e.g., a new, written, signed promise to pay under § 12-508). The interaction of such events with § 33-816 will be fact-specific.
• Scope beyond deeds of trust: Section 12-1104(B) applies broadly to interests and liens in real property. The decision’s logic may affect other lien types governed by distinct enforcement statutes. Practitioners must analyze the applicable limitations scheme for each lien.
• Effect on debt rights: The debt is not “extinguished” in an ontological sense—limitations generally bar the remedy, not the existence of the obligation. But § 12-1104(B) turns that limitations bar into a conclusive judgment prohibiting assertion of the lien against the property.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Quiet Title: A lawsuit to establish clear ownership of real property and to remove any claims or liens that cloud title.
• Deed of Trust vs. Note: The Note is the borrower’s promise to pay; the Deed of Trust is a lien on property securing that promise. Foreclosure or trustee’s sale enforces the lien, not the promise itself.
• Statute of Limitations (SOL): A legal deadline for bringing a lawsuit or initiating certain remedies. When the SOL “runs,” a court will not allow the time-barred action—though the underlying obligation may still exist abstractly.
• § 12-1104(B)’s innovation: It transforms a limitations defense into a quiet title remedy. If the “remedy for enforcement” of a lien is time-barred, the property owner is entitled to a judgment barring the lien’s assertion against the property.
• § 33-816 peg: The time to foreclose or conduct a trustee’s sale equals the time to sue on the Note. If you’re out of time to sue on the Note, you’re out of time to enforce the deed of trust.
• § 33-714’s role: Not a limitations period. It sets an automatic final expiration date for liens that have not otherwise been satisfied or discharged—essentially a backstop to clear ancient liens from the record.
• Equity vs. Statute: “Equity” refers to judge-made notions of fairness. But when a statute expressly sets rights or remedies, those statutory rules govern. Courts cannot use equity to contradict clear statutory text.
• Overruling Provident: The 1914 rule that a borrower must pay the debt to quiet title—even when enforcement is time-barred—cannot stand against § 12-1104(B). The statute prevails, and Provident is overruled to the extent of conflict.

Authorities Discussed

• A.R.S. §§ 12-1101, 12-1104(B), 12-548(A)(1), 33-816, 33-714; § 1-201.
• Provident Mut. Bldg.-Loan Ass’n v. Schwertner, 15 Ariz. 517 (1914) (overruled in part).
• De Anza Land & Leisure Corp. v. Raineri, 137 Ariz. 262 (App. 1983).
• Valley Drive-In Theatre Corp. v. Superior Court, 79 Ariz. 396 (1955); Cloeter v. Superior Court, 86 Ariz. 400 (1959).
• Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85 (2009).
• In re Riggins, 257 Ariz. 28 (2024); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Craig, 200 Ariz. 327 (2001).
• State v. Ewer, 254 Ariz. 326 (2023); Columbus Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Trust, N.A., 255 Ariz. 382 (2023); Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273 (1999).

Conclusion

Aroca marks a decisive turn in Arizona’s treatment of time-barred mortgage enforcement and quiet title. The Court holds that when the statute of limitations has run on both the debt and the linked lien-enforcement remedies, § 12-1104(B) entitles the property owner to a quiet title judgment discharging the deed of trust—even if the debt remains unpaid. In doing so, the Court overrules Provident’s equitable barrier and reaffirms that statutory rights control over inconsistent common-law doctrines. The opinion clarifies that § 33-714 does not extend enforcement windows but instead sets a maximum lien duration for liens not otherwise satisfied or discharged.

For borrowers, this decision provides a concrete pathway to clear title after the enforcement period has lapsed. For lenders and servicers, it underscores the necessity of timely action: the six-year clock governs, and § 33-714 will not save an otherwise time-barred enforcement. For the real estate market, the decision promises cleaner titles sooner, less uncertainty, and improved marketability. In sum, Aroca delivers clarity, statutory fidelity, and a practical framework for reconciling expired enforcement rights with recorded liens.

Case Outcome

• Superior Court’s dismissal: reversed.
• Court of Appeals’ opinion: vacated in part (paras. 1–16 and 19), attorney-fee portions (paras. 17–18) left intact.
• Remand: For entry of judgment in favor of the Arocas quieting title and discharging Tang’s deed of trust lien.
• Attorney fees and costs: Tang’s request denied as it was not the successful party.

Timeline at a Glance

• 2007: Arocas execute $40,000 Note and record Deed of Trust; balloon due April 30, 2012.
• 2008–2009: Interest-only payments for one year; then default.
• 2012: Balloon maturity date passes; Tang does not enforce.
• 2022: Arocas file quiet title and related claims.
• 2023: Superior Court dismisses.
• 2024: Court of Appeals reverses.
• 2025: Arizona Supreme Court reverses and remands for entry of judgment for the Arocas; Provident overruled to the extent of conflict; statutory harmonization announced.