Quid Pro Quo, Proven by Implication: Sixth Circuit Affirms RICO Convictions and Requires Quid Pro Quo Standards for Bribery Predicates Involving Campaign Contributions

Introduction

In United States v. Householder and Borges (Nos. 23-3565/3566, decided May 6, 2025), the Sixth Circuit affirmed RICO conspiracy convictions stemming from a sprawling “dark money” scheme in which former Ohio House Speaker Larry Householder used FirstEnergy’s contributions—channeled through a 501(c)(4)—to fund his rise to the speakership and pass a billion-dollar bailout (House Bill 6), and then to protect that bailout from a voter referendum. Lobbyist Matthew Borges was convicted for agreeing to facilitate the enterprise—including running interference against the referendum effort and attempting to purchase inside information from the campaign’s vendor.

The appeal presented foundational questions at the intersection of bribery law, campaign finance, and RICO conspiracy. The court:

Reaffirmed that Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right and honest-services fraud in the form of bribery require a quid pro quo—an unambiguous agreement to exchange things of value for specific official action—but that such an agreement may be proven by implication through words and conduct.
Held that “as opportunities arise” instructions are permissible when tethered to specific official acts, and rejected a defense instruction that would have required contemporaneity of payment and agreement.
Concluded that Ohio’s bribery instructions (as given) were likely erroneous under the First Amendment because they did not require a quid pro quo in the campaign-contribution context—but deemed the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reiterated that a RICO conspiracy conviction does not require proof that the defendant personally committed any predicate acts (Salinas v. United States), thereby foreclosing most of Borges’s predicate-specific challenges.
Upheld evidentiary rulings (including use of co-conspirators’ guilty pleas to contextualize credibility) and Householder’s sentence (finding any Guidelines-calculation error harmless given the statutory maximum and the district court’s alternative-variance statement, while admonishing district courts to explain loss enhancements with specificity).

Judge Thapar concurred, urging the Supreme Court to revisit Evans v. United States and the Hobbs Act’s judicially expanded reach into bribery, warning that certain formulations risk criminalizing constitutional campaign activity. He also flagged unresolved federalism and notice concerns with using a rarely enforced state election-law provision as a Travel Act predicate and highlighted open questions in honest-services law.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed both convictions after a 26-day jury trial. As to Householder:

Jury Instructions: The court approved instructions tracking Evans (knowledge payment was given “in return for” official acts), confirmed that quid pro quo may be implied and proven with circumstantial evidence, and upheld an “as opportunities arise” instruction consistent with Sixth Circuit precedent (Hills). It found the Ohio state-law bribery instruction likely unconstitutional in contribution settings for omitting a quid pro quo, but the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence and the parties’ shared framing that all bribery predicates required a quid pro quo.
Sufficiency: Ample evidence supported quid pro quo public-official bribery and honest-services fraud: the creation and use of a 501(c)(4) to conceal unlimited contributions; contemporaneous communications trading money for legislative action; FirstEnergy’s drafting role; and extensive post-enactment funding to defeat the referendum, coupled with concealment and intimidation tactics. Money-laundering predicates rose or fell with the bribery proceeds and therefore stood.
Sixth Amendment and Evidentiary Issues: No violation in dismissing a juror for COVID-related noncompliance; no bar on Householder speaking with counsel; recordings used to impeach Householder’s claimed conciliatory motives were relevant and not unduly prejudicial; co-conspirators’ guilty pleas were admissible to allow the jury to evaluate credibility.
Sentencing: Although the district court’s explanation for the $59 million “value of the payment/benefit” enhancement was cursory, any procedural error was harmless because the court would have imposed the same 20-year statutory maximum. The sentence was substantively reasonable given the magnitude of the offense and need for deterrence.

As to Borges:

RICO Conspiracy Theory: Under Salinas, the government did not need to prove that Borges personally committed any predicate acts, only that he knew of and agreed to facilitate an enterprise that, if completed, would include two or more racketeering acts.
Evidentiary Rulings: The district court properly limited pseudo–advice-of-counsel insinuations; admitted testimony from referendum signature collectors about obstruction and harassment; and allowed the jury to learn of co-conspirators’ guilty pleas.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992): Central to the instruction that extortion under color of official right is completed when a public official receives a payment knowing it is made in return for agreement to perform specific official acts. The panel faithfully applied Evans and Sixth Circuit pattern instructions.
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991): The “explicit quid pro quo” requirement in campaign contribution contexts anchors the court’s insistence on an unambiguous meeting of the minds between donor and official—later elaborated by Sixth Circuit law (Sittenfeld).
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010): Honest-services fraud under §1346 is limited to bribery and kickback schemes. The panel embraced that limitation and, crucially, treated honest-services bribery in the contribution setting as requiring a quid pro quo.
United States v. Hills, 27 F.4th 1155 (6th Cir. 2022): Approved “as opportunities arise” instructions when anchored to specific official acts; the panel directly relied on Hills in upholding a similar instruction here.
United States v. Sittenfeld, 128 F.4th 752 (6th Cir. 2025): The panel leaned on Sittenfeld’s articulation that the quid pro quo requires an unambiguous agreement as understood by both sides and can be proven through circumstantial evidence, warning that “winks and nods” cannot defeat bribery law.
United States v. Benjamin, 95 F.4th 60 (2d Cir. 2024): Cited to confirm that an explicit quid pro quo may be proved by implication from words and actions; the panel rejected a contrary district court view.
United States v. Silver and United States v. Skelos (2d Cir.): Used to demarcate acceptable “as opportunities arise” charging from broader formulations that risk loosening the link to specific official acts.
FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U.S. 289 (2022): Anchors the panel’s First Amendment analysis; contribution limits or criminalization are justified only to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, leading the court to flag Ohio’s instruction (without a quid pro quo) as constitutionally infirm in contribution contexts.
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999): Provided the harmless-error framework used to sustain the verdict notwithstanding the Ohio instruction error.
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997): Decisive for Borges; a RICO conspiracy does not require personal commission of predicate acts, only agreement that the enterprise would engage in a pattern of racketeering.
Nardello, Rewis, Perrin (Travel Act trilogy): Discussed at length in the concurrence to highlight unresolved federalism and lenity issues when federal prosecutors bootstrap novel state-law predicates into federal felonies.

Legal Reasoning

1) Federal bribery predicates: quid pro quo, timing, and proof by implication

The court held that both Hobbs Act extortion and honest-services fraud (bribery) require a quid pro quo—that a public official received money in exchange for a promise to take specific official action. It underscored three doctrinal strands:

Unambiguous mutual understanding—but not necessarily express: Following Sittenfeld, the agreement must be unambiguous to the participants but may be implied and evidenced circumstantially. The jury may infer the agreement from what participants “say, mean, and do.”
“As opportunities arise” is permissible: The instruction that a public official agreed to take specific official action “when the opportunity presented itself” is proper when, as here, the specific acts at issue are identified.
Fulfillment is unnecessary; agreement at receipt suffices: Echoing Evans and McDonnell, the offense is completed upon receipt of payment “in return for” the agreement—actual completion of the official act is not required, nor must payment and official act occur simultaneously.

2) State bribery predicate: constitutional constraint and harmless error

The Ohio bribery instruction criminalized accepting a “valuable thing” with the intent it “improperly influence” the official’s duties, without specifying a quid pro quo. In the campaign-contribution setting, the panel concluded this standard likely violates the First Amendment under Cruz because only quid pro quo corruption justifies restricting contributions. Nonetheless, the error was harmless: the evidence overwhelmingly established a quid pro quo; both sides argued the case to the jury as if quid pro quo applied to all public-corruption predicates.

3) Sufficiency: a paradigmatic exchange of money for state action

The record showed a sustained exchange: FirstEnergy money flowed (largely undisclosed) into Householder’s 501(c)(4) “Generation Now” to fund a slate of loyal candidates; once Householder became Speaker, FirstEnergy executives and lobbyists helped draft House Bill 6; millions more flowed to preserve the bailout from a referendum; and the enterprise engaged in tactics to suppress signature gathering. The panel emphasized indicia of corruption—explicitly “tying” contributions to legislation, concealment mechanisms, and contemporaneous statements describing the arrangement as a “big bet” that “paid off.” This comfortably met the quid pro quo requirement for Hobbs Act extortion and honest-services bribery and, derivatively, supported money-laundering predicates.

4) RICO conspiracy: breadth and Borges

Salinas controlled: the government need not prove Borges committed any predicate acts; it need only show he knew of and agreed to facilitate the scheme. Evidence showed Borges helped identify legislators, suggested bill language, pressured state actors to shield the law from referendum, orchestrated efforts to disrupt signature collection, and sought inside counts from a vendor by paying $15,000. That sufficed to establish agreement to further an enterprise that, if completed, would include two or more racketeering acts.

5) Evidentiary rulings and sentencing

Prior inconsistent statement instruction: Proper where a witness acknowledged a prior statement to a reporter that conflicted with trial testimony; no separate exhibit was necessary, as the admission occurred through testimony.
Co-conspirator guilty pleas: Admissible even where defendants stipulate they will not impeach on that basis. Jurors must assess credibility; pleas answer inevitable questions about why witnesses testify and do not constitute improper bolstering.
Recordings: Clips contradicting Householder’s narrative of bridge-building were relevant and not unfairly prejudicial given the trial’s evidentiary context.
Sentencing: The court flagged the district judge’s thin explanation for the massive loss enhancement, advising future courts to tie enhancements to specific factual findings. Still, any error was harmless because the statutory maximum controlled and the judge stated he would impose the same sentence irrespective of the Guidelines calculation.

Impact

Clarifying the quid pro quo standard in the Sixth Circuit: The opinion cements that both Hobbs Act extortion and honest-services fraud bribery require an unambiguous quid pro quo and that juries may infer that agreement from circumstantial evidence. Prosecutors need not secure an express “this for that” statement but must present coherent, specific-act-linked proof of a mutual understanding.
Jury instructions in contribution cases: The panel’s First Amendment analysis signals that state bribery predicates used in federal cases must be instructed to require a quid pro quo when contributions are involved. Trial courts within the circuit should conform state-law bribery instructions accordingly to avoid reversible error.
“As opportunities arise” remains viable—but must be tethered: Prosecutors can continue to use this formulation, provided instructions tie the agreement to specific official acts and not a general promise of goodwill.
Conspiracy breadth and charging strategy: Salinas continues to empower enterprise-wide prosecutions even where some participants handle discrete tasks far from the principal quid pro quo. Defense strategies must attack knowledge and agreement, not only personal predicate conduct.
501(c)(4) “dark money” as a vehicle for bribery and laundering: The case underscores that use of undisclosed social-welfare entities neither immunizes contributions nor reduces them to mere political support; when tied to specific official action, they can supply bribery proceeds and money-laundering predicates.
Sentencing practice: Expect closer appellate scrutiny of outsized bribery-value enhancements. District courts should link the selected valuation (payment vs. benefit received) to the record or presentence findings, especially where enhancements drive the range near or beyond statutory caps.
Supreme Court horizon: Judge Thapar’s concurrence invites reconsideration of Evans and the line between extortion and bribery and flags potential limits on Travel Act predicates and honest-services theories. Should the Court narrow Evans or refine §1346, past convictions predicated on those theories may face renewed challenges; cases with interdependent predicate theories could require re-evaluation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

RICO conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)): An agreement to conduct an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. The government need not prove the defendant personally committed any predicate acts—only that he agreed the enterprise would do so.
Predicate acts: The underlying crimes (e.g., bribery, extortion, honest-services fraud, money laundering) that, when committed in a pattern, constitute racketeering activity.
Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right: A public official’s acceptance of payment knowing it is in return for performing (or agreeing to perform) specific official acts. No need to complete the act; the crime is complete upon the corrupt agreement and receipt.
Honest-services fraud (§ 1346): A subset of mail/wire fraud covering schemes to deprive another (often the public or an employer) of the intangible right to honest services, narrowed by Skilling to bribery and kickbacks.
Quid pro quo: Latin for “this for that.” In bribery law, an unambiguous exchange: the payor provides something of value to obtain a specific official act, and the official agrees to perform that act in return. It may be proved by implication from conduct and context.
“As opportunities arise” instruction: Tells jurors the agreement can be to take a specific official action when a suitable opportunity presents itself. It remains valid if connected to specific official acts, not general goodwill.
Harmless error: Even if a trial error occurred (e.g., a flawed instruction), the conviction stands if the appellate court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not affect the verdict.
Travel Act predicate: The federal Travel Act punishes use of interstate facilities to carry on certain crimes (like “bribery”) as defined by state law. Its use raises federalism and fair-notice questions if prosecutors rely on obscure state provisions in novel ways.
Fiduciary duty in honest-services cases: Post-Skilling, honest-services bribery typically requires a breach of a fiduciary duty (e.g., duties owed by public officials or employees). Courts differ on whether this duty must come from state law, common law, or a federal gloss.

Conclusion

Householder and Borges marks a pronounced clarification—and a caution—in the Sixth Circuit’s public-corruption jurisprudence. The court reaffirms that:

Bribery predicates (Hobbs Act and honest-services) require a quid pro quo, but the agreement can be proved by implication from words and deeds when linked to specific official acts;
“As opportunities arise” instructions are permissible if tied to specific acts;
In campaign-contribution contexts, state bribery instructions must include a quid pro quo to avoid First Amendment problems—though the court found the omission harmless here given the record and trial posture;
RICO conspiracy remains broad: agreement and facilitation suffice without personal commission of predicates;
Co-conspirator guilty pleas may be admitted to enable jurors to assess credibility; courts must still carefully cabin their use with limiting instructions;
Sentencing courts should make clear, record-based findings when imposing large bribery-value enhancements.

The concurrence signals meaningful unsettled terrain: the Supreme Court may revisit the Evans line and the scope of the Hobbs Act; the use of novel state-law predicates via the Travel Act could encounter federalism and lenity limits; and honest-services law still contains unresolved edges (property interests, foreseeability, fiduciary duty sources). For now, however, the Sixth Circuit’s message is unambiguous: campaign money becomes criminal when—and only when—it is part of an unambiguous exchange for specific official action, a fact that juries may find from the totality of the parties’ words and deeds.