Qualified Immunity in Child Welfare Proceedings: Individualized Analysis of Medical Consultants and Caseworkers

Introduction

Erika Mabes v. Angela McFeeley is a Seventh Circuit decision clarifying how qualified immunity applies to medical consultants and child-protective caseworkers in Section 1983 suits. The case arose from a tragic child-abuse investigation in July 2019, when Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) responders and Dr. Shannon Thompson, a hospital child-protection consultant, removed three Mabes children after a two-month-old infant (L.M.) was flown to Riley Hospital with a severe skull fracture and brain damage. The Mabeses sued nine DCS employees and Dr. Thompson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district court denied all qualified-immunity motions because of factual disputes; on appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that each defendant was entitled to immunity after a precise, individualized analysis.

Summary of the Judgment

On April 28, 2025, a three-judge panel reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The court held:

Dr. Thompson, as a hospital consultant with no decision-making authority, is immune from suit for providing medical opinions to DCS.
Case Managers Natasha Davis and Courtney Oakes, Supervisor Hannah Lyman, and Office Director Courtney Crowe are immune for ordering an emergency removal of the Mabes children, because they had a reasonable belief (probable cause) that the infants faced imminent harm.
The same DCS officials are immune against challenges to factual statements in the CHINS Petition, as no precedent clearly prohibits every misstatement made in exigent circumstances when parents are present and represented.
All remaining claims—failure to consider exculpatory evidence and alleged conflicts in the Child Care Worker Assessment Review Process—also fail, because the Mabeses point to no case clearly establishing a right to a disinterested reviewer with zero prior involvement.

The court emphasized that qualified immunity demands a careful, defendant-by-defendant and claim-by-claim approach. Because no clearly established law prohibited the defendants’ conduct under these facts, the court remanded for entry of judgment in favor of all ten defendants.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Brokaw v. Mercer County (235 F.3d 1000): Defines personal liability under § 1983 and notes that social workers ordinarily receive qualified immunity for child removal decisions.
Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster (657 F.3d 463): Holds that removal without a pre-deprivation hearing is valid if there is probable cause to believe a child is in imminent danger.
Siliven v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services (635 F.3d 921): Defines “probable cause” for child-seizure decisions as what a reasonable caseworker would believe about immediate risk.
Dupuy v. Samuels (397 F.3d 493): Requires investigators to consider exculpatory evidence but does not demand that such evidence be dispositive.
White v. Pauly (580 U.S. 73): Confirms that “clearly established” law must be particularized to the facts at hand.
Pearson v. Callahan (555 U.S. 223): Affirms the two-step qualified-immunity framework.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied the familiar two-step qualified-immunity analysis:

Constitutional-violation inquiry
The plaintiffs alleged Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizures (emergency removal without a warrant), Fourteenth Amendment procedural-due-process claims (misstatements in the CHINS petition and review process flaws), and substantive-due-process claims (family-separation rights). The court accepted the Mabeses’ version of disputed facts, as required at summary judgment.
Clearly-established-law inquiry
The Mabeses failed to identify any precedent putting DCS employees or a hospital child-protection consultant on notice that their actions—forming a medical opinion, removing children under exigent circumstances, submitting an expedited CHINS petition with parents present, or using a reviewer with some investigatory involvement—were unlawful.

The court stressed that child-welfare officers and medical consultants often confront life-or-death decisions on short notice, and qualified immunity “gives ample room for mistaken judgments.” Because all defendants’ actions fell within “reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions,” immunity was appropriate.

Impact

Section 1983 Claims in Child Welfare Context
Plaintiffs suing under § 1983 must now cite closely analogous cases to overcome qualified immunity when challenging medical consultants and DCS workers. Broad statements condemning any mistakes in child-removal proceedings are unlikely to suffice.
Medical Consultants and DCS Reliance
Physicians who serve as child-protection consultants enjoy immunity for medical assessments unless they act with reckless disregard for the law or facts—a high bar.
Documentation and Exigent Filings
DCS’s emergency filings (CHINS petitions) will be upheld against due-process challenges so long as officers act on probable cause and the family has an opportunity to respond.
Review Process Procedures
Due-process demands an impartial reviewer, but prior involvement in some investigatory tasks does not automatically disqualify an official; no blanket rule prohibits any overlap.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity
A shield for government officials sued in their individual capacities. To overcome it, a plaintiff must show (1) a constitutional violation and (2) that the right was “clearly established” in prior case law.
Probable Cause vs. Reasonable Suspicion
Probable cause requires facts that would lead a prudent person to believe a child is in immediate danger. Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard, used for family-separation (substantive due process) claims.
CHINS Petition
A formal request under Indiana law to adjudicate children as “in need of services.” It triggers temporary state custody and requires facts sufficient to show necessity of intervention.
Child Care Worker Assessment Review Process
A statutorily mandated appeal for childcare workers facing substantiated abuse allegations. The reviewer should not have a conflict of interest, but prior supervisory contact is not per se disqualifying.

Conclusion

Erika Mabes v. Angela McFeeley underscores that qualified immunity in child-welfare litigation hinges on a meticulous, individual analysis of each defendant’s role and the specific legal claims. The Seventh Circuit made clear that:

Medical consultants providing reasoned opinions to state agencies are insulated from liability absent evidence of recklessness.
DCS officials making exigent removal decisions need only probable cause and reasonable reliance on medical expertise.
Expedited petitions and review processes do not violate due process so long as parents are represented and have an opportunity to respond, and reviewers are not demonstrably biased.

This decision will shape future § 1983 litigation in the child-protection arena by raising the bar for plaintiffs to demonstrate clearly established law and by reaffirming qualified immunity’s role in protecting reasonable official action under urgent and complex circumstances.