Introduction

In Jason Moorhead v. West Virginia Army National Guard and West Virginia Mountaineer Challenge Academy, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia considered whether Mountaineer Challenge Academy (“MCA”) and the West Virginia Army National Guard (“Respondents”) were shielded by qualified immunity after a cadet candidate, Jason Moorhead, sustained a knee injury during his two-week acclimation period.

Moorhead alleged that Academy staff failed to enforce their own safety protocols—specifically, the approved method of dismounting from top bunks—and that this failure both caused his injury and led to his subsequent dismissal for noncompliance. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents on the basis of qualified immunity, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“this Court”) ultimately upheld those rulings on May 2, 2025.

The Court’s decision clarifies two key points: first, that appeals from the ICA are subject to de novo review as to legal questions like summary-judgment rulings; and second, that internal agency policies that lack legislative backing cannot, by themselves, create “clearly established” statutory or constitutional rights for purposes of qualified immunity.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court’s opinion, authored by Justice Walker, reaffirmed the following:

1. De Novo Standard of Review: On appeal from the ICA, this Court reviews a circuit court’s summary‐judgment rulings de novo (Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavy).
2. Qualified Immunity Principles: The ultimate question of qualified immunity is one of law, appropriate for summary disposition absent a bona fide factual dispute (Syllabus Point 1, Hutchison v. City of Huntington).
3. Scope of Discretionary Immunity: Public officers are immune from suit for acts within the scope of their duty that involve the exercise of judgment and discretion (Syllabus Point 4, Clark v. Dunn).
4. Clearly Established Law Versus Internal Policies: Internal agency policies that lack legislative approval cannot, on their own, create clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known (Syllabus Point 4, W. Va. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. David B.).
5. Malice, Fraud, Oppression: In the absence of a showing that discretionary acts were fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive, both the State and its officials enjoy immunity (Syllabus Point 11, W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B.).

Applying these principles, the Court held that: (a) MCA’s supervision of cadets is a discretionary function entitled to qualified immunity; (b) Moorhead failed to point to any clearly established constitutional or statutory duty violated by MCA’s conduct; and (c) there was no evidence of fraud, malice, or oppression in MCA’s actions. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment for Respondents was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Hutchison v. City of Huntington (198 W.Va. 139, 479 S.E.2d 649 (1996)) – Held that qualified immunity is a question of law and ripe for summary disposition absent genuine disputes over foundational facts.
• Clark v. Dunn (195 W.Va. 272, 465 S.E.2d 374 (1995)) – Established that public officers are immune from negligence claims for discretionary acts within their scope of authority.
• Chase Securities, Inc. (188 W.Va. 356, 424 S.E.2d 591 (1992)) – Critiqued the ministerial/discretionary distinction and folded it into the analysis of clearly established rights.
• W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B. (234 W.Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751 (2014)) – Clarified that discretionary governmental functions enjoy qualified immunity unless rights violated are clearly established or acts are fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive.
• W. Va. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. David B. (251 W.Va. 217, 911 S.E.2d 884 (2024)) – Held that internal policies not enacted by the legislature cannot create “clearly established” law for immunity analysis.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in three stages:

1. Discretionary Function Inquiry: MCA’s supervision, training, and discipline of cadet candidates is a classic discretionary governmental function. Whether and how instructors correct bunk-exit procedures plainly involves judgment and is immune from negligence claims under Clark v. Dunn.
2. Clearly Established Rights: Moorhead attempted to anchor his claims in (i) MCA’s internal bunk-exit policy, (ii) his constitutional right to a safe educational environment, and (iii) statutory in loco parentis duties under public‐school law. The Court rejected each: internal policies lack legislative force (David B.), MCA is not a public school subject to Chapter 18A duties, and no authority held it accountable under Article 12, Section 1 for personal injuries in a quasi-military program.
3. Malice, Fraud, Oppression: Moorhead relied on the timing of his dismissal to suggest malicious intent. But MCA promptly provided medical care, accommodated temporary restrictions, and discharged him only after multiple documented warnings for unwillingness to participate. On these undisputed facts, no reasonable jury could infer oppressive or fraudulent conduct.

Impact

This decision reinforces several important principles for West Virginia jurisprudence:

• Appellate Review: Orders granting summary judgment on immunity grounds from the ICA are reviewed de novo, aligning with Painter v. Peavy and ensuring consistent federal-style analysis.
• Qualified Immunity Scope: Discretionary decisions—especially in educational or quasi-military settings—remain protected unless a statutory or constitutional right is explicitly violated or official acts are malicious.
• Internal Rules vs. Law: Entities should heed that their own manuals or policies, absent legislative enactment, cannot be used by plaintiffs to overcome immunity by creating “clearly established” duties.
• Limits on Public‐School Analogies: Specialized programs like MCA, established by statute under the Adjutant General’s authority, will not be automatically equated with traditional public schools for liability purposes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity

A judicial doctrine that shields government entities and officials from lawsuits over discretionary acts, unless they violate a right so clearly established that any reasonable official would know it.

De Novo Review

An appellate standard in which the reviewing court re-examines legal questions from scratch, without deference to lower‐court conclusions.

Discretionary vs. Ministerial Acts

Discretionary: Tasks requiring judgment or choice (e.g., how to enforce safety rules).
Ministerial: Tasks that are always the same, with no room for personal judgment (e.g., filling out a form exactly as prescribed).
West Virginia now assesses “discretionary” acts directly, but treats “ministerial” duties as part of the “clearly established law” inquiry.

Clearly Established Law

The level of legal clarity required for a public official to know that their actions violate someone’s rights. A rule is “clearly established” if prior court decisions or statutes would have put a reasonable official on notice.

Conclusion

The Court’s decision in Moorhead v. West Virginia Army National Guard & MCA affirms that (1) discretionary supervisory decisions are protected by qualified immunity, (2) internal policy manuals cannot create new, clearly established rights, and (3) appeals from the ICA’s summary-judgment rulings follow a de novo standard. Together, these holdings strengthen the predictability of immunity doctrine in West Virginia and underscore the importance of legislative action—rather than internal guidelines—when imposing novel duties on public actors.