Qualified Immunity Does Not Shield Malicious Prosecution Built on Manufactured Evidence

Commentary on Lee Evans v. Newark City, Nos. 23-1723 & 23-1724 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2025)

Introduction

This precedential decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addresses a core question at the intersection of qualified immunity, malicious prosecution, and the constitutional prohibition against fabricated evidence. The case arises from the infamous disappearance of five Newark teenagers in 1978, a cold case revived decades later. In 2008, investigators secured a confession from Philander Hampton implicating Lee Evans. Evans was prosecuted and tried, with Hampton as the state’s star witness, but Evans was acquitted in 2011. Evans then filed a civil rights action, alleging malicious prosecution and fabrication of evidence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, grounded in the claim that Hampton’s confession was coerced and the narrative was manufactured by law enforcement.

On interlocutory appeal, Detectives Lou Carrega (ECPO) and William Tietjen (NJSP) sought qualified immunity, arguing that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Evans’s malicious prosecution claim. Writing for the court, Judge Restrepo affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, emphatically holding that qualified immunity does not protect officers who manufacture evidence to prosecute—a constitutional violation that remains unlawful regardless of any independent probable cause to arrest. The panel also remanded for reconsideration of the timeliness of Evans’s separate fabrication-of-evidence claim, in light of later developments.

Key issues included:

• Whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity where probable cause is allegedly manufactured through a coerced confession and material omissions.
• How courts evaluate tainted affidavits and omissions in the probable-cause analysis.
• The interplay between Fourth Amendment seizure principles and Fourteenth Amendment due process protections against fabricated evidence, especially when a prosecution proceeds to trial.
• Whether an acquittal forecloses liability for the pretrial and trial use of manufactured evidence (it does not).
• Accrual and timeliness considerations for a § 1983 fabrication-of-evidence claim that turns on use of the false evidence at trial and later recantations.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity on Evans’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim and remanded for further consideration of the separate fabrication-of-evidence claim’s timeliness.

• Constitutional violation (prong one): Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Evans, a jury could find the detectives knowingly or recklessly omitted critical information from the warrant affidavit and from prosecutors—namely that Hampton’s confession was coerced and preceded by repeated denials—thereby tainting the probable-cause determination and violating Evans’s right to be free from prosecution without probable cause.
• Clearly established right (prong two): It was clearly established that police may not arrest or prosecute absent probable cause, and, critically, that due process forbids fabricating evidence or coercing confessions to build a case. No reasonable officer could think it lawful to “cook up” evidence to get a prosecution.
• “Probable cause cures all” rejected: The court rejected the detectives’ argument that independent probable cause to arrest—setting aside the confession—would immunize their later use of fabricated evidence to prosecute. That theory is “absurd,” as it would license coercion and fabrication so long as an arrest could be justified for any reason.
• Due process through trial: The use of fabricated evidence at and leading up to trial implicates the Fourteenth Amendment, distinct from Fourth Amendment pretrial seizure interests. The court underscored that such claims are actionable even when the criminal trial ends in acquittal.
• Remand on accrual: The court directed the district court to revisit whether Evans still has a timely standalone fabrication-of-evidence claim in light of when the injury occurred (use of the evidence through trial) and the timing of Hampton’s 2017 recantation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Mitchell v. Forsyth and Johnson v. Jones: The court had jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal on legal questions related to qualified immunity, but not to revisit disputed facts. As a result, the panel accepted, for present purposes, the district court’s view of the facts, including that the confession was allegedly coerced and that material omissions were made.
• Pinkney v. Meadville and Andrews v. Scuilli: The court reiterated its duty to “dissect” a tainted warrant affidavit, recognizing that deference to warrants evaporates if material facts are misrepresented or omitted.
• Wilson v. Russo and Sherwood v. Mulvihill: These Third Circuit mainstays provide the Franks-like framework for omissions—asking whether omissions were made knowingly or recklessly and whether they were material to probable cause. The court applied this framework by “inserting” the omitted facts (the alleged coercion and repeated denials) into the affidavit to reassess probable cause.
• Dempsey v. Bucknell University: Officers cannot ignore plainly exculpatory evidence. This principle undergirded the conclusion that failing to inform the issuing judge and prosecutors of coercion and prior denials can be both reckless and material, and indicative of malice.
• Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police; Berg v. County of Allegheny; Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle: These decisions establish—clearly—that citizens have a right to be free from arrest without probable cause, satisfying the “clearly established” component of qualified immunity.
• Halsey v. Pfeiffer: A foundational Third Circuit decision recognizing a stand-alone Fourteenth Amendment claim for the use of fabricated evidence where there is a reasonable likelihood it affected the conviction. Evans’s case does not involve a conviction, but Halsey’s core principle—that the government cannot fabricate evidence—underpins the conclusion that malicious prosecution claims built on such fabrication are unconstitutional.
• Black v. Montgomery County: Clarifies that claims predicated on fabrication are actionable even when the criminal proceeding ends in acquittal. The court relied on Black to reject any suggestion that acquittal insulates officers from liability for pretrial and trial-phase constitutional violations.
• Zimmerman v. Corbett: Distinguished. There, charges were dropped before trial, and there was no allegation that fabrication infected the proceeding beyond initial charging. By contrast, Evans’s case centers on a confession allegedly coerced and deployed at trial, triggering Fourteenth Amendment concerns.
• Pierce v. Gilchrist (10th Cir.): Quoted for the proposition that constitutional analysis shifts from the Fourth Amendment to the Fourteenth as proceedings move toward and through trial—illuminating why fabricated evidence at trial is a due process problem even if the initial arrest could otherwise be justified.
• Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Saucier v. Katz; Davis v. Scherer; Anderson v. Creighton: These Supreme Court decisions frame qualified immunity doctrine and the “reasonable officer” standard. The Third Circuit rejected reliance on “reasonable mistake” where the conduct at issue is the manufacture of evidence—no reasonable officer would think evidence fabrication is lawful.
• Wright v. City of Philadelphia (noting Chiaverini’s abrogation on another point): Cited for jurisdiction over the legal sufficiency of probable cause; the panel’s analysis focused on whether the affidavit, with omitted facts restored, could sustain probable cause.

Legal Reasoning

1. Summary judgment posture and interlocutory scope

Accepting the district court’s factual view, the panel treated Hampton’s confession as potentially coerced and materially unreliable and treated the detectives’ omissions as established for analysis. The court emphasized that its review is limited to legal issues; disputed facts about what actually occurred are for the jury.

2. Constitutional violation (lack of probable cause due to material omissions and fabrication)

• Framework: Under Wilson/Sherwood, courts ask whether the omissions were (a) knowing or reckless, and (b) material to probable cause. Materiality is assessed by “reconstructing” the affidavit to include the omitted facts and reassessing whether probable cause remains.
• Omissions identified: The affidavit recounted Hampton’s detailed inculpatory statement. But, on Evans’s version of the facts, it omitted that Hampton had repeatedly denied involvement and told investigators the story he ultimately recorded was false and coached. Both points are quintessentially material—“the kind of thing a judge would wish to know.”
• Prosecutorial acknowledgment: Prosecutors later conceded that without Hampton’s statement, there was no probable cause to arrest Evans. That admission powerfully supports materiality.
• Malice: Coupled with the alleged coaching and coercion, the omissions support an inference of malice—another element of malicious prosecution—because they suggest a deliberate or reckless attempt to secure charges by concealing exculpatory facts.

3. Clearly established law (no reasonable officer would think this conduct lawful)

• Free from arrest/prosecution without probable cause: Long-settled in Third Circuit law.
• No fabrication rule: The opinion reiterates that “it is always unconstitutional” for police to coerce confessions or manufacture evidence to prosecute. Halsey condemned “cooking up” evidence; Black reaffirmed the viability of such claims even absent a conviction.
• Reasonable mistake doctrine inapposite: The Anderson “reasonable but mistaken” shield does not apply to intentional fabrication. As the court put it, fabricating evidence to create probable cause “eviscerates” any claim of reasonableness.

4. Fourth Amendment versus Fourteenth Amendment

The court draws a critical distinction:

• Fourth Amendment governs the initial seizure and pretrial detention. In some cases, where charges are dropped pretrial and there is untainted probable cause, the claim may fail, as in Zimmerman.
• Fourteenth Amendment due process governs the fairness of the criminal process through and at trial. Use of fabricated evidence at trial (or to sustain proceedings into trial) is a separate constitutional injury, actionable under § 1983. The fact of acquittal affects damages but does not negate the constitutional violation.

5. “Probable cause cures fabrication” theory rejected

The detectives argued that as long as probable cause existed without the confession, they should receive qualified immunity for all conduct thereafter. The court called this result untenable: it would effectively authorize officers to “use whatever means they choose” to secure convictions, including coercion and fabrication, whenever an arrest could be justified for any reason. That proposition is incompatible with due process.

6. Accrual and timeliness of a standalone fabrication claim

The district court had earlier found portions of Evans’s § 1983 claims (including “abuse of process and related theories”) untimely, reasoning that injury would have been apparent no later than grand jury proceedings. The panel declined to resolve the timeliness of a discrete “fabrication of evidence” claim and remanded, highlighting two considerations:

• Use-of-evidence injury: For a claim predicated on the use of fabricated evidence at trial, it “makes little sense” to set accrual before trial begins.
• Recantation timing: Hampton’s sworn recantation did not occur until 2017 (well after the complaint), potentially affecting when Evans knew or should have known the evidence was fabricated.

The remand signals that accrual for fabrication claims may align with the point at which the fabricated evidence is used to advance the prosecution (often trial), or when the plaintiff reasonably discovers the fabrication—fact-intensive issues the district court must now address.

Impact

• Bright-line against fabrication: The Third Circuit’s pronouncement that it is “always unconstitutional” to coerce confessions or manufacture evidence, and that qualified immunity does not shield such conduct, fortifies existing law and provides unmistakable guidance to officers and agencies.
• No safe harbor from “independent probable cause”: Agencies cannot rely on an “independent probable cause” theory to insulate later misconduct designed to bolster or sustain a prosecution. The constitutional injury is not limited to the moment of arrest.
• Affidavit integrity and disclosure duties: Investigators must not omit plainly exculpatory facts—such as prior denials or coercion—in affidavits or charging meetings. Wilson/Sherwood reconstruction will expose omissions, and Dempsey precludes ignoring exculpatory material.
• Trial-phase due process claims remain viable after acquittal: Black and this decision together confirm that acquittals do not foreclose liability for the use of fabricated evidence through trial. Damages may differ, but liability remains possible.
• Accrual doctrine in flux for fabrication claims: The remand encourages careful, fact-sensitive accrual analysis where fabrication is discovered late or is tied to trial use, potentially allowing claims to proceed that might otherwise be deemed time-barred.
• Training and policy implications: Prosecutors and police should reinforce policies against reliance on polygraph “failures,” ensure recorded interviews are voluntary, and document and disclose all exculpatory or undermining information. Supervisory review of affidavits and charging packages should check for omissions or coercion concerns.
• Litigation strategy: Plaintiffs should frame malicious prosecution claims to capture both the Fourth Amendment seizure and Fourteenth Amendment due process injuries, particularly where fabricated evidence influenced the decision to prosecute and the conduct of the trial. Defendants should recognize that disputes about coercion and materiality are jury issues unlikely to be resolved at summary judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified Immunity: A doctrine shielding government officials from damages unless they violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. It protects reasonable mistakes; it does not protect intentional fabrication of evidence.
• Malicious Prosecution under § 1983: In the Third Circuit, a plaintiff must typically show initiation of a criminal proceeding without probable cause, malice, a deprivation of liberty consistent with a seizure, and a favorable termination. When fabricated evidence drives the case forward, the claim also implicates Fourteenth Amendment due process.
• Probable Cause: Facts sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that a suspect committed an offense. When a warrant is obtained, courts defer to it unless officers misrepresent or omit material facts.
• Material Omission/Franks-Type Analysis: If officers omit key facts from an affidavit, courts “reconstruct” the affidavit by inserting the omitted facts to decide whether probable cause still exists. Knowing or reckless omissions that are outcome-determinative violate the Fourth Amendment.
• Fabrication of Evidence: Creating or coercing false inculpatory statements or otherwise falsifying evidence. Its use to pursue or sustain charges violates procedural due process, independent of whether a conviction results.
• Fourth vs. Fourteenth Amendment: The Fourth governs the initial arrest and pretrial seizure; the Fourteenth governs fair process through and at trial. Fabricated evidence used at trial is a Fourteenth Amendment problem even if the arrest was initially supported by probable cause.
• Collateral Order Doctrine: Allows interlocutory appeals of certain nonfinal orders, such as denials of qualified immunity, on pure legal issues. Appellate courts must accept the plaintiff’s version of disputed facts at this stage.
• Clearly Established: A right is clearly established when precedent places the constitutional question beyond debate. Officers need not have a case with identical facts; it is enough that core principles (e.g., no evidence fabrication) are settled.

Conclusion

Lee Evans v. Newark City cements a vital constitutional principle in the Third Circuit: qualified immunity is no shield for malicious prosecution claims that rest on manufactured evidence. The court reaffirmed that officers cannot fabricate or coerce confessions, cannot omit plainly exculpatory facts in warrant applications or charging meetings, and cannot rely on an “independent probable cause” theory to sanitize misconduct that sustains a prosecution into and through trial. The decision also clarifies that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against the use of fabricated evidence at trial, and that acquittal does not absolve constitutional violations that occurred along the way. Finally, the remand on accrual signals a nuanced, context-specific approach to timeliness in fabrication-of-evidence cases, especially where key revelations emerge after trial.

Taken together, the opinion strengthens the constitutional guardrails against wrongful prosecutions by emphasizing truthfulness in affidavits and investigations, accountability for coercive tactics, and the unyielding prohibition on manufactured evidence. For law enforcement, it offers clear notice; for prosecutors and courts, a framework to scrutinize tainted evidence; and for civil rights litigants, a pathway to vindicate due process even in the absence of a conviction.