Qualified Immunity Bars Damages for Suggestive Identification Absent Evidence Manufacturing

Introduction

In Eric Blackmon v. Gregory Jones, 23-3288 (7th Cir. Mar. 20, 2025), the Seventh Circuit addressed whether police officers can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for introducing the results of suggestive identification procedures into evidence at trial, absent proof that they manufactured or concealed evidence. The plaintiff, Eric Blackmon, was convicted in an Illinois state court of murder based largely on two eyewitness identifications. Years later, after federal habeas proceedings revealed that his trial counsel failed to interview alibi witnesses (Blackmon v. Williams, 823 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 2016)), he was released and brought a § 1983 suit against the arresting officers, claiming that the pretrial photo array and lineup were unduly suggestive and that using those results at trial violated his due-process right to a fair trial.

Summary of the Judgment

The district court denied qualified immunity, reasoning that it was “clearly established” since Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), that evidence obtained by unduly suggestive photo arrays or lineups may not be used at trial. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Applying the Supreme Court’s two-step framework from Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134 (2022), the court held:

Conducting suggestive identification procedures does not itself violate the suspect’s constitutional rights, because the suspect’s presence or absence during a procedure does not trigger a personal right, and any derivative use of that procedure (e.g., in a prosecutor’s file) is no greater intrusion on the suspect’s due-process rights.
Introducing the suggestive identification at trial is not an act by the officers at all, but by the prosecutor and the judge, both of whom enjoy absolute immunity for such decisions. Hence, absent extraordinary misconduct—such as coaching witnesses, fabricating photo arrays, or lying to the prosecutor—the officers cannot be held liable in damages.
Because no circuit had previously held that officers are personally liable for a suggestive lineup or photo array on its own, the right was not clearly established in 2002 or thereafter. Qualified immunity therefore protects the officers against damages for the mere use of suggestive identification procedures.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) – Recognized a due-process right to exclude overly suggestive pretrial identification evidence.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) – Addressed reliability factors in evaluating suggestive identifications.
United States v. Johnson, 745 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 2014) – Applied the Manson factors in federal prosecutions.
Payner v. United States, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) – Held that suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not give rise to a private § 1983 claim by a third party.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134 (2022) – Established that failure to give Miranda warnings creates a trial-right remedy (exclusionary rule) rather than a § 1983 damages remedy, absent unusual circumstances.
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) – Limited interlocutory appeals of qualified-immunity denials to pure legal questions.
Hensley v. Carey, 818 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1987) – Refused to impose § 1983 liability on officers for suggestive identification procedures leading only to pretrial detention.
Wray v. New York, 490 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2007) – Held that damages for suggestive identifications are “unprecedented and unwarranted” absent evidence of prosecutorial deception or fabricated lineups.

Legal Reasoning

The court followed a two-step analysis modeled on Vega v. Tekoh. First, it asked whether the use of suggestive identification procedures itself violates a constitutional right entitling the suspect to damages. It concluded that the Constitution does not recognize a free-standing right against being placed in a suggestive lineup or photo array. A suspect who is not present (photo array) or who does not challenge the lineup procedure at trial suffers no personal intrusion. Any due-process protection instead takes the form of a trial remedy—exclusion of the identification testimony if shown to be unduly suggestive.

Second, it asked whether officers might be liable for introducing suggestive identification evidence at trial. Because prosecutors and judges control admission of evidence and both enjoy absolute immunity, officers cannot be held accountable for the trial presentation or judicial rulings. To impose § 1983 liability on officers in this circumstance would undermine the separation of functions and give rise to unfair burdens on law enforcement.

Finally, the court considered whether the right was “clearly established” in 2002 when the identifications occurred. No prior appellate decision—within the Seventh Circuit or elsewhere—had imposed § 1983 damages liability on officers merely for conducting or turning over suggestive identification procedures. The absence of such precedent foreclosed a finding that the right was clearly established, thus entitling the officers to qualified immunity.

Impact

This decision clarifies the contours of due-process protection against suggestive pretrial identification:

Trial-level remedy remains exclusion: Defendants challenged by suggestive photo arrays or lineups must move to exclude the fruits of those procedures at trial. Failure to raise the issue waives the remedy.
Qualified immunity for officers: Absent evidence of deliberate manufacturing, coaching, or concealment of evidence, officers cannot be sued for damages under § 1983 for suggestive identification procedures.
Higher bar for “unusual circumstances”: Only extraordinary misconduct—lying to prosecutors or judges, fabricating witnesses or arrays—gives rise to § 1983 liability.
Alignment with Miranda doctrine: The decision parallels Vega by reinforcing that many procedural rights yield an exclusionary remedy, not a damages action.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A doctrine protecting government officials from lawsuits unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right.
Suggestive Identification: Any photo array or lineup that highlights the suspect (e.g., by hairstyle or clothing), risking that witnesses pick him based on suggestion, rather than genuine memory.
Exclusionary Rule: A trial-level remedy that forbids introduction of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights.
Absolute Immunity: Complete protection for prosecutors (for conduct in initiating or pursuing a criminal prosecution) and judges (for judicial acts) from civil liability.
Unusual Circumstances: Exceptions to the general rule where officers’ deliberate deception or fabrication undermines all normal safeguards and justifies damages.

Conclusion

Blackmon v. Jones establishes that, under § 1983, officers are entitled to qualified immunity for damages claims arising from suggestive photo arrays or lineups, unless they engaged in affirmative misconduct—such as manufacturing evidence or lying to prosecutors—that would undermine the integrity of the trial process. The decision reinforces the principle that due-process protection against suggestive identifications is enforced through trial-level exclusion of evidence, not through a damages remedy, and aligns the Seventh Circuit’s approach with the Supreme Court’s framework in Vega v. Tekoh. Going forward, criminal defendants must promptly challenge identification procedures in court, and § 1983 plaintiffs must plead and prove extraordinary misconduct to overcome qualified immunity.