Pursuit Eliminates Justification and Defendant Admissions Defeat Georgia’s Circumstantial Evidence Rule: A Commentary on Mack v. State (Ga. 2025)

Introduction

In Mack v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed convictions arising from two fatal shootings by Bernie Mack: the malice murder of his wife, Bridget Brooks‑Mack, and the voluntary manslaughter of his son-in-law, Jeremy Santos. The trial unfolded against the backdrop of a family conflict that escalated from a May 2, 2022 altercation at a youth baseball game to a double homicide on May 5, 2022.

On appeal, Mack advanced two principal arguments:

First, that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of federal due process and, alternatively, under Georgia’s circumstantial-evidence rule (OCGA § 24-14-6), to prove malice murder (for Bridget) and to disprove his claim of self-defense (for Jeremy).
Second, that the trial court erred by admitting a medical examiner’s “less scientific” expert comment about typical shot sequencing, arguing it invaded the province of the jury and violated OCGA § 24-7-704(b).

The Court rejected both contentions. It held that the evidence, viewed under the proper standard, was sufficient for both homicide verdicts and that any error in admitting the challenged expert comment was harmless. The opinion—while not announcing a brand-new rule—reasserts and clarifies important Georgia doctrines on:

How pursuit after an initial exchange can vitiate a claim of self-defense;
Why a defendant’s own admissions at trial constitute direct evidence that removes a case from Georgia’s circumstantial-evidence rule; and
How Georgia courts conduct de novo harmless-error review of non-constitutional evidentiary errors.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed all convictions. The jury had found Mack guilty of malice murder for Bridget’s death and of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter for Jeremy’s death. It also found him guilty on two firearm-possession counts.

The Court’s key holdings were:

The evidence was constitutionally sufficient to support malice murder for Bridget, including proof of intent and malice, and to disprove self-defense for Jeremy’s killing.
Georgia’s circumstantial-evidence rule (OCGA § 24-14-6) did not apply because there was direct evidence—namely, Mack’s own admissions at trial that he shot both victims.
Even assuming the medical examiner’s “less scientific” testimony about typical shot sequences exceeded the proper scope of expert testimony or flirted with OCGA § 24-7-704(b), any error was harmless under Georgia’s non-constitutional harmless-error standard.

Sentences imposed included life without parole for malice murder (Count 1), 20 years for voluntary manslaughter (Count 5) consecutive to Count 1, and two five-year terms on the firearm counts (Counts 4 and 8), each ordered to run consecutive to Count 5. Other counts merged or were vacated by operation of law.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Arnold v. State, 321 Ga. 434 (2025) — The Court reiterated the familiar sufficiency standard: evidence is assessed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, with deference to the jury on conflicts, credibility, and reasonable inferences. This framework governed the Court’s assessment of both homicide convictions.
Scoggins v. State, 317 Ga. 832 (2023) — Clarifies that malice murder requires malice, which incorporates the intent to kill. The Court applied this principle to conclude that physical and circumstantial indicators—two shots, including a contact wound to the back of the head; removal of casings; flight; and lies—permitted the jury to find express or implied malice.
Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 400 (2022) — Authorizes juries to reject accident defenses where the evidence supports intent. Here, the medical and behavioral evidence authorized the jury to disbelieve Mack’s accident account.
Donaldson v. State, 302 Ga. 671 (2017) — Emphasizes the jury’s role in resolving evidentiary conflicts and credibility. The Court invoked it to reinforce deference to the jury’s rejection of Mack’s accident narrative.
Anthony v. State, 298 Ga. 827 (2016) — Stresses that juries may reject justification/self-defense based on the overall circumstances. The Court relied on testimony that Jeremy and Brianna drove away, Mack pursued, and then chased Jeremy on foot, to conclude the jury could find the threat to Mack had dissipated—negating self-defense.
Troutman v. State, 320 Ga. 489 (2024) and Bradley v. State, 318 Ga. 142 (2024) — Together, these cases establish that Georgia’s circumstantial-evidence rule (OCGA § 24-14-6) does not apply when there is direct evidence. Bradley underscores that eyewitness testimony based on firsthand observation—including a defendant’s own trial admissions—is direct evidence. Citing these cases, the Court foreclosed Mack’s circumstantial-evidence argument because he testified he shot both victims.
Haufler v. State, 315 Ga. 712 (2023) and Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263 (2022) — Provide the governing harmless-error test for non-constitutional errors: reversal is unwarranted if it is highly probable the error did not contribute to the verdict. Moore adds a critical methodological point: appellate courts review de novo and weigh the evidence as a reasonable juror, not in the light most favorable to the verdict, when conducting harmless-error review.
Remler v. State, 318 Ga. 61 (2024) and Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716 — Illustrate that improper expert testimony can be harmless when cumulative or when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. The Court analogized to these decisions in finding harmlessness here.

Legal Reasoning Applied

1) Malice Murder of Bridget Brooks‑Mack

The Court identified multiple strands of proof supporting malice and intent:

Forensic evidence of execution-style shooting: The medical examiner testified the second shot was fired with the gun pressed against the back of Bridget’s head. Contact wounds to the back of the head are strong indicators of purposeful killing, inconsistent with accidental discharge.
Sequence and conduct indicating consciousness of guilt: Mack admitted he removed spent casings, left Bridget’s body in the basement, left the scene, and lied to family members about his whereabouts and Bridget’s status. He never called police. These behaviors permitted an inference of malice and intent, and a rejection of accident.
Deference to the jury on credibility: The jury was entitled to disbelieve Mack’s accident account in light of the medical and behavioral evidence (Jones; Donaldson).

2) Voluntary Manslaughter of Jeremy Santos and Rejection of Self-Defense

Although the jury convicted Mack of voluntary manslaughter rather than malice murder for Jeremy’s death, the appellate issue focused on justification. The Court highlighted evidence that:

After Jeremy initially fired at Mack’s returning vehicle, Jeremy and Brianna drove away and were out of Mack’s sight.
Mack then pursued them by car, located Jeremy on foot, got out, and chased him. A foot chase ensued, followed by an exchange of gunfire in which Jeremy was killed.

On these facts, the jury could find that any immediate threat to Mack had ceased (or at least that Mack no longer “reasonably believe[d]” deadly force was necessary). Under OCGA § 16‑3‑21(a) and Anthony, the defense of justification was properly rejected. Pursuit after a threat has abated is a critical inflection point that undermines self-defense.

The opinion does not analyze the separate elements of voluntary manslaughter (OCGA § 16‑5‑2) because the defense focused on justification. As a practical matter, a jury’s decision to convict on a lesser-included offense like voluntary manslaughter—where the evidence might have supported murder—often reflects mitigation or jury lenity the appellate court will not disturb.

3) Georgia’s Circumstantial-Evidence Rule Does Not Apply When There Is Direct Evidence

Mack argued the evidence was “wholly circumstantial” and failed to exclude reasonable hypotheses of accident (for Bridget) and self-defense (for Jeremy) under OCGA § 24‑14‑6. The Court rejected this threshold premise. Direct evidence existed in the form of Mack’s own testimony admitting that he shot both victims. Under Troutman and Bradley, direct evidence takes the case outside § 24‑14‑6 entirely, rendering the circumstantial-evidence rule inapplicable.

This is a practical and frequently outcome-determinative point: when a defendant testifies and admits to core conduct (even while asserting a justification or accident), he supplies the State with direct evidence that obviates § 24‑14‑6’s heightened exclusion-of-hypotheses requirement.

4) Expert Testimony and Harmless Error

The medical examiner gave forensic opinions on the order of the shots based on physiological evidence (blood loss patterns and wound trajectories), which were not challenged. She then added a “less scientific” generalization: that, typically, individuals shot multiple times are shot from farther away first, and then at closer range. Defense counsel objected that this exceeded her expertise and invaded the jury’s province, invoking OCGA § 24‑7‑704(b). The trial court overruled the objection.

On appeal, the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that admitting this “typical” pattern comment was error but deemed it harmless because:

Cumulative to admissible points: The challenged remark echoed the examiner’s unchallenged, science-based conclusions and Mack’s own testimony about shot sequence (Remler).
Orthogonal to the most inculpatory fact: The key forensic fact was the point-blank contact wound to the back of the head—evidence strongly inconsistent with accident—regardless of which shot came first.
Strength of the overall case: When weighed as a reasonable juror in a de novo harmless-error analysis (Moore; Haufler), the total evidence of guilt was robust (Munn).

Notably, the Court did not resolve whether OCGA § 24‑7‑704(b)—which prohibits expert opinions on a criminal defendant’s mental state—applies to this type of “typical sequence” testimony. That legal question remains open for a case where it matters to the outcome.

Impact and Practical Significance

For criminal practitioners

Self-defense is highly fact specific, and pursuit matters: Evidence that a defendant actively pursued an encounter after an initial threat dissipated is powerful evidence against justification. Defense counsel should scrutinize and challenge “pursuit” narratives; prosecutors should develop them thoroughly.
Be strategic about defendant testimony: A defendant’s admission to the core act (e.g., “I fired the gun”) transforms the evidentiary posture. It becomes direct evidence, taking the case outside OCGA § 24‑14‑6. If a defense hinges on § 24‑14‑6’s exclusion-of-hypotheses rule, counsel should understand how a client’s testimony may foreclose that argument.
Expert boundaries and preserving error: Experts should stay within demonstrable expertise and avoid “profiling” generalizations. Defense counsel should object, request limiting instructions, and, to avoid harmless-error outcomes, articulate concrete prejudice linking the improper opinion to a contested issue the State otherwise struggles to prove.
Harmless-error review is demanding: Georgia’s non-constitutional harmless-error test asks whether it is highly probable the error did not contribute to the verdict, with appellate courts weighing the record as a reasonable juror. Errors that are cumulative or peripheral will rarely secure reversal.

For trial courts

Gatekeeping over expert testimony: Courts should evaluate whether “typical” or “less scientific” assertions meaningfully rest on specialized knowledge or drift into speculation. Where admissible, courts may consider clarifying instructions to cabin the use of such testimony.
Jury instructions on justification and pursuit: Clear instructions that a defendant may not claim self-defense when he is the pursuer after an initial encounter helps juries evaluate justification in dynamic fact patterns.

For appellate courts and scholars

Doctrinal clarity on OCGA § 24‑7‑704(b): Mack illustrates an unresolved question: does a forensic “typical pattern” opinion implicate § 24‑7‑704(b) or is it merely an ultimate-issue opinion generally permitted by Georgia law when not targeting mental state? Future cases may need to squarely address this line.
Methodological consistency: Mack is a clean reaffirmation that harmless-error review is de novo and not viewed through the pro-verdict lens, a distinction sometimes blurred in practice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Malice murder (OCGA § 16‑5‑1): An unlawful killing with “malice aforethought,” either express (intent to kill) or implied (no significant provocation plus an abandoned and malignant heart). Here, the contact shot to the back of the head, removal of evidence, flight, and lies supported malice.
Voluntary manslaughter (OCGA § 16‑5‑2): A killing that would otherwise be murder but is mitigated to manslaughter if committed in a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation. The appellate court did not analyze provocation here because the defense focused on justification.
Justification/Self-defense (OCGA § 16‑3‑21): Deadly force is justified only if the defendant reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury. The justification can evaporate if the defendant becomes the pursuer after the threat subsides.
Direct vs. circumstantial evidence; OCGA § 24‑14‑6: Direct evidence proves a fact without inference (e.g., a defendant’s own admission to the shooting). Circumstantial evidence requires inferences. Georgia’s special rule for circumstantial cases—requiring exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis except guilt—does not apply when any direct evidence exists.
Harmless error (non-constitutional): An evidentiary error warrants reversal only if it is not highly probable the error contributed to the verdict. Appellate courts review de novo and weigh the record like a reasonable juror, not in the light most favorable to the verdict. Cumulative or peripheral errors are commonly harmless.
OCGA § 24‑7‑704(b): Experts in criminal cases may not opine directly on whether a defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime or of a defense. Opinions touching an ultimate issue may be allowed in general, but mental-state opinions are restricted. Mack leaves for another day whether “typical sequence” testimony falls within or outside this boundary.
Merger and “vacated by operation of law”: When the jury returns guilty verdicts on multiple counts stemming from a single criminal transaction, some lesser counts may merge into greater offenses for sentencing, or be vacated to avoid multiple punishments for the same offense.

Conclusion

Mack v. State is a significant reaffirmation of Georgia’s evidentiary and justification doctrines with concrete guidance for trial practice:

When a defendant admits to the act of shooting, the case contains direct evidence, and Georgia’s circumstantial-evidence rule does not apply.
Self-defense is undermined where the defendant pursues the confrontation after the initial threat abates; pursuit is a powerful fact cutting against justification.
Suspect expert opinions that stray into “typical” patterns may be error, but reversal will require a convincing showing that the error likely mattered—mere overlap with admissible testimony or peripheral linkages will render such errors harmless.

The Court’s reasoning—rooted in deference to juries on credibility and in a rigorous harmless-error methodology—underscores a practical message: sufficiency challenges must grapple with the whole record, especially forensic evidence and consciousness-of-guilt behavior, and evidentiary objections must be tied to demonstrable prejudice. For Georgia practitioners, Mack provides both a cautionary tale about the trial risks of defendant testimony and a roadmap for analyzing pursuit and justification in fast-moving, multi-episode violent encounters.