Purposely Failing to Stop Is Independently Chargeable Under RSA 265:4, I(c): No Proof of Willful Eluding Required

Introduction

In State of New Hampshire v. Donald Thompson (No. 2024-0519), decided by order under New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 20(3) on September 12, 2025, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed a bench-trial conviction for disobeying a police officer under RSA 265:4 and resisting arrest under RSA 642:2. The defendant advanced three principal claims on appeal:

That the State was required to prove he acted with a purpose to evade a pursuit (i.e., willful eluding) to convict him of “disobeying a police officer” under RSA 265:4, I(c);
That the trial court allegedly did not require, and therefore did not find, the requisite specific intent (here, “purposely”) to support resisting arrest under RSA 642:2; and
That the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction.

The case presented a statutory-interpretation question about the structure of RSA 265:4, I(c) and a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to both convictions. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s arguments, clarified the elements of disobeying an officer, and upheld the trial court’s mens rea findings and sufficiency determinations.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court reaffirmed that RSA 265:4, I(c) contains two independent ways to commit the offense of disobeying a police officer:

Purposely neglecting to stop when signaled by a law enforcement officer; or
Willfully attempting to elude pursuit (e.g., by increasing speed, extinguishing headlamps while in motion, or abandoning a vehicle).

Relying on State v. Hall, 133 N.H. 446 (1990), the Court held the State was not required to prove a willful attempt to elude to convict Thompson of the first variant—purposely neglecting to stop. Applying de novo review of statutory interpretation (State v. Jordan, 176 N.H. 34 (2023)) and the light-most-favorable standard for sufficiency (State v. Seibel, 174 N.H. 440 (2021)), the Court concluded that the trial evidence, including body-worn and dashboard camera footage, allowed a rational factfinder to find purposeful neglect to stop beyond a reasonable doubt.

On the resisting arrest charge, the Court held that the trial court’s narrative order sufficiently found that Thompson purposely physically interfered with an officer effecting an arrest, satisfying the elements of RSA 642:2 as described in State v. Rogers, 177 N.H. 47 (2024). The Court further held the video evidence supported the conviction.

Disposition: Affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

State v. Hall, 133 N.H. 446 (1990): The cornerstone for interpreting RSA 265:4, I(c). Hall articulates the two independent variants of disobeying an officer: (1) purposely neglecting to stop when signaled, or (2) willfully attempting to elude pursuit. The Thompson Court expressly reaffirmed Hall’s disjunctive reading, thereby rejecting any argument that the State must prove eluding to convict on the “purposely neglect to stop” clause.
State v. Jordan, 176 N.H. 34 (2023): Statutory interpretation principles—reviewed de novo, anchored in plain and ordinary meaning, and disciplined by a refusal to add words the legislature did not include. The Court applied Jordan to construe RSA 265:4, I(c) as written.
State v. Seibel, 174 N.H. 440 (2021): Governs sufficiency review: the evidence and all reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the State. When evidence is solely circumstantial, the “sole rational conclusion” formulation applies if the chain of circumstances must support guilt as the sole rational inference, assuming credibility determinations in favor of the State.
State v. Saintil-Brown, 172 N.H. 110 (2019): The defendant bears the burden to show insufficiency; in circumstantial cases, the evidence must exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt.
State v. Rogers, 177 N.H. 47 (2024), 2024 N.H. 57, ¶13: Elements of resisting arrest under RSA 642:2: (1) knowingly or purposely; (2) physically interfered; (3) with a person recognized as law enforcement; (4) while the officer sought to effect an arrest or detention of the defendant.
State v. Goodwin, 140 N.H. 672, 674 (1996): Clarifies the relationship between the Criminal Code’s mental states and traditional “intent” terminology: “purposely” aligns with specific intent; “knowingly” with general intent.
In the Matter of Salesky & Salesky, 157 N.H. 698, 702 (2008): Trial court orders are interpreted de novo.
State v. Palermo, 168 N.H. 387, 394 (2015): Appellate presumption that the trial court made all findings necessary to support its decision.
RSA 265:4, I(c) (2024) (amended 2024): Sets out the offense of disobeying an officer, with the key language: “Purposely neglect to stop when signaled … or otherwise willfully attempt to elude pursuit….”
RSA 626:2, II(a) (2016): Defines “purposely”: a conscious object to cause the result or engage in the conduct comprising the element.
RSA 642:2: Resisting arrest: knowingly or purposely physically interfering with a law enforcement officer effecting an arrest or detention; verbal protests alone are insufficient.

Legal Reasoning

1) RSA 265:4, I(c) creates two independent variants

The defendant’s core interpretive claim was that the State had to prove he “willfully attempted to elude” pursuit, even though the State charged the “purposely neglect to stop when signaled” variant. The Court rejected this argument based on the statute’s plain language and the controlling interpretation in Hall.

Grammatically, RSA 265:4, I(c) states two alternatives separated by “or”: (a) purposely neglect to stop when signaled; or (b) otherwise willfully attempt to elude pursuit. The Court reiterated that it will not read into the first clause additional language (e.g., “with a willful attempt to elude”) that the legislature did not include. This application of Jordan’s plain-meaning rule was decisive: the statute as written criminalizes purposeful failure to stop upon a lawful signal, independent of proof of eluding.

Importantly, although RSA 265:4 was amended in 2024, the Court’s reliance on Hall signals continuity: the disjunctive structure and two-track liability remain intact, and the 2024 amendments do not alter this interpretive baseline (at least for the language at issue).

2) Sufficiency of the evidence—disobeying an officer

Applying Seibel and Saintil-Brown, the Court reviewed the entire record in the light most favorable to the State and assessed whether a rational factfinder could find purposeful neglect beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial record, including body-worn and dash camera footage, showed that Thompson:

Drove approximately 0.7 miles and for more than one minute after blue lights were activated;
Continued driving—and briefly accelerated by about 10 mph—after the siren sounded directly behind him;
Signaled with his hand multiple times, acknowledging the officer’s presence;
Passed several locations where he could have safely stopped before finally stopping; and
Stated after stopping, “you don’t have to stop until you’re in a public place.”

From these facts, a rational factfinder could infer that Thompson’s conscious object was to continue driving despite a clear signal to stop—i.e., he “purposely” neglected to stop as defined in RSA 626:2, II(a). The Court did not need to (and did not) find willful eluding to sustain the conviction under the first variant of RSA 265:4, I(c).

3) Mens rea for resisting arrest and interpretation of the trial court’s order

The defendant argued the trial court did not find the specific intent required to convict him of resisting arrest. The Supreme Court disagreed. RSA 642:2 requires that the defendant acted “knowingly or purposely” in physically interfering with an officer effecting an arrest. Rogers supplies the elements; Goodwin clarifies that “purposely” is the Criminal Code’s analogue to specific intent.

The trial court stated that the defendant “moved his arms away and twisted his body away such that it physically interfered with law enforcement’s ability to place him under arrest,” and that the State proved “this element, along with the other required elements, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Interpreting the order de novo (Salesky) and applying the ordinary presumption that all necessary findings were made (Palermo), the Supreme Court read the trial court’s order as having found the requisite mens rea—here, that the defendant purposely interfered with the officer’s attempt to arrest him, as charged.

4) Sufficiency of the evidence—resisting arrest

The video evidence showed:

The officer wore a uniform and drove a marked cruiser with emergency lights and siren activated;
The officer told Thompson he was under arrest and repeatedly directed him to place his hands behind his back;
While the officer attempted to apply handcuffs, Thompson pulled his arms away and twisted his body multiple times, while verbally arguing.

Because RSA 642:2 explicitly excludes “verbal protestations alone” but criminalizes purposeful physical interference, the combination of arm-pulling and body-twisting amply supported the trial court’s finding. Viewing the evidence in the State’s favor, a rational factfinder could conclude that Thompson purposely physically interfered with a known law enforcement officer who was seeking to arrest him.

Impact and Practical Implications

1) Clarification of RSA 265:4, I(c) after the 2024 amendment

Thompson reaffirms—post-amendment—the disjunctive, two-variant structure of RSA 265:4, I(c), removing any doubt that:

The State may secure a conviction by proving either (a) purposeful failure to stop when signaled, or (b) willful eluding; and
Proof of eluding is not an element of the first variant.

Prosecutors can charge, prove, and argue the “purposely neglect to stop” variant without presenting evidence of a high-speed chase or evasive maneuvers. Defense strategies predicated on conflating the two variants will likely fail.

2) Mens rea findings in bench trials

The Court’s acceptance of the trial court’s statement that “the other required elements” were proven as encompassing the necessary mens rea underscores two practice points:

For trial courts: While concise narrative orders are permissible, expressly reciting the mental state found can forestall appellate disputes.
For appellate counsel: Absent a clear omission, appellate courts may presume the trial court made all necessary findings, particularly when the order indicates “all elements” were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

3) Guidance for traffic-stop compliance and charging decisions

The factual discussion implicitly delineates lawful behavior during traffic stops:

While drivers concerned for safety may slow and proceed to a nearby safe location, passing multiple obviously safe places to stop while acknowledging signals and continuing to drive can support an inference of purposeful failure to stop.
Brief acceleration after activation of a siren, repeated acknowledgment of the officer, and post-stop statements indicating a belief that stopping was not yet required can cumulatively establish purposeful neglect to stop.
Prosecutors need not prove “eluding” behaviors for the first variant; however, evidence like acceleration can still corroborate purposeful noncompliance.

4) Resisting arrest: speech vs. conduct

Thompson reinforces that resisting arrest requires physical interference; verbal disagreement alone does not suffice. Physical acts such as pulling arms away or twisting the body to prevent handcuffing constitute interference, even absent striking or flight. Video evidence remains pivotal in resolving these disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

De novo review: The appellate court gives no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions (e.g., how a statute is interpreted) and decides the issue afresh.
Sufficiency of the evidence (light most favorable to the State): The court asks whether a rational factfinder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence and reasonable inferences, viewing the record in the State’s favor. In purely circumstantial cases, the evidence must exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt; the question becomes whether guilt is the sole rational conclusion (Seibel).
“Purposely” vs. “willfully” (and “specific” vs. “general” intent): Under RSA 626:2, II(a), to act “purposely” means the person’s conscious object is to perform the conduct. Goodwin explains that “purposely” aligns with what many practitioners call “specific intent.” RSA 265:4, I(c) uses “purposely” for failure to stop and “willfully” for eluding; the Court treats these as distinct mental states for distinct variants. For resisting arrest, the statute requires “knowingly or purposely”; either suffices.
Two-variant structure of RSA 265:4, I(c): The statute is disjunctive: the State can prove either purposeful neglect to stop when signaled or willful eluding. Proof of eluding is not an element of the first clause.
Verbal protestations vs. physical interference (RSA 642:2): Words alone are not resisting; any purposeful physical act impeding an arrest (e.g., pulling away, tensing, twisting) can qualify.

Conclusion

State v. Thompson confirms and clarifies two important points in New Hampshire criminal practice:

Disobeying a police officer under RSA 265:4, I(c) is a two-track offense. The State may obtain a conviction by proving the driver purposely failed to stop when signaled, or by proving a willful attempt to elude pursuit. Proof of eluding is not required for the “failure to stop” variant. This holding reaffirms State v. Hall and underscores a plain-meaning, text-focused approach to statutory construction.
Resisting arrest under RSA 642:2 hinges on purposeful or knowing physical interference. The Supreme Court will read concise trial court orders in context and presume necessary findings where the court states that “all elements” are proven. On the facts presented—including audiovisual evidence—pulling one’s arms away and twisting the body while an officer attempts to handcuff are sufficient to show purposeful physical interference.

The decision provides clear guidance to law enforcement, prosecutors, and defense counsel: failing to stop upon a clear police signal can sustain a conviction without proof of evasive pursuit; and physical resistance, even short of assault, suffices for resisting arrest when done purposely or knowingly. As a practical matter, Thompson strengthens the enforceability of lawful traffic-stop commands and clarifies mens rea findings in bench-trial orders, while reiterating rigorous but well-settled sufficiency standards for reviewing courts.

Case: State v. Donald Thompson, No. 2024-0519 (N.H. Sept. 12, 2025) (order under Sup. Ct. R. 20(3)).