Introduction

In this unpublished, per curiam decision, the Eleventh Circuit (Judges Rosenbaum, Abudu, and Ed Carnes) affirmed the conviction and sentence of Adam Joseph King for distributing five grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii). The case presents three issues:

• Whether methamphetamine purity affects the mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(B) when the defendant has a qualifying prior “serious drug felony.”
• Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying King’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea after a DEA lab report showed the drugs were 95% (not 100%) pure.
• Whether the district court violated due process by imposing “standard” supervised-release conditions without enumerating them orally at sentencing.

The court affirmed across the board, relying heavily on established Eleventh Circuit precedent regarding methamphetamine quantity calculations and supervised-release pronouncements, while applying the familiar standards governing plea withdrawals.

Summary of the Opinion

• Mandatory Minimum Applies Regardless of Purity: Relying on United States v. Frazier (11th Cir. 1994), the court held that the “5 grams or more of methamphetamine” threshold in § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) refers to the amount of actual methamphetamine involved, computed by multiplying the mixture’s weight by its purity. Purity need not be 100%. King’s 19.68 grams at ~95% purity equaled about 18.69 grams of methamphetamine—well above the 5-gram threshold—triggering the 10-year minimum because he had a prior serious drug felony.
• No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Plea Withdrawal: The post-plea DEA lab result did not undermine the voluntariness or knowledgeability of the plea, given the Rule 11 colloquy and King’s acknowledgments about the mandatory minimum. The purity finding did not change the applicable minimum under controlling law.
• Supervised Release Conditions Validly Imposed by Reference: The district court’s oral reference to “standard conditions,” coupled with the presentence report’s citation to the publicly available list and a written judgment that matched the standards, satisfied due process under Eleventh Circuit cases such as Rodriguez (2023), Hayden (2024), and Read (2024).
• Result: Conviction and sentence affirmed in full.

Note: The decision is designated “Not for Publication,” and is therefore non-precedential in the Eleventh Circuit. It nonetheless provides persuasive guidance and reaffirms existing published circuit law.

Detailed Analysis

I. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Frazier, 28 F.3d 99 (11th Cir. 1994): The linchpin precedent. Frazier held that the statutory phrase “100 grams of methamphetamine” (in § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), then applicable) means the quantity of the drug “however it is found.” In practice, the amount of “pure” methamphetamine is calculated by multiplying the mixture’s weight by its purity; the drug need not be 100% pure. The court quoted Frazier’s “absurd results” reasoning (adopted from a First Circuit decision): an offender should not evade a mandatory minimum by diluting otherwise-qualifying amounts slightly with an inert substance. Here, Frazier foreclosed King’s argument that his sale must be classified solely as a “mixture” and thus measured against a 50-gram threshold.
• Prior Panel Precedent Rule: The panel relied on United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2008), and United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019), to emphasize that a published prior panel decision controls unless overruled by the court en banc or by the Supreme Court. United States v. Deleon, 116 F.4th 1260 (11th Cir. 2024), clarified there is no “overlooked reason or argument” exception. This foreclosed King’s request to revisit Frazier.
• Plea Withdrawal Standards: The court cited Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B) (a plea may be withdrawn upon a “fair and just reason” before sentencing) and applied an abuse-of-discretion standard (United States v. McCarty, 99 F.3d 383 (11th Cir. 1996)). The panel also emphasized the strong presumption of truthfulness for Rule 11 colloquy statements (United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185 (11th Cir. 1994); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977); United States v. Rogers, 848 F.2d 166 (11th Cir. 1988)) and referenced United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469 (11th Cir. 1988), on factors including close assistance of counsel and voluntariness.
• Supervised-Release Pronouncements: The panel relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (authorizing mandatory and additional conditions) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)-(d) (listing discretionary “standard” and “special” conditions). It cited a trilogy of Eleventh Circuit decisions:
  • United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231 (11th Cir. 2023): A district court need not individually pronounce each discretionary condition if it expressly incorporates a written list detailing those conditions.
  • United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832 (11th Cir. 2024): Upholds an oral pronouncement referring to the district’s 13 standard conditions, where the written judgment specified the same conditions found in a publicly available judgment form and tracked § 5D1.3.
  • United States v. Read, 118 F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2024): Due process concerns arise only when there is a conflict between the oral sentence and the written judgment. No conflict exists where the written judgment merely expounds on the oral pronouncement of “standard conditions.”

II. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Purity and the § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) Mandatory Minimum

Section 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) creates two alternative quantity triggers for methamphetamine offenses:

• “5 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers” (often understood as “actual” methamphetamine); or
• “50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, or salts of its isomers.”

For defendants with a prior “serious drug felony,” the minimum term escalates to 10 years if either quantity threshold is met. Applying Frazier, the court reiterated that the “5 grams or more of methamphetamine” clause does not demand 100% purity; rather, the relevant amount is the actual methamphetamine in the substance, computed as mixture weight × purity. The DEA lab found King possessed approximately 19.68 grams at ~95% purity, equaling about 18.69 grams of methamphetamine (even subtracting the stated potential variation still leaves well over 5 grams). Because King had a qualifying prior serious drug felony and his offense exceeded the 5-gram “actual” threshold, the 10-year mandatory minimum applied. The panel declined King’s request to revisit Frazier under the prior panel precedent rule.

B. Denial of Plea Withdrawal

To withdraw a plea before sentencing, a defendant must show a “fair and just reason.” King argued that the DEA lab report—revealing the substance was 95% pure—transformed his conduct into the “mixture” pathway (with a 50-gram threshold) and thus made his plea unknowing or involuntary. The court rejected this argument for two reasons:

• Under Frazier, purity is immaterial to satisfying the 5-gram “actual methamphetamine” threshold; the lab report did not change the applicable statutory minimum.
• The Rule 11 colloquy was robust: King signed a plea agreement acknowledging the 10-year minimum; the court explained it on the record; King affirmed understanding of the charges, elements, penalties, and the court’s lack of discretion to go below the minimum absent a substantial assistance motion; and he confirmed no undisclosed promises or coercion. These solemn declarations carry a strong presumption of verity.

Given King’s close assistance of counsel and his sworn acknowledgments, coupled with the legal irrelevance of the purity result to his exposure, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying withdrawal.

C. Supervised-Release Conditions Imposed by Reference

King contended due process was violated because the court imposed “standard” supervised-release conditions without orally listing them at sentencing. The panel found no error. The PSR recommended the standard conditions and pointed to a publicly available list on uscourts.gov. At sentencing, the court stated the standard conditions would apply. King did not object or seek clarification.

Under Rodriguez, a court may incorporate by reference a written list of discretionary conditions rather than pronounce each one individually. Hayden and Read teach that due process is satisfied where the written judgment specifies the same standard conditions referenced orally and publicly available, and no conflict exists between oral and written pronouncements. Here, the written judgment “specified what the oral pronouncement had already declared,” foreclosing any due process concern.

III. Impact and Practical Implications

• Drug Quantity and Purity: This decision reaffirms that, in the Eleventh Circuit, the “actual methamphetamine” path to § 841(b)(1)(B) liability does not require 100% purity. Defendants cannot evade the 5-gram threshold by characterizing high-purity methamphetamine as merely a “mixture.” Prosecutors and courts will continue to calculate actual methamphetamine as mixture weight × purity, consistent with Frazier.
• Plea Practice: Defendants who plead guilty to methamphetamine offenses tied to threshold quantities will face steep odds withdrawing their pleas based on later lab purity reports unless those reports meaningfully undermine the factual basis or legal exposure. Robust Rule 11 colloquies—such as those documenting understanding of mandatory minimums and the absence of undisclosed promises—will remain decisive.
• Supervised Release Conditions: District courts in the Eleventh Circuit may continue to impose standard conditions by expressly incorporating them by reference—e.g., via the PSR and publicly available forms—so long as the written judgment aligns with the oral pronouncement. Defense counsel should object at sentencing if they seek clarification or wish to challenge specific conditions; silence will hamper later due process claims absent a conflict between oral and written sentences.
• Non-Precedential but Harmonizing: Although this is an unpublished decision, it harmonizes with and reinforces existing published Eleventh Circuit doctrine on (1) drug-quantity calculations for methamphetamine, (2) the prior panel precedent rule, (3) Rule 11 plea-withdrawal standards, and (4) supervised-release condition pronouncements.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Actual” Methamphetamine vs. “Mixture”: Federal drug statutes often treat methamphetamine in two ways. One path looks at “actual” methamphetamine—how many grams of the drug itself are present (mixture weight × purity). The other looks at the total weight of any “mixture or substance” containing methamphetamine. Section 841(b)(1)(B) sets a 5-gram threshold for “actual” methamphetamine, but a higher 50-gram threshold for mixtures. High-purity meth usually clears the “actual” threshold even when the total mixture is below 50 grams.
• Mandatory Minimum Enhancement for Prior Convictions: Under § 841(b)(1)(B), if a defendant has a prior “serious drug felony” (a defined federal term), the minimum sentence increases (here, to 10 years) once the relevant quantity threshold is met.
• Prior Panel Precedent Rule (Eleventh Circuit): A published decision by a prior three-judge panel binds later panels unless overturned en banc or by the Supreme Court. Panels cannot disregard such precedent simply because they disagree with it or think new arguments might alter it.
• Plea Withdrawal (“Fair and Just Reason”): Before sentencing, defendants may withdraw guilty pleas only if they can show a fair and just reason—such as lack of voluntariness, misunderstanding of consequences, or a fundamental change in circumstances. Courts give great weight to what defendants say under oath during the plea colloquy.
• Oral vs. Written Sentences and Supervised Release: The sentence pronounced in open court is controlling. But due process is not violated when a court says “standard conditions apply” and later issues a written judgment listing those standard conditions, as long as the written judgment does not conflict with the oral sentence and the conditions are reasonably accessible (e.g., via the PSR and official websites).

Conclusion

United States v. King reaffirms three core principles in Eleventh Circuit criminal practice. First, for § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii), the methamphetamine quantity threshold can be satisfied by the amount of actual methamphetamine present, and the drug need not be 100% pure; Frazier remains controlling. Second, a defendant’s Rule 11 colloquy admissions carry substantial weight, and post-plea lab reports that do not change legal exposure will rarely supply a “fair and just reason” to withdraw a guilty plea. Third, district courts may validly impose standard supervised-release conditions by referencing established, publicly available lists and then specifying them in the written judgment, so long as there is no conflict between the oral pronouncement and the written sentence.

Though unpublished and non-precedential, King aligns with and reinforces binding Eleventh Circuit law, offering clear guidance to district courts and practitioners on methamphetamine quantity calculations, plea-withdrawal standards, and the method of imposing supervised-release conditions.