Purely Economic Loss Outside the MPLA: The New Limiting Principle in Neidig v. Valley Health System

Introduction

In Elaine Neidig v. Valley Health System, the Supreme Court of West Virginia confronted a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: does the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) apply when a plaintiff sues a health-care provider but seeks only economic damages—disclaiming any physical or emotional harm? The Court’s majority said “No,” thereby carving out a new limitation to the MPLA’s reach. Justice Armstead’s lengthy dissent (the focus of the excerpt supplied) vigorously criticizes that holding, warning that the majority’s approach invites “artful pleading” and thwarts the Legislature’s intent. Although we possess only the dissenting opinion, the majority’s rule constitutes the operative precedent.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court answered the certified question in the negative: claims against a health-care provider that allege solely economic loss (“out-of-pocket” or “benefit-of-the-bargain” damages) and expressly disclaim bodily or emotional injury do not constitute “medical professional liability” within the meaning of the MPLA, even if the factual allegations involve substandard medical care. Consequently, such claims are not subject to the MPLA’s one-year statute of limitations, presuit notice, and certificate-of-merit requirements.

Justice Armstead dissented, insisting that the statutory text, prior case law, and legislative purpose require MPLA coverage whenever alleged wrongdoing is “based on health-care services rendered,” regardless of the type of damages sought.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Role

State ex rel. WVU Hospitals v. Scott, 246 W. Va. 184 (2021)
Introduced the “anchor claim” concept: once a qualifying health-care claim exists, related or contemporaneous claims also fall under the MPLA. The dissent argues that Neidig’s breach-of-contract attack on mammography services is the anchor; the majority apparently found no qualifying anchor because no physical injury was pled.
Blankenship v. Ethicon, 221 W. Va. 700 (2007) & Minnich v. MedExpress, 238 W. Va. 533 (2017)
Stand for the proposition that “artful pleading” cannot avoid the MPLA. Justice Armstead relies on these cases to say that recasting malpractice facts as consumer-protection or contract claims should not succeed. The majority reconceived that limit, holding that absence of bodily harm places the case outside the statute entirely.
State ex rel. CAMC v. Thompson, 248 W. Va. 352 (2023)
Recently held that mishandling of fetal remains, although post-treatment, still falls within the MPLA. The dissent cites it to show the statute’s breadth.
Classical statutory-construction cases (Wilson v. Hix, Mitchell v. Wheeling, etc.) are invoked by the dissent to argue for giving every word of § 55-7B-2 meaning.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning (Majority vs. Dissent)

a. Majority’s Path (inferred from the dissent)

Focuses on the statutory phrase “death or injury of a person,” reading “injury” to mean bodily or emotional harm, not purely financial loss.
Because Neidig expressly disclaimed physical or emotional injury, there is no statutory “injury” and therefore no “medical professional liability.”
Without an anchor claim, ancillary or related claims cannot enter MPLA territory.
Result: plaintiff may litigate under consumer-protection and contract theories subject only to general civil-procedure rules and longer limitations periods.

b. Justice Armstead’s Rebuttal

Statute defines “medical professional liability” to include “any liability for damages … for any tort or breach of contract based on health-care services rendered.” That language, he says, stands independently of the “death or injury” clause.
The term “injury” is unambiguously broad; legal (economic) injury is still an injury.
Grammatical canons: a single preposition (“from”) can govern compound objects (“death or injury … [and] breach of contract …”), so the majority’s parsing is grammatically unsound.
Policy: Excluding economic-only claims guts legislative reforms designed to protect medical providers via short limitations periods and presuit screening.

3. Impact on West Virginia Law

The majority’s holding establishes a bright-line rule:

Where the plaintiff disavows physical or emotional harm and seeks only economic damages, the MPLA does not apply.
Plaintiffs may strategically plead consumer-protection, contract, or unjust-enrichment theories against health-care entities without triggering MPLA hurdles.
Hospitals and physicians may face increased exposure to class-action suits (as here) outside the MPLA’s damages caps and one-year statute of limitations.
Future litigation will likely test borderline scenarios—e.g., nominal “emotional distress” allegations, mixed damage formulations, or post-treatment conduct (billing, marketing) claims.
Legislative response is possible if the Legislature believes the Court undercut the MPLA’s protective intent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

MPLA: A statute governing malpractice suits against health-care providers. It shortens the filing deadline (1 year), requires presuit notice and a medical expert certificate, and caps certain damages.
Artful Pleading: Drafting a complaint to style allegations under a preferred legal theory (e.g., consumer fraud) so as to avoid an unfavorable statute (here, the MPLA).
Anchor Claim vs. Ancillary Claim: Under Scott, an “anchor” is a traditional medical-negligence allegation that brings the case under the MPLA; ancillary claims (e.g., fraud) hitch a ride if they are related and contemporaneous.
Pure Economic Loss: Monetary damages not based on bodily injury or property damage. Examples: paying for a defective but non-dangerous medical test, overpaying for services, or loss of contract value.
Statutory Construction Canons: Courts interpret statutes by giving words ordinary meaning, avoiding surplusage, and reading grammar contextually (e.g., a preposition can govern multiple objects).

Conclusion

Neidig v. Valley Health System announces a significant limitation on the West Virginia MPLA: without allegations of bodily or emotional harm, a plaintiff’s lawsuit—however rooted in substandard medical practice—falls outside the Act. The immediate effect is to permit suits for deceptive marketing, breach of contract, or unjust enrichment against health-care providers without the Act’s protective procedural requirements. Justice Armstead’s dissent warns that the decision undermines legislative intent and invites manipulation of pleadings, but his view did not prevail. Going forward, litigators must pay close attention to the types of damages alleged, and legislators may face pressure to clarify whether the MPLA should extend to purely economic injuries. This ruling reshapes the strategic landscape of medical-related litigation in West Virginia.