Punitive Damages in New York Defamation Need Not Be “Sole-Motive” Malice and Are Proven by a Preponderance: The Second Circuit’s Clarification in Carroll v. Trump

Introduction

In Carroll v. Trump, No. 24-644 (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 2025), a Second Circuit panel (Chin, Merriam, and Kahn, JJ.) affirmed an $83.3 million defamation verdict against former President Donald J. Trump arising from statements he made in June 2019 about E. Jean Carroll. A jury found Trump acted with common-law malice and awarded $18.3 million in compensatory damages (including $11 million for a reputation repair program) and $65 million in punitive damages.

On appeal, Trump raised presidential immunity, evidentiary, instructional, and damages challenges. The court rejected each, holding that:

• The law-of-the-case doctrine forecloses relitigation of presidential immunity; the Supreme Court’s Trump v. United States (2024) did not change the controlling law on waivability or jurisdictionality of presidential immunity.
• Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) from the earlier Carroll II trial properly established falsity and, alternatively, actual malice was established on summary judgment as a matter of law.
• The district court did not abuse its discretion in striking a portion of Trump’s testimony, and any error would have been harmless.
• Under New York law, punitive damages for defamation require common-law malice but not that malice be the defendant’s sole motive; and the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence, not clear and convincing.
• The compensatory and punitive awards—particularly given a years-long campaign of defamatory repetition—were not excessive under New York law, federal common law, or constitutional due process principles.

In doing so, the Second Circuit provides important clarifications on punitive damages in New York defamation law, the reach of issue preclusion across serial defamation cases, and the practical limits of post–Trump v. United States criminal-immunity doctrine for civil suits.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed in all respects. It held that presidential immunity is waivable, and Trump had waived it long ago; Trump v. United States (2024) did not alter that result. The district court’s partial summary judgment appropriately applied New York collateral estoppel based on the Carroll II verdict: the falsity of Trump’s materially identical statements and the occurrence of sexual abuse (including forcible digital penetration) could not be relitigated. Independently, the court affirmed summary judgment on the “actual malice” element based on undisputed facts (including Trump’s own deposition).

The trial court’s evidentiary ruling striking part of Trump’s narrative answer (“I just wanted to defend myself, my family, and frankly, the presidency.”) was not an abuse of discretion; the court reasonably curtailed attempted relitigation of settled elements, and in any event the exclusion was harmless given other record evidence of Trump’s state of mind.

On punitive damages, the Second Circuit clarified that, under New York law, “common-law malice” need not be the speaker’s sole motive except when used to pierce a conditional or qualified privilege; for punitive damages, “sole motive” is not required. The court further held that the burden of proof for punitive damages in New York defamation is preponderance of the evidence (Corrigan; Celle), not clear and convincing (which applies to constitutional “actual malice”).

Finally, the court upheld the $7.3 million non-repair compensatory award as reflecting reputational and related harms beyond “garden-variety” emotional distress and held the $65 million punitive award—about a 3.6:1 ratio—reasonable given the egregiousness, persistence, and deterrence needs presented by Trump’s repeated defamatory statements.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Presidential immunity and law of the case:
  • Carroll 3, 88 F.4th 418 (2d Cir. 2023): The Second Circuit previously held presidential immunity is waivable and that Trump waived it by not pleading it at the outset. That ruling became law of the case.
  • Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024): Recognized presumptive criminal immunity for official acts; did not address waiver or jurisdictionality in civil cases. The Second Circuit held Trump did not constitute an intervening change requiring departure from law of the case.
  • Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982): Longstanding recognition that presidential immunities are rooted in separation of powers; relied on to show that Trump added no new principle affecting waivability.
  • United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979): Requires explicit waiver for Speech or Debate Clause immunity. The panel held Trump forfeited any argument to analogize presidential to legislative immunity, and, in any event, presidential immunity differs in origin and purpose.
  • Law-of-the-case authorities: Frias, Quintieri, Palin, Aquart, Tenzer—the court applied the framework: absent an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, or manifest injustice, prior appellate determinations stand.
• Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) under New York law:
  • Framework: Phoenix Light; Buechel. The identical issues were actually decided in Carroll II, decisive here, and Trump had a full and fair opportunity to litigate them.
  • Falsity: 2019 and 2022 statements were materially identical in accusing Carroll of lying; the Carroll II verdict finding the 2022 statement false precluded relitigation of falsity for the 2019 statements.
  • Specific conduct: The district court’s finding of forcible digital penetration rested on Rule 49(a)(3) after a special verdict form that did not specify the precise act; the court’s finding was not clearly erroneous and is preclusive. Authorities: Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a)(3); Sealey v. Giltner; Roberts v. Karimi; Anderson v. Cryovac.
• Actual malice (constitutional):
  • Standard: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Celle. Actual malice focuses on defendant’s subjective awareness of falsity or reckless disregard, often inferable from objective facts (Bose).
  • Application: Undisputed facts (e.g., Trump’s deposition admissions of no investigation before speaking) compelled summary judgment on actual malice. The earlier Carroll II verdict (clear-and-convincing finding of malice) reinforced this conclusion.
• Evidentiary rulings:
  • Fed. R. Evid. 103(a), (d) and 403 guided the trial court’s exclusion of Trump’s non-responsive narration and efforts to relitigate settled issues. Given ample other state-of-mind evidence (including Trump’s deposition and his in-trial statements), any error was harmless (Cameron; Lore).
• Punitive damages—substantive New York law:
  • Common-law malice definition and purpose: Prozeralik (N.Y. 1993) recognizes punitive damages for malicious, wanton, or reckless conduct motivated by hatred, ill will, or spite. Common-law malice pertains to motive toward the plaintiff, distinct from constitutional malice.
  • Privilege vs. punitive distinction: In privilege cases, common-law malice must be the “one and only cause” for the publication (Liberman; Stukuls; Chandok). The Second Circuit clarified that this “sole motive” requirement does not govern punitive damages; it applies only to defeating a conditional/qualified privilege.
  • Rejecting Morsette: The panel declined to follow Morsette and its progeny to the extent they imported a “sole motive” requirement into punitive damages. The court aligned punitive-damages law with Prozeralik and New York Pattern Jury Instructions § 3:30.
  • Burden of proof: The court reaffirmed Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill and Celle: preponderance of the evidence governs punitive damages in defamation; clear and convincing applies only to constitutional “actual malice.”
• Damages review:
  • Compensatory: New York’s “deviates materially” standard (CPLR 5501(c); Patterson; Stampf) applies. The $7.3 million award was not limited to emotional distress; it also covered reputational harms, lost career opportunities, and related impacts not encompassed by the separate “reputation repair” bucket.
  • Comparables: Prozeralik awards in the millions upheld; other federal cases (e.g., Cantu, Osorio) align after inflation adjustment.
  • Punitive: Under constitutional (BMW v. Gore; State Farm) and federal common-law (Payne; Turley) review, the 3.6:1 ratio, while high, was justified by extraordinary reprehensibility and the need for deterrence given a multi-year, escalating course of conduct and in-trial repetition. Comparators include the Giuliani election-workers case and the Alex Jones/Sandy Hook litigation.

Legal Reasoning: How the Court Reached Its Conclusions

• Presidential immunity is waivable; Trump (2024) does not reopen the question:
  • Law-of-the-case barred relitigation of immunity’s waivability. Trump v. United States concerned criminal prosecution and said nothing about waiver or jurisdictionality in civil suits. No intervening change justified departing from the mandate.
  • Arguments analogizing to structural immunities (Speech or Debate; sovereign immunity) were forfeited by not being raised in Carroll 3. Even if explicit waiver were required, Trump previously conceded he waived immunity.
• Issue preclusion properly bridged Carroll II and Carroll I:
  • Material identity of defamatory statements (2019 vs. 2022) meant the Carroll II falsity finding controlled here. The heart of each was that Carroll lied for improper motives; the jury found in Carroll II that she told the truth and that Trump’s statement was false.
  • For the specific act, the Rule 49(a)(3) special-verdict structure allowed the district court to find forcible digital penetration consistent with the verdict and damages. That finding is preclusive and supported by the trial record.
• Actual malice resolved on summary judgment:
  • Given preclusion of sexual abuse and falsity, plus Trump’s own admissions that he conducted no inquiry before speaking, the only reasonable conclusion was that he knew, or recklessly disregarded, the falsity of his denials. The court therefore granted summary judgment on actual malice.
• Evidentiary ruling was within discretion and harmless:
  • The trial judge curtailed a non-responsive, narrative answer that would have reintroduced settled issues; Rule 403 permitted excluding confusing and unfairly prejudicial material. Other evidence (including Trump’s deposition and in-court statements) adequately put his state of mind before the jury.
• Punitive-damages instructions correctly stated New York law:
  • “Sole motive” malice is necessary to pierce privilege, not to award punitive damages. For punitive damages, “common-law malice” exists where statements were made with a deliberate intent to injure, out of hatred, ill will, or spite, or in willful, wanton, or reckless disregard of another’s rights.
  • Standard of proof is preponderance; Sullivan’s clear-and-convincing standard applies to constitutional “actual malice,” not to punitive damages predicated on common-law malice.
• Damages were within reasonable bounds:
  • Compensatory: The non-repair bucket permitted the jury to value reputational injury, humiliation, and economic/career harms. The $7.3 million award is supported by the scale of publication (85–104 million viewers), the severity and duration of threats and harassment, and lost professional opportunities.
  • Punitive: The 3.6:1 ratio was justified by highly reprehensible, prolonged conduct, repeated after adverse court rulings and even during trial, and by the need to deter an unabated campaign. Analogous high punitive awards in comparable defamation contexts underscore reasonableness.

Impact

• Punitive damages doctrine in New York defamation clarified:
  • District courts in the Second Circuit now have clear guidance: plaintiffs seeking punitive damages need not prove the defendant was solely motivated by malice; it suffices that common-law malice was a motivating factor. Jury instructions should align with PJI 3:30 and Prozeralik.
  • Burden of proof is preponderance. Parties should tailor proof accordingly; defendants should not expect a higher evidentiary hurdle for punitive damages beyond actual malice’s constitutional standard.
• Serial defamation and issue preclusion:
  • Where later and earlier statements are materially identical, a verdict in one case can preclude relitigation of falsity (and possibly malice) in another. Defendants should anticipate that adverse findings will travel across cases.
  • Special verdicts and Rule 49(a)(3) can anchor fact-finding (e.g., precise conduct) that becomes preclusive later. Counsel should request necessary interrogatories to preserve or refine factual issues.
• Presidential immunity in civil litigation:
  • Trump v. United States (2024) does not reopen settled waivability of presidential immunity in this civil context. Immunity must be raised promptly; failure to plead it can be fatal, and law-of-the-case can bar later attempts to revive it.
• Damages strategy and deterrence:
  • Reputation repair experts and distinct damages buckets can help juries understand and separately value (1) repairing public perception and (2) other reputational/emotional/economic harms.
  • Persistent, post-verdict, and in-trial repetition of defamatory statements materially increases reprehensibility and the likelihood of substantial punitive damages to achieve deterrence.
• Trial management and evidentiary guardrails:
  • Courts may use Rules 103 and 403 to prevent relitigation of precluded or summarily adjudicated issues and to maintain focus on damages.
  • Parties’ public statements during trial can become evidence of malice and deterrence needs. Counsel should advise clients accordingly.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Actual malice vs. common-law malice:
  • Actual malice (constitutional): Defendant knew a statement was false or recklessly disregarded its truth. It safeguards free speech and requires clear and convincing evidence.
  • Common-law malice (New York punitive damages): Defendant acted out of spite, hatred, ill will, or in wanton/reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights. It focuses on defendant’s attitude toward the plaintiff and is proven by a preponderance.
• Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel): Once a court or jury actually decides an issue, the losing party cannot relitigate that same issue in another case if it’s decisive and they had a full and fair chance to litigate it before.
• Rule 49(a)(3) special verdicts: When a jury returns a special verdict that omits an issue, a party must ask to submit that issue to the jury; otherwise, the court may find the facts itself, and those findings carry weight on appeal and can have preclusive effect later.
• Law of the case: An appellate court’s prior legal rulings generally control the rest of the case. To revisit them on a later appeal, a party must show an intervening change in law, new evidence, or manifest injustice.
• Punitive damages ratio guideposts: Courts compare punitive to compensatory damages. Ratios around 4:1 may approach constitutional limits when compensatory damages are substantial, but factual context—especially reprehensibility and deterrence—can justify higher multiples.

Conclusion

Carroll v. Trump establishes durable guidance on several fronts. Most notably, the Second Circuit clarifies that, under New York law, punitive damages in defamation do not require proof that malice was the defendant’s sole motive; common-law malice suffices if it was a motivating factor, and it is proven by a preponderance. The court further underscores how issue preclusion can carry findings across serial defamation cases when statements are materially identical, and it reaffirms that presidential immunity remains waivable and is not revived by the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Trump v. United States.

On damages, the decision confirms the viability of substantial compensatory awards that encompass reputational harms beyond emotional distress and validates significant punitive damages where sustained, malicious conduct demands meaningful deterrence. For litigants and courts, Carroll offers a comprehensive roadmap for managing serial defamation litigation, structuring jury instructions and verdict forms, and calibrating damages within constitutional and state-law limits.